Arkansas Tech University The Culture Wars & Political Polarization in Perspective
CHAPTER 6: Multidimensional Polarized Politics: Social Issues, the Economy, & Foreign Policy
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| CHAPTER 6: Multidimensional Polarized Politics: Social Issues, the Economy, & Foreign Policy
Issue Polarization - ‘You Can Have My Gun When You Pry It from My Cold, Dead Hands’ Barak Obama made the quoted observation above to a group of California contributors in trying to explain why small towns in Pennsylvania care about social issues. Like Thomas Frank, he seems to think that there is a significant segment of the American electorate motivated by the culture war issues that Hunter originally identified as the turf over which secularists and traditionalists would battle. Putting aside Obama’s socio-psychological explanation for these issue positions among the Pennsylvanian rural electorate, clearly these social issues continue to resonate on the political scene. But is Hunter’s thesis—that these issues will increasingly dominate our politics, that voters will increasingly look to issue positions in the social and religious issue dimensions, and that this conflict will be increasingly strident and bitter—reflective in what we know about these issue dimensions and what the electorate thinks about them? Layman and Carsey find polarization at the level of the mass electorate across three major domestic policy agendas: social welfare, racial, and cultural issues which they term “conflict extension” (Layman and Carsey 2002). Miller and Hoffman, similarly, find increasing salience on many social and moral issues during the 1970’s and 1980’s, resulting in a redefinition of what it means to be conservative and liberal. Thus orthodox religious denominations have increasingly categorized themselves as ‘conservative’ while progressive religious denominations have increasingly identified as ‘liberal’ (Miller and Wattemberg 1984; Miller and Hoffmann 1999). Lindaman and Haider-Markel find mixed evidence that mass partisans have polarized along with elite partisans. They examine four issue areas, but only on the environment and gun control did they find significant increases in polarization at the mass and elite level (Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002). Fiorina, as noted earlier, finds liberalizing trends on gay rights and that the electorate is increasingly moderate and centrist on social issues (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004). In Chapter 4 I established that significant political polarization has occurred at the level of the mass electorate on a key culture war issue: homosexual rights. But that is just one point on the continuum of political issues. There are other flashpoints of political competition and conflict in the culture wars that span the gamut of social issues: abortion, school prayer, religious monuments and expressions in the Public Square, crime and social order, etc. Furthermore, beyond the culture war thesis, political polarization in other issue classes—such as the scope of government, economic & financial , defense, foreign policy, and regulatory issues—is just as important, if not more so, than that which occurs in the cultural arena. The attitudes of the American public on issues and policy is reflected in the aggregate opinions on the issues themselves, their attitudes towards groups relevant to that particular political dimension, and the parties which stake out positions and mobilize in response to opinions on these political dimensions. Here I examine a wide variety of political issues and attitudes of the American public in the social, economic, and defense issue dimensions. The goal is to assess the extent to which the views of Americans have moved to the extremes versus moved to the center on multiple political issues in distinctly different dimensions, to assess the degree to which the views on these issues or groups have become dispersed or consolidated, and how those opinions interact with the partisan identification of the mass public. In short, I will look at the breadth of political issue dimensions in American politics and assess whether polarization, depolarization, or the status quo on opinion distribution has remained relatively stable over the past three decades. Using the measures of polarization and the methods assessing polarization over time, I examine a variety of measures of mass public opinion across the assortment of political issues to empirically test for trends in polarization and depolarization. Data The data for this analysis is culled from the American National Election Study (ANES) cumulative file.41 I use the ANES studies from 1970-2004.42 The creation of the data set for analysis of polarization trends for the mass public is a two-step process. In the first step, univariate statistics are generated on the substantive variables from the ANES cumulative file. Specifically, the means and standard deviations for the variables were output. The second step involves creating a time-series data set with the means and standard deviations for the relevant ANES variables treated as individual variables themselves in the new data set. For example, let’s consider the thermometer score for the military from the ANES. The first step involves generating the means and standard deviations for the military thermometer score for each of the study years. In the second step, a data set is created where one variable is the mean military thermometer score for the study years. The other variable is the standard deviation for the military thermometer score for the study years. A time series data set was created that contains mean and standard deviation variables for all of the variables relevant to the polarization analysis. Variables The substantive variables included in the analysis and the years for which data was collected on those variables are listed in Appendix G. Rather than detailing every variable included in the analysis, I will discuss them in terms of their types and classifications. Ordinal Scale Variables The ANES time-series includes a number of issue-oriented ordinals scales with which respondents can place themselves, the parties, and candidates in an issue space. While a number of interesting issues have come and gone in the ANES time-series, there are a number of issues that span the breadth of the time series that the ANES has collected data on consistently. Every issue variable rated on an ordinal scale in this analysis has at minimum a respondent self-placement on the issue. The issues include respondent attitudes on government aid to Blacks, women’s role in society, government spending, defense spending, jobs, and abortion. The issue placement that is collected in the most study years for the respondents is the ideological placement variable (asking respondents to place themselves and the parties and candidates on a 7-point ideological scale ranging from strongly conservative to strongly liberal). The variable for which the least number of years is included is the defense spending item, which the ANES did not begin collecting until 1980. The questions in the survey used to build the issue scales are consistent over the time period used in the analysis with the exception of the abortion item. 43
The feeling thermometer variables ask respondents to rate groups in society on a scale of 0-100, with 0 – 49 indicating the respondent does not feel favorably (cold) towards that group and 51-100 indicating that they do feel favorable (warm) towards that group. Respondents are instructed to give a 50 if they have a neutral disposition towards the group (neither warm nor cold). The feeling thermometers relevant to political polarization assess the attitudes of respondents towards groups associated with the relevant issue dimensions. Attitudes towards groups such as evangelicals, Catholics, Protestants, Christian fundamentalists, gays and lesbians, and blacks may provide insights into American social conflict. Trends in the views on the poor, big business, welfare and labor groups can reveal polarization or depolarization on economic issues. Opinion on the military can shed light on the defense issue dimension. And opinions on the political parties and the federal government can provide perspective on partisan polarization and shifts in the attitude towards the size and scope of government. Open-Ended Variables The final category of variables included in the polarization analysis is the open-ended questions on party likes and dislikes as well as the “most important national problem” questions.44 For both types of questions, the cumulative file contains collapsed categories that reflect the general types of open-ended answers to the open-ended questions. While these are useful in assessing polarization, the categories were not created with looking at the social, economic, defense issue dimensions specifically. For that purpose, the fully coded Republican and Democrat likes and dislikes are included in the analysis.45 Discussion In order to examine social conflict in the context of other kinds of political polarization (i.e. other dimensions of politics), I employ a variety of measures developed from the ANES to cover the broad classifications of American political issues: social issues, economic issues (i.e. Jobs), foreign policy and defense issues, and the scope of government (i.e. spending). While the primary focus remains on the social issue dimension, mass attitudes on economics, foreign policy, and on government influence the same actors and institutions as those affected by the culture wars. The culture wars do not exist in a vacuum. Furthermore, political polarization is not restricted to the culture wars. Polarization along other issue dimensions can be just as destructive as cultural/social polarization. While it is not a specific subject of this analysis, the polarization and partisan conflict in the wake of 9-11 over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have had profound impacts on policy, the democratically responsive political actors and institutions, and on the competition between parties. Thus it is important to avoid myopic focus on just one aspect of the changing landscape of the past three decades in terms of the public agenda, public attitudes, and policy. While polarization on one dimension does not necessarily imply the absence of polarization on others, the degree to which one set of issues becomes increasingly the focus of party and political conflict can change the nature of that competition as well as crowd out the other issues.
To get a gauge of the changing public attitudes on political issues, I examine the yearly trends in public attitudes towards groups strongly associated with the issue dimensions. Religious groups, gays and lesbians, and feminists are associated with the social issues that primarily concern them. Labor unions and businesses are associated with the economic issues they compete over. And attitudes towards the military provide a rough proxy for the disposition of the public on foreign policy. Table 6.1 reports regressions of changes in the average mean response on feeling thermometers by ANES respondents towards the relevant political groups. It should be noted from the outset that examining attitudes on issues using groups is at least one step removed from the subject of interest. There is nothing necessary about one’s attitude towards the military that speaks to a particular position on foreign policy or whether that dimension is relevant in an individual’s partisan affiliations, policy preferences, or electoral decisions. Still, if you oppose gay marriage, gay adoption, gays in the military, etc. there is a likely correlation between those issue position and your attitudes towards gays and lesbians as a group. Another caveat: some of the items were collected over a small number of survey years. While I report regressions where the normality assumption is suspect, the regressions provide a TABLE 6.1: Trend Regressions of Public Attitudes on Issue Dimension-Related Groups (Means)
* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level
* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level data reductive method for examining the trends. Where the n is small, caution is necessary in taking significance and model-fit results at face value. However, regression is a robust method of analysis and clues can be found even where data is scarce. Partisan Groups Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the mean and standard deviation trend models for the issue-related group thermometer scores. The evidence in Table 6.1 indicates that there is increasing partisan polarization at the mass public level. The significant trends in the means of the feeling thermometer responses on House candidates as well as the major party candidates is consistent with increasing dispersion in attitudes towards the two parties. This could reflect increasingly negative feelings by partisans of one party towards the other. This supposition is supported by the results from the partisan models in Table 6.2. Both attitudes towards Democratic Party and major party candidates have evidenced increasing dispersion since the 1970’s. Attitudes about the Democratic Party have become more disperse at a rate of .119 on the thermometer scale for each year of the time series, and this model explains over half of the variation in thermometer scores for the Democratic Party (.560). The increase in the standard deviation for the major party feeling thermometer apparent in Table 6.2 underscores the evidence from Table 6.1: increasing partisan polarization. Economic Groups One merging theme of this analysis is the lack of a trend in polarization on economic issues (attitudes towards big business have slightly improved). This isn’t to say that economic issues are not a major source of political conflict, but rather that that conflict has not become more polarized over the past three decades. Attitudes towards big business were already near the 50/50 cut point in the 1970’s and not much has changed in that regard in the 21st century. One exception to that general finding, however, is the significant negative trend in attitudes towards the poor in the mass public. However, while support for the poor has declined over the time-series, attitudes towards the poor are still relatively positive (65.51 average feeling thermometer, 2002). Defense / Foreign Policy Group – the Military There is no apparent trend in attitudes toward the military. The average feeling thermometer rating of the military is near 70 for the entire time-series with only small oscillations. If there is growing polarization on foreign policy, it is not reflected in attitudes towards the United States armed forces. Most Americans have had, on average, very positive feelings towards the military irrespective of whether there was an ongoing conflict or the relative popularity of that conflict in the American public. While the Iraq war became extremely unpopular in the later half of the 2000’s, this seems to have had little to no impact on attitudes towards the military. Social & Religious Groups The results from Table 6.1 do show that attitudes towards religious groups have changed significantly. While there is no apparent trend in attitudes towards Christian fundamentalists, the first time data on this feeling thermometer was collected was 1988, just short of the burgeoning culture war. The average FT attitude for Christian fundamentalists at that time was 51.34, near the absolute point of group conflict. Attitudes since have changed little, oscillating between 51 and 53 for the survey years in which the item is collected. This is not so for evangelicals and protestants. While neither coefficient is significant (likely due to the extremely small N’s), the trends for both are negative, indicating decreasing support in the public. Protestants rate a good 10 points higher than evangelicals in the time series, most likely due to the greater number of citizens who identify as protestant relative to evangelicals. However the consistent trend suggests two things: religiosity may be on the decline (and thus igniting the culture war) and the increasing association of the religious with the political. The greater dispersion in attitudes towards Catholics apparent in Table 6.2 could be a reflection of decreasing religiosity, a reaction to the pedophile priest scandal, or a reaction to the Church’s strong position and activism on abortion. While this is just speculation, the pattern of declining positive feelings towards religious groups suggests conflict. Though the trend on attitudes towards gays & lesbians is positive, as you will recall from Chapter 5, this is not necessarily evidence of the absence of polarization. The first time the item on attitudes towards gays and lesbians was asked in the ANES was 1984, with an average feeling thermometer score of 29.9. While attitudes towards gays and lesbians have become more tolerant (gaining over a point on the thermometer score each survey year – largest trend coefficient), the 48.37 mean attitude in 2004 illustrates the ‘great divide’ that now exists on gay rights in the wake of the culture war. The declining dispersion of attitudes towards Blacks and feminists suggests that the racial and gender conflicts that reached their peak in the 1960’s and the 1970’s are less an object of political conflict today. The attitudes towards feminists, however, remain well within the range of political conflict (56.14 FT, 2004). Attitudes towards blacks were well on the positive side of the distribution and have only moved closer towards consensus over the last thirty years, gaining 10 points on the feeling thermometer scale for the time series. Trends in Mass Public Opinion on Issue Dimensions The simple univariate statistics for the time-series data on the closed-ended issue self-placement items are reported in Table 6.3. The three primary measures of polarization employed in this analysis are the means, standard deviations, and kurtosis scores for each of the self-placements on the ideology scale (liberal-conservative), the jobs and guaranteed standard of living scale (rating the degree to which respondents wish government to provide job assistance versus leaving individuals to make their way in the job market on their own), the defense spending scale (whether the federal Table 6.3 Simple Statistics on Means, S.D.’s & Kurtosis for Issue Self-Placements for Time Series
government should increase or decrease it), the aid to blacks scale (rating how much the government should help minority groups), the government spending scale (rating whether government should provide more or less services and spending), the abortion scale (reporting the respondent’s position on abortion), and the women’s role in society scale (rating whether respondent believes women should have an equal role with men or whether women’s place is in the home). All of the issue scales are 7-point scales except for the Abortion scale (4-point scale). Table 6.3 is organized into three tiers reporting the average, standard deviation, and min/max values for the mean, standard deviation, and kurtosis for the responses on the issue scales for the period of 1970 to 2008. So, for example, the mean reported in Table 6.4 for Ideology (4.3) is the average mean ideology for respondents to the ANES from 1972 to 2008. Not all the scales where collected for all of the survey years during this period. Estimates of the mean, standard deviation, and kurtosis for an issue were interpolated where there was an immediately proximate survey year before and after the year where the issue is to be interpolated in which the issue scale was included. If this condition was not met, the value for that issue scale was set to missing. I interpolate the data points for the ANES closed-ended analyses using the two most proximate data points (survey year prior, survey year after) and the simple linear interpolation method.46 There were relatively few points that needed to be interpolated for most of the survey years.47 The exceptions were 2002 and 2006. In 2002, only the ideology scale was an included item for the ANES. No issue scale data was collected. In 2006, there was no ANES Time Series Study. As such, all issue scale data for those years was interpolated. Regression models were estimated with and without the interpolated data. No substantial changes in statistical significance, model fitness, or the size of the coefficients were found, and there was no change in the direction of the signs for the coefficients. The statistics in Table 6.3 illustrate a state of conflict for all but one of the issue scales included (Women’s role in society). For the 7-point issue scales the standard deviation is at or above 1.5 points on the scale, indicating a relatively dispersed distribution of opinion on these issues. Furthermore, the distributions on the issue scales are nearly all playtkurtic, suggesting a relatively bimodal distribution of opinion on those issues (and thus ripe for political conflict). The lone exception here is the women’s role scale, which has a leptokurtic distribution, indicating single-peakedness (consensus). Excluding the women’s role scale, the least ‘conflictual’ issue included in the analysis is defense spending. It has a kurtosis score--while still on the bimodal side of the ‘normal distribution’ divide—that is closest to zero of the playtkurtic or unimodal distributions. Furthermore, of the 7-point issue scales it has the smallest average standard deviation over the time series. However, as I will demonstrate, this average result is somewhat misleading and the story of polarization on defense spending and foreign policy is a bit more complex (and hence murkier) than it would seem at first blush. The most significant outlier of the issue scales is clearly that of women’s equal role in society. It has the largest range between its minimum (1.833) and maximum (3.511) average self-placements as well as the minimum and maximum standard deviation and kurtosis for the time series. Indeed, women’s role in society and defense spending are the only issues which cross the “normal distribution” zero boundary48 over the time series, indicating that a shift between a more bimodal to a more unimodal distribution occurred between 1970 and 2008. For at least some time in the covered period, the mass opinion on these two issues exhibited traits of consensus.
In order to examine the trend in polarization on mass opinion in these issue dimensions and assess the direction and statistical significance of these trends, I regress the data on the mean, standard deviation, and kurtosis for the issues on survey year. The regressions for the economic, ideological, and defense / foreign policy dimensions are reported in Table 6.4. No trend in polarization is apparent for the defense spending and jobs issue dimensions. There are no significant trends in bimodality or dispersion in the opinion of the mass public for either of these issues. There has been a significant negative trend over the time series for the jobs scale, indicating the public has become less supportive of government involvement in providing jobs. On defense spending there is a significant positive trend on defense spending, with the public becoming more supportive of increased spending on defense over the course of the time series. Overall, there is no trend in the dispersion of opinion on defense spending. Bimodality decreased overall over the past three decades. This average trend, however, masks what is TABLE 6.4: Polarization Trend Models for Multiple Issue Dimensions
* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level essentially a non-linear trend in bimodality for defense spending. I will take a closer look at polarization on defense spending and foreign policy later in chapter 7. Ideological and Government Spending Trend Models The issue dimensions in which polarization is apparent are the ideological and government spending dimensions. On both ideology and government spending, the distribution of public opinion has become increasingly bimodal since 1972 and 1982 respectively. The strong platykurtic trend in ideology indicates that the mass public has shifted away from the center, with either more conservatives and liberals (as opposed to centrists) or more conservatives and liberals identifying with the ideological extremes. The time-trend model of kurtosis explains just short of half of the variation in the bimodality of ideology (.460). Furthermore, there is an increase in the overall dispersion of the distribution, suggesting that the public is increasingly identifying with the extremes of the ideological distribution. This strong, positive trend shows that the average distances among the ideological self-identifiers have increased (0.005) over the time period. It suggests more citizens are identifying themselves as “very conservative” and/or “very liberal” in comparison to the other categories or identifying themselves as “somewhat conservative” and/or “somewhat liberal” in comparison to the moderate category. While there is no statistically significant trend in dispersion for government spending, the kurtosis model suggests a statistically significant trend in bimodality on government spending. The government spending bimodality model, however, is not as good a fit as the ideological model (.140). Social Issue Trends The models for the three social issue items from the ANES with sufficient coverage for the time period are reported in Table 6.10. Although the degree to which these items rate as “issues” and issues relevant to the Culture Wars varies. Clearly abortion is both a social issue and one of particular importance to the culture wars. Indeed, in many ways, abortion is the sine qua non of the culture war TABLE 6.5: Polarization Trend Models for the Social Issue Dimension
* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level debate. Aid to Blacks is a social issue as well, given the heated debate over the role of government in helping Blacks overcome the dual legacies of slavery and segregation. The third issue—women’s equal role in society—is related to social concerns, but the item itself does not necessarily imply government intervention. The item rates public opinion on what should be the condition of women in society, not on whether government should have a role in determining that condition. As such, the “equal role” item is broader than the scope of the other two included social issues. That said, it certainly captures public attitudes towards the role of women in society and thus women in the workplace. Given the religious-based opposition to non-traditional roles for women, its relevance to the culture wars is apparent. The results in Table 6.5 demonstrate that not all social issues during the culture war period have been characterized by greater conflict and polarization. On the Aid to Blacks issue dimension, there is a statistically significant leptokurtic trend in bimodality, suggesting a move towards consensus on aid to Blacks. The positive coefficient (0.011) in the mean model on aid to blacks indicates that Americans have moved away from government solutions to racial problems in society since the 1970’s. The most remarkable trend among the three social issues is a depolarization trend in opinion on the equality of women in society. Nearly all of the variance in the average opinion on women’s role in society is explained by the linear progression of time (R2 = .974). The negative coefficient (-0.045) indicates that citizens were becoming increasingly supportive of equality between women and men in society. This trend is consistent with a growing consensus in favor of gender neutrality. We see a significant decline in the dispersion of opinion on women’s equality in the time series (-0.021) and a positive trend in kurtosis, indicating that the distribution of opinion on women’s equality is increasingly unimodal. The ANES social issue measures have not uniformly depolarized, however. The mean, standard deviation, and kurtosis models for abortion all show significant trends over the past 30+ years and are indicative of increasing polarization. The positive coefficient (0.009) suggests that, on average, Americans have become more Pro-Choice over the course of the time-series. At the same time, the abortion issue has become increasingly divisive and polarized. There is a statistically significant increase in dispersion (0.004) and a negative trend in kurtosis (bimodality) for abortion (-0.011). These models explain over seventy-five percent of the variation in opinion on abortion for the time series (SD R2 = .833; K R2 = .769). In brief, there is strong evidence that opinion on women’s equality has depolarized. There is some evidence of aid to Black’s depolarization, and there is strong evidence that public opinion on abortion is increasingly polarized.
I report a summary assessment of polarization and polarization trends in Table 6.6. The analysis of political polarization across multiple issue dimensions in the aggregate reveals a great deal of ‘static’ polarization in the sense that on most of these issue dimensions public opinion was ‘polarized’ to begin with and the changes over the course of the time series have not changed the fundamental conflict that exists within these issue dimensions. In addition, there has been a great deal of ‘dynamic’ polarization—or polarization trends—as can be seen in the case of aggregate ideology, aggregate opinion on abortion, and aggregate opinion on spending. From a static perspective, to assess average opinion distributions and dispersion in issue dimensions requires a point of reference from which to assess whether the observed opinion and the observed dispersion is ‘polarized’ or not. For average opinion, I have suggested that polarization is much more probable when that opinion is near the center rather than when it is on the extremes. Average opinion close to the center is likely a product of opposing opinions rather than consensus squarely in the middle of the distribution. The disposition of dispersion and bimodality within the opinion distributions provide confirmatory evidence for this supposition. For example, two of the polarized opinion distributions that exhibit increasing polarization, ideology and spending, are also two opinion distributions with the global average mean opinion nearest the center of the seven point issue scale (both at 4.25). Opinion on the equality of women in society, which exhibits significant depolarization trends, has an average mean position on the scale considerably distant from the center (2.55). However, this is not to say that all opinion distributions with centrally-located means exhibit conflict, that all trend towards the center are increasing conflict, and that all trends away from the center are evidence of increasing consensus. These are suggestive, not determinative. Indeed, you can have increasing polarization or depolarization without the mean position moving at all. In order to TABLE 6.6: Dimensional Polarization and Polarization Trends
assess the polarization of the mean position for all citizens, one must take into account the distribution of opinion in terms of dispersion and bimodality. In the section on dispersion inTable6.6, it is apparent that the distributions on these issues are fairly dispersed. All of the issues have average standard deviations above 1 with most of the variables closer to a standard deviation of 2 rather than to 1. The two most dispersed issue opinion distributions are aid to blacks (1.804) and jobs (1.862). Only two of the issues exhibit significant increasing dispersion since the 1970’s: ideology and abortion. Defense spending, government spending, and aid to Blacks exhibit no apparent trend in dispersion over the time series, at least in the aggregate, linear models estimated in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5. Public opinion on the equality of women in society exhibits marked and significant declining dispersion. The measure of polarization which exhibits the most polarizing trends over the past thirty-plus years is the kurtosis measure (bimodality). Two issue dimensions (abortion, government spending) and the ideological dimension have become more bimodal over this period. Exhibiting declining bimodality are the aid to Blacks item and, once again, the women’s equality item. The one issue on which there is depolarization across all three measures is the women’s equality item, while the one issue that shows characteristics of polarization across all three measures is the abortion issue. Overall, along multiple dimensions of political issues, there is strong evidence of polarization. On several issues, public opinion has moved towards the center of conflict, has an increasingly dispersed range of opinion, and a more bimodal shape. However, polarization has not occurred across the board. In several polarized distributions there was no apparent trend in polarization over this time. And on women’s ideology a previously polarized distribution has become distinctly depolarized. Having examined the broad, linear trends in polarization on these political dimensions, in the next chapter I take a closer look at the trends in polarization. Have the linear trend models masked important, nonlinear relationships? Secondly, I look at potential causes of polarization. Are these random fluctuations in opinion, is it a function of elite manipulation, or are the trends in polarization on social, economic, government philosophy, and foreign policy dimensions comprehensible in terms of an attentive public reacting to exogenous political events and/or public policies advocated and enacted by the parties in the government?
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