Atsb transport safety report

Marine safety recommendations and Safety Advisory Notices (SANs)

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Safety action type Who Safety issue description Status
Table 10: Marine: ATSB Safety Advisory Notices

Marine safety recommendations and Safety Advisory Notices (SANs)

Table 9 and Table 10 below provide a short description of all marine safety recommendations and SANs in the 2009-2010 financial year. Details of the safety actions are found in Appendices B and C.

Table 9: Marine: ATSB Safety Recommendations

Safety action type	Who	Safety issue description	Status	Safety Recommendation outcomes
ATSB Safety Recommendation MO-2008-009-SR-020	Parakou Shipping	The work permit system had not been effectively implemented on board the ship. Consequently, most maintenance and repair work was being carried out by ship’s personnel without the work permits and ‘Danger: Do Not Operate’ tags that were required by the ship’s procedures.	Closed - action taken 11/11/2009	The company has revised its ballast water and work permit procedures and has advised ship's crews of these changes. The company also intends to measure the implementation of these procedures through on board inspections and audits.
ATSB Safety Recommendation MO-2008-010-SR-039	Volcano Company	While the Volcano Company safety bulletin warned of the dangers associated with servicing the VJ type burner, it did not inform operators that the burner could be replaced with a VJP burner (a similar burner fitted with a diesel pilot burner), or recommend that existing oil firing units could be modified.	Closed - action taken 05/01/2010	The Volcano Company has advised the ATSB that they will; 1. Advise all operators of the occurrence of accident on board the bulk carrier Saldanha. 2. Advise all operators of the importance of adhering to the safety bulletin, regardless of the type of burner, and the fact that if the operation and servicing are not done as per our safety bulletin, ship crews will be exposed to the same risks as those seen on board Saldanha. 3. Advise all operators that the VJ burner is a direct ignition type and that there is also another type of burner VJP fitted with pilot burner. If operators wish to have a burner fitted with a pilot burner, we will advise them that the existing burner could be replaced with VJP type burner or that it can be modified. 4. We will also put the same advice on our homepage for a certain period.
ATSB Safety Recommendation MO-2009-004-SR-008	Danish Maritime Authority	Both the 6 hours on/6 hours off work routine for watchkeepers and the modified work routine for deck ratings used on board Thor Gitta, while complying with the ILO 180 and STCW requirements for rest, probably resulted in a cumulative level of fatigue in the crew.	Closed - partial action 2/02/2010	The DMA has, in 2008, established a procedure on examination of rest and work hours, as well as outlook whenever a Danish or Greenlandic ship is involved in grounding or collision or has a very serious accident. In these cases, the Investigation Division gather relevant information and evaluate the information before forwarding them to various departments within the DMA for further consideration. The considerations focus on whether there have been violations of rules in force. Consideration is also focusing on questions in relation to the manning of ships and possible need of changes.
ATSB Safety Recommendation MO-2008-003-SR-049	Sierra Leone International Ship Registry	The ship’s certification was issued by a management company to itself on behalf of the Republic of Sierra Leone, solely with the purpose of allowing the ship to sail on an international voyage and did not represent the ship’s actual management or that any effective inspections of the ship or audits of the ship's safety management system had taken place.	Closed - action taken 13/07/2010	The Sierra Leone Flag Administration has advised the ATSB that: Sierra Leone Flag Administration has reviewed this case in order to establish an understanding of the situation. The vessel was registered with Sierra Leone Flag with a special registration for one single voyage from Singapore to Nigeria (duration of the special registration is three months). The Recognized Organization, New United, issued the statutory certificates also for one voyage (duration of three months). In view of the grounding of the vessel in February 2008, we have requested the Recognized Organization to supply all information in regards to this vessel. Kindly note that all statutory certificates issued on behalf of the Republic of Sierra Leone are duly reviewed by this Administration and any questions / concerns that the Administration could have about those certificates are presented to the issuing Recognized Organization and are duly explained to this Administration.

Table 10: Marine: ATSB Safety Advisory Notices

Safety action type	Who	Safety issue description	Status
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-008-SAN-025	Owners, operators and masters	Iron King’s safety management system did not include procedures that adequately ensured that the ship’s master and crew were aware of, and drilled in, the emergency steering system change over procedure to be followed in the event of steering control loss.	Closed 13/10/2009
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-010-SAN-041	Flag States, ship owners, operators and masters	Saldanha’s master and crew were not aware of the appropriate first aid treatment required for burn injuries. As a result, the third engineer was not immediately provided with appropriate first aid.	Closed 22/10/2009
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-003-SAN-047	Jevkon Oil and Gas	The International Safety Management (ISM) Code requires ship owners to ensure that each ship’s master is given all necessary support to fulfil their duties. However, Jevkon Oil and Gas did not provide the necessary support either before the commencement of the delivery voyage or after the ship’s crew began having difficulties using the intermediate fuel oil in the main engine and started drifting in the Indian Ocean.	Closed 9/04/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-003-SAN-048	Jevkon Oil and Gas	The ship's safety management system was inadequate. Had Jevkon Oil and Gas implemented an effective safety management system on board Breakthrough, the risk of an incident such as the one that occurred on the delivery voyage would have been reduced.	Closed 10/04/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-003-SAN-050	Ship owners, managers and masters	The operation of the ship’s systems and the decisions made by the ship’s senior officers suggests that they did not have appropriate knowledge and experience to safely undertake Breakthrough’s delivery voyage and that they did not effectively use the time spent in China, standing by the ship, to acquire the necessary knowledge.	Closed 9/04/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-011-SAN-045	ASP Ship Management	The ship’s health, safety, security and environment meetings and job hazard opportunity log were not effectively used to raise and discuss safety issues associated with cargo crane operations.	Closed 14/04/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-011-SAN-042	ASP Ship Management	The ship's safety management system working aloft procedure was not effectively implemented on board the ship and was not routinely followed when crew members climbed the emergency ladder to assist with the stowage of the cargo crane hook.	Closed 14/04/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2008-011-SAN-019	Marlow Navigation	The design of the cradle for the crane’s hook did not allow for unassisted stowage of the hook when the ship had a stern trim in excess of 2.1 m.	Closed 14/04/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2009-008-SAN-012	Flag States	While most flag States have laws in place that implement the UNCLOS requirement for a ship’s master to render assistance to the crew of another vessel following a collision, these laws are not being effectively implemented on board all ships.	Closed 15/06/2010
ATSB Safety Advisory Notice MO-2009-008-SAN-014	Owners operators and skippers of small vessels	The evidence suggests that Class B AIS transmissions may not be reliably detected by watch keepers on board all ships. Therefore, operators of small vessels fitted with Class B AIS units should be aware that they cannot rely on the AIS unit alone to warn ships of their presence.	Closed 15/06/2010

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