Australian Quarantine Review Secretariat Australian Quarantine a shared responsibility
OTHER APPLICATIONS OF RISK ANALYSIS
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- 7.7.1 Evaluation of Border Activities
- 7.7.2 Export Facilitation
- 7.8 KEY CENTRE FOR QUARANTINE RISK ANALYSIS
- 8. BORDER ACTIVITIES
- PRINCIPLES OF BORDER QUARANTINE
7.7 OTHER APPLICATIONS OF RISK ANALYSISRisk analysis can be applied to a wide range of topics related to animal and plant health and quarantine, including areas such as food safety and endemic disease control. However, two particular areas relevant to quarantine operations and trade issues are its application for evaluation of border activities and facilitating exports. 7.7.1 Evaluation of Border ActivitiesThe principles of risk analysis can be applied to help determine the risk associated with different pathways of entry. Risk analyses of the pathways by which exotic pests and diseases might enter Australia would help to evaluate their relative risk. The level of relative risk would also assist in the evaluation of border policies and procedures, and enable Quarantine Australia to allocate resources according to the degree of risk. This matter is considered further in Chapter 8 on Border Activities. 7.7.2 Export FacilitationThe principles of risk analysis can also be applied to help developing countries that import from Australia to formulate appropriate import protocols. Assisting such countries with risk analysis is consistent with the recent focus on positioning Australia as the 'supermarket for Asia' (see Section 4.4.1.1). It may also be a future requirement for GMOs (or food or products of GMOs) developed in Australia (see Section 7.6.2) and is consistent with the SPS principle of providing technical assistance to developing countries (see Appendix C). 7.8 KEY CENTRE FOR QUARANTINE RISK ANALYSISMany submissions to the Review stressed that Australia needs to develop and maintain a leadership role in quarantine risk analysis. Some argued that Australia had a significant leadership role in this area (particularly in animal health in the late 1980s and early 1990s) internationally, but had not maintained this position in recent years. The Review Committee concurs with these views. As a significant trading nation, it is in Australia's interests to lead in this area and to influence international developments through organisations such as the OIE and the IPPC (see Section 5.2). As previously noted, New Zealand is now playing a significant international leadership role in risk analysis and related areas, and has dedicated significant resources to maintaining this position. The Review Committee also noted that the United States is committing substantial resources in this area both at its Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health at Fort Collins and its new plant equivalent, which is being developed at Raleigh. Canada has also devoted significant resources to quarantine risk analysis. One way to re-kindle interest and establish a strong base for this work in Australia is to develop a Key Centre in quarantine-related risk analysis. Such a Centre would provide a base for training and research in risk analysis and related disciplines. It could be established with an initial five-year grant that would be supplemented and gradually replaced by other sources of funds (e.g. external research grants, training and consultancy services, and extension into other related areas of risk analysis such as food safety and public health). Ideally, the Centre should be based at an Australian university, preferably in a relevant faculty or school (e.g. of epidemiology, public health, veterinary science or plant protection), and involve other agencies with expertise and experience in quarantine risk analysis. Given its background in quarantine risk analysis and its significant in-house computing capacity, the Bureau of Resource Sciences would be expected to be a participant in the Centre. The Centre should be established by developing a detailed proposal and calling for competitive tenders from interested parties to bid for the initial grant funding, as per the usual process for establishing Key Centres. The Review Committee believes that establishing a Key Centre for quarantine-related risk analysis is essential to enhance Australia's intellectual leadership in this area. Recommendation 47: The Review Committee recommends that Government provide funds to establish a Key Centre for quarantine-related risk analysis to enhance Australia as a world leader in this field. PART V: BORDER QUARANTINE 8. BORDER ACTIVITIESBorder activities are but a part of a continuum of pre-border, border and post-border arrangements that combine to form the total complement of quarantine controls. Because of the highly regulatory nature of border processes, these activities have the highest profile and tend to attract most public interest. It is for this reason that the Review Committee devoted a good deal of attention to border quarantine activities. Appendix E provides brief descriptions of all current border programs. The Review Committee found that there are a number of common concerns across border programs and hence have made some recommendations that apply to more than one program. The Review Committee has thus approached concerns with the quarantine border on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than by program. PRINCIPLES OF BORDER QUARANTINEQuarantine activities at the border are designed to meet the quarantine goal through the implementation of effective controls on the entry of people, animals, plants and goods that may introduce unwanted pests and diseases. The principles of border quarantine are: · determining, through a process of scientific analysis, the level of risk posed by items of human, animal and plant origin passing through the border; · identifying and targeting high risk pathways through which items of potential quarantine concern may gain undetected access to Australia; · developing appropriate border controls to prevent undetected entry, especially through the use of new technology; · promoting awareness of quarantine and the dangers presented by risk items — both within Australia and overseas — particularly in the minds of the travelling public; · fostering close and effective relationships with other agencies that have border responsibilities; · delivering quarantine border programs in the most efficient and effective manner, including contestable third-party delivery arrangements; delivering nationally consistent quarantine border programs; and · undertaking regular audit and review of controls and procedures for border activities. 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