Basic Public Transit Fares: Should They Be an Administrative Responsibility?



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Matthew Meltzer
Basic Public Transit Fares: Should They Be an Administrative Responsibility?
For the first half of the twentieth century, trolley and other private transportation companies and investors operated transit systems across the United States. However, that model of private, profit-based operation failed again and again with the advent of enormous railroad debts, the rise of automobiles and government investment in road paving programs, rising costs due to organized labor, and General Motors’ effort to buy out urban electric trolley lines and replace them with buses.1 Respective state and local governments bought out those urban transit systems that were not destroyed or did not disappear, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) being a prime example of such a purchase.2 The organization known as the MBTA today was formed out of the remnants of the Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, which itself was the Bay State Street Railway, before going bankrupt in 1919.3 Of the 117 largest U.S. cities just 10 had publicly-owned transit systems in 1949, and by 1979 106 cities had publicly-owned transit systems.4

In the wake of the changes in residential geography (both in the sense that Americans were moving within the country and that they were moving from cities to suburbs) and transportation through the middle of the twentieth century, states created regional transportation authorities to govern and oversee the operation of these purchased mass transit systems. Among the powers given to these agencies was the responsibility of controlling passenger fares.5 This seems a natural responsibility for an agency overseeing transit services.

However, raising fares deeply affects people’s lives and has enormous ramifications both for the financial health and viability of the agency and for its ridership. Moreover, fare increases are frequently tinged with political strife as various interest groups fight to maintain rates or lower them for certain at-risk and disadvantaged populations. The numerous political and legal battles over fare increases are as old as transit systems themselves.6 History also illustrates the danger of refusing to raise fares, such as the example of the Denver Tramway Company, which was forced to cap its fares at a nickel in the early 20th century. By 1917 it was losing both money and riders and eventually initiated bankruptcy proceedings and a court-mandated fare hike was imposed, but it was too little, too late for the beleaguered company.7 Changing contemporary fare policy is essential so that tragedies like that of Denver in 1917 are not repeated.

By examining the administrative processes for raising fares in the ten largest transit systems in the nation it is evident that the method and current results are grossly inadequate.8 Those systems have a long history of failing to routinely raise fares, and then raising fares by large percentages when they do. Those systems in order by daily ridership are: 1) New York, New York (Metropolitan Transportation Authority); 2) Chicago, Illinois (Chicago Transit Authority); 3) Los Angeles, California (Los Angeles County MTA); 4) Washington, D.C. (Washington Metro Area Transportation Authority); 5) Boston, Massachusetts (Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority); 6) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (South Eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority); 7) San Francisco, California (San Francisco Bay Area RTD); 8) Atlanta, Georgia (Metropolitan Atlanta RTA); 9) Seattle, Washington (King County DOT); 10) Miami, Florida (Miami-Dade Transit Agency).9 None of these agencies are subject to state statutes governing fare structures. They are merely given the authority to regulate fares, usually in broad terms, such as to maximize welfare and balance the finances of the organization.

Of the ten systems reviewed, all the authorizing statutes gave enormous discretion to the respective boards to authorize fare decisions. The respective statutes authorize the boards to collect fares that together with other forms of income provide funds “for the payment of all operating costs and expenses which shall be incurred by the authority.”10 California’s statute is representative of the conditions imposed on most boards, stating, “Insofar as practicable the rates shall be fixed so as to result in revenue” sufficient to pay operating expenses, provide for repairs and maintenance and provide for purchase and acquisition of rolling stock.11 Of the systems reviewed, only Massachusetts reviews fares in a specific fashion; however, the statute actually limits fare hikes and makes the process arduous.12 The Board is required to hold public hearings for any increase of fares by 10% (or cut in services by 10%).13 Moreover, the Board is limited to raising fares only to provide needed revenue and shall not “increase fares solely for the purpose of funding the stabilization fund.”14 Fares are part of a larger legal and financial authority to govern the agencies, including the responsibility of accepting state and federal subsidies, issuing bonds, signing contracts with third parties and being the source for all legal responsibility including the ability to sue and be sued.

Most of these agencies follow a similar corporate organizational structure. They are statutorily created for the purpose of overseeing the agency, much as a corporate board of directors oversees the management of a corporation.15 The following table displays how the ten agencies in this study are governed and how those who are on the respective governing boards arrive there.



Agency

Number of Board Members

How Members are Selected

MTA16

17

Members are nominated by the Governor, with four recommended by New York City's mayor and one each by the county executives of Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Dutchess, Orange, Rockland, and Putnam counties (the members representing the latter four cast one collective vote)

CTA17

7

Three members appointed by Governor, four members appointed by Mayor of Chicago.

LA MTA18

13

The members are the Mayor of Los Angeles, the five Los Angeles County Supervisors, three members are appointed by the Mayor, four city council members from cities inside the county but outside of Los Angeles proper

WMATA19

8 (16)

Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia and Federal General Services Administration each appoint two voting members and two alternate members

MBTA20

5

Appointed by Governor

SEPTA21

15

One member appointed by Philadelphia Mayor, one member appointed by Philadelphia City Council (each of these first two has veto power), four neighboring counties each appoint two members, State Senate majority and minority each appoint one member, State House majority and minority each appoint one member, Governor appoints one member

BART22

9

Each member elected from one of nine districts

MARTA23

18

Four members appointed by city of Atlanta, 10 members appointed by four surrounding counties, four members representing four Georgia state committees

King County DOT24

1*

*Governed by a single appointed director of the county Department of Transportation

Miami-Dade MTA25

13

Overseen by Board of County Commissioners, each elected to represent a single district

From the above chart, it is clear that there is not a single governing system for major transit systems. Boards range in size from five to 18, and the degree of political accountability for a single individual is on the spectrum from absolute in Massachusetts (where the Governor appoints the entire board), to essentially non-existent in the D.C. metro area. These corporate boards legislated legal authority, but lack the political authority to act responsibly. At least in Massachusetts the Governor can be truly held responsible for transit policy, but in most other cities no one political actor can be held responsible for board actions. In reality, the only system that demands real political accountability for the actions of those governing major transit systems is in San Francisco, where all the board members are independently elected. However, it is clear that none of these governing systems is up to the task of routinely raising fares. While these boards may be diverse in their constructions and individually diverse—such as MARTA’s policy of insuring that all areas that receive coverage are represented—and that representation may be helpful for insuring all populations receive appropriate services, they are ineffective at raising fares equitably and effectively. Moreover, even in San Francisco where board members are elected, it is questionable how effectively a board can be judged at the election polls regarding fares.26

The structuring of fares is admittedly a complicated manner and fares cannot all necessarily be raised uniformly without some administrative supervision. Therefore, this paper focuses on single-trip base fares, the price of a single ride on a transit system without the use of some fare-packaging device such as a monthly pass. Moreover, this paper does not address the utility of other fare strategies, such as the use of a flat fare system, distance-based or zonal pricing, time-based pricing (i.e. peak vs. off-peak pricing) and mode differentiation (i.e. different charges for bus and rail).27 These pricing strategies are subject to the same studies and criticisms as regards raising fares, but for the purposes of this paper it is best to focus on a single and most basic fare strategy.

The essential problem with leaving fare prices entirely to agency discretion is that fares are not adjusted with sufficient frequency to correspond to financial needs of the agency as well as to correspond with the inflationary value of the dollar. Moreover, the political pressures that often prevent agencies from steadily increasing fares frequently lead to gaps of years between increases, where the subsequent increase is quite large. Below are several examples of individual fares for rail services over time and their respective adjusted values in today’s currency, based on the Department of Labor’s online inflation calculator.28




MBTA Year

Fare

2009 value

CTA Year

Fare

2009 Value

MARTA Year

Fare

2009 Value

1968

$0.25

$1.56

1961

$0.25

$1.82

1972

$0.15

$0.78

1980

$0.50

$1.32

1967

$0.30

$1.95

1979

$0.25

$0.75

1981

$0.75

$1.80

1968

$0.40

$2.50

1980

$0.50

$1.32

1982

$0.60

$1.35

1970

$0.45

$2.52

1981

$0.60

$1.44

1989

$0.75

$1.32

1976

$0.50

$1.91

1987

$0.75

$1.44

1991

$0.85

$1.36

1979

$0.60

$1.80

1989

$0.85

$1.49

2001

$1.00

$1.23

1981

$0.80

$1.92

1990

$1.00

$1.67

2004

$1.25

$1.44

1981

$0.90

$2.15

1992

$1.25

$1.94

2007

$1.70

$1.78

1986

$1.00

$1.99

1996

$1.50

$2.08










1988

$1.25

$2.30

2000

$1.75

$2.21










1991

$1.50

$2.40

2009

$2.00

$2.03










2004

$1.75

$2.02



















2006

$2.00

$2.16



















2009

$2.25

$2.28









It is immediately evident from the historic fares above that agencies have fallen prey to the dual problem of inconsistent periods between hikes and correspondingly large hikes in fare prices when increases are determined.29 Large gaps that stick out include for the MBTA between 1991 and 2001, for the CTA between 1991 and 2004 and for MARTA between 2000 and 2009. New York City experienced a similar gap between 1995 and 2003.30 In terms of financial jumps, the uncertainty at MARTA between 1979 and 1981 after a seven-year period of absence of change is noteworthy just as is the 28% jump in 2007 for the MBTA. In fact, just looking at these three agencies and the 34 respective fare changes, 16 of those raised fares by at least 20% over the prior fare, six raised the fare by at least 30% and four raised the fare by at least 50%.

Based on the data, transit agencies are not regularly reviewing fares and are likely reacting to specific challenges when they do, whether they are related to economic downturns, changes in ridership, or changes in state and federal assistance. In fact, according to a 1994 American Public Transportation Association survey of 344 transit systems, 329 or 95.6% adjust their fares on as needed basis, and only 15 systems adjust their fares on annual or multi-year basis or based on some trigger point, such as a mandated fare recovery percentage.31 These reactionary changes are neither forward-looking nor part of consistent policy goals, but rather a symptom of larger fiscal irresponsibility. The MBTA is currently operating with a $160 million deficit for FY2010 and has an astounding $5.2 billion in debt.32 In a 2000 study it was shown that the MBTA also paid its employees more than other similarly skilled Massachusetts employees and workers at other transit agencies, and at that time the MBTA had one of the lowest fare rates in the country.33 In 1999 the MBTA was paying just 25.4% of its operating expenses with fares, down from 74% in 1964.34

There is a significant issue of environmental and community justice regarding fare policies. The Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental justice as creating policy and acting such that “no group of people [all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income] should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies.”35 Certainly fare hikes have a disproportionate effect on people of lower incomes—as higher fares affect their finances in higher proportion—who frequently tend to be minorities in areas served by large transit systems. While there is no economic evidence I am aware of to show that routine, smaller fare increases are less harmful than larger, occasional larger fare increases, it is my contention in this paper that fares will be raised regardless due to economic necessity and that incremental change is easier to adjust to for riders—both psychologically and financially—than sudden seismic shifts. Chicago’s example is instructive. Residents of Chicago had a stable fare for 13 years between 1991 and 2004 at $1.50, but in the subsequent six-year period, fares were raised a total of 75¢, or a 50% increase from where they had been stable for so long.36 If fares had been raised 7% every three years over the same period of time, the end result would have been the same. Small incremental changes that occur on a consistent basis will help finances for the agency and will also help riders from feeling gouged when fares go up by a large percentage suddenly.

Historically large increases have been challenged again and again by vocal community groups (and sparring politicians) representing the types of groups environmental justice is concerned with. Even where these lawsuits have not been successful, they often have forced or encouraged transit agencies to change their fare policies.37 For example, in 1995 the New York Urban League and Straphangers Campaign challenged a 20% fare hike instituted by the New York MTA, increasing base fares for subways and buses from $1.25 to $1.50.38 The plaintiffs based their claim on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stating that because the majority of subway and bus riders were minorities, the effect of the fare increase subjected riders to discrimination based on race, color and national origin.39 The district court supplied the requested injunction to stop the fare increase because of a disparate impact on urban transit riders compared to commuter rail riders—who are predominantly white—who were to pay a disparate share of the operating cost of the system.40

The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, stating that farebox recovery ratios were not the best method to measure the benefits and costs of subsidization and fare increases.41 Moreover, the Circuit Court noted even the district court recognized that a fare increase was a business necessity in the near future and concluded—without citing Chevron, but utilizing Chevron-like deference—that the District Court had not assessed the impact of the fare increases in light of the larger financial and administrative picture of which those fare increases are a part.42 The agency was left the ability to raise fares and apply subsidies as it saw fit, as long as those standards were not arbitrary.

Philadelphia’s SEPTA was also subject to a Title VI suit in 1990 when it sought to raise fares, which appeared in the eyes of a Committee for a Better North Philadelphia that federal subsidies were being unfairly spent on commuter rail rather than intra-city transit services.43 This particular suit alleged that there was a Title VI violation because SEPTA conceded that while “City Transit” had a higher percentage of black riders than “Commuter Rail” and that if it had allocated its available subsidies in accordance with the amount of passenger revenue received, City Transit fares would be lower.44 SEPTA justified its allocation as part of a plan to stabilize Commuter Rail fares and lure riders back to the system, which was beneficial to the overall health of SEPTA operations, as City Transit operations were partly dependent on Commuter Rail riders entering the city.45 The Court recognized that SEPTA was tasked with operating a whole system and that there is a level of deference to SEPTA utilizing its “best business judgment in making fiscal decisions.”46

Similarly in 1994, the Bus Riders Union of Los Angeles brought a civil rights class action lawsuit against the county Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), claiming that the MTA unlawfully discriminated against inner-city and transit dependent bus riders in its allocation of resources.47 Rather than going to trial the District Court approved a consent decree that committed the MTA to implementing a detailed plan to improve bus service.48 The Bus Rider Union claim was based on the fact that the MTA was spending 71% of its resources on rail projects when 94% of riders took the bus and that the MTA refused to provide service to some minority areas and to connect them to other areas.49 The District Court provided an injunction against a proposed 25¢ fare increase.50 The consent decree, which was later allowed to expire by the Ninth Circuit due to completion of its granted amount of time and fulfillment of its objectives,51 created a Joint Working Group composed of equal numbers of MTA representatives and Bus Rider Union representatives to deal with a variety of transit issues, including fare increases.52

There have been several other notable fare challenges, such as the City of Atlanta’s challenge to MARTA’s 1980 fare increase and numerous challenges to SEPTA fare hikes in Philadelphia. The issue in Atlanta had to do with the legality of the construction of the board voting for the fare increase.53 The Fifth Circuit ruled that statutory changes to the membership of the MARTA board that gave outside counties greater influence did not deprive Atlanta citizens of due process or equal protection rights.54 Nearly every SEPTA fare increase since 1970 has been challenged in one way or another. Of particular interest was a 1989 challenge to a SEPTA fare increase brought by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), challenging the fairness of the increase and asserting that an increase was unnecessary because the State General Assembly would rescue the transportation authority.55 The Commonwealth Court found in favor of SEPTA, because in the face of a large budget deficit fares must inevitably rise, and SEPTA’s only other choice was to significantly curtail services.56 Moreover, the Court gave credence to SEPTA’s consideration of the social impact of the fare hike when it calculated that 3.3% of riders would choose not to use SEPTA going forward, but only 10% of those, .0033% of total riders, would not be able to find any means of transportation.57 Lastly, that SEPTA did not choose to pawn the political hot potato of subsidies to the legislature without acting first was not found to be an abuse of discretion, and therefore the Court left to the legislature and the SEPTA board the decision of what proper subsidies for the authority were.58

SEPTA’s above concern with ridership loss is a constant theme with fare increases. Any change in fare levels, like changes in prices with all products, will lead consumers to reevaluate how to utilize the service. It is generally considered that drops in ridership due to fare increases can be formulaically predicted. That formula is Y = 0.80 + 0.30X, where Y is the percent loss in ridership compared to prior ridership and X is the percent change in fares compared to prior fares.59 Therefore, a 20% fare hike will result in a 6.8% drop in ridership (0.8 + .3 x 20). However, this formulation is an average and there are a host of other factors that shape ridership losses (and gains).

One of the most significant deviations is that large cities with developed transit systems—where cars may already be more difficult to use for commuting—tend to lose fewer riders than the formula would suggest. This also may be combined with modal use and that people are more forgiving of changes in rail transit than bus costs.60 Fare increases are also more or less influential based on time of day, as peak riders (i.e. rush hour riders) are unlikely to change their use of public transit, but off-peak riders may stop riding in greater numbers than on average.61 Moreover, it is very difficult to discern the effect of fare hikes on low-income riders because it is dependent on many of the issues above, including auto availability, walking availability and peak vs. off-peak travel.62 In reality, most low-income riders who travel via public transit are probably transit dependent, and concerns over fare costs are really an issue of attracting wealthier riders who have greater choice in their means of transportation.63

The state has an enormous interest in passing a statute that would govern fare increases, if for no other reason than that states make large investments in public transportation systems. For example, in FY 2009 the state of New York spent $372 million supporting the New York City MTA.64 Given the enormous challenge of constructing state budgets, knowing what expected revenues are for transit agencies and knowing that agencies will have a greater degree of self-reliance is helpful. Moreover, a statute is a far more certain guarantee than requiring agencies to adopt general policies to review fares on an annual or multi-year basis. Also, a statute places only limited one-time responsibility in the hands of legislature and once a statute is passed neither the governor, the legislature, or anyone politically appointed would be responsible for setting base fare policy. An ideal statute might look something like this:

1. A single-trip cash fare for a one-way trip purchased for access to ­­­_____ costs $X.XX as of MM/DD/YYYY. Every __ years from this date the single-trip cash fare for a one- way trip shall be raised Z% from its previous value, rounded up to the nearest five-cent value.

a. The Board of ______ shall have the absolute authority to set fare policy regarding multi-trip passes, student passes, senior passes and passes for disabled riders.

b. In the case of extreme economic distress the Board is reserved the authority to raise fares beyond what is authorized in this statute. Extreme economic distress occurs when there at least a ___ % budget shortfall for the projected fiscal year.

c. No part of this statute shall be construed to constrain the Board’s authority to implement new types of fares or fare-collecting technologies.


This statute could also be adopted for transit systems that choose to implement zone payments, as in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, where riders are assessed a fare based on where they enter the system and where they get off.65 The statute could be rewritten to establish a base value for single-zone travel as well the value of moving to each additional zone, and those could be raised similarly.

Such a statute would not preclude many other changes that agencies could and should undertake to deal with larger organizational and financial problems. Some organizational changes that a boards may undertake include enunciating detailed and reasoned policy preferences for the respective agencies, and insuring that directors are only appointed if they have familiarity with management of complex organizations, knowledge of corporate business and finance and have a sensitivity to social policy.66 Also, there is a significant question of whether corporate boards (an outgrowth of governing what were once private businesses) should exist, rather than utilizing typical top-down agency models as in most departments of transportation.



However, this one-time legislative change would clarify the financial roles of both the legislatures and agency boards. No longer could legislatures mull over transit subsidies and lament that transit agencies are not pulling their weight by refusing to raise fares, and likewise the agencies would be able to reasonably lobby the legislature for appropriate funds saying their hands are bound on basic fare policy. Moreover, for systems that are typically cash-strapped there is great value in having certain fare hikes. The boards can focus on larger fare policy issues such as collection, discounts, and pricing systems without worrying about what base fare to create programs on. Without concern of political (and costly legal) challenges to fare decision, boards can focus on fiscal responsibility and more important transit and organizational issues. Similarly, active community organizations, which have been busy challenging fare increases, can instead focus on creating new policies such as linking transit discounts to welfare or food stamps and ensuring that services, routes and frequency of travel benefit their constituents.

1 Stephen B. Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle Between Road and Rail in the American Century, 120-126 (Basic Books) (1994).

2 MBTA History: Electrification, http://www.mbta.com/about_the_mbta/history/?id=960.

3 Id.

4 Neil Hamilton, Bruce Feldman & Heather Crisp, A Comparison of Governance of Publicly-Owned Transit, 6 Can.-U.S. L. J. 1, 3 (1983).

5 See, e.g. West’s Ann.Cal.Pub. Util.Code § 29038.

6 See, for example fare battles at the Washington, D.C. Metro, Fare Wars at Metro, Washington Post http://voices.washingtonpost.com/getthere/2007/10/fare_wars_at_metro.html.

7 Owen D. Gutfreund, 20th Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape, 70-74 (Oxford University Press) (2004).

8 American Public Transportation Association, Public Transportation Ridership Report: Fourth Quarter 2009 (2010).

9 Id.

10 Pennsylvania Legislative Service Act 1994-3, Pa. C.S.A. § 1741(16).

11 West’s Ann.Cal.Pub.Util.Code § 29038.

12 M.G.C.L. 161A § 5(d)

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Seattle’s Metro and Miami-Dade County MTA are exceptions to this rule. Seattle is run without a board by the county Department of Transportation. There is no corporate oversight element involved, making the Metro much more like traditional transportation operations such as highways state departments of transportation. The Miami-Dade County MTA is overseen by county overseers who are independently elected, but have many governing roles beyond transit. There is an independent citizen’s review panel in Miami-Dade County that makes recommendations and has perfunctory oversight roles, but no authority to make changes to agency policy or rules.

16 http://www.mta.info/mta/leadership/

17 http://www.transitchicago.com/about/overview.aspx

18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_County_Metropolitan_Transportation_Authority#Governance

19 http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/board_of_directors/

20 M.G.C.L. 6C § 2(b) The MBTA used to be governed by an independent board and therefore all fare numbers produced earlier were based on that structure. The current five member board oversees all parts of the Massachusetts DOT, including the airport, the registry of motor vehicles, and the highway department.

21 http://www.septa.org/about/board/

22 http://www.bart.gov/about/bod/index.aspx

23 http://www.itsmarta.com/board-of-directors.aspx

24 http://www.kingcounty.gov/transportation/kcdot/AboutUs/Director.aspx The Director oversees all parts of the DOT, including the airport, the roads and the ferries.

25 http://www.miamidade.gov/commiss/

26 Hamilton, supra, at 40.

27 Transportation Research Board, TCRP Report 10: Fare Policies, Structures and Technologies, 23 (1996).

28 Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. The CTA fares can be found in: Chicago Transit Authority, President’s Report on CTA’s Fares and Proposal for the FY2004 Budget, 48 (2003), and A Brief History of Chicago Surface Lines, http://www.chicagobus.org/history. The MBTA fare history is based on data from, MBTA Advisory Board, Report on the Proposed 2007 Fare Restructuring and Fare Increase, 4 (2006). The MARTA fare history is found at, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority History, http://wapedia.mobi/en/Metropolitan_Atlanta_Rapid_Transit_Authority_history.

29 Low costs for riders are an important consideration and there have been numerous efforts over time in a variety of locales to provide free transit. See TCRP Report 95 at 12-31 – 12-34. However, until federal, state and local government make free transit a policy priority it is an irresponsible financial pipe dream to pursue. Moreover, the effect of free transit on ridership has shown mixed results, with some systems showing large increases in ridership (e.g. Austin, Texas in 1989-1990) and others staying largely stagnant (Monterey Park, California in 1986-1988).

30 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_City_transit_fares#Fare_History

31 TCRP 10, at 9. Mandated fare recovery percentage is the percent of operating costs for the agency that must covered by collection of fares. Therefore if 20% of agency costs must be covered by fares, the agency must adjust fares to meet that percentage.

32 http://www.mbta.com/about_the_mbta/news_events/?id=16823&month=3&year=09. In the MBTA’s defense, not all of that debt is the agency’s fault as some of it was imposed upon it. “This debt originates from three sources:  legacy debt inherited by the MBTA at the onset of Forward Funding, costs of projects required to be built as legal commitments associated with the central Artery permitting process and the authority’s desire to act as a good steward of the system and fund $470 million per year in state of good repair projects which still leaves the deferred maintenance backlog at $2.7 billion. “

33 Aniko Laszlo, Financing the MBTA: An Efficient and Fare Solution, 1-2 (2000).

34 Id. at 15.

35 http://epa.gov/environmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html

36 Chicago Transit Authority, supra.

37 Transit Cooperative Research Program, TCRP Report 94: Fare Policies, Structures and

Technologies: Update, 48 (2003).

38 New York Urban League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transportation Auth., 905 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (S.D. NY 1995), rev’d, 151 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995)

39 Id. at 1272.

40 Id. at 1274-75.

41 New York Urban League v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995).

42 Id. at 1037.

43 Committee for a Better North Philadelphia v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 1990 WL 121177, 1 (E.D. PA 1990), aff’d 935 F.2d 1280 (3rd Cir. 1991).

44 Id. at 3.

45 Id.

46 Id. at 4.

47 Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009).

48 Id. at 1117.

49 Transit Cooperative Research Program, TCRP 94, supra, at 49.

50 Id.

51 Los Angeles County MTA, 564 F.3d at 1120.

52 Transit Cooperative Research Program, TCRP 94, supra, at 49.

53 City of Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 506 F.Supp. 883, 885-86 (N.D. Georgia 1980), aff’d, 636 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1981).

54 City of Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 636 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981).

55 South Eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, 563 A.2d 565 (1989).

56 Id. at 571-72.

57 Id. at 572.

58 Id. at 573.

59 Transit Cooperative Research Program, TCRP Report 95: Transit Pricing and Fares, 12-8 (2004). The study creating this formula was originally published by, F.V. Webster and P.H. Bly, The Demand for Public Transport. Transport and Road Research (1980).

60 Id. at 12-13.

61 Id. at 12-14. However, this conclusion is based on a 1991 American Public Transportation Association study and the availability of monthly passes may change these numbers today as monthly passes will not change how much a person travels, especially at off-peak times as long as a person calculates they will use up the value of the pass.

62 Id. at 12-37 - 12-38.

63 Id.

64 Metropolitan Transportation Authority, MTA Consolidated 2010 Operating Budget, appx 2 (2009)

65 http://www.bart.gov/tickets/index.aspx These are closed systems that require riders to insert a pre-paid ticket when entering and the same ticket when exiting. A value based on the distance traveled is deducted when the ticket is swiped on the way out.

66 Hamilton, at 34-36.



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