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- Newcomb ’ s paradox
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- Christiane, Veronika I
- Risk averse for gains, risk seeking for losses
- Best core theory depends on error theory
| §3.4 is nice, with the title: “The difficulty of establishing equivalence of ambiguous and unambiguous probabilities.” That an unknown probability of 0.1 due to skewness may be overestimated, even by SEU.
probability intervals: p. 346 bottom writes that with probability intervals it is true that one need not give precise probabilities, but one then has to give precise boundaries of probability, an argument also advanced by Lindley (1996). ambiguity seeking for losses: §5.1 discusses ambiguity in health (which means losses). Problem in health is that ambiguity will suggest that the health outcomes are less known, and will decrease the value of the outcomes. Still they report less ambiguity aversion for health than for money. P. 354 bottom: “These medical and health studies are a little discouraging, because they show less ambiguity aversion, and less reliable measurement of ambiguity, than is observed or assumed in laboratory experiments (and in theory).” P. 359, 2nd full paragraph points out that a Dutch book example discussed before requires “isolation” (~ additivity). The next paragraph describes the “Dutch book” commonly advanced against violation of DC (dynamic consistency), in the Raiffa (1961) answer to Ellsberg, and calls it “less slippery.” P. 361 has a nice text on the discrepancy between empirical and theoretical workers on ambiguity, still relevant in the year I copy this text (2015): “The differences in researchers' purposes sometimes limit communication and crossfertilization. For example, psychologists are sometimes annoyed that decision theorists rely on unrealistic axioms. But theorists see more realistic axioms as inelegant and difficult to work with. A review like this is meant to promote cross-fertilization by telling people with different purposes about other kinds of research, so they can draw inspiration and ideas from others. Since psychologists and decision theorists are not as curious about market implications as economists, economists who find the psychology described here inspiring must figure out its market implications and test those using market data, themselves. Similarly, pyschologists who are curious about the descriptive validity of new axioms, and theories based on them, must conduct tests themselves since most decision theorists are more interested in the mathematical properties of axioms than in their descriptive validity.” P. 361: “There are diminishing returns to studying urns!” %} Camerer, Colin F. & Martin Weber (1992) “Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 325–370. {% %} Cameron, Trudy A. (2005) “Updating Subjective Risks in the Presence of Conflicting Information: An Application to Climate Change,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 30, 63–97. {% real incentives/hypothetical choice: compare 7 kinds of contingent valuation, including one real choice. Methods give same results with exception of direct matching, which gives lower values than binary-choice derived WTP. %} Cameron, Trudy Ann, Gregory L. Poe, Robert G. Ethier, & William D. Schulze (2002) “Alternative Non-Market Value-Elicitation Methods: Are the Underlying Preferences the Same?,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44, 391–425. {% Review and discuss different definitions of subjective well-being (happiness) and quality of life, and the move from objective to subjective of the latter, and conclude that these concepts are about the same. %} Camfield, Laura & Suzanne M. Skevington (2008) “On Subjective Well-Being and Quality of Life,” Journal of Health Psychology 13, 764–775. {% We often discretize and even dichotomize what in reality is a continuum for simplicity and for clarity of speech. But sometimes it better not be done. This paper argues that for the experienced versus descriptive debate nowadays, the dichotomy is oversimplistic. I agree! Seems that, when presenting supposedly random samples to subjects, they in reality gave exactly representative samples (matching samples paradigm), which would comprise some deception (deception). They did this as variation of Ungemach et al. (2009). %} Camilleri, Adrian R. & Ben R. Newell (2011) “Description- and Experience-Based Choice: Does Equivalent Information Equal Equivalent Choice?,” Acta Psychologica 136, 276–284. {% %} Camille, Nathalie, Giorgio Coricelli, Jerome Sallet, Pascale Pradat-Diehl, Jean-René Duhamel, & Angela Sirigu (2004) “The Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex in the Experience of Regret,” Science 304, 1167–1170. {% value of information: in welfare context. %} Campbell, Colin (2004) “Blackwell’s Ordering and Public Information,” Journal of Economic Theory 114, 179–197. {% SIIA/IIIA, social welfare function implementable only if Arrow IIA %} Campbell, Donald E. (1992) “Implementation of Social Welfare Functions,” International Economic Review 33, 525–533. {% SIIA/IIIA, continuous-alternative-space extension of Arrow’s impossibility theorem %} Campbell, Donald E. (1992) “Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environment,” International Economic Review 33, 341–352. {% revealed preference; that IIIA implies rationalizability even if all choice sets contain at least m elements. %} Campbell, Donald E. (1994) “Arrow’s Choice Axiom,” Economics Letters 44, 381–384. {% utility elicitation; seems to find that CRRA coefficient increases substantially if human wealth is included in wealth. Well, this in itself is a simple numerical fact so I should recheck. %} Campbell, John Y. (1996) “Understanding Risk and Return,” Journal of Political Economy 104, 298–345. {% %} Campbell, John Y. & John H. Cochrane (2000) “Explaining the Poor Performance of Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models,” Journal of Finance 55, 2863–2878. {% %} Campbell, John Y. & Robert J. Shiller (1987) “Cointegration and Tests of Present Value Models,” Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062–1088. {% free-will/determinism %} Campbell, Joseph Keim (2007) “Free Will and the Necessity of the Past,” Analysis 67, 105–111. {% Committee Appointed by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, “Quantitative Estimates of Sensory Events” (1938), with Campbell in the committee. Campbell argued that no interval scales can be observed in the social science, here and in his 1938 work. %} Campbell, Norman R. (1920) “Physics: The Elements.” Cambridge University Press, New York. Reprinted in 1957 as “Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and Experiment.” Dover Publications, New York. {% %} Campbell, Norman R. (1920) “An Account of the Principles of Measurement and Calculation.” Longmans, Green, London. {% Newcomb’s paradox %} Campbell, Richmond & Lanning Sowden (1985, eds.) “Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoners Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem.” University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. {% conditional probability, unexpected evidence %} Campbell, Richmond & Thomas Vinci (1982) “Novel Confirmation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34, 315–341. {% Discussing claimed solutions to Hume’s problem of induction through simple statistical formulas it seems. %} Campbell, Scott & James Franklin (2004) “Randomness and the Justification of Induction,” Synthese 138, 79–99. {% Give extensive references on the measurement of vNM utility from psychology, medicine, and many other fields. %} Campello, Fernanda & Ferdando Menenez Campello de Souza (2012) “A New Protocol for the Eduction of the Utility Function for Money,” working paper. {% one-dimensional utility: derive results for weak continuity %} Campión, María J., Juan C. Candeal and Esteban Induráin (2006) “The Existence of Utility Functions for Weakly Continuous Preferences On A Banach Space,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 51, 227–237. {% February 2005: I couldn’t find anything of this reference, and expect that there is something wrong about it. Z&Z Say that 2/3 of the Dutch population has the compulsory ziekenfondsverzekering for health insurance. %} Camps, Marielle, Ben Geurts, & Steef Kaatee (2000) “De Zorgverzekeringscombi,” Economisch Statistische Berichten (3-11-2000), 873–875. {% Shows relations between axioms in Debreu-type separability contexts, often leading to dictatorial solutions. ordered vector space: Corollary 3.6 gives a funny way to characterize the dictatorial solution in welfare theory: elements of n are welfare allocations over n individuals, and we study a preference relation over them. What I call de Finetti's additivity is called zero independence by the author. The multiplicative version (so coordinate-dependent changes of scale should not affect preference) is called scale-independence by the author. The former condition implies the well-known linear representation of de Finetti, and the latter implies the same but after taking logarithms (handle negatives properly). These exclude each other, except if there is degeneracy of only one essential coordinate when the representations are just ordinal. This is exactly the dictatorial approach. Funny! %} Candeal, Juan C. (2012) “Subgroup Independence Conditions on Preferences,” Social Choice and Welfare 39, 847–853. {% ordered vector space: considers variations of the interesting Corollary 3.6 of Candeal (2012 SCW, cited as 2011 forthcoming.) where continuity is dropped. Then lexicographic things come in. %} Candeal, Juan C. (2013) “Invariance Axioms for Preferences: Applications to Social Choice Theory,” Social Choice and Welfare 41, 453–471. {% Dutch book; ordered vector space %} Candeal, Juan Carlos & Esteban Induráin (1995) “A Note on Linear Utility,” Economic Theory 6, 519–522. {% one-dimensional utility; this paper primarily considers extensive measurement %} Candeal, Juan Carlos, Juan R. de Miguel, & Esteban Induráin (1995) “Extensive Measurement: Continuous Additive Utility Functions on Semigroups”. {% Dutch book: let be a weak order and + an operation. Assume the order topology. There exists an additive and continuous function representing whenever: (i) weak ordering; (ii) the order topology is connected; (iii) + is continuous. (iv) is ~- cancellative (the three equivalences x + y ~x + z, y + x ~ z + x, and y ~z are logically equivalent); (v) is ~- associative ((x + (y + z) ~ (x + y) + z). I like that apart from continuity, only ~ is considered. %} Candeal, Juan Carlos, Juan R. de Miguel, & Esteban Induráin (2000) “Expected Utility from Additive Utility on Semigroups.” {% Eighteen economics students (acquainted with utility) were asked to give direct quantitative evaluations of three monetary outcomes and six lotteries over these, and three health states and six lotteries over these. From these, probability weighting was calculated under RDU. Probability weighting was less elevated for health than for money. %} Canjels, Eugene & Hans J.M. Peters (1989) “Testing the Rank Order-Approach to Utility for Money and Health States,” Quantitatieve Methoden 11, 53–64. {% Christiane, Veronika & I %} Cannon, Edmund & Gian Pietro Cipriano (2004) “Euro-Illusion: A Natural Experiment,” Dept. of Economics, University of Bristol. {% one-dimensional utility %} Cantor, Georg (1895) “Beiträge zur Begründung der Transfiniten Mengenlehre,” §11, Mathematische Annalen 46, 481–512. Reprinted in Georg Cantor (1932) Beiträge zur Begründung der Transfiniten Mengenlehre, Gesammelte Abhandlungen Mathematischen und Philosophischen Inhalts, 282–356, Springer, Berlin. {% information aversion; prenatal diagnosis %} Cantor Scott B. (1991) “A Decision Analytic Approach to Prenatal Diagnosis,” Ph.D. Thesis in Decision Sciences, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA. {% anonymity protection: events with very small probabilities %} Cantor Scott B., Richard D. Clover, & Robert F. Thompson (1993) “A Decision Analytic Approach to Postexposure Rabies Prophylaxis,” University of Texas. {% %} Cao, H. Henry, Tan Wang, & Harold H. Zhang (2005) “Model Uncertainty, Limited Market Participation, and Asset Prices,” Review of Financial Studies 18, 1219–1251. {% %} Capaldi, Elizabeth J., Daniel J. Miller, Suzan Alptekin (1989) “Multiple-Food-Unit-Incentive Effect: Nonconservation of Weight of Food Reward by Rats,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 15, 75–80. {% Compares choice from multiple sets with ranking. Does a greater effort than preceding studies to make the two setups ceteris paribus. Uses binary choice as gold standard and finds no difference between (multiple) choice and ranking. Nice literature review on the topic restricted to environmental valuation. %} Caparrós, Alejandro, José L. Oviedo, Pablo Campos (2008) “Would You Choose Your Preferred Option? Comparing Choice and Recoded Ranking Experiments,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90, 1–13. {% %} Cappelli, Veronica Roberta, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci (2016) “Sources of Uncertainty,” in preparation. {% linear utility for small stakes: §3.3 beginning: “The amounts of money involved in experiments are too small to trigger risk aversion relevant to life cycle spending. For that reason, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro, 1997, constructed a stated preference question that placed enough wealth on the line to introduce significant wealth swings. It involved a switch of job with a potentially large change in income. With the advantage again of being able to place these on the HRS, this form of question is now widely used and related to portfolio choice.” This text also pertains to real incentives/hypothetical choice. Argues that for economists to work with data, they have to produce much of the data artificially by themselves, using theoies, having to do for one with the central role of counterfactuals in decisions. (conservation of influence) From economic data we usually cannot separate preferences (utilities) from beliefs. Does the consumer really prefer this product, or have wrong beliefs? Argues that economists also have to reckon with perceptions of consumers, and not just with what was objectively offered to the consumer. This is an input in the development of stochastic choice theories. End of §4.3 discusses what is in fact only the observability problem of indifference; i.e., the difficulty to falsify indifference empirically. %} Caplin, Andrew (2016) “Economic Data Engineering,” working paper. {% Provide some preference axioms for predicted and experienced reward, which they interpret as dopaminenergic, to reflect dopamine neurotransmitters. Their application to belief elicitations consists of a speculation that dopamine measurements can help elicit beliefs, with learning and addiction idem dito. In this way the authors aim to help bridge the conceptual gap between neuroscience and economics, as they write in their abstract. %} Caplin, Andrew & Mark Dean (2008) “Dopamine, Reward Prediction Error, and Economics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 663–701. {% Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140117 Theoretical decision-cost model; deriving that from revealed preference. %} Caplin, Andrew & Mark Dean (2015) “Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition,” American Economic Review 105, 2183–2203. {% value of information: different anxiety types have different needs for information. Let emotions such as anxiety enter as arguments into the utility function. Is a bit like the intrinsic value of information and early/late resolution of uncertainty. %} Caplin, Andrew & John Leahy (1999) “The Supply of Information by a Concerned Expert,” Dept. of Economics, New York University. {% conservation of influence Agent receives physical prize z1 in period 1, physical prize z2 in period 2. There is uncertainty, so probability distributions over prizes are involved. is a map that, at the end of period 1, maps the agent towards a psychological state. depends not only on z1 but also on the lottery over the z2’s, and can reflect anxiety etc. There are decisions at both time points. This model generalizes Kreps & Porteus (1978) by permitting time inconsistency. Utility (from prior perspective) V1(y1) is sum of expected utility E(u2) over second period and utility u1((y1)) of psychological state (y1) at period 1, see Eq. (1) on p. 63. Decision making is assumed to be sophisticated, so not resolute. Under appropriate continuity, an optimal priori strategy exists if the set of options is compact. In several places, the authors state that anxiety will depend on possibility and will overestimate small probabilities (e.g. p. 56). §IV.B argues that what is often called risk aversion should have a dynamic aspect of anxiety and is not static. The enthusiasm of the authors is reflected by sentences such as “More recently, these findings have moved out of the laboratory and into the field” (top of p. 60) or “One important advantage of our formulation over static nonexpected utility models is that the latter theories attempt to telescope a dynamic pattern of feelings into a single static utility function.” (p. 75) or the closing sentence of the paper. information aversion: §II.B gives many refs where people, owing to anxiety etc., prefer not to receive info. The model is general but, in return, it is not easy to see how to derive predictions from data. How can we measure its primitives from data? Are they identifiable? On p. 75 the authors explain that their model is very general indeed, incorporating everything relevant, with footnote 20 citing Machina on EU being normative then. As Machina added to this point, however, the problem then is that it is hard to derive predictions from data. %} Caplin, Andrew & John Leahy (2001) “Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 55–79. {% time preference; dynamic consistency; point out that deciding social discount rate on basis of revealed preference means privileging the current agent at the cost of the future agent, which does not seem to be normative. They nicely discuss discounting of past consumption. DC = stationarity: their time consistency in Def. 1 p. 1261 is indeed time consistency; Eq. 1 implicitly implies stationarity. P. 1263 shows that they can characterize quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This paper is nice! %} Caplin, Andrew & John Leahy (2004) “The Social Discount Rate,” Journal of Political Economy 112, 1257–1268. {% dynamic consistency: they distinguish between recursive and subgame perfectness. The difference concerns indifferences. In the subgame-perfect solution, the posterior agent chooses arbitrarily, but in the recursive approach it is apparently permitted that the prior agent then choose. %} Caplin, Andrew & John Leahy (2006) “The Recursive Approach to Time Inconsistency,” Journal of Economic Theory 131, 134–156. {% Assume SEU with everything finite, state space, outcome set, act set. But additionally assume a perception function. It is unobservable, but is derived from how subjective probabilities change. A “no improving action switches” (NIAS) condition is important. %} Caplin, Andrew & Daniel Martin (2015) “A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception,” Economic Journal 125, 184–202. {% Dutch book: axiomatizations of concave and convex functionals with variations on Dutch books and incompleteness. %} Capotorti, Andrea, Giulianella Coletti, & Barbara Vantaggi (2008) “Preferences Representable by a Lower Expectation: Some Characterizations,” Theory and Decision 64, 119–146. {% Consider incoherent conditional probabilities, a distance measure (variation of proper scoring rule), and a way to correct the incoherence, maybe by taking the nearest coherent (I did not check). %} Capotorti, Andrea, Giuliana Regoli, & Francesca Vattari (2010) “Correction of Incoherent Conditional Probability Assessments,” International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51, 718–727. {% DM-Subjects can distribute risky prospects over other subjects (and also if self involved) before the uncertainty of the risks are resolved. Next the uncertainties are resolved. Next the DM-subjects can redistribute. So, this is about the interaction of fairness and risk, in Harsanyi-type models. They find that ex ante considerations remain dominant ex post, but there are some redistributions. They redistribute much more the differences resulting from different luck, than differences resulting from different decisions. Although being stakeholder or not matters, the same fairness views underly both cases. %} Cappelen, Alexander W., James Konow, Erik O. Sorensen, & Bertil Tungodden (2013) “Just Luck: An Experimental Study of Risk-Taking and Fairness,” American Economic Review 103, 1398–1413. {% Risk averse for gains, risk seeking for losses: seems to find risk seeking for bad outcomes, if some are below survival-minimum. This should be no surprise! %} Caraco, Thomas (1981) “Energy Budgets, Risk and Foraging Preferences in Dark-Eyed Juncos (Junco Hyemalis),” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 8, 213–217. {% dynamic consistency: finds violation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Does so in market setup with forward and spot market. Done with real incentives (real incentives/hypothetical choice: for time preference). decreasing/increasing impatience: find counter-evidence against the commonly assumed decreasing impatience and/or present effect. %} Carbone, Enrica (2008) “Temptations and Dynamic Consistency,” Theory and Decision 64, 229–248. {% The authors consider an allocation problem and then test some ambiguity theories. My views on ambiguity theories and their implementations deviate in many respects from the account given, for instance, in §2 here. The authors find that SEU performs well. %} Carbone, Enrica, Xueqi Dong, & John Hey (2017) “Elicitation of Preferences under Ambiguity,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 54, 87–102. {% P. 129 argues that inconsistency is partly irrational but partly also close-to-indifference, so not totally irrational %} Carbone, Enrica & John D. Hey (1995) “A Comparison of the Estimates of Expected Utility and Non-Expected-Utility Preference Functionals,” Geneva Papers in Risk and Insurance Theory 20, 111–133. {% Best core theory depends on error theory: seems so. %} Carbone, Enrica & John D. Hey (2000) “Which Error Story Is Best?,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 20, 161–176. {% dynamic consistency: empirical test of backward induction %} Carbone, Enrica & John D. Hey (2001) “A Test of the Principle of Optimality,” Theory and Decision 50, 263–281. {% Theoretically examine the hypothesis of less tax for the poor because there are more poor to vote. %} Carbonell-Nicolaua, Oriol & Efe A. Ok (2007) “Voting over Income Taxation,” Journal of Economic Theory 134, 249–286. {% gender differences in risk attitudes: women more risk averse than men. %} Cardenas, Juan-Camilo , Anna Dreber, Emma von Essen, Eva Ranehill (2012) “Gender Differences in Competitiveness and Risk Taking: Comparing Children in Colombia and Sweden,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 83, 11–23. {% Theorem 2 mentions (minus) the Pratt-Arrow index f''//f' as measure of convexity. %} Cargo, Gerald T. (1965) “Comparable Means and Generalized Convexity,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 12, 387–392. {% Considers concave functions of quantiles, which generalizes rank-dependent utility. %} Carlier, Guillaume (2008) “Differentiability Properties of Rank-Linear Utilities,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 15–23. {% Shows results, e.g. on differentiability, for usual thing that core of convex probability transformation is set of dominating measures, but in differentiable continuous-distribution context. %} Carlier, Guillaume & Rose-Anna Dana (2003) “Core of Convex Distortions of a Probability,” Journal of Economic Theory 113, 199–222. {% %} Carlier, Guillaume & Rose-Anna Dana (2011) “Optimal Demand for Contingent Claims when Agents Have Law Invariant Utilities,” Mathematical Finance 21, 169–201. {% Efficient risk sharing is characterized by a comonotonicity condition for univariate outcomes. For multivariate more complex because no direct extension of comonotonicity. %} Carlier, Guillaume, Rose-Anna Dana, & Alfred Galichon (2011) “Pareto Efficiency for the Concave Order and Multivariate Comonotonicity,” Journal of Economic Theory 147, 71–92. {% %} Carlier, Guillaume, Rose Anne Dana, & Niousha Shahidi (2003) “Efficient Insurance Contracts under Epsilon-Contaminated Utilities,” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 28, 59–71. {% Tests Allais paradox; gives no probabilities but numbers on wheel. Greatly reduced effect, only 20 out of 142 exhibited effect, whereas 16 out of those 142 violated independence in other direction. %} Carlin, Paul S. (1990) “Is the Allais Paradox Robust to a Seemingly Trivial Change of Frame?,” Economics Letters 34, 241–244. {% Theorem 1 extends Hölder’s Lemma to non-Archimedean and incomplete. %} Carlson, Erik (2011) “Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability,” Mathematical Social Sciences 62, 71–76. {% %} Carlson, John A. (1998) “Risk Aversion, Foreign Exchange Speculation and Gambler’s Ruin,” Economica 65, 441–453. {% Risk attitude is measured with as outcomes monthly lifetime income of grandchildren. In the inequality aversion formula (5), p. 379, I do not understand why utility depends only on the inequality index and, for instance, not on absolute level of utility. %} Carlsson, Fredrik, Dinky Daruvala, & Olof Johansson-Stenman (2005) “Are People Inequality-Averse, or just Risk-Averse?,” Economica 72, 375–396. {% %} Carlsson, Fredrik, Olof Johansson-Stenman, & Peter Martinsson (2004) “Is Transport Safety More Valuable in the Air?,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 28, 147–163. {% time preference in sense of value of waiting time %} Carmon, Zvi, J. George Shanthikumar, & Tali F. Carmon (1995) “A Psychological Perspective on Service Segmentation Models: The Significance of Accounting for Consumers’ Perceptions of Waiting and Service,” Management Science 41, 1806–1815. {% Seems to be a good reference on logical positivism. Good to cite, together with Popper’s (1935) notion of falsifiability, as basis of revealed preference. %} Carnap, Rudolf (1923) “Über die Aufgabe der Physik und die Anwendung des Grundsatze der Einfachstkeit,” Kant-Studien 28, 90–107. {% %} Carnap, Rudolf (1950) “Logical Foundations of Probability.” University Press, Chicago. (2nd edn. 1962.) {% %} Carnap, Rudolf (1952) “The Continuum of Inductive Methods.” University Press, Chicago. {% %} Carnap, Rudolf (1980) “A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part II.” In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.) Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. II, 7–155, University of California Press, Berkeley. {% %} Carnap, Rudolf & Richard C. Jeffrey (1971, eds.) “Studies in Inductive Methods I,” University of California Press, Berkeley. {% N = 140, students. Subjects three times had to choose one of six prospects to measure their risk attitude à la Binswanger (1981). The first six-tuple was fifty-fifty, in the second all prospects were equally ambiguous, and the third was as the first but with $50 subtracted from all payments leading to mixed prospects. (losses from prior endowment mechanism). They, unfortunately, implemented all three choices, generating income effects. What they call losses throughout the paper is mixed. Download 7.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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