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real incentives/hypothetical choice: random incentive system, explained on p. 166-167; also for losses (though there subjects had a prior choice of whether or not they wanted to have the random incentive system actualized, with the loss gambles surrounded by more gain-gambles; virtually all subjects preferred to really play.) They received prior endowment (losses from prior endowment mechanism) but not enough to compensate all potential losses. They don’t report raw data, and not even all of the stimuli they used. They show that with juxta-position manipulation they can confirm predictions of regret theory. %} Starmer, Chris & Robert Sugden (1989) “Probability and Juxtaposition Effects: An Experimental Investigation of the Common Ratio Effect,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2, 159–178. {% backward induction/normal form, descriptive; Shows, in reaction to Holt (1986, AER), that isolation effect works for the random incentive system. Shows that RCLA is violated more than compound independence. Thus, gives evidence in favor of backward induction; also positive evidence for isolation effect. They consider a standard test of the common consequence effect. That is, a choice between (0.2: 10, 0.75: 7, 0.05:0) versus (1:7) and a choice between (0.2:10, 0.8:0) versus (0.25:7), 0.75;0). Several subjects got only one choice. Others got both, knowing it was fifty-fifty which one would be implemented for real (RIS). Under single choice the authors found, between-subject of course, significant violation of expected utility, with the common Allais paradox (AP) pattern more frequent than its reverse. Under RIS they found the same (so, isolation). Complete RCLA would predict as many AP patterns as their reverses. So, they significantly reject complete RCLA to the favor of isolation. Other violations of isolation are not ruled out of course, the more so as confirmation of isolation is only a H0 not-rejected. %} Starmer, Chris & Robert Sugden (1991) “Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation,” American Economic Review 81, 971–978. {% coalescing; Found that a prospect generally becomes more attactive when an event that yields a positive outcome is unpacked into two components. They thus undermine the regret-theory explanation of violations of monotonicity, and cast doubt upon regret theory. %} Starmer, Chris & Robert Sugden (1993) “Testing for Juxtaposition and Event-Splitting Effects,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 6, 235–254. {% Paper investigates various explanations for the preference cylces, originally explained by regret theory. Somewhat surprisingly, it finds that event-splitting (coalescing) does not explain things. They find more agreement with regret theory for matrix-presentations than for other presentations, and argue that framing is doing much. %} Starmer, Chris & Robert Sugden (1998) “Testing Alternative Explanations of Cyclical Choices,” Economica 65, 347–361. {% %} The Statistician 42 (1993) no.3: Special issue: Conference on Practical Bayesian Statistics {% %} Statistical Science 7, no. 1, Febr. 1992, “Editorial.” {% Investigates equilibria with regular Bayesian beliefs, then distortions of those beliefs leading to ambiguity, and then situations in which this does not change the equilibrium. So the equilibrium should be robust against such distortions of beliefs. %} Stauber, Ronald (2011) “Knightian Games and Robustness to Ambiguity,” Journal of Economic Theory 146, 248–274. {% Beginning has nice discussion, and references, on counterfactual reasoning underlying backward induction. The paper considers the approach where deviations from BI (also to be analysed if BI is satisfied) are due to “crazy types” who choose completely randomly. This is taken as ambiguity, and then à la maxmin he goes by the worst scenario. Then probability of crazy types is taken to tend to 0, and the resulting equilibria are considered. Those need not satisfy subgame perfectness, for instance. %} Ronald Stauber (2017) “Irrationality and Ambiguity in Extensive Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 102, 409–432. {% They wrote a computer program that generates ambiguity. So, it produces random numbers, but with ambiguity, so not with probabilities. If one has observed 10,000 numbers generated by the program, one has no clue what the next nr. or future distribution will be. The drawings obviously are not IID or independent. Still no convergences within sight. The program keeps changing “regime.” They heavily use Cauchy distributions throughout the generating process. A very original idea! Here is a website to use it: http://ambiguity.typesofnote.com Stecher emailed, Oct. 2017: “There are links to source code on a GitHub site, which is all in Haskell and therefore should be free of side effects. The GitHub site also has the MIT license, which was the most permissive one we could find.” %} Stecher, Jack D., Timothy Shields, & John W. Dickhaut (2011) “Generating Ambiguity in the Laboratory,” Management Science 57, 705–712. {% Use Brouwer’s view on maths to explain puzzle in finance. %} Stecher, Douglas & Mark van Atten (2015) “Using Brouwer’s Continuity Principle to Pick Stocks,” Annals of Operations Research 225, 161–171. {% foundations of statistics; discussed different interpretations of the llh principle. In particular it considers a version that says that different observations give the same evidence for a given hypothesis if same llh (LP1), and another version that says that different hypotheses get the same evidence from an observation if the same llh (LP2). The paper considers LP1 to be plausible but LP2 less so. %} Steel, Daniel (2007) “Bayesian Confirmation Theory and the Likelihood Principle,” Synthese 156, 53–77. {% Confuses several things. P. 192 top seems to think that there being no specified probability in Ellsberg three-color means that it is not a violation of the sure-thing principle. P. 199 footnote 25 shows little understanding of Broome (1991), who has subtle and careful discussions of whether our not outcomes can become too general, using the term individuation in such discussions. %} Steele, Katie (2007) “Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief from “Risk-Averse” Preferences,” Synthese 158, 189–205. {% Contains probably example of the “long line.” Seems that pp. 67-68 show that preference relation is continuous w.r.t. a connected topology iff the order topology is connected. %} Steen, Lynn A. & J. Arthur Seebach Jr. (1970) “Counterexamples in Topology.” Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York. {% %} Steenhoff, Paul & Peter P. Wakker (2008) “Verliesangst is Drijfveer voor Afsluiten Verzekeren,” Postbank NL 10 no. 1, 27–29. Link to paper
Stefan, Simona & Daniel David (2013) “Recent Developments in the Experimental Investigation of the Illusion of Control. A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 43, 377–386. {% Chance neutrality: tastes are independent of beliefs. May be similar to state independence. %} Stefansson, H. Orii & Richard Bradley (2015) “How Valuable Are Chances?,” Philosophy of Science 82, 602–625. {% measure of similarity %} Steffens, Timo (2007) “Enhancing Similarity Measures with Imperfect Rule-Based Background Knowledge.” IOS Press, Fairfax, VA. {% %} Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1973) “Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, Band IVa, Personelle und Statistische Warscheinlichkeit,” Springer, Berlijn. {% %} Stehling, Frank (1975) “Eine Neue Characterisierung der CD- und ACMS-Produktionsfunktionen,” Operations Research-Verfahren 21, 222–238. {% This paper points out that in lottery choices, as in fact in all choices, there is a winner’s curse going on. Not only will the lottery be good, but also the error probably was favorable. So one should lower one’s evaluation of one’s preferred choice somewhat. For every first bias/error, one can imagine situations where other errors occur and such that the first bias/error reduces the others. Then the first bias/error happens to be useful there. This paper shows that, thus, under particular errors in observations, the overestimation of small probabilities can mitigate the consequences of those errors. One reasoning is that for the most preferred prospect the probability of a good outcome is probably high so that overweighting the small probability lowers the evaluation (p. 1603 2nd para). The result of course depends much on the errors assumed. If a decision maker knows about an error in observation, may also mitigate the error there rather than overweight small probabilities. The authors often link their result to evolution (e.g. p. 1604 mid). The two observations above were provided before in the same journal by van den Steen (2004). P. 1608 middle: the small corrections considered here only matter for decisions that are perceived close to indifferent. (But then the change of choice does not matter much.) From this the authors come to a most remarkable conclusion (P. 1620 end of Section V): “Put differently, debiasing may be beneficial in certain circumstances, but only in those that, from an evolutionary perspective, rarely result in a tie.” Wow! Every biologist ever working on evolution (and still alive) should be informed about this insight, as should every still-living person who ever worked on debiasing. P. 1617: the choice problem considered is that from a set of options a fixed fraction is chosen. %} Steiner, Jakub & Colin Stewart (2016) “Perceiving Prospects Properly,” American Economic Review 106, 1601–1631. {% Discusses problems with conveying statistics, based on group observations, to individual patients for treatment decision. A t the end of p. 619 author seems to mix up things himself: “How many patients are sufficiently committed to the health of the population that they will take medications for years, knowing that some will benefit if all comply?” %} Steiner, John F. (1999) “Talking about Treatment: The Language of Populations and the Language of Individuals,” Annals of Internal Medicine 130, 618–622. {% %} Steingrimssona, Ragnar & R. Duncan Luce (2007) “Empirical Evaluation of a Model of Global Psychophysical Judgments: IV. Forms for the Weighting Function,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 51, 29–44. {% Is there a world outside us?? %} Steinhoff, Gordon (1989) “Putnam on “Empirical Objects” ,” Dialectica 43, 231–248. {% Christiane, Veronika & I; %} Stenkula, Mikael (2004) “The Euro Cash Changeover Process,” Kyklos 57, 265–286. {% Seem to recommend ambiguity aversion for climate change decisions. %} Stern, Nicholas, Siobhan Peters, Vicki Bakhshi, Alex Bowen, Catherine Cameron, Sebastian Catovsky, Di Crane, Sophie Cruickshank, Simon Dietz, Nicola Edmonson, Su-Lin Garbett, Lorraine Hamid, Gideon Hoffman, Daniel Ingram, Ben Jones, Nicola Patmore, Helene Radcliffe, Raj Sathiyarajah, Michelle Stock, Chris Taylor, Tamsin Vernon, Hannah Wanjie, Dimitri Zenghelis (2006) “Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. {% Reference many studies into intertemporal choice for animals, and adds an observation for lemurs. %} Stevens, Jeffrey R. & Nelly Mühlhoff (2012) “Intertemporal Choice in Lemurs,” Behavioural Processes 89, 121–127. {% questionnaire versus choice utility: argue that a cubic function better fits the relation between VAS and SG than a power transformation. Shmueli (2007) criticizes the paper. %} Stevens, Katherine J., Christopher J. McCabe, & John E. Brazier (2006) “Mapping between Visual Analogue Scale and Standard Gamble Data; Results from the UK Health Utilities Index 2 Valuation Survey,” Health Economics 15, 527–533. {% questionnaire versus choice utility: use power transformation from VAS to SG. %} Stevens, Katherine J., Christopher J. McCabe, & John E. Brazier (2007) “Multi-Attribute Utility Function or Statistical Inference Models: A Comparison of Health State Valuation Models Using the HUI2 Health State Classification System,” Journal of Health Economics 26, 992–1002. {% Uses subjective bisection. %} Stevens, Stanley S. (1936) “A Scale for the Measurement of a Psychological Magnitude: Loudness,” Psychological Review 43, 329–353. {% May have been the first to introduce meaningfulness. social sciences cannot measure: wrote his text as reaction to the Ferguson et al. (1940) report. %} Stevens, Stanley S. (1946) “On the Theory of Scales of Measurement,” Science 103 no. 2648, 677–680. {% Argues that instead of Fechner’s logarithmic law, often power functions fit data better, citing data from 14 different perceptual continua. standard-sequence invariance: p. 159 discusses subjective standard sequence measurement of loudness where first hearing highest sound or first hearing lowest sound gave different results, citing Garner (1954). standard-sequence invariance: p. 166 cites J.C. Stevens on tradeoff comparisons (taking multiplicatively, as ratios) to measure subjective loudness. just noticeable difference: In several places, e.g. p. 172, Stevens argues against using just noticeable differences/ratios as basis of cardinal or ratio scales. He writes: “It is improper simply because it is wrong.” P. 173 2nd para discusses adding a little term to power functions, similar to one of the solutions to defining negative powers at 0. P. 176 1st para discusses that measuring equalities a/b = b/c = c/d will not identify the whole ratio scale, similar to Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker’s (2009) time tradeoff sequences identifying discounting only up to a power. P. 178 2nd para: “One occasionally gets the impression that there are more people with a method who are looking for a problem to use it on than there are searchers with a problem looking for a method.” The paper throughout criticizes Fechner, e.g. in final para. %} Stevens, Stanley S. (1957) “On the Psychophysical Law,” Psychological Review 64, 153–181. {% decreasing ARA/increasing RRA: gives psychological arguments for power utility %} Stevens, Stanley S. (1959) “Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility.” In C. West Churchman & Philburn Ratoosh (eds.) Measurement: Definitions and Theories, Wiley, New York. {% ratio-difference principle: seem to have it. %} Stevens, Stanley S. & Hallowell Davis (1938) “Hearing: Its Psychology and Physiology.” Wiley, New York. {% Prothetic continua are scales that are perceived in a concave manner, e.g. duration, loudness, etc. Their perceptions are usually power functions, less curved than the logarithm (so power between 0 and 1). Metathetic continua can in principle be perceived in a linear manner, e.g. visual position. P. 388: “Despite pride of ownership, at least one of the authors is prepared to admit that this function is probably too steep to be representative.” Pp. 389-390 has two nice paras on validity being difficult and subjective that I reproduce below: “The question of validity.—An equation such as the one proposed above may be expected to hold under some set of “standard conditions,” e.g., lifting weights of standard, uniform size under a standard method of lifting. It will not necessarily hold for the lifting of weights that differ in size, or weights presented in different ways. As in all scientific endeavor we have to start with some set of “standard conditions,” determine the empirical rules, and then explore the problem of the invariance of the rules under transformations of the conditions. Contrary to what some authors seem to imply, the failure of invariance to hold does not invalidate the rules or the equations that hold for the standard conditions. Our aspiration, of course, is to formulate rules of wide invariance, for that is the chief aim of the scientific enterprise. The demonstration that the outcome of an experiment depends on “conditions” is a way of showing that invariance is limited, but this fact has no necessary bearing on the problem of validity. The validity of a subjective scale, or of any other scale, is always a matter of opinion. Valid is what makes sense to the scientific community in terms of the problems before it, and, unfortunately, when we push the problem back to where we have to make fundamental choices, there are no external criteria to guide the ultimate value judgments that have to be made. Reliability is a tempting criterion, but sometimes we find that agreement among experimental results is due to the operation of factors that force agreement, as when all Os give identical ratings to the three weights shown by the squares in Fig. 4D. Predictive power is another tempting criterion, but it occasionally happens that prediction succeeds for wrong reasons, as when Fechner's law predicts the outcome of some types of category judgments. What we consider to be valid measures of things is subject to constant revision because we are always up against the uncertain task of deciding, without firm external criteria, that the given measures do or do not assess the things we are interested in.” P. 39-0 2nd para describes history how Stevens run into nonlinear subjective perceptions. P. 397: the oldest subjective category scale available is judgments of brightness of stars by astronomers. %} Stevens, Stanley S. & Eugene Galanter (1957) “Ratio Scales and Category Scales for a Dozen Perceptual Continua,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 54, 377–411. {% time preference; discounting normative: interprets positive time preference as an implicit risk value in lotteries with one nonzero outcome %} Stevenson, Mary K. (1986) “A Discounting Model for Decisions with Delayed Positive or Negative Outcomes,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 115, 131–154. {% time preference; %} Stevenson, Mary K. (1993) “Decision Making with Long-Term Consequences: Temporal Discounting for Single and Multiple Outcomes in the Future,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122, 3–22. {% conservation of influence? Edgeworth (1881) refers to this work without dating it. Seems to discuss mechanism of life. %} Stewart, Balfour, (1873) “The Conservation of Energy Being an Elementary Treatise on Energy and Its Laws.” Henry S. King, London. (4th edn. 1878) {% Seems to cite a number of empirical studies into the utility of money that usually find that square-root utility works well. %} Stewart, Neil (2009) “Decision by Sampling: The Role of the Decision Environment in Risky Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 62, 1041–1062. {% Propose a theory that is a kind of mix of CBDT of Gilboa & Schmeidler, Arducci’s range-frequency theory, and Erev’s experience-theory. Choice alternatives are evaluated by comparison to related alternatives stored in memory, and binary comparisons with those. It leads to alternative explanations for some of the main empirical findings, such as concave utility, inverse-S probability weighting, loss aversion, and hyperbolic discounting. %} Stewart, Neil, Nick Chater, & Gordon D.A. Brown (2006) “Decision by Sampling,” Cognitive Psychology 53, 1–26. {% %} Stewart, Neil, Nick Chater, Henry P. Stott, & Stian Reimers (2003) “Prospect Relativity: How Choice Options Influence Decision under Risk,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132, 23–46. {% SEU = SEU: P. 688 2nd para lists Savage (1954) as one of the nonEU theories for risk. This paper gives further evidence on the theories of Stewart et al, that decisions, utility, and so on are influenced by stimuli seen before. The authors use pessimistic words such as “there is no stable mapping between attribute values and their subjective equivalents.” I have a different DESCRIPTIVE opinion coming from the NORMATIVE view (not central among psychologists) that such subjective equivalents should exist for rational decisions, and then the descriptive goal to find them as good as possible despite the big biases and noise that exist. %} Stewart, Neil, Stian Reimers, & Adam J.L. Harris (2015) “On the Origin of Utility, Weighting, and Discounting Functions: How They Get Their Shapes and how to Change Their Shapes,” Management Science 61, 687–705. {% three-prisoners problem %} Stibel, Jeffrey M., Itiel E. Dror & Talia Ben-Zeev (2009) “The Collapsing Choice Theory: Dissociating Choice and Judgment in Decision Making,” Theory and Decision 66, 149–179. {% P. 122 about idea that policy making can do expected value maximization because it is like repeated games, giving ref to Elstein & Chapman (1994). %} Stiggelbout, Anne M. (1995) “Trade-offs between Quality and Quantity of Life,” Ph.D. Thesis in Medicine, University of Leiden, the Netherlands. {% questionnaire versus choice utility: survey on QALY etc., many references to people who empirically relate utility measurements to psychometric measurements and people using power transformations to relate VAS to TTO. P. 303: “Many authors have assessed the relationship between descriptive (or psychometric) methods for the assessment of quality of life and preference-based (or valuation) methods.” %} Stiggelbout, Anne M. (2000) “Assessing Patients’ Preferences.” In Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A. Sonnenberg (eds.) Decision Making in Health Care. Theory, Psychology, and Applications, 289–312. Cambridge University Press, New York. {% P. 221 discusses whether policies should be based on patients’ utilities or general public’s utilities, bringing the pros (public should decide in the end) and cons (public does not know disease well) as I like them. P. 228 3rd para discusses the same issue but claims that for meso decisions patients’ utilities are to be used, for individual level individual utilities prior to the decision. Here the nuances that I like are missing. P. 221 2nd column gives short discussion of EuroQol and its transformation to utilities. risky utility u = strength of preference v (or other riskless cardinal utility, often called value): p. 222 first column penultimate para equates the two without further ado, as commonly done in medical decision making. P. 222 Fig. 1 gives a decision tree of laryngeal cancer, 65 year old man with T3N0M0 cancer. P. 224 criticizes the SG for probability distortion plus ceiling effects (SG doesn’t do well). P. 226/227 reviews the effect of experience with health state on evaluation. P. 228 bottom of first column, on utility measurement: “For decisions for the individual patient, the methods are not sufficiently reliable,” %} Stiggelbout, Anne M. & Hanneke C.J.M. de Haes (2001) “Patient Preference for Cancer Therapy: An Overview of Measurement Approaches,” Journal of Clinical Oncology 19, 220–230. {% %} Stiggelbout, Anne M., Marinus J.C. Eijkemans, Gwendoline M. Kiebert, Job Kievit, Jan-Willem H. Leer, & Hanneke C.J.M. de Haes (1996) “The Utility of the Visual Analogue Scale in Medical Decision Making and Technology Assessment: Is it an Alternative to the Time Trade-Off?,” International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 12, 291–298. {% In the Netherlands the price of one QALY is between 25.000 and 50.000 Euros. %} Stiggelbout, Anne M. (2000), Interview in Cicero. {% SG higher than CE: p. 87 argues for it through indirect data (direct SG for health states is higher than TTO-with-utility-correction-for- CE (certainty equivalent) %} Stiggelbout, Anne M., Gwendoline M. Kiebert, Job Kievit, Jan-Willem H. Leer, Gerrit Stoter, & Hanneke C.J.M. de Haes (1994) “Utility Assesment in Cancer Patients: Adjustment of Time Tradeoff Scores for the Utility of Life Years and Comparison with Standard Gamble Scores,” Medical Decision Making 14, 82–90. {% %} Stiggelbout, Anne M., Gwendoline M. Kiebert, Job Kievit, Jan-Willem H. Leer, J.Dik F. Habbema, & Hanneke C.J.M. de Haes (1995) “The “Utility” of the Time Trade-Off Method in Cancer Patients: Feasibility and Proportional Trade-Off,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 48, 1207–1214. {% People mention attributes most important for their quality of life, score them, and then determine weights to aggregate them into an overall value. The scoring is sometimes done with direct weighting (DW), i.e., direct subjective assessment, but this does not work well. Judgment analysis (JA) does not ask for direct assessement but uses simple binary choices to assess decision weights. Still the method has many drawbacks. This paper proposes adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) as a more sophisticated method, with more elaborate choices between n-tuples, based on conjoint analysis of marketing (and mathematical psychology), and asking for direct scalings of strengths of preferences. Although problems remain, it works considerably better. %} Stiggelbout, Anne M., Elsbeth Vogel-Voogt, Evert M. Noordijk, Thea P.M. Vliet Vlieland (2008) “Individual Quality of Life: Adaptive Conjoint Analysis as an Alternative for Direct Weighting?,” Quality of Life Research 17, 641–649. {% This is a highly impressive work that I enjoyed immensely and spent much time on. I have one major criticism. Stigler is often overly negative on others. It seems that he does not try to understand what others did, but rather tries to ascribe mistakes to others. Here are some examples of points where Stigler did not seem to be accurate. (1) In §I (first citation of Bentham) he cites Bentham and thinks that it is about interpersonal comparison. I think it isn’t. When Bentham speaks about two individuals it is only his way of expressing dependence on !one! individual. I think that Bentham is discussing consequentialism there, properly pointing out that one cannot incorporate “everything relevant” because then the model becomes intractable. (Note: Becker goes in the opposite direction.) (2) In §V (p. 94) he cites Fisher on ordinal nature of utility and criticizes Pareto for being inconsistent in using cardinal utility elsewhere. However, in the cited part of Fisher, Fisher does not say utility is ordinal. He says: utility is ordinal !!if!! we only seek ... Similarly for Pareto, his commitment will depend on context and antecedent assumptions. It seems that Bruni & Guala (2001) point out this mistake of Stigler. (3) On p. 77, footnote 82, he suggests that §VII will demonstrate that Slutsky had seen something on quasi-concavity versus concavity of additively decomposable utility. However, I think §VII does not give that. (I didn’t check very carefully.) (4) §VIII C argues that people do not gamble and that this should have been used to ... For this purpose, the claim of no gambling is armchair. utility = representational? Outline: - §I on Bentham and others who posited utility. - Then the Ricardians who did not adopt Bentham’s utility. - Then §II on people who stated diminishing marginal utility but did not do anything with it. - Gossen was nice, first to derive optimality condition (marginal utility divided by price should be same for all commodities). - §III on marginal-revolution people (Jevons, Menger, Walras) who used utility and did things with it and to measure it in ways not-too-convincing. - §IV on shape of utility, additive decomposability, concavity, competing and completing commodities, here also the earlier Bernoulli is mentioned. Also just noticeable difference. - §V on (non)measurability, Fisher and Pareto, and Slutsky who banned psychology from economics - §VI on complementarity (saying it’s hard to reconcile with ordinalism) - §VII more on utility versus demand; Part A does abandonment of utility. - §VIII, the final one, does general comments on parsimony versus generality and empirical reality. Beginning of §II refers to several people who assume: marginal utility is diminishing utility families parametric: §IV.C: “The precise shape of the utility function received little attention in the main tradition of utility theory.” Mentions many people who, on the one hand, say interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, but on the other hand do need and use them in their analysis. Download 7.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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