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RADIATION WILL MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR HUMANS TO USE THE ELEVATOR-Foust ‘03



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RADIATION WILL MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR HUMANS TO USE THE ELEVATOR-Foust ‘03

[Jeff; The Space Elevator: Going Up?; The Space Review; 22 Sep 2003; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/48/1; retrieved 01 Aug 2011]


Besides debris, another issue addressed at the conference was radiation from the belts of charged particles orbiting the Earth. While not so much an issue for unmanned spacecraft, which can be easily shielded from the particles, the radiation becomes an issue for future human transit on the elevator. Anders Jorgensen of Los Alamos noted that the risk is severe because the elevator would be traveling slowly—about 200 kmph—and thus could expose passengers to the belts for about 90 hours.

To demonstrate the effects of the radiation, Jorgensen looked at radiation exposure data from the Apollo missions. The missions that traveled through the radiation belts to the Moon received, on average, about 0.5 rads, with Apollo 14 getting the most at 1.14 rads. However, he noted, those missions passed through the radiation belts in only about a half hour. This means that the passengers on a space elevator could be exposed to as much as 100 rads during their passage through the belts, enough to induce acute radiation sickness.


EVEN IF WE DEVELOP THE TECHNOLOGY, THE WORLD MAY NOT BE POLITICALLY STABLE ENOUGH FOR THE ELEVATOR FOR A CENTURY-Foust ‘03

[Jeff; The Space Elevator: Going Up?; The Space Review; 22 Sep 2003; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/48/1; retrieved 01 Aug 2011]


Other sessions of the conference looked at legal and regulatory issues involving a space elevator, with the conclusion that many aspects of the Outer Space Treaty that deal with launches would also apply to the elevator. William Press, deputy director for science and technology at Los Alamos, reminded people of another issue: terrorism. “The space elevator is a physically fragile thing,” he noted. “We may need a stable world society to support the space elevator.” This, he concluded, may mean that while the elevator could be technically feasible in a decade, it might be closer to a century before the world is stable enough to permit its construction.



THE SPACE ELEVATOR MAY BE VIABLE IN THE FUTURE, BUT THE TECHNOLOGY SIMPLY DOES NOT EXIST TODAY-Pugno ‘07

[Nicola; Professor of Structural Engineering, Politecnico di Torino; Space Elevator: Out Of Order?; Nano Today; Dec 2007; pgs. 44-47]


We have presented key formulas for the design of a flaw-tolerant space elevator megacable, suggesting that it would have a lower strength, or would need a larger taper ratio, than has been previously proposed. The thermodynamic maximum achievable strength, which does not involve any best-fit parameter, has been derived to calculate the first ab initio statistical prediction of the megacable strength. This is expected to be <45 GPa. A strength of 10 GPa (which has been experimentally observed in individual CNTs), for example, would dramatically increase the taper ratio to 613. Thus, is the space elevator out of order? Our opinion is: at present, yes; but never say never. However, our proposed flaw-tolerant concept could be key for a terrestrial space elevator design far in the future.
THE PROPOSED DESIGN OF SPACE ELEVATORS REQUIRES A FRAGILITY THAT WILL BE HARD TO ADDRESS-Munck ‘03

[Bob; researcher for NASA NIAC program; The Space Elevator; 16 Jan 2003; http://www.mill-creek-systems.com/HighLift/contents.html; retrieved 02 Aug 2011]


The design of the cable for the space elevator straddles a fine line between impossibility and too fragile to survive. On one hand the cable can be designed to be strong enough to survive any problem and have orders of magnitude more strength than theoretically required. The problem is that such a cable is so massive that there is no feasible way to deploy it in a reasonable time. On the other hand a cable can be designed skirting the theoretical lower limits in strength and come down before the first climber begins its ascent. The problem is to find any middle ground that is feasible.

In the proposed system a standard safety factor of 2 was selected. This implies that the cable has twice the strength theoretically required at any point along its length. The question of a safety factor also changes as the cable is constructed. The cable is the most vulnerable at the very beginning but as it increases in size and thickness the stresses from meteors and wind diminish considerably.


METEORS POSE A SERIOUS THREAT FOR SURVIVABILITY OF THE SPACE ELEVATOR CABLING-Munck ‘03

[Bob; researcher for NASA NIAC program; The Space Elevator; 16 Jan 2003; http://www.mill-creek-systems.com/HighLift/contents.html; retrieved 02 Aug 2011]


Meteors are a serious concern for the survivability of the space elevator cable. Meteor fluxes have been measured from Earth, and their impact characteristics have been studied in-situ (LDEF) and in high velocity impact facilities. In the thick plate regime meteors will destroy an volume 50 times that of the impactor and to depths of several times the impactor's diameter. Much of this destruction is due to the energy shock that is created in the bulk material by conversion of kinetic to thermal energy. In a thin plate scenario this changes. The shock is more intense in a solid thin sheet because the reflection off the back face combines with the initial shock. However, much of the energy also escapes out the back side of the thin plate without destroying more of the plate so the total volume destroyed in a thin plate is less than in a thick plate. In our case we have a more unique situation, we have a sheet composed of independent fibers in a very thin plane. We will see how this affects our situation. But first we will examine our environment.
Space Shuttle Retirement Negative

HARMS: THE SHUTTLE IS NOT NECESSARY FOR ISS


THE END OF THE SPACE STATION IS NOT THE END OF THE ISS OR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT FOR NASA-Kugler ‘11

[Justin; works at NASA Johnson Space Center in the International Space Station National Laboratory Office; Avoiding the End of NASA; The Space Review; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1901/1; 08 Aug 2011; retrieved 09 Aug 2011]


Taylor Dinerman recently published an op-ed for the Hudson Institute that purports to link the supposed “end of NASA” with impacts to national security. Unfortunately, this is only one example of the pervasive attitude in much of the media that equates the successful final mission of the Space Shuttle program with the end of American manned spaceflight.

On its face, the argument doesn’t make much sense. The United States and its international partners have committed to extending operations on the International Space Station until, at least, 2020. After comments from Roskosmos deputy chief Vitaly Davidov about why we would need to de-orbit the ISS at the end of its mission were blown out proportion, NASA reiterated that work is underway to certify on-orbit components through 2028.

Congress has also made it abundantly clear that the roughly $100 billion investment in the only National Laboratory in microgravity is not to be squandered. NASA is in negotiations with the Center for the Advancement of Science In Space (CASIS), a new non-profit organization, to manage research for the National Lab and bring in partners from industry, academia, and other government agencies.
SOYUZ HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR SPACE STATION TRAVEL-Kugler ‘11

[Justin; works at NASA Johnson Space Center in the International Space Station National Laboratory Office; Avoiding the End of NASA; The Space Review; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1901/1; 08 Aug 2011; retrieved 09 Aug 2011]


Though American astronauts will be riding on Soyuz vehicles to get to the ISS until either commercial crew vehicles come online or the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, derived from the Lockheed Martin Orion crew exploration vehicle, is available, there is still plenty of work to be done on-orbit. For that matter, Soyuz has always been the primary crew transfer vehicle for the Space Station because the Shuttle could not provide persistent lifeboat capability.
PRIVATE AMERICAN SPACESHIPS ARE GOING TO INNOVATE AND ARE ALREADY SCHEDULED TO DOCK WITH ISS-Wall ‘11

[Mike; senior writer;Space Station Puts Out Welcome Mat for Private Spaceships; Space.com; 28 Jul 2011; http://www.space.com/12468-space-station-private-spaceships-dragon-cygnus.html; retrieved 08 Aug 2011]


Despite the grounding of NASA's storied space shuttle fleet, American spaceships are expected to make three trips to the International Space Station in the coming months.

All of these visits, however, will be by private vehicles. The California-based company SpaceX is set to launch its Dragon capsule toward the station on Nov. 30 on its second and final orbital test flight, NASA officials announced last week. And if all goes well, the firm could launch another Dragon capsule on its first operational cargo-carrying mission three or four months later.

The Virginia-based company Orbital Sciences, for its part, is planning to send its Cygnus capsule racing toward the station in February 2012.

So, even though the shuttle program has been retired, the future may not be so bleak for American spaceflight, many in the private sector stress.

"I believe we're on the cusp of a golden age of industry-led innovation," Garrett Reisman, head of SpaceX's commercial crew development program, said today (July 28) at the New Space 2011 conference, which is being held here at NASA's Ames Research Center.

SOLVENCY: THE SPACE SHUTTLE WAS A DEEPLY FLAWED PROGRAM


THE SHUTTLE WAS AN INHERENTLY FLAWED, BUDGET-BUSTING VEHICLE-Roland ‘11

[Alex; emeritus professor of History, Duke;Too Much Heavy Lifting; The News & Observer; 30 Jun 2011]


But the shuttle failed to provide safe, reliable, economical access to low-Earth orbit. If this technological tour de force could not open up the potential of space, you have to wonder what can?

The shuttle is still the envy of space-faring nations around the world. But as former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin has observed, the shuttle was also "an inherently flawed vehicle." Its design was constrained by budget limitations and by Air Force insistence that it accommodate the largest of spy satellites and the mission profiles to support them. It was only partially reusable, jettisoning its main fuel tank and rocket boosters on its way to orbit. The wear and tear of flying in and out of the atmosphere drove refurbishing costs to budget-busting levels.


THE SHUTTLE KEPT EXPENSES VERY HIGH WITH TOO MUCH FOCUS ON MANNED MISSIONS-Roland ‘11

[Alex; emeritus professor of History, Duke;Too Much Heavy Lifting; The News & Observer; 30 Jun 2011]


Far from reducing launch costs by an order of magnitude, as it was designed to do, the shuttle actually cost more to fly than the Saturn launch vehicle it replaced. On average, each of shuttle's 135 flights cost the taxpayer $1.5 billion.

Cost remains the bane of chemical-fueled launch vehicles around the world. The Russians probably have the best record, using "big dumb boosters" of simple but reliable design; their real costs for human launches, however, appear not to have achieved NASA's criterion of reducing launch costs by 90 percent. The Chinese, Indians, Japanese and Europeans have all forecast manned spaceflight programs, but so far only the Chinese have joined the U.S. and the Russians in human space-faring. And the Chinese have not flown a taikonaut in three years.


THE COST OF THE SHUTTLE WAS NOT WORTH THE EXPENSE, WHICH HAS BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO NEW PROGRAMS-Logsdon ‘11

[John; professor emeritus at the Space Policy Institute, George Washington University; Was the Space Shuttle A Mistake?; Technology Review; 06 Jul 2011; http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/37981/page1/; retrieved 12 Jul 2011]


But were these considerable benefits worth the $209.1 billion (in 2010 dollars) that the program cost? I doubt it. The shuttle was much more expensive than anyone anticipated at its inception. Then-NASA administrator James Fletcher told Congress in 1972 that the shuttle would cost $5.15 billion to develop and could be operated at a cost of $10.5 million per flight. NASA only slightly overran development costs, which is normal for a challenging technological effort, but the cost of operating the shuttle turned out to be at least 20 times higher than was projected at the program's start. The original assumption was that the lifetime of the shuttle would be between 10 and 15 years. By operating the system for 30 years, with its high costs and high risk, rather than replacing it with a less expensive, less risky second-generation system, NASA compounded the original mistake of developing the most ambitious version of the vehicle. The shuttle's cost has been an obstacle to NASA starting other major projects.

IT WAS A MISTAKE TO MAKE THE SHUTTLE THE CENTERPIECE OF SPACE POLICY-Logsdon ‘11

[John; professor emeritus at the Space Policy Institute, George Washington University; Was the Space Shuttle A Mistake?; Technology Review; 06 Jul 2011; http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/37981/page1/; retrieved 12 Jul 2011]


I have previously written that it was a policy mistake to choose the space shuttle as the centerpiece of the nation's post-Apollo space effort without agreeing on its goals

Today we are in danger of repeating that mistake, given Congressional and industry pressure to move rapidly to the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle without a clear sense of how that vehicle will be used. Important factors in the decision to move forward with the shuttle were the desire to preserve Apollo-era NASA and contractor jobs, and the political impact of program approval on the 1972 presidential election. Similar pressures are influential today. If we learn anything from the space shuttle experience, it should be that making choices with multidecade consequences on such short-term considerations is poor public policy.


THE SHUTTLE WAS INCREDIBLY EXPENSIVE AND UNRELIABLE-Meigs ‘11

[Jim; Was the Shuttle Worth It?; Popular Mechanics; Jun 2011]


For most Americans who, like me, believe human spaceflight is vital to our future, the shuttle remains a flying contradiction. On the one hand, it is an elegant and ambitious feat of engineering, able to carry large crews and big cargos, launch and retrieve satellites, and then land on a runway when it returns to Earth. Yet the shuttle is also an ungainly and impossibly delicate piece of hardware. (One launch was delayed because of damage from woodpeckers.) Conceived as a practical, affordable workhorse, it turned out to be unreliable and, with total costs of well over $1 billion per launch, wickedly expensive. And, of course, dangerous, with an overall failure rate of one per 67 missions.
THE SHUTTLE NEVER COULD BECOME THE WORKHORSE NASA ENVISIONED-Meigs ‘11

[Jim; Was the Shuttle Worth It?; Popular Mechanics; Jun 2011]


But alarms were raised early on. Space policy writer Gregg Easterbrook labeled the shuttle a "death trap" in 1981, before it ever flew, and argued that the program should be shut down. Then the 1986 explosion of the Challenger put the program into permanent go-slow status. By the early 1990s, it was clear that the shuttle would never become the practical workhorse of NASA's dreams.

So why didn't they just retire it? Perversely, the high cost of the program was one key to its long survival. Some 15,000 contractual employees and 2000 civil servants were needed to keep the shuttle running. Many of those contractors and workers were strategically distributed across a belt of politically potent states from Florida to California. And those states' congressional leaders-such as Texas senator Kay Bailey Hutchison -- were dependable defenders of the shuttle. Ironically, a leaner, more affordable space vehicle probably would have garnered less support in Congress.


THE SHUTTLE WAS A BOLD EXPERIMENT, BUT WE CAN DO BETTER-Meigs ‘11

[Jim; Was the Shuttle Worth It?; Popular Mechanics; Jun 2011]


Instead of specifying particular spacecraft designs, NASA needs to define its missions, then take bids from private contractors that can innovate quickly -- and retire unsuccessful experiments just as fast. Today, private companies routinely launch satellites at competitive prices, while innovative outfits such as XCOR Aerospace, SpaceX, Orbital Sciences and Armadillo Aerospace are building new launch vehicles. And businesses are already competing to carry paying passengers into space. In the future, NASA may be just one client among many hiring their services.

As the shuttle prepares for its final flight, let's remember to salute the innovation of its design and the dedication of the astronauts who flew it. The shuttle was a bold experiment. But it kept flying far too long. We can do better next time.


SOLVENCY: SHUTTLE RETIREMENT GOOD FOR NASA


RETIRING THE SHUTTLE WILL PROVIDE URGENCY TO BUILD THE NEXT-GENERATION SPACECRAFT-Shannon ‘11

[John; Space Shuttle Project Manager; http://blog.chron.com/sciguy/2011/07/shuttle-program-manager-on-the-silver-lining-to-his-programs-end/; retrieved 11 Aug 2011]


I think one of the silver linings of retiring the shuttle is that it should drive some urgency in both NASA and the administration and Congress that will say we really need to commit now. In the past we’ve made half steps and then we quit. But now that we don’t have the shuttle any more, we really need to commit to the next program. I think there are enough lessons learned out of the shuttle and canceled programs that we can really make a go of it this time. That’s my hope anyway, that the urgency will be built from the shuttle’s retirement, and it will carry us through.

We always had the shuttle. Once it gets hard or expensive, when it gets over budget or the schedule slips, it was easy to say, “Well let’s just continue flying the shuttle, then. We’ll come tackle this at a later date when the economy’s better, or XYZ problem is solved, or we’re not engaged in this other activity nationally.” We always had the shuttle to fall back on. You get three big things from retiring the shuttle. The first is that sense of urgency, the I-don’t-have-a-domestic-vehicle-that-I can-launch-astronauts-and-do-the-beyond-Earth-orbit-activities-we-would-like-to-do vehicle. The second thing you get is a little bit of money back. The shuttle program pays for a lot of infrastructure around the space agency, so the savings from ending the shuttle is only about $1 billion a year to invest in something else. And you’ll get the people. And I think this is huge.

One of the things we probably did not do right when we were doing new human spaceflight programs is we didn’t take the ones that had really made the shuttle program work and make them move over to the new programs. I think you’re going to have people who are used to doing things, and getting things accomplished, and working under tight schedules and budgets. I think those three things are really going to help NASA, the urgency, the budget back and the people.


NASA WILL BE BETTER OFF NOT FALLING BACK TO ITS OLD WAYS-Kugler ‘11

[Justin; works at NASA Johnson Space Center in the International Space Station National Laboratory Office; Avoiding the End of NASA; The Space Review; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1901/1; 08 Aug 2011; retrieved 09 Aug 2011]


Some might even argue that, in the long run, NASA will do better to not fall back on old ways of doing business. Even Space Shuttle Program Manager John Shannon himself has said that the end of the shuttle gives NASA a sense of urgency, freed-up resources, and the ability to apply the knowledge of the Space Shuttle workforce to the next generation of NASA programs. Technological advancement is increasingly driven by the private sector, which is why the intelligence community created In-Q-Tel in 1999 to harness that rapid innovation. NASA’s Office of the Chief Technologist is now trying to do much the same thing through its strategy of “push-pull” technology development that is designed to both address identified agency needs and provide room for breakthrough innovations to grow.

Space Tourism Negative

INHERENCY: ALREADY HAPPENING
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS ARE ALREADY EXPLORING AND DEVELOPING SPACE TOURISM PLANS-Freeland ‘10

[Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010]


Following the success of SpaceShipOne, entrepreneur and founder of the Virgin group of companies, Richard Branson, announced that he had reached an agreement with its designers for the construction of a larger commercial vehicle, intended to provide ‘Virgin Galactic’ passengers with a three-and-a-half hour journey into space. In the euphoria of that moment, newspapers reported that over 7000 people had signed on to reserve a US$200 000 seat on these flights,[8] although the actual figure appears to be far smaller and, according to Virgin Galactic itself, currently amounts to ‘several hundred people’ who have reserved their ticket, either directly or ‘through [a] global network of specially appointed and highly trained Accredited Space Agents’.[9] In late 2009, Virgin Galactic rolled out its SpaceShipTwo spacecraft at a gala press conference attended by the Governors of both California and New Mexico.[10]

Likewise, in 2007, European aerospace company EADS Astrium unveiled its own plans to provide space tourism flights at an estimated cost of €200 000 per ticket. It was reported that the proposed technology would involve just the one space vehicle, as opposed to the method of launching from a plane as utilised by the Virgin Galactic program.


SPACE TOURISM IS BECOMING A REALITY NOW-Bensoussan ‘10

[Denis; Space Tourism Risks: A Space Insurance Perspective; Acta Astronautica; Jun-Jul 2010; pgs. 1633-1638]


Space tourism is becoming a reality: within a few years, private space travel has gone from concept to near-reality. Virgin Galactic's SpaceshipTwo suborbital spacecraft is already taking reservations from aspiring space tourists, and hopes to start commercial flights by 2011–2012. Amazon founder Jeff Bezos's own space tourism craft is on a similar timeline. The prototype of Las Vegas hotel billionaire Robert Bigelow's ‘space hotel’, a private space station that could be rented out to everyone from wealthy vacationers to national space programs, has been in orbit since July 2006.

However, given current economic conditions, caution is advisable as to the future development and success of space tourism. A recent Sunday Times opinion qualified Space Tourism as a ‘USD 200,000 trip to nowhere’, stressing its lack of business case and the penalty of its exclusiveness.


HUNDREDS OF TRIPS WILL HAPPEN IN THE NEXT YEAR-Jones ‘11

[Charisse; Space tourism comes closer to liftoff; USA Today; 28 March 2011; http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2011/04/Space-tourism-travel-comes-closer-to-fruition/46549950/1; retrieved 14 August 2011]


For years, when John Spencer talked about tourists taking forays into space, he often was met with giggles or a blank stare.

"The laugh factor on this was really intense," says Spencer, founder of the Space Tourism Society, an advocacy group based in West Los Angeles. But with corporate visionaries pouring millions of dollars into the building blocks of such an industry, Spencer says, few people are laughing now.

"It's happening," he says. "There's a market. There's a waiting line. … Our ultimate goal is: Tens of thousands of space tourists actually leave Earth, go to orbital cruise ships, lunar ships, lunar resorts, and have a great time."

The notion of an ordinary person taking a trip beyond Earth's atmosphere is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Several already have gone, and hundreds more have paid for trips that could begin as soon as next year. Even as NASA's shuttle program is drawing to a close — its next-to-last launch is scheduled for Friday, when the shuttle Endeavour is to begin a two-week mission to the International Space Station— private companies are soliciting passengers for commercial trips to space.


SOLVENCY: IMPRACTICAL/UNREALISTIC

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