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Revolution Under Siege: Law, Violence and Marxist Legal Theory
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Revolution Under Siege: Law, Violence and Marxist Legal Theory Cosmin Cercel, University of Nottingham - Cosmin.Cercel@nottingham.ac.uk Marx against Schmitt: Democratic Dictatorship and Dictatorial Democracy Dimitrios Kivotidis, Birkbeck School of Law - dkivot01@mail.bbk.ac.uk Towards a Revolutionary Jurisprudence Tormod Johansen, University of Gothenburg - tormod.otter.johansen@law.gu.se Panel 3: Revolution and Beyond: Law, Reaction and Transition Chair: Daniel McLoughlin Apparatuses of Neoliberal Transition: Transitional justice as Omnus et Singulatem Josh Bowsher, University of Nottingham - ajxjb3@nottingham.ac.uk Precarity and Cumulative Radicalisation: Nazi Law as Revolution and Reaction Simon Lavis, Open University - Simon.Lavis@open.ac.uk Law’s Monsters: The Reductive Framing of Enemies in International Discourse Lynsey Mitchell, University of Strathclyde - lynsey.mitchell100@strath.ac.uk 16. THE TIME AND TEMPORALITY OF VULNERABILITY Panel 1. Framing the Temporality of Law and Vulnerability Chair: Nayeli Urquiza Law’s Time: the temporal dimensions of responsibility and vulnerability in law. Jill Stauffer, Assoc. Haverford College, Haverford The Precarity of Judgment: Temporal Spectrality and the Legal Subject Thomas Giddens, St Mary’s University. Locating the temporalities of vulnerability Tiffany Page, Goldsmiths University Panel 2. Time Disjunctions and Temporalizing Regulations Chair: Thomas Giddens The Times of Ort des Erinnerns: Walter Benjamin, Memorials, and the Nuremberg Race Laws Tiffany MacLellan, Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada Against and with all odds: Foucauldian perspectives on time and temporality in family migration. Alexandra König, Birkbeck School of Law, London; MA in Gender Studies and Political Science, University of Vienna. Multiple Parents and the Temporality of the Family Haim Abraham, University of Toronto Panel 3. Spaces of precarity: race, belonging and temporality Chair: Arturo Sanchez Garcia From Land to Futures: Are Title Registries like Time Machines? Sarah Keenan, Birkbeck School of Law Cashless Welfare Transfers for ‘Vulnerable’ Welfare Recipients – Law, Ethics and Vulnerability Shelley Bielefeld, School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet), Australian National University. “The body that loses its chair”: ‘New’ legal temporalities and the racialised subject Nadine El-Enany, Birkbeck College, University of London. Panel 4. Courts and the multiple temporalities of vulnerable bodies Chair: Carolina Y. Farusho The court as the narrator: narrative strategies in the construction of children as legal subjects Kristina Hultegård, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The (In)Vulnerable Female Asylum Seeker in Strasbourg Lourdes Peroni, Human Rights Center, Ghent University, Belgium. Childhood and vulnerability in ECtHR immigration cases Ellen Nissen, Centre for Migration Law/ Institute for Sociology of Law. Panel 5. Vulnerable subjects: timely construct against persistently unequal relations? Chair: Lourdes Peroni How do intimate relationships make us vulnerable and why should the law respond? Ellen Gordon-Bouvier, University of Birmingham Future Generations as Vulnerable Subjects: Out of Sight, Not Out of Mind Michael Monterossi, University of Venice. The subject or object of law: a trap of civil law equality. Katarzyna Wojtkowiak, Gdańsk University. GENERAL STREAM PREVENT Roundtable Discussion: Critical legal scholarship in times of PREVENT? Activist explorations of the responsibility of the critic Alexandra König, Ceylan Begüm Yildiz, and Paddy McDaid (all from the School of Law, Birkbeck) Thirty years ago, the Critical Legal Conference argued that 'critical thought' must insist on the inseparability of the theoretical from the practical. However, when it comes to questions of critical practice today, how does this legacy reflect upon the matters we are subjected to as students, managers, educators, academics, authors, and activists embedded in specific societal contexts? This session proposes to discuss the 'PREVENT duty' being imposed on UK universities by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The session is committed to the idea of critical practice and will therefore focus on identifying strategies to build resistance against this toxic body of laws and policies. It is intended that, after a short introduction to PREVENT and its implementation at universities, the session will take on a more participatory format dealing with practical questions of building resistance jointly as critical legal scholars around the UK. We hope that you will join us for this important conversation. Further reading: http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/04/01/open-letter-resist-prevent-duty/ Documentary Panel: The Failure of Dublin Agreements and Schengen Aisling O’Regan, Birkbeck Panel 1: Critical Subjectivity Chair: TBC Law and the Pleasure of Text Mark Antaki, Faculty of Law, McGill University - mark.antaki@mcgill.ca> This paper is part of my preparation for a colloquium on Roland Barthes and law. I focus on his “The pleasure of the text”/Le plaisir du texte.” I use this text as an entry point into questions of the the corporeality of (legal) language and texts and that an erotic relation to and experience of (legal) texts. In doing so, I also consider and bring Barthes into conversation with the likes of Susan Sontag (Against Interpretation), Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method among others), Denis J. Schmitdt (Between Word And Image: Heidegger, Klee, and Gadamer on Gesture and Genesis) and some legal scholars who consider these same questions. Notes on the Black Notebooks: Thinking v Theory v Practice Gilbert Leung, Independent Scholar – gillyleung@gmail.com Since the publication of Heidegger’s black notebooks in 2014, there has been much debate over the significance of the indubitable antisemitism contained therein. Should we now, once and for all, stop reading Heidegger? My short answer to this question is no, but with this arises further questions I wish to focus on, namely the relation between theory and practice and the somewhat more obscure question of the relation of thinking to theory. Could it be that theory is the hypostatization of thinking? Is it the case that while theory may inform or guide practice, thinking only connects to practice insofar as it interrupts theory? What is thinking? — Heidegger’s question par excellence. And does his antisemitism mean that at some point he actually stopped thinking? What are the implications for critical legal scholars who, self-consciously or not, engage in ‘theory’? From Subject Crisis to Critical Subjectivity. A Theory of Discourse for The Man of the Crowd Marco Castagna, Università di Napoli "Federico II" - marco.castagna@gmail.com As happens in the pages of the well-known tale by Edgar A. Poe “The Man of the Crowd”, the unveiling of the void hidden under each presumption of “clear consciousness”- or “absolute meaning” (that is the “essence of all crime” in Poe’s work) - seems to determine the only possible existence for the “subject” in an unsolvable dichotomy between “autism” of the individual and “anomie” of the multitude. However, we can observe that it is the semiotic nature of the human “being” that denies every certainty of Subject; and so it is in the pragmatics of languages that we have to look for resources of any attestation of a Self with the Others inthe World. In this perspective, the proposed speech will be focused on the Theory of Discourse, and how this was systematized by French linguist Émile Benveniste (and re-reading by some of the most important thinkers of the last Century, such as Foucault, Lacan or Ricoeur). In fact, in the Discourse, the subject-speaker is called to an act of telling that is never only “individual” but also and always “social”, because every Discourse requires the use of one or more shared code systems - mainly linguistic; and, vice versa, what determines each system is not only “social”, since it exists only in the act of the individuals who use it. Thus, Discourse does not obtain its regularity a priori, but it defines a space of meaning that can be subjected to stability and to heterogeneity of the possible at the same time. In this (utopian) space, the static Absolute Subject of Modernity has no reasons to exist, and it is replaced by a dynamic Critical Subjectivity, fully responsible for the continuity and coherence of its position. Genealogical Critique in Uncertain Times Andreas Kotsakis, Oxford Brookes University - akotsakis@brookes.ac.uk Genealogy is most commonly understood as a critical ‘history of the present’, i.e. as a critical method that uses historical sources to disrupt and destabilise the established and self-evident knowledge, assumptions and practices of our contemporary condition. The continued popularity of this function of genealogy as a form of subversive critique, belonging to the Nietzschean philosophical tradition and reworked primarily by Michel Foucault, is faced with two significant challenges today, when both the reality of our contemporary condition and our perception of it becomes ever more fragmented, unequal and unstable. The first challenge relates to the elements of the genealogical method; while for Foucault and other genealogists working within the Western philosophical tradition it was relatively easy to posit a common present to be problematised, the extension of the genealogical approach to global and/or non-Western institutions and practices has not been accompanied with a critical reflection on what constructing a notion of ‘our’ contemporary condition entails. Foucault himself discussed the task of rendering visible subjugated knowledges and voices in the construction of the present and this has been productively taken up by postcolonial studies, and in fields such as critical international law. But what happens when atavist, imperialist or racist voices regard themselves as ‘subjugated’? The second challenge is wider and relates to the social function of critique; given how our present is experienced, what is the purpose of critical scholarship adding more disruption to something already tittering on the edge of the collapse? As Bruno Latour has said, ‘is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins?’ The paper examines these two sets of challenges using examples from legal studies, and argues that in a world where politicians of ‘conviction’ openly call for the public to disregard all experts and intellectuals, there should be more attention to the structure, objects and aims of critical methods; as well as profound concern regarding how and by whom the findings of genealogical or other forms of critique are welcomed and encouraged. Panel 2: Alternative Critiques Chair: TBC The turning point potential of breaking dominant communication tools for the purpose of expressing critique towards the legal system Natalie Ohanathe, UCL - natalya.oe@gmail.com My paper will examine the turning point potential of an art and dialogue workshop I conducted in a refuge for women fleeing domestic violence in London exploring women’s critique of their encounters with the legal system in the context of trauma. By engaging with Deleuze and Guatari’s minor literature theory I will explore the effects of abandoning a dominant medium for expression – language and particularly the legal language – and using instead a non-disciplinary art form as an alternative, for the purpose of expressing critique towards the legal system. I will present the question whether the workshop represented a turning point that shifted the effectiveness of people subjected to legal proceedings in platforms for legal change - from outsiders perceived as lacking entitlement and skills to participate to leading, central and effective actors. Formalism as Mishandling the Legal Map Peter Brezina, University of Economics and Management in Prague - peter.brezina@vsem.cz Formality and formalism of law has been discussed in scholarship for centuries and in focus of attention of legal scholars for decades. Even some of the greatest debates in modern jurisprudence can be seen as debates on formalism. Most of these endeavours, however, only deal with the inherent and proper formalism of law, while in practice the term is mainly used to denote specific failures of legal enterprise. In his seminal paper “Law: A Map of Misreading” (dating back to 1987) Bonaventura De Sousa Santos proposed metaphors from cartography to explain various legal issues. To my mind this approach can very well be also used to study (excessive) formalism in law – that is, as a specific mishandling of legal space, mainly manifested by mishandling the formal legal map of rules and principles. In this paper I try to demonstrate it. Sleep’s Legal Form; An Anthropological Reading On The Normative Significance Of Late Modern Sleep. Ignacio Riquelme Espinosa, University of Bristol - i.riquelme@bristol.ac.uk Over the last decades sleep has appeared as a new topic for the law, calling for discussion, dedicated regulation, and growing social concern. Though sleep has been a topic of social and intellectual interest way beyond late modern culture, it’s political and legal appearance point to a crucial change in the event´s social signification. This paper inquiries about the social conditions that have enabled and propelled the appearance of sleep as a matter of legal concern, as well as the possible implications of that specific social articulation. By linking anthropological work the “sleep problem” and social temporality the paper focuses on the way in which sleep has become an element under law’s explicit consideration. In a more general view, this essay seeks to provide an insight to the way in which law, in identifying and defining a new element of regulation, engages with several other social discourses and arrangements, which in turn enable the object’s legal relevance. The paper presents a progressive argument in three parts. First it unpacks the late modern sleep conflict by presenting the discursive articulations that have permitted its redefined public appearance. Then, it situates sleep conflict in relation with modern-western social time structures. By discussing the anthropological literature on social articulations of time I show that one of the most relevant aspects of sleep’s new political discussion is a redefined normative temporality. Finally it returns to sleep conflict’s political and legal resonances, proposing that a legal articulation of sleep reveals central aspects of the way in which law engages with temporal conflicts and divergent discourses. Humiliation’s jurisdiction – the animation of the legal world and the creation of political memory Juliet Rogers, University of Melbourne/Griffith Law School, Queensland - juliet.rogers@unimelb.edu.au Stories of humiliation at the hands of police, military and other official personnel permeate the narratives of those who live under occupation; either militarily, such as in Palestine, or Northern Ireland under British rule, or politically, such as Indigenous people in Australia. For those subject to humiliation the world is animated, at the point of encountering, in the image of the soldier, the police or the beaurocrat, as the worker of the regime. This animation, even for a short time, can produce a profound, and memorable effect, and in this sense, it realizes the legal world in the flesh. Whereas torture leaves a scar, and certainly has some of the properties of humiliation, it is viewable in the flesh. Legal judgment too is experienced, in Cover’s terms, ‘in the field of pain and death’,1 the jurisdiction of humiliation is identity. Humiliation, unlike most forms of torture, works to make those subject to it complicit in their own subjugation, it pretends to choices and choices are the terrain of identity. Thus, the experience of humiliation can be as lingering as the life of the subject, and it can produce a legal world that reflects the lived experience of humiliation. In this paper I discuss selected moments of humiliation in Northern Ireland and Australia and consider, with the help of psychoanalysis, how the lived memory creates practices of legal and political affiliation in the one humiliated. Panel 3: Regulation and technology Chair: TBC Measuring the ‘lawfulness’ of legal technologies: from speedbumps to smart contracts Jake Goldenfein, Swinburne Law School, Swinburne University of Technology - jgoldenfein@swin.edu.au Is there a difference between a technological artefact designed to implement legal normativity – what has been called ‘techno-regulation’ (such as a speedbump) – and a technical ‘expression’ of law? Law is, of course, already an information-technological system, however increasingly, arguments are being made that the format or medium for the transmission of legal rights and relations requires rethinking for law to retain its identity and efficacy. Some have even argued for technical expressions of law that are capable of being articulated into the telecommunications infrastructure itself. These could be legal artefacts that carry both the architectural force of technology and the compulsion of legal legitimacy. Indeed, the take-up of legal expert systems in administrative law is leading to the creation of fully automated technological systems that produce binding legal outcomes, and there has been significant research into translating legal instruments (like legislation) into formalised logic languages. However, the idea that, for example, legislation itself could be created in formal programming languages is relatively new. These ideas provoke various criticisms on legal, technical and political registers. However, this paper focuses on claims that formalised automated technological expressions of law risk undermining the ‘nature’ of law, and even bringing about the ‘end of law’. These questions acquire new relevance in the context of distributed ledger technologies and the protocols that facilitate automated action (such as smart contracts) on blockchain infrastructure. Some have claimed that, in the same way as BitCoin avoids the necessity (to a certain extent) of financial intermediaries, new blockchains (and automated transactions) will avoid the necessity of legal intermediaries to enforce agreements between parties or administer governance structures. But what is the ‘legal’ character of these environments and how might they interrelate with traditional regulatory categories, structures and exercises? This paper accordingly seeks to identify a framework for thinking through questions of technical legal nature in relation to the possibility of digital, and automated expressions of law. This requires addressing questions such as whether there is a material difference between the regulatory characters of law and technology? That is, whether artefacts of techno-regulation are simply a delegation of law into technology – a juridification of technical modes of existence? Or whether there a point on the spectrum between ‘weakly legal’ and ‘definitively legal’ (legal per se) that satisfies the jurisprudential character of ‘legality’, ‘lawfulness’ and legal ‘legitimacy’? This implicates questions around the essentiality of informality in legal nature (and its relationship particular political rationalities like liberalism), or whether it will become necessary to acknowledge some plurality in legal nature or plural legal natures? The Right to Internet Access, ICCPR, and China: Legal and Practical Insights on Chinese Internet Censorship Artem Sergeev, University of Hong Kong - sergeev@connect.hku.hk Following the effect of the internet on the different aspects of human lives, it was argued that the internet is currently protected by international law. The present research assesses the validity of this legal assumption with conjunction to the internet policy in China. The first part of the article argues that the internet is currently protected under the international Human Rights law, and, in particular, under the freedom of expression. Accordingly, the internet is not the right per se, but a tool to exercise the freedom of expression. The second part of the research argues that the vast Chinese internet censorship goes contrary to the internet’s protection under the freedom of expression. Furthermore, the argument explores if China breaches the ICCPR’s object and purpose as it disproportionality limits the means of the freedom of expression, namely, the internet. Lastly, the research examines the practical contribution of the internet to the democracy building and domestic liberalization. The research argues that the internet is not a reason for political changes, but, it is a convenient tool of the latter. Accordingly, the internet is an outcome of a free society, but it is not the cause of the existence of such society. International Space Law and Legal Mechanism to protect Moon’s Environment Amit Kumar Padhy, Hidayatullah National Law University, India -mitkumarpadhy24@gmail.com With both advances in technology and increasing demand for constrained crude resources (limited raw materials which primarily emphasises on natural resources) on earth, the issue of private property rights and protecting the ecosystem of the moon has again assumed prominence. While it is widely believed that many parts of the Moon Agreement are unworkable, until recently there has been no impetus for a new system, simply because it seemed unnecessary. This paper will argue that a new system is necessary, and that the way to ease into it to set up a provisional system, under the aegis of the Outer Space Treaty, that will allow the first few enterprises to work on the moon real legal certainty for their activities. This provisional system will allow the pioneers legal certainty for their activities while preserving the rights of the citizens of the world as the system develops, so that even as the resources of the moon are used to help mankind, the environment of the moon is protected. The implementation of plans for intensive activities on the Moon seem to become ever more probable: On January 14, 2004, the U.S. President George W. Bush announced plans for space travel in the coming decades which involve extended human missions to the Moon as early as 2015, with the goal of living and working there for increasingly extended periods of time. Only three years later, in September 2007, plans to establish a Russian Moon station suitable for permanent settlement on the Moon’s surface in the period between 2028 and 2032 have been published2. This way, the space law community can see what problems will arise in this experimental atmosphere, enabling them to perfect, when the activities on the moon become so widespread that a permanent system is needed, a legal framework that both encourages commercial activity and protects space from pointless environmental damage3. Panel 4: Movement, Constraint and the Loss of ‘Home’ Chair: Suhraiya Jivraj Directory: law law -> Law in American Society Black History Month Essay Contest law -> A brand New Image? Should Personality Rights be law -> Jurisdiction of the Courts law -> Luther V. Borden: a taney Court Mystery Solved law -> ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Sport’ law -> The law of tort introduction a. What is a Tort? law -> Law of Delict Chapter 1: General Introduction law -> Appendix C: Federal and Minnesota Case Law Summaries Download 0.92 Mb. Share with your friends:
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