VII. Case Study: The Taiwan Issue

VII. Case Study: The Taiwan Issue

Although most people would speculate that the Taiwan issue would be an exception to China’s overall foreign policy because of historical sentimental factors and geopolitical politics, the following analysis shows that China has handled this most sensitive issue in a way that remains consistent with its national agendas – focusing on economic development, domestic stability, and cultivating an international environment conducive to domestic growth. China has shown its prudence and patience on the Taiwan issue, especially after 1978, and has made its Taiwan policy responsive to both the domestic and international situations.

According to Michael Swaine, China’s decision to shift the basic thrust of its Taiwan policy from confrontation to peaceful reunification through negotiations did not emerge fully until the late 1970s/early 1980s. He argues that it was the logical consequence of other major policy initiatives, including the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations and the adoption of economic reform and opening policies. In particular, the economic reform and opening policies required the development of a peaceful and stable external environment conducive to economic growth, including amicable ties with the major powers and with Asian neighbors.⁸⁸ In the reform era between 1978 and 1995, China did not threatened to unify with Taiwan by force, despite the fact that China did not renounce the use of force.

Despite the fact that President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in June 1995 and his statement of “two-state theory” in July 1999 triggered military threats from China, Beijing showed the same restraint in addressing cross-Strait relations and U.S.-China relations. For example, although Chinese leaders at the Beidaihe meeting in early August 1995 reconfirmed their view that the United States likely sought to contain China, they recognized that Beijing needed to maintain workable relations with Washington. Both President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng espoused the argument that China could not afford to confront the West and that Deng Xiaoping’s longstanding emphasis on economic reform and development must remain dominant in China’s overall strategy. This theme was repeated by President Jiang in a series of leadership meetings held in August and September.⁸⁹

Beijing escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 and 1999-2000 but never went beyond posturing, both rhetorically, and more seriously, militarily. Through its limited force deployments to the Strait region, China signaled that it did not intend to actually attack Taiwan – China referred to its force buildup as “deterrence” (against Taiwan independence). China did not deploy the material means to realize an actual invasion. In addition, even Chinese analysts believed that U.S. leaders (and Taiwanese leaders) knew from intelligence gathered by U.S. satellite reconnaissance that Chinese intentions were limited to influencing Taiwanese leaders and public psychology.⁹⁰

In February 1996, the U.S. embassy in Beijing was informed that no attack on Taiwan was planned. In February and March, Li Zhaoxing, China’s vice foreign minister (and later ambassador to the United States), and Liu Huaqiu, director of the Foreign Affairs Office of China’s State Council, held a series of intensive meetings with officials from the U.S. State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. During these meetings, the PRC officials gave strong assurances about the limits in time, scale, and location of its military exercises and missile tests. They gave the United States government explicit assurance that the PLA would not attack Taiwan while it urged the United States to stay out of the cross-Strait quarrel. According to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman, the PRC had told the United States, in both public and private conversations, that it had no intention of attacking Taiwan. Even the chance of accidental “incidents” was minimized. The PLA’s Front Line Command strictly ordered the participants to avoid any “unwanted situation to emerge.” Beijing’s assurances truly reflected this intention because they were made before the heated missile-test exercises in early March 1996 and before the United States deterred China by sending two aircraft carriers to the waters near the Taiwan Strait.⁹¹

It seems contradictory that, on the one hand, China needs stability and peace, but, on the other hand, Beijing engaged in sabre rattling. In fact, Beijing’s military brinkmanship involved both war games and war avoidance. Beijing’s logic, as You Ji explains, is that: “(1) China would have to wage a war against Taiwan if the latter declares independence; so (2) military threats would reduce the likelihood of a declaration of independence; and so (3) military threats would make a war less likely.”⁹² Ultimately, China wanted to avoid a military conflict with Taiwan.

In March 1996, having used brinkmanship throughout the crisis, Beijing finally accepted the fait accompli of Taiwan’s election results and referred to the re-elected Lee Teng-hui as a “local” leader. The military exercises ended without escalating into a war. Even though the Chinese government had tried to focus its anti-Taiwan independence attack on Lee Teng-hui for several months prior to the presidential election, Beijing’s post-election comments mainly targeted Peng Ming-min, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate. With the substantial reduction of votes received by Peng compared with votes received by the DPP in previous elections, Beijing declared a victory for pro-unification forces in Taiwan.⁹³

Through much of February and March 2000, China’s top leaders threatened trouble if Chen Shui-bian, the DPP presidential candidate, won the election. Premier Zhu Rongji suggested that if Taiwan chose pro-independence leaders, it might not get the chance to choose again. However, right after Chen’s victory on March 18, a Chinese government statement said, “The election of the leader of Taiwan and its outcome cannot alter the fact that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory…. We will listen to the words and observe the actions of Taiwan’s new leader and wait and see in which direction he takes cross-Strait relations.”⁹⁴ As of early 2002, Beijing had yet publicly condemned Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian in the official press.

In late November 1995, polls commissioned by the General Office of the CCP Central Committee showed that about 90 percent of the China’s population supported military action against Taiwan if the pro-independence movement gained momentum. According to a March 2000 telephone poll conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou by the China Social Survey Affairs Institute, 95 percent of those interviewed said that “if Taiwan independence elements come to power, we will resolutely support the government in going to war against Taiwan.” However, in these two Taiwan Strait incidents, Beijing did not manipulate Chinese nationalism to escalate the crises or even to support its military action toward Taiwan. By contrast, Beijing was cautious and prudent.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, Chinese authorities found themselves boxed in by their own rhetorical excesses. Right after acknowledging that Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election on March 18, 2000, some five thousand students marched through the streets of Chongqing City as well as Wuhan City demanding a tough response. Nonetheless, demonstrations were stopped early on by the local police. The government was apparently able to prevent similar protests from developing in Beijing and Shanghai. The police immediately rejected the application of so-called “Anti-Taiwan Independence Demonstrations” by the students in those two cities.⁹⁶

In order to minimize the emotional reaction by the Chinese people, the government reportedly issued an “internal circular” pledging Beijing’s “determination and ability” to recover Taiwan within a certain (albeit unstated) time frame. In particular, the circular urged the public, including students and soldiers, not to take any rash action, including demonstrations. It said, “We understand the angry reaction of the public to the rise of the DPP. However, the nation must concentrate on economic construction and remain in unison with the center.” [emphasis added]⁹⁷

Despite Beijing’s cautious use of military threats toward Taiwan, China’s missile tests and military exercises in March 1996 sparked international concerns. In order to minimize international suspicion, China’s top generals and Foreign Ministry spokesman repeatedly provided assurances that China had neither aggressive intentions nor invasion plans. Liu Huaqing, first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, said reassuringly, “China will neither invade any other country nor join in the arms race.” General Fu Quanyou, chief of the PLA General Staff, said China needed not only political and social stability at home, but also a peaceful international environment, especially a stable surrounding environment. In addition, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman asserted that China had no intention of hurting the economies of the region with its war games. After the missile crisis, from March 1996 to mid-1997, Chinese civilian and military leaders traveled to cities in Asia and Europe in order to reassure the world that China remained committed to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and would not threaten the peace, stability, and growth of Asia.⁹⁸

In addition, Beijing strongly and repeatedly reassured Taiwan’s investors in China during the 1995-96 and 1999-2000 incidents that their legitimate interests would be protected. Furthermore, Chinese leaders repeatedly reassured Taiwanese investors that there would be no war in the Taiwan Strait. These reassurances reflect China’s national agenda and will be discussed further in Chapter 10.