Business organizations, party systems and state structure in the age of innocence cathie jo martin


Party and State Structure Variables



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Party and State Structure Variables

#8: the higher the level of proportionality in voting, the higher the corporatist organization of employers

#9: the lower the level of state centralization (i.e., more federalism), the lower the corporatist employers’ organization

Table 3. The Underpinnings of Employers’ Organization, 1900's-1930's in 16 Nations.


Variables

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

Proportionality of Electoral System

1.9195***

(.3191)


---

---

2.1116***

(.3179)


1.8149***

(.3243)


.9172**

(.4350)


Federalism


-.7604*

(.5026)


.2607

(.4129)


.4871

(.4836)


-1.2867**

(.5677)


-.2362

(.7912)


-5959

(.4958)


Disproportionality Index (log)

---

-.8920***

(.2451)


---

---

---

---

Multipartism


---

---

.6090*

(.4345)


---

---

---

Economic Concentration

% GDP in Manufacturing



---

---

---

.0548*

(.0366)


---

---

Religious and Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation

---

---

---

---

-1.7341

(1.9128)


---

Traditions of Coordination


---

---

---

---

---

.7647***

(.2223)


Union Mobilization

(Union Density)



.0538***

(.0188)


.0378**

(.0236)


.0655**

(.0260)


.0497***

(.0173)


.0392**

(.0229)


.0607***

(.0195)


(Log) Area


.2087

(.1579)


-.3198***

(.1114)


-.4644**

(.1247)


.4284

(.2045)


.1527

(.1672)


.2544

(.1538)


Openness (Exports as % of GDP)

.0080

(.0254)


-.0074

(.0268)


.0098

(.0264)


.0204

(.0268)


.0159

(.0298)


.0223

(.0197)


(Log) Per Capita GDP


1.3530*

(.9728)


-1.2502

(.9446)


-2.0795

(.8021)


2.1417**

(1.1531)


1.4149*

(.9920)


1.9646**

(.9452)


Constant

-2.5736

12.4192

12.8677

-8.8674

-.9190

-4.6785

R2

.7648

.6369

.5718

.7812

.6784

.8007

All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors. Cases are 36 country decades for the 16 nations defined in the text. Each model includes time period dummies for 1900's, 1910's, and the 1920's.


* probability < .10

** probability < .05

*** probability < .01
Table 4. Final Models of Pre–WWII Employers Organization and Social Corporatism


Variables

Employers Final Model

Pre-WW II Corporatism

Employers (LDV model)

Employers

(Jackknife-i’s)



Employers (Jackknife-t’s)

Proportionality of Electoral System

.9172**

(.4350)


.4047*

(.2984)


.4166**

(.2466)


.8572**

(.4126)


.9936*

(.3414)


Federalism


-.5959

(.4953)


-.4819***

(.2074)


.1507

(.3119)


-.5710***

(.1983)


-.5954***

(.2166)


Union Mobilization

(Union Density)



.0607***

(.0195)


---

.0329***

(.0125)


.0625***

(.0198)


.0585***

(.0041)


Traditions of Coordination

.7647***

(.2224)


.3678**

(.1783)


.2625*

(.1762)


.7962***

(.1917)


.7001***

(.1125)


(Log) Area


.2544

(.1533)


.1312

(.0809)


.0357

(.1094)


.2531

(.1083)


.2436

(.0407)


Openness (Exports as % of GDP)

.0223

(.0197)


-.0040

(.0136)


.0004

(.0160)


.0238*

(.0174)


.0137

(.0303)


(Log) Per Capita GDP

1.9546**

(.9453)


1.7887***

(.5448)


-.0583

(.5652)


1.8420***

(.4801)


1.8384*

(.8838)


Employers Organization t-1

---

---

.9257***

(.1504)


---

---

Constant

-4.6702

-5.2747

-.4527

---

---

R2

.8007

.7135

.9127

---

---

N

36

36

36

---

---

Models of columns I to III are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors. Cases are country decades as defined in the text. The model includes time period dummies for 1900's, 1910's, and the 1920's. The models of columns IV and V report jackknifed coefficients as defined in the text. * probability < .10 ** probability < .05 *** probability < .01



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NOTES

1. We considered other political and institutional factors that may retard or promote employers’ organization. We find little support for them in empirical models presented below and, because of space constraints, do not expand on theory and (null) findings here. First, the timing of suffrage might matter. Early suffrage reportedly creates a division of work between left parties and unions, with parties addressing broad political rights and unions managing workplace conflicts (Shefter 1986). Similarly, without political struggle over basic political rights driving societal organization, business associations might afford to be ill-organized. Second, the number of veto points may matter in that veto points increase the size of the majorities necessary to pass legislation and politicians might reach out to corporate supporters (Huber, Regan and Stephens 1993). Finally, the size of the public sector may matter as it may signal the needs and capacity of the state to mobilize business for policy purposes. Employers may concomitantly organize to defend their interests.

2. We also measure the sectoral dispersion of economic activity through the index of qualitative variation, or 1 - ∑pi2, where p is the proportion of employment in each i sector: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, communications, transportation and services . Firm size may also reflect the level of industrialization; however, comparable data on firm size do not exit for our sample.

3. We also measure state centralization by the percentage of total general revenues collected by the central government. Tests of this alternative measure produced null findings.

4. We establish the following criteria concerning democracy (to be used to judge inclusion/exclusion of a country decade): universal male suffrage; competitive elections; recognition of political and civil liberties.

5.Employers in the building and metal trades formed the Danish Employers’ Confederation of 1896 and in 1898, the handicrafts sectors joined to create the Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Galenson, 1952).

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