Chapter 1: Property as rights, not thing


Chapter 2: Which Rights in Which Things?



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Chapter 2: Which Rights in Which Things?

Theories of Property Why do we get certain Right?

1. The following contains some of the principal justification for private property offered by political and legal theorists.

2. Learn a general understanding as they inform legal decision making.

3. Even where private property is the dominant means of resource allocation, two main problems still emerge:



  • Some folks try to claim rights in a thing not hitherto considered suitable for private property; and

  • Questions arise as to the extent of private rights.

1. Labour


Justification of Private Property: Locke: “When the labour was mixed with a thing, the thing was removed from the state of nature and became the property of the individual who had worked with it.” This transforms common property into individual property. “The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, has fixed my property in them”.


John Locke, Quoted in: Property mainstream and critical positions. (1978) p. 45 – Justification of private property. Common property + Labour = Private Property.

  • Overview – Any common property that a person mixes his labour with becomes his private property. The property is moved out of a state of nature (common property) and become the property of the person who worked on it.

  • Labour belongs exclusively to the Labourer, so by mixing it with common property he creates for himself private property….so long as there is enough left in common for others.

  • First Occupancy – seldom grounds title, and possession doesn’t ground ownership either. Both would lead to violence and this is why they are not justified.

  • Remember class example of pouring tomato juice into the ocean, is the ocean then yours? What is labour? What if some people can labour more than others, how equitable is this?




James Tully, Rediscovering America, in Locke in Context. (1993) p. 46 – Indian forms of Property disregarded in Locke’s concepts.

  • Overview – The Concepts of political science and property are inappropriate to and misrepresent two specific political problems: the problem of aboriginal self-government, and ecology.

  • The native struggle for recognition as self-governing nations and efforts to reclaim their traditional lands has brought them into conflict with modern forms of land use that pose the greatest threat to the environment.

  • Aboriginal land use and property relations offer enough of an alternative to our system of property to help inform our debates about property.

  • First occupancy cannot be a justifying principle of property b/c the Crown’s own title would fall to the Natives.

Locke’s theory is constructed to obscure and downgrade the distinctive features of Amerindian forms of property.

  • He defines political society so that Indian gov’t do not qualify as legitimate forms of political society; and

  • He defines property so that Indian land use is not legitimate.

  • The result is that Indian land is subjected to the sovereignty of European concepts of politics and property.

  • He suggest Locke could be viewed as supporting colonialism.

So long as we continue to use Locke’s concepts of political society and property, Indian claims to self-government and land holdings will be misunderstood.

2. Occupancy or Possession [48]


The person who occupies or possesses property has property rights, this justified private property

This is not much of a justification for private property as it is a justification of why particular rights are assigned to a particular person.


3. Utility [48]


Bentham: private property rights should be awarded for utilitarian reasons – greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

  • He defines happiness as including security and subsistence which is obtained through private property.

  • Utility should be used as a standard against which we measure property rules.

  • Cost benefit analysis is a very common method of grounding property.

  • How do you define the “good” that we are trying to maximize? And who is the good for?

4. Law and Economics (Used more in the USA than Canada [49]


Property should be allocated to achieve ‘market efficiency’, thus market is the best regulator of this.

Scholars argue that this is reached when the private property regime incorporates maximum levels of exclusivity, maximum use, and maximum transferability = everyone is assumed to be a wealth maximizer.



Descriptive: Theory asks what people are likely to do assuming they are wealth maximizers. Explains people’s behaviour. INS v. AP: some protection needed because without some protection there is no incentive to go on producing newspaper.

Prescriptive: normative considers what would be the most efficient.

5. Freedom and Personality [49]


Private property enhances human freedom and moral development.

Also the ability to control resources allows humans to exert their will over the external environment and in the process to demonstrate their individuality. It is this assertion of dominance over things that liberated the personality and made human beings human.





M.J. Radin, property and personhood. (1982) p. 50 – What is a Person?

  • If property is for “personhood”, then what is a person.

  • Roman – the persona

    • The person is a rights holder.

    • Kant: free and rational whose existence is an end in itself.

  • Classical View – Locke

    • Person is essential attributes include self-consciousness and memory.

    • Locke: “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself”.

  • Persons as human bodies

    • Continuous embodiment is a necessary but not sufficient condition of personhood.

    • The best picture of the human soul is the human body.

  • No name

    • Individual’s ability to project a continuing life plan into the future is as important as memory or continuing consciousness.

    • Persons are what they are in virtue of their past and future integrated by their character.

  • Communitarian

    • Above theories are all derived from an individualistic worldview.

    • Persons are embedded in language, history, and culture, which are social creations.

    • There can be no such thing as person without society.

  • Fetishistic

    • When the good of ownership is overtaken by ownership to the extreme. Fingernails.

6. Radical Theories [54]


All start from MacPherson’s positions that “Property is Power”.

  • This might justify limiting property rights. Ie. rent control limits a landlords rights to let market forces set the rate of rent.

  • Legal analysis tends to assume that there is an ‘essence’ to property and that only certain attributes can be property. This ignores the fact that property is rights which are awarded by those with the authority to do so.

  • To say something is “not property” only means that a court has not recognized it as property.

  • There is no correlation b/w any of these theories and the political position that stresses the predominance of unlimited private property.




Cohen, Property and Sovereignty. (1978) p. 55– Dominion over things is also imperium over human beings

  • Property law has perpetuated the ancient tradition of ‘property as sovereign power compelling service and obedience’.

  • This is obscured in a modern commercial economy by money, but hasn’t really changed at the core.

  • Property law determines what men shall acquire and determines the future distribution of goods that will come into being.

  • Dominion over things, as an owner for example, is also absolute power over our fellow human beings.

7. Gift - What is a gift? [59]





M. Mauss, The Gift(Maori). (1967) p. 59 – Things have spirits/souls which pass b/w giver and receiver

  • The Taonga (thing) is animated by the hau (spirit) and the hau follows after anyone possessing the thing.

  • This illustrates the nature of the legal tie that arises through the passing of the thing. What imposes an obligation is that the thing is not inactive, even when abandoned, it still possesses something of the person.

  • Making a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself.

  • Is a gift then “free” if it contains a part of yourself? Link this to Haida Potlatch and point on guy who studied gifts from Julia’s summary.




L. Hyde, The Gift (The Girl and the Dead Man) (2007) p. 61;

  • Overview –

  • Blessings:

    • Mother’s choice – Blessing < food or No Blessing > food

    • Brought to life

  • Gifts can have obligations

  • Gifts should not stay put, but should be moved on to others.

What are the principles underpinning a gift?



  • A gift that stays in motion remains a gift

  • By keeping a gift, no one gets more gifts

  • A gift must be used, consumed, or eaten

8. Value (Rubbish, Walden)[63]
Value

Michael Thompson, Rubbish Theory: The creation and Destruction of Value. (1979) 64 – Value in the way that you say it, not in what you say

  • Text explores the transformation of objects from rubbish to objects of value by exploring the contrast between the categories of transient and durable:

  • TransientObjects in this category decrease in value over time and have finite life spans.

  • RubbishObjects that fall into this covert category have a zero and unchanging value.

  • Durable - Objects in this category increase in value over time and ideally have infinite life spans.

  • We can make transient objects durable based on how we treat the object. Rubbish category provides the path for the transfer of an object from transience to durability.

Major points

  • There is usually a decline from transience to rubbish and a possible accession to durability. The rubbish to durable transfer is an all-or-nothing transfer. For an item to cross these boundaries of rubbish to durable it must begin to acquire value and it must emerge from obscurity. It is unlikely that one will ever be able to point to an exact moment in time, and say that is when such and such an item became durable – it happens whenever the aesthetic judgments will become sufficiently centric for a market to emerge. The objects are usually considered as ‘decorative’ and the ideal collecting conditions of availability are those of a high supply and low demand.

  • Once in durable category, there is an increasing aesthetic value.

  • Durables are always in the hands of the most powerful. (Great example is artwork that is no longer in its native country such as many of the sculptures that formed the façade of the Parthenon were taken by the English. The justification for them not being returned to Greece is that Greece does not have the capacity to preserve the sculpture (i.e maintain their durability) in the same way that England does.

  • Availability of supply coupled with a low price brought about by a general lack of demand is a perfect description of the circumstances surrounding eccentric aesthetic valuations within the realm of rubbish.

  • Uses Stevengraph example to demonstrate the Rubbish theory but also to emphasize the trivial nature of that theory: when all said and done, most people manage to get through life without even being aware of its existence. BUT there comes a point beyond which culture is indivisible.

  • In addition, when the transfer of control from women to men does not occur, item does not transfer from rubbish to durable. Women have been excluded from durability.

  • Value is an interesting concept. It’s not a justification for property but it’s a concept that runs in tandem to property.

  • The concept of durables always being in the hands of the most powerful is a really important concept to keep in mind throughout the course when considering the concept of property.

  • What type of value

  • Changes in relations to others over time

  • Unfair competition



International News Service v. Associated Press, USA (1918), 80– Intangibles as Property; quasi-property rights;

Facts: INS and AP are two news companies. AP is suing INS for “stealing” its news. INS was taking news from bulletins or early editions of AP’s newspaper and sending the info by telegraph or telephone to the western papers in order to be delivered earlier or at the same time as AP’s papers.

Issue:

  1. Are there property rights in news? (No, for general public, yes between competitors)

  2. Can INS be restrained from selling news to its clients that it appropriates from AP? (Yes) AP has right of exclusion towards INS.

  3. Did INS’ conduct constitute unfair competition in trade? (Yes)

Maj (Pitney J): Question centers not on news independently as property but news as a quasi property between competitors.

There are property rights in news but only between competitors and not against the public at large

  • Is there property in news?

    • Need to recognize dual character distinguishing between the substance of the information and the particular form or collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it.

    • The news element – the information respecting current events contained in the literary production - is not the creation of the writer but is the history of the day.

    • So in the news element itself there isn’t a right of property recognized.

    • Also point out that news of current events may be regarded as common property. (cf. MacPherson)

  • Unfair competition in Business

    • News question doesn’t matter because case turns around unfair competition in business.

    • Not dealing with restrictions on publication but with the very facilities and processes of publication.

    • Concerned with the business of making news known to the world.

    • Not about rights against the public but their rights as between themselves.

    • Regard news as but the material out of which both parties want to make profits, must recognize for this purpose and between them as a quasi property.

    • Court says you can’t consider this problem by considering the relationship between the defendant and the public but must consider the relationship between the two competitors in business.

    • By act defendant is admitting that it takes material that has been acquired by complainant by labor and which is salable for money, that the defendant is appropriating for money.

  • Abandonment

    • Contention that news is abandoned is untenable

    • Abandonment is a question of intent, the AP association negatives this purpose.

Dissent (Holmes): AP cannot win because it is impossible to say that one party can claim a property right over the news: facts cannot be owned.

  • There is no property right in a “combination of words” or just because there is an exchange value to those words and despite the fact that it took “labour and genius to make it.”

  • With respect to the unfair trade argument, the only reason why these cases are actionable b/c they tend to give the defendant an advantage in his competition with the plaintiff and that it is thought undesirable that an advantage should be gained in that way. Holmes J thinks there was an unfair advantage.

  • He views the case from the implied misstatement point of view; i.e. it can be corrected by stating the truth (acknowledgment of AP, or delaying the publishing of the AP acquired news for hours).

Dissent (Brandeis J): Products of the mind are not property just because they cost money to produce and have an exchange value.

  • With respect to unfair trade, judge says that this doctrine has to do with the manner or means of conducting business. In this case, means were not objectionable; information is taken from papers brought in open market. INS did not seek to benefit from AP’s reputation. They are merely using this product without compensation; that they have a right to do so b/c the product is not property, and they do not stand in any relation (i.e. K or trust) to the AP. In addition, INS did not have to disclose the source of its news (b/c there is no K or law requiring acknowledgment).

  • Brandeis argues that this question is better answered by the legislature. Only the legislators can reconcile the effect of extension of property rights (private interest) and a corresponding curtailment of the free use of knowledge (public interest).


Ratio: Unfair competition is the major point that allows the majority to find a quasi property right in the news for AP.

  • Quasi Property rights are possible.

  • Property rights are shown to adapt to current technological developments.

-Don’t forget to think about this case in relation to the idea of the fundamental right of property being the right to exclude. (Cf. Merrill)



Comments:

1. how to justifying taking property from common to private.

Is Exchange value enough to make an intangible thing “property”.

Property” reasoning of:



Pitney: Property is relational. If you labour to create something that you then hope to sell you deserve to exclude others from the right to what you have created / discovered. But your right to exclude is only towards those who desire to profit from your discoveries. (Very Labour justification) (CF. Locke)

Holmes: Just because something has an exchange value does not mean it can be claimed as property.

Brandeis: Products of the mind are not property even if they cost money to produce them.
How does each judgment demonstrate that AP wins the case on the grounds of unfair competition?

P: Because the question of news is put on the backburner, P. can focus on the labour involved in producing the news to justify its protection and claim unfair competition.

H and B: refuse to depart from the question of news as property. By maintaining the idea that news cannot be property and maintain it as the central question of the case, they cannot attain a decision that INS was using unfair competition.
What is the relationship between unfair competition and property in news? What has been misappropriated?
What does Pitney mean by quasi-property? Would Macpherson use the term quasi-property, if not how would he characterize Pitney’s conclusions about the news?
Why, given that existing rules do not lead inevitably to those conclusions do the judges arrive at them?


Notes [93]

  • Several cases have dealt with whether “exchange value” is enough to justify making that intangible thing “property” – generally speaking you have to weigh the competing interests in this analysis and decide whether the value that was created deserves the protection of the law and why – justification is very important because there is no clear rule

  • In Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KOY Broadcasting (1930) (US Dist. Ct. Penn), the football team obtained an injunction to prevent the defendants from making unauthorized broadcasts of their games. Judge said that: “Pittsburgh Athletic Company by reason of its creation of the game, its control of the park, and its restriction of the dissemination of news therefrom, has a property right in such news and the right to control the use thereof for a reasonable time following the games.”

  • In Canadian Admiral Corporation Ltd. v. Rediffusion Inc. [1954] Exch., the court held that “no matter how piratical, the taking by one person of the work of another may be, such taking cannot be an infringement of the rights of the latter unless copyright exists in the work.” Such copyright did exist under the Copyright Act.

  • J.A. Rahl notes that the misappropriation doctrine enunciated in INS v. AP should not be employed against competition and should instead safeguard the plaintiff’s opportunity to market his trade value; it should not protect opportunities to increase profitability.




Victoria Park v. Taylor, Aust, 1937, 98– Intangible is not property; Property rights are limited by relations with other people

Facts: Plaintiff company carries on business of racing on racecourse known as Victoria Park. Defendant is owner of land near the racecourse. Has placed elevated platform on his land from which he can see the racecourse. He produces a live broadcast of the races by radio. Plaintiff wants the broadcasting stopped because it prevents people from going to the races. By reporting without permission, D is infringing on his property right.

Issue:

  1. Does VP have a right to exclude Taylor from reporting what he sees on VP’s land? If so, is there private nuisance with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land? (Held: NO)

  2. Can there be property rights in a spectacle? (Held: No)

Appeal dismissed (Judge Latham J): The term quasi property in the spectacle is vague, ‘spectacle’ cannot be owned in any ordinary sense of the word.

  • If VP does not want T to see the race it should have built a higher fence but that the Cml Law does not recognize a “privacy” interest. He does not see any right that was violated or any wrong done to the plaintiff. No authority was cited to show that any general right of privacy exists.

Appeal dismissed (Dixon J): The right to exclude the defendant from broadcasting a description of the occurrences they can see on plaintiff’s land is not given by law. Considering there to be a property right in a spectacle would be the introduction into the law of a new doctrine.

  • VP is trying to claim a right in the creation of profit and that this is not property – cites Brandeis J from INS v. AP as accurately stating the English Cml Law position: “it is not because the individual has by his efforts put himself in a position to obtain value for what he can give that his right to give it becomes protected by law and so assumes the exclusiveness of property, but because the intangible right he claims falls within a recognized category to which protection attaches.” English law is clear that the natural rights of an occupier do not include freedom from the view and inspection of neighbouring occupiers or of other persons who enable themselves to overlook the premises. Occupier of land is, however, at liberty to exclude his neighbour’s view by any physical means he can adopt.

  • Substance of the plaintiff’s complaint goes to interference with the profitable conduct of its business and not with its enjoyment of the land. As evidenced by the law of copyrights (as special heads of protected interests and not under a wide generalization), British courts, unlike US courts, do not seem to recognize ‘broadcasting rights’ as quasi-property created by the enterprise, organization and labour (i.e. intangible elements of value, ‘value in exchange’)

Appeal Allowed dissent (Rich J): Property rights are relational (MacPherson)

  • this is a property right in the same way as hot news was property but only in relation to competitors. He frames the issue in the following way: “How far can one person restrain another from invading the privacy of land which he occupies, when such invasion does not involve actual entry on the land?” An improper or non-natural or use in excess of a right which curtails or impairs his neighbour’s legitimate enjoyment of his property is ‘tortuous and hurtful’ and constitutes a nuisance. A man has no absolute right ‘within the ambit of his own land’ to act as he pleases. Defendant’s rights are related to plaintiff’s rights and each owner’s rights may be limited by the rights of the other.

  • One of the prime purposes of occupation of land is the pursuit of profitable enterprises for which the exclusion of others is necessary either totally or except upon conditions which may include payment.

  • Right of view or observation from adjacent land has never been held to be an absolute and complete right or property incident to the occupation of that land and exercisable notwithstanding its destructive effect upon the enjoyment of the land of the other.

  • Rich is looking to the future and thinking about how these issues will play out when things like T.V are invented.

Appeal Allowed dissent (Evatt J): Defendant has endeavored to reap where it has not sown.

  • Desire for business profit and an almost reckless disregard of the ordinary decencies and conventions which must be observed between neighbours induced the broadcasting company to cause the loss to the plaintiff which has been proved in this case.

  • Defendants argue that the damage and loss to the plaintiff have been sustained by it rather in its character as racing entrepreneur than as occupier of land. But profitable conduct of its business cannot be dissociated from its occupation of the land, and damage to the plaintiff’s business is necessarily reflected by some diminution in the value of the land of the plaintiff.

  • Nuisance does not convey the idea of injury to the realty itself. It means rather an interference with some right incident to the ownership or possession of realty. Note that ownership or rightful possession necessarily involves the right to the full and free enjoyment of the property occupied.

  • Defendants are not engaged in normal trade competition (i.e. argument that ‘old school’ is replaced by ‘new school’, i.e. media). The defendant’s operations are conducted to the plaintiff’s detriment systematically and indefinitely.

  • England does not recognize any general right of privacy. BUT, not every interference with this right must be unlawful. England does not forbid one person to overlook the property of another. BUT, systematic watching can amount to civil wrong.

Major problem court is faced with here is changing property regime or simply applying traditional property law concepts to new circumstances (technological in particular).

Ratio: This was a split judgment.

Does it make a difference if the issue for determination is whether a property right exists in a spectacle, as opposed to the extent existing property rights in land?

Yes, because the spectacle brings in the element of the spectator and thus an experience which is ephemeral. While this occurs upon the land it cannot be contained upon the land, particularly with the advent of new technology.



If the Court in Victoria Park had applied the reasoning from International News Service would the result have been the same?

No, this is pretty obvious from the reasoning given by the dissenting judges in Victoria.



**Property is all about land, intangible property land is all about statute/regulation** Cdn Admiral…will not recognize the intangible work of others without statute. (not many statutes dealing with intanglibes)


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