Chesterfield fire department response to severe storm emergencies executive analysis of fire department operations in emergency management

Hail ¾" in diameter or greater

Rainfall capable of local and flash flooding

1. 
   Dangerous lightning (Vavrek et al., 1995, p. 7).
   

The county also lies in a storm track followed by hurricanes, or their tropical storm remnants, that make landfall in the southeastern United States. Since 1969, seven of the 12 significant severe storms that the county has experienced were hurricanes, tropical storms, or their remnants (Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, Part I, August 5, 1997).

Chesterfield Fire Department personnel would benefit greatly from training about the characteristics of severe weather and its potential for adverse consequences in the county. That training would develop a greater awareness of the types of damage that could occur and the safety hazards that they would face while responding to emergencies during severe weather. Such training would also enable Middle Managers (Senior Battalion Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Senior Captains) to make better decisions about when conditions are too hazardous for response operations to continue.

A good working knowledge of how to use the information provided by Doppler Radar is not enough. Despite great advances in meteorology and instruments for supercell identification during the last decade, severe weather can develop so rapidly that warnings may not reach personnel in time. Emergency responders must be able to use common sense and pay attention to the visual clues of potentially dangerous thunderstorms.

Fire departments that provide EMS for their communities have known for many years the need for situation assessment when preparing for, and managing, multiple-casualty incidents (MCI). One of the key objectives identified in managing a MCI is the need to conduct systematic triage to determine the number and severity of patients, and to prioritize the treatment and transportation of patients based on severity (Burkle, Sanner, and Wolcott, 1984, p. 45). Patient care resources are directed to those patients with the most severe injuries and patients receive the minimum amount of resources to accomplish the task. The incident management focus is on balancing the available resources and the patient care needs so that the greatest number of patients get an acceptable level of patient care (Aud der Heide, 1989, p. 166).

Severe weather emergencies or disasters are characterized by great uncertainty. Often the character and extent of the damage and the secondary threats (leaking chemicals, downed power lines, weakened dams) are not immediately apparent and therefore the necessary countermeasures not undertaken (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 63). The information gathered during the preliminary assessment, or “snapshot” assessment, coupled with the secondary, or “windshield assessment”, is the necessary incident “triage” that the emergency managers need to develop incident action plans and allocate resources to the situations where the most good can be done for the greatest number of people. “Disasters are also very fluid in nature with needs changing from minute-to-minute. This fluidity necessitates a procedure for determining and updating what the overall disaster situation is and what problems need to be tackled” (Auf der Heide, 1989, p.63).

Chesterfield Fire Department currently has no such procedures in place for the wide-spread systematic assessment of the county should severe weather strike creating extensive damage and secondary hazards. The normal operating practices remain in place: (1) emergency 9-1-1 calls from the public come into the Emergency Communications Center; (2) the call is entered into the Computer-Aided Dispatch System (CADS); (3) CADS recommends what emergency resources to dispatch based on unit availability in the computer; (4) emergency resources respond to the incident and operate according to normal procedures; (5) upon completion of the assignment the resource clears for another call, which it receives, or it returns to quarters to await another call.

Fire company officers (Lieutenants and Captains) are not trained in how to do situation assessment of their response district. Nor are they training in a system of structural triage, such as the USAR program, so that structures that have been searched or assessed can be marked as such, thus eliminating the potential that the same building would be searched by another crew.

The department’s middle managers are not trained in how to collect such information from fire companies in their battalion (if it existed) and analyze the information for strategic decision making purposes. Middle Managers are not trained to become information and resource managers for their area of responsibility; they continue to respond from one call to another “searching” for the situation, which under normal operating conditions, would require the presence of a Middle Manager, i.e., a structure fire, building collapse with persons trapped, etc. Chesterfield Fire Department needs to train its Middle Managers to function at the strategic level during mitigation activities before and after severe weather strikes.

Developing Incident Objectives

Emergency response to severe storm related emergencies require strong strategic leadership on the part of senior emergency managers and equally strong tactical leadership from officers commanding fire companies (J.E. Graham, personal communications, September 16, 1999). The widespread devastation and multiple problems in multiple areas create the need for a comprehensive written Incident Action Plan (IAP) that identifies the priorities necessary to mitigate those problems (FEMA, 1994, SM 3-15).

Chesterfield Fire Department’s command level officers are not experienced and practiced in the development of a comprehensive IAP. The skill with which an officer, or group of officers, manages the complex and multiple problems caused by severe weather is predicated on their previous experience, if they have any, of managing such a situation. This causes the organization to remanage incidents, or to manage large-scale incidents as it would the smaller routine emergencies (J.E. Graham, personal communication, September 16, 1999).

The use of standard documentation afforded by the use of standard ICS forms is a critical component of the IAP. For the larger scale incident, such as those caused by severe weather, a more formalized process of identifying objective and committing them to written form becomes critical to the success of operations. Auf der Heide (1989), FEMA (1994), and FEMA (1999) all recommend that the Incident Commander, as quickly as possible, begin that formal documentation of incident objectives using standard Incident Command System Forms 201-220. (See Appendix K). The department currently has, and uses, ICS Tactical Worksheets for use in managing incidents. These worksheets, however, are tactical in nature and designed for the management of a single incident.

FEMA (1994) and FEMA (1999) introduced the advanced ICS components of Incident Complex and Area Command as necessary components of an organization’s ICS to effectively manage larger scale incidents. Chesterfield Fire Department has not added such capabilities to its ICS since its adoption in 1985. These tools would enable senior managers to exercise greater command and control at larger incidents while at the same time maintaining the principles of ICS: (1) unity of command; (2) effective span of control; and (3) functional positions. These additional tools also would help facilitate better incident communications and resource management.

Emergency managers responding to the increased service demands of a severe weather emergency are faced with a situation very similar to a MCI–more problems than they have resources. The demands of severe weather emergencies require a different paradigm than that used of daily response to emergencies.

The department’s middle managers need to become skilled and practiced in receiving situation status reports from company officers in the field, processing that information for their area of responsibility, and then allocate the appropriate resources within their area.

Another component of resource management that needs to be addressed is how emergency calls are prioritized and resources dispatched. The historical review of severe weather in Chesterfield County revealed many situations where situation assessment activities such as the “windshield assessment” may not be necessary due to the smaller scope and magnitude of the event. Typically, this is the spring or summer thunderstorm that generates 30 to 40 calls for service during a period that lasts an hour to hour-and-a- half (Review of storm related activity memorandums to Fire Chief completed by battalion staff officers, November 20, 1999).

Currently, the ECC has 35 available fire call types that can be used to enter an emergency call for service into the CADS for dispatch. Thirty of those call types are Priority 1, the highest priority, which dictates a “red lights and siren” response by response personnel. When a thunderstorm does strike, the number of Priority 1 calls received and dispatched can quickly commit the available resources in the county to situations that may not be life-threatening.

The current operational policy for storm response directs the Senior Battalion Chief on duty to direct the ECC to dispatch, and have active, no more than three Priority 3 calls at any given time. This does not have a significant effect on the “resource drain” since only one Priority 3 call type (Public Service call) occurs with any significance during severe weather. The department would be better served to reclassify the fourteen less significant Priority 1 call types as Priority 2 call types (See Appendix H). Under normal operating conditions emergency responders would still respond to those Priority 2 call types under emergency conditions, “red lights and siren”. (This would be consistent with the dispatch procedures for EMS calls that categorize calls for service as Priority 1, 2, or 3). In a severe storm situation the Senior Battalion Chief could direct the ECC to only dispatch emergency resources to Priority 1 calls until the severe weather subsides. The ECC would continue to log any Priority 2 or 3 calls into CADS for dispatch after the storm; priority 2 calls would get priority post storm followed by Priority 3 calls.

The department’s currently operational policy for the recall of off-duty personnel is not adequate and has not been revised since 1995. The policy states that shift commanders (company officers) who are in quarters will, upon notification, make telephone calls to off-duty personnel directing them to report for duty. The policy states that those personnel will respond to their assigned duty stations unless directed otherwise. There is no systematic methodology for getting those recalled personnel into the system where they can do the most good. Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999), Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999), Castillo, Montes, and Paulison, (1992), and Eichelberger (1991) all identified this as a significant issue that must be addressed to ensure that the organization can increase its resource levels for more effective response.

Computer software solutions are available that could eliminate this problem. Bradford (1999) wrote of one software package that addresses many of the personnel and staffing issues of a fire department, including the recall of off-duty personnel. Other software packages, such as those used by telemarketing companies provide a ready solution to the singular personnel issue of recalling off-duty personnel. Many police departments across the country are already using so-called “Reverse 9-1-1" software to place calls, using a computer, to residents in an area specified in the computer to alert them of criminal activity, or to issue evacuation notices due to impending severe weather. “It is sophisticated enough to indicate whether a call was received or whether a message was left on an answering machine. It can also be programmed to keep trying” (Sharp, 2000, p. A2).

Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999), Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999), Castillo, Montes, and Paulison, (1992), and Eichelberger (1991) also identified in their writings the necessity of having reserve apparatus within a department properly equipped for deployment. That deployment may be necessary because primary units have been damaged by the severe weather, or because those units will be staffed by recalled off-duty personnel or staff personnel from support divisions. Chesterfield Fire Department currently has several pumpers in its reserve fleet, but those units are not equipped for immediate deployment. With the exception of attack and supply hose, all emergency response equipment must be transferred to the reserve unit from the primary unit that it replaces.

The review of the literature provided a great deal of information about the safety hazards associated with response to severe weather emergencies. Emergency responders are not immune to the threats presented by high winds, lightning, torrential rains, or hail.

“Torrential rains associated with severe weather can quickly turn even small local streams into raging rivers” (Segerstrom, 1991, p. 20). Flooding associated with severe weather was identified as causing the highest number of deaths each year from weather, yet the majority of fire departments do not train and educate their personnel on handling emergencies that can occur in flood waters (NFPA, 1999, p. 29). Heavy rains and water from streams and creeks that have breached their banks can quickly undermine the foundations of roadways making their navigation extremely hazardous, especially for large vehicles such as fire apparatus (Segerstrom, 1991, p. 20).

Chesterfield County provides an ideal setting for the types of safety hazards described above. The county is extremely vulnerable to severe weather as described elsewhere in this project.

Chesterfield Fire Department would significantly improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of its emergency response to severe weather situations by developing a comprehensive policy for that response and training all of its personnel in how to use that policy. The application of the risk management principles associated with safety (examination of risk and frequency) to develop policies and procedures for emergency response can significantly increase the probability of proper conduct should such response be required (Graham, 1997). Though the frequency of actual response to a severe storm, such as a hurricane or tornado, may not be extremely high on an annual basis in Chesterfield County, the consequences (risk) of fire department personnel not responding appropriately could be devastating for the department, the county government, and ultimately the citizens who needed the service.

The recommendations of this study are as follows: