Almost Inexhaustible Resources

The crisis over Czechoslovakia brought defence matters to a head. In April 1938 a new programme of air development without financial restraints provided for 12,000, later 17,500, planes in two years. On 22 February 1939 production to the limit was allowed. Secret aeroplane works were developed and Arthur Purvis headed a purchasing mission to America which provided 400 planes. As Mowat says, "It was in the strengthening of her air power that the breathing spell afforded by Munich was of supreme value to Great Britain". The government began to borrow (£90m in 1938; £380m in 1939), in addition to increasing defence spending which reached £273m in 1939.

Duff Cooper had been ineffective at the War Office but his successor, Hore Belisha, began to get things changed. Re‑equipping and stockpiling began, including the purchase of Brens from Czechoslovakia, and the limited role of the army was abandoned in January 1939. A BEF of 21 divisions was to be formed ‑ 10 were ready by January 1940. The Territorial Army was to double in size, and conscription was introduced in April 1939. Even the long‑awaited Ministry of Supply appeared the same month. Hoare declared, "I am convinced we could not be defeated in a short war by any knock‑out blow, and that in a long war our almost inexhaustible resources will ensure final victory."

 

Civil Defence

The British army was expected to provide for home defence and for imperial garrisons but not to produce an expeditionary force on the continent of Europe. In May 1940 the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commanded by General Lord Gort VC had been built up to 394,000 men with 5 Regular and 5 Territorial fighting Divisions on the Belgian frontier where the main German attack was expected. As an alternative to a war of attrition, the Germans had developed the concept of blitzkrieg or ‘lightning war’; an idea first suggested by British military writers. Blitzkrieg relied on rapid penetration on a narrow front by armour and motorised infantry with close air support.

As in 1914, the British Army which went to war in 1939 was a small, long-service force which lacked the great reserves of trained soldiers necessary to bring it up to a size equal to those of its continental allies or enemies. Its main reserve was the part-time volunteer Territorial Army, which lacked training and was under-equipped. Thus it was able to send only 10 divisions to the continent in 1939 to stand beside the French. However, it had already begun to conscript young men and eventually built up fifty divisions. And it had an important source of additional strength in the forces of the empire and the dominions. The Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African Armies would each send several divisions into the field, while the Indian Army stood ready at the beginning of the war to deploy nearly 200,000 men.

The British command system, unlike the German or French, devolved considerable responsibility on to the generals in the field. Churchill, with advice from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff - for most of the war the able Alan Brooke - decided the main lines of policy, but left the theatre and battlefield commanders to construct and execute their own battle plans. After American entry, British commanders became increasingly under the control of inter-Allied headquarters, of which the chiefs were usually American. The cordiality of relationships established between the headquarters of both armies was remarkable and a major contribution to the winning of the war.

By June 1945 the British Army had grown to 2,920,000 men. During the Second World War 144,079 British soldiers were killed, 239,575 were wounded and 152,079 were taken prisoner.

You will often hear that forces are divided in to regiments and brigades and divisions. This table gives you an idea of the numbers of troops in each of these units.

Battle of Britain RAF worked on the following basis:

If the strength fell below 9 they should have been relieved and posted to another Group, however some squadrons suffered exhaustion from persistent combat and heavy losses, and were far from efficient before being withdrawn.

The British government grew increasingly concerned about the growth of the Luftwaffe in Nazi Germany and in 1938 Vice Marshal Charles Portal, Director of Organization at the Air Ministry, was given the responsibility of establishing 30 new air bases in Britain. In September 1939 Bomber Command consisted of 55 squadrons (920 aircraft). However, only about 350 of these were suitable for long-range operations. Fighter Command had 39 squadrons (600 aircraft) but the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance aircraft.

During the 1920s and early 1930s the bomber-fighter debate was largely contained within military and economic spheres. The British, for instance, invoked a "Ten Year Rule" for approving military expenditures, based on the probability of war in the next ten years. Events in Germany in 1933 changed the rules.
In late 1937, the first Vickers Wellington appeared, boasting a speed of 230 mph and a phenomenal bomb load of 4500 lbs. Of geodetic construction and largely fabric-covered, the 'Wimpey' was a truly astounding aircraft, and would serve the RAF well for many years. She too carried defensive armament in the nose and tail turrets to fight of enemy fighters.

Bomber development was amazingly rapid in all countries during the 1930s, Britain introduced the Blenheim and Battle (both light bombers), and the Hampden and Whitley (medium bombers).

Even more extraordinary was the development of a new generation of fighter aircraft. The Hawker 'Hurricane' and Supermarine 'Spitfire' in Britain, were only some of the fighters developed during the late 30s. Even in their early versions, all but one of these were much faster than previous fighters, with maximum speeds ranging from 320-380 mph.

PROBLEMS

Despite some innovative initiatives, Britain did not have sufficient trained pilots. In Bomber Command, this extended to all other air crew: gunners; navigators; wireless operators. The Voluntary Reserve, begun in 1937, had helped address the lack of pilots, but not nearly quickly enough. And although the RAF had a fine training school both for ground and air crew, the number of bodies completing the training was below requirements. Exacerbating this, there were insufficient aircraft to train even the pilots and crew they had. Aircraft in existing squadrons were being cannibalized to keep other planes in readiness; to remove yet

more for training purposes could prove disastrous.

In 1939 there were no accurate, reliable navigation aids. In simple terms, how does a pilot bomb a target if he cannot find it? How does he find it at night? The third difficulty was related to the second. Even if reliable navigation devices had been available, pilots and navigators had simply not had enough experience flying through adverse weather to be successful in the range of conditions to be expected in northern Europe. Having been 'stood down' in inclement conditions during peacetime - a sensible precaution in terms of crew and aircraft safety, though not exactly forward-thinking when training for war - aircrew were totally unprepared for the seasonal hazards of fog, snow, ice and cold.

This air campaign killed an estimated 600,000 civilians and destroyed or seriously damaged some six million homes. A total of 70,253 RAF personnel were lost on operations during the Second World War. Of these, 47,293 came from Bomber Command.

At this time 1939 Bomber Command consisted of 55 squadrons, which consisted of 920 aircraft. Fighter command had 39 squadrons with 600 aircraft. However, in 1918, the RAF had more than 22,000 aircraft; therefore it had been significantly reduced. Also, the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance aircraft (used for monitoring enemy activity). Moreover, the growth of the Luftwaffe in Nazi Germany meant that the enemy was gaining an advantage over Britain. Germany had been building up their air force since the early 1930s in breach of the Treaty of Versailles. They had even trained their pilots inside the Soviet Union. By 1939 their aircraft numbered 4210 but Britain’s was only approximately 900. This left Britain extremely vulnerable to air attack.

Yet, Britain’s air force benefited from a number of technological advances. Light and medium monoplane bombers were developed, such as the Vickers Wellington. It appeared in 1937, had a speed of 230 miles per hour and a bomb load of 4500lbs. The Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire were heavily armoured interceptor aircraft, designed to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft. They had speeds ranging from 320 to 380 mph and were designed by R.J. Mitchel. The Battle of Britain would not have been won without them. In addition, in 1939 the Government announced a scheme for the production of seventeen and a half thousand aircraft. This was made possible by the restructuring of industry. Also, aircraft output rose from 161 in January 1938 to 712 in March 1939.

However, bombers were being developed in all countries, plus there was a real fear of German bombers. This was evident in 1938 when the German air force bombed Guernica during the Spanish Civil War killing hundreds. Chamberlain stated, ‘the bomber will always get through’⁷, in reference to the German bombers. There was also underlying problems with the RAF personnel and training. Pilots were not suitably trained nor were gunners, navigators or wireless operators. Also, pilots were insufficiently trained to fly in bad weather and unknown climates. There was also scarce aircraft to train pilots and was introduced too late to make a real difference. ‘The Germans had a larger force of trained pilots on which to call, with an overall military figure of 10,000 in 1939, while Fighter command could only add 50 each week to its complement’⁸.

In order to overcome some of the problems, the RAF was reorganised and Lord Swinton was put in charge of the Air Ministry. In addition, in 1938 Vice Marshal Charles Portal (Director of Organisation at the Air Ministry) established 30 new air bases in Britain. However, many of Britain’s efforts to prepare the RAF for war were too late.

Britain had an advantage over Germany when it came to radar’s however as Britain had a chain of radar stations from John O’ Groats to Lands end. These gave early warning of incoming aircraft without wasting fuel or pilot time. This was one of the most important developments for Britain during the war.