Régie d’assainissement des eaux du basin de La Prairie v. Janin Construction (1983) Ltée, [1999] R.J.Q. 929 (C.A.)
FACTS: a “contrat à forfait relatif” entered into b/w Régie and Janin. Before preparing the k, Régie asked some relevant companies, such as Fondatec Inc., to work for them. Janin, when preparing its “soumission”, also consulted an “expert en excavation de tunnels et le géologue Fojanesi” and “pour l’exécution des travaux, il avait engagé un ingénieur spécialisé en géo-technique”. In the k, there is an exclusion clause, in which Régie was excluded any liabilities due to the information they provided in k. However, b/o the condition of the soil, the work was delayed. Janin brought an action for the damage it suffered and its extra expenses due to the wrongful information in the k.
ISSUE: Ought there be a duty to inform in the party of Régie? Could Régie use the exclusion clause to get out of his duty to inform?
HELD: yes, there should be a duty to inform in the party of Régie. Even though Régie is not expert/professional, its position make it have the duty to inform or get information to inform the co-contractor.
NOTES:
In Bail, Gonthier set up three elements to the duty to inform.
Knowledge of the information, whether actual or presumed, by the party which owes the obligation to inform;
The fact that the information in question is of decisive importance;
The fact that it is impossible for the party to whom the duty to inform is owed to inform itself, or that the creditor is legitimately relying on the debtor of the obligation.
In this case, the judge goes further to hold that b/o the position of Régie who prepared the tender, he should owe the duty to inform to Janin, as a contractor. Even thought, Régie didn’t know the condition of the soil too.
The court characterized the k as an adhesion k based on the fact that the k was not negotiable b/w the k parties (art.1379), no matter if there is unequal bargaining power b/w the parties. Then according to art.1437, the exclusion clause in k could be declared null as an abusive clause. The court stated that
“Les tribunaux, inspirés par la doctrine, ont longtemps vu dans cette notion d’adhésion non pas un acte juridique de nature particulière, mais le rappel de la nécessaire protection, dans certains contrats, de la parties la plus faible”.
“Peu à peu, on a substitué à la description traditionnelle du contrat d’adhésion, qui mettait essentiellement en lumière le déséquilibre des contractants, une définition qui permet d’appliquer le contrat d’adhésion aussi bien aux situations où ce déséquilibre existe qu’à celles qui mettent en cause des relations économiques entre partenaires de force comparable”.
Was the crt here correct? Is there other ways to deal with it?
Defect consent;
Public order, art. 9
Can we argue that 1375 is public order?
-“notwithstanding”;
-art.6, 7
-doctrinal support from karim.
DISCUSSION:
in this case, there was a K of adhesion between the Régie and Janin
in that K, there was a clause excluding liability for any mis-information
the case is decided under 1437, which says that abusive clauses in contracts of adhesion can be struck out or the obligations resulting therefrom reduced
So, the question is whether the court would have held the same if it hadn’t been a K of adhesions
-I think that certainly the K of adhesion made the Court’s job easier, and that they were acting prudently in only deciding what was necessary on the facts before them
-although you can never know for sure, I think if the you follow what happened in Aselford it shouldn’t matter that there was a K of adhesion. Aselford practically gave good faith the status of public order and said that a clause that was so contrary to the principles of then “equité” under 1024, but now 1434 and good faith under 1375. Thus, you can’t contract out of it. But, that case was pre-CCQ and was only a Superior Court decision. But the court was being prudent so the true test case to affirm this principle is still out there.
according to Gonthier’s decision in Bail the duty to inform is base don a recognition of an inequality of information power and to recalibrate the balance between the parties
but Jukier says that is not really what Janin is all about: here we have the Government who wants to install a sewer system and Janin, a sophisticated contractor with expertise
but, eventhough the Regie is not an expert, and there is no inequality on bargaining power, the regie had an obligation to get information from third parties, which it did, and Janin was entitled to rely on that information
Janin tried to say exclude its liability for any inaccuracy in the information provided in the invitation for tenders, but cases like Bail recognize a duty of information in this type of situation
So, they were not allowed to exclude it, but the decision was grounded in articles dealing with K of adhesion, and it remains to be seen if it would extend generally.
Obligation d’information à la formation du contrat: Baudouin –p.261
l’obligation d’une partie de fournir à l’autre les information nécessaires à un consentement pleinement éclairé est reconnue depuis assez longtemps dans certains domaines, i.e. contrat de soins médicauxé. Par le dol par réticence et surtout le dol par le silence, la jurisprudence, sous l’empire du Code du Bas-Canada imposait une obligation d’information à l’une des parties quand l’autre, dans les circonstances, plaçait en elle sa confiance relativement à des faits déterminants.
Peu de temps avant l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau code, la Cour suprême est venue consolider cette tendance et faire de l’obligation d’information, à certaines conditions, une obligation générale; l’existence de cette obligation a été reconnue à la formation du contrat et en cours de contrat (Bail).
L’obligation précontractuelle d’information se fonde donc, soit sur les articles 6 et 1375, soit, plus précisément, sur l’article 1401.
L’obligation de se renseigner: Baudouin –p. 270
l’obligation de se renseigner est au fond la limite imposée à l’obligation de renseignement, l’envers de la médaille. Dans la mesure, en effet, où, d’une façon générale, le contractant a la possibilité de connaître l’information ou d’y avoir accès, l’obligation de se renseigner vient faire échec au devoir corrélatif de renseignement de l’autre partie.
Dans l’obligation d’information, le droit entend protéger la contractant contre une inégalité situationnelle, mais non contre sa propre sottise (foolishness) ou négligence.
Aussi la Cour suprême a-t-elle pris la précaution de situer l’obligation d’information dans le contexte général où toute personne a le devoir de se renseigner raisonnablement avant de conclure un contrat (Bail).
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