Chandler v Blogg [1898] 1 Q.B. 32

Chandler v Blogg [1898] 1 Q.B. 32

1897 Nov. 24.

Insurance (Marine)—Policy—Reinsurance—Collision Clause—Collision with sunken Barge.

The plaintiff underwrote a time policy on a vessel, the “Newburn”, containing a clause that if the steamer should come into collision with any other vessel, and the insured should have to pay damages, the insurers would pay.

The defendant underwrote a policy of reinsurance, on the same vessel, for the same period, subject to the same clauses and conditions as the original policy, and to pay as might be paid thereon, but only to pay all claims for loss or damage done or received through collision.

During the period covered the Newburn, while swinging off Regent's Canal in the River Thames, struck with her port side abreast the engine-room of the sailing barge Lizzie, which had just been sunk by collision with the steamship Lodore. The Newburn remained fast on the Lizzie for several hours, and while she so remained fast she was run into by the SS Senior, and also by barges laden with coal, which drove across her stern, striking her heavily aft under the counter. The Lizzie was raised on December 3, and having sustained comparatively small damage, at once sailed to Faversham, her home port, and was there repaired by her owners.

The plaintiff sued on behalf of underwriters at Lloyd's, who in the course of their business had underwritten policies of insurance on the SS Newburn, by which she was insured to the total amount of £300 for twelve calendar months, commencing at noon on February 20, 1894.

The defendant admitted liability to his proportion of the loss (if any) sustained by reason of the collisions between the Newburn and the SS Senior , and the coal-laden barges, respectively, but contended that the contact between the Newburn and the sunken barge Lizzie was not “collision with any other ship or vessel,” within the meaning of the policies.

Held, that, although, at the moment when the steamer struck her, the barge could not have been navigated, yet, as she became navigable as soon as she was raised, there was a collision between two navigable vessels, in respect of which the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the policy of reinsurance.

BIGHAM J.

I am of opinion that my judgment ought to be in favour of the plaintiff. The question to be determined is whether, on two policies of reinsurance, the defendant is liable, under the circumstances stated in the special case, as for damage caused by collision. I am disposed to agree with Mr. Walton's contention, that “collision,” when used alone, without other words, means two navigable things coming into contact. In the present case the Lizzie was a barge, which happened to have been sunk, and therefore could not have been navigated at the moment when that which the plaintiff contends was a collision took place. If one takes the case of a vessel at anchor, which has taken the ground at low water, it is clear that she cannot be navigated until the tide rises and floats her. Or take the case of a vessel the rudder of which has been unshipped, she cannot be navigated until her rudder has been shipped again. Yet in neither of the cases which I have suggested could it properly be said that there was not a vessel, or that the vessel was not navigable. I am of opinion that, although the Lizzie could not have been navigated during a period of a few hours, that is, until she was raised and floated, nevertheless she was a vessel, and was navigable, within the meaning of the definition which has been suggested, and therefore what took place comes within Mr. Walton's own definition of a collision. The result is that there will be judgment for the plaintiff for his claim in respect of the damage caused to the Newburn by the collision with the Lizzie.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Case Study One

Pelton SS Co v North of England Protection and Indemnity Association (1925) 22 LlL Rep 510

The SS Zelo struck the wreck of the Finnish SS Merkur, which had sunk some months earlier and was in the process of being salvaged. The plaintiffs, having failed to recover from the insurers, brought an action against the P & I Club for the loss. The P & I argued that they were, under the ¾ Collision Clause, liable for only a ¼ of the loss.

The question for the court was whether the sunken Merkur was a vessel under the Clause in question.

Held that the Merkur was a vessel and that the P & I Club was only liable, under the Clause for ¼ of the loss

Greer J

A ship, like any other thing, remains entitled to its description until facts are established which show it has become disentitled to its ordinary name or description. Just as a man may be moribund without ceasing to be a man if the doctors are hopeful that they will be able to secure his recovery by treatment, so I think a ship may remain a ship or vessel even though she be damaged and incapable of being navigated, if she is in such a position as would induce a reasonable minded owner to continue operations of salvage; and if she would, in the ordinary use of the English language, be still described as a ship or vessel, though described as one which was in serious danger of ceasing to be a ship or vessel. In my judgment, the salvors at the time of the loss had a reasonable expectation that they would be able to salve the vessel.

…

It seems to me, with great respect, that navigability cannot be the test as to whether the thing is or is not a ship or a vessel… It does not seem to me you can test whether a vessel at the bottom is or is not a ship or vessel by saying she will be navigable immediately she comes to the surface. You must apply some other test; and I cannot find any better test than the question whether or not any reasonably minded owner would continue salvage operations in the hope of completely recovering the vessel by those operations and subsequent repair.

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