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| Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, (May 2017). Rick Stengel, What Hillary Knew About Putin’s Propaganda Machine Politico, Nov. 15, 2017. Testimony of General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, US. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US. Department of Defense, United States Euro- pean Command, Hearing before the US. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 23, 2017. US. Department of State, ‘‘IVLP,’’ https://eca.state.gov/ivlp (visited Jan. 4, 2018). Although beyond the scope of this report, the US. has made considerable investments in enhancing the military capabilities of our partners in Europe to deter Russia since 2014. For 2018, the US. is seeking a $1.4 billion increase, to $4.8 billion, for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). As part of EDI, the US. deploys on average 7,000 servicemembers to Europe. The US. also plays a leading role in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence which deploys multinational battlegroups to Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. As of May 9, 2017, 4,530 troops from 15 countries participate in the EFP effort. US. European Command Public Affairs Office ‘‘2018 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet Oct. 2, 2017; NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Factsheet, May 2017. the United States is to achieve the level of engagement needed to counter foreign state propaganda and disinformation. In addition to the GEC, the State Department and USAID support a number of other assistance programs that can help build resilience in democratic institutions, to include projects to monitor and counter disinformation, promote independent media and investigative journalism, and strengthen civil society and civic education. State Department officials overseas closely monitor local media stories and distribute them throughout the Department and US. embassies. 854 The US. government conducts or commissions polls of foreign audiences to get a read on their perceptions of Russian media, as well as their reactions to different types of messages. The State Department and the Department of Defense’s European Command (EUCOM) have launched a joint effort called the Russian Information Group (RIG, which grew out of a small social media group called the Ukraine Task Force that the State Department setup to counter Russian disinformation in Ukraine in 2014. RIG seeks to support a credible counter-Russian voice in there- gion,’’ according to a former senior State Department official. 855 In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the head of EUCOM, General Curtis Scaparrotti, noted that the RIG has to be reinforced, it has to be financed, they have to have the authorities that they need to lead that forward.’’ 856 Finally, State Department exchange programs, such as the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), can be highly effective countermeasures to Russian state media disinformation campaigns. IVLP brings media professionals to the United States and trains them on investigative journalism skills and the role of a free press in democracies. 857 To their credit, mid-level officials at the State Department have given some thought to crafting a multifaceted approach to push back against the Russian governments malign influence In congressional testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Hoyt Yee, outlined the State Department’s approach to combatting Kremlin propaganda, which includes amplifying our messages, correcting false statements, and engaging decision makers to support independent media and investigative jour- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 152 Testimony by Hoyt Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US. Department of State, The Balkans Threats to Peace and Stability, Hearing before the US. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, May 17, 2017, at 3. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, at 35 (Dec. 2017). 860 Ibid. at 48. nalists with small grants. 858 In its December 2017 National Security Strategy, the White House admitted that the United States has done too little to deter Putin’s assaults, noting, US. efforts to counter the exploitation of information by rivals have been tepid and fragmented. US. efforts have lacked a sustained focus and have been hampered by the lack of properly trained profes- sionals.’’ 859 While recognizing these shortcomings is an important first step, the Administration has unfortunately failed to put forward a plan to rectify them. Notably, the Strategy states only that the United States and Europe will work together to counter Russian subversion and aggression.’’ 860 Yet coordination is only one piece of the aggressive strategy that the United States needs. VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER |