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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations



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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations
The Russian government, under Putin’s leadership, has shown that it is both capable of and willing to assault democratic and transatlantic institutions and alliances. These assaults take many forms, including the use of disinformation, cyberattacks, military invasions, alleged political assassinations, threats to energy security, election interference, and other subversive tactics that fuel corruption, employ organized crime, and exploit both far-right and far-left ideologies to sow discord and create confusion. Putin also seeks to repress the exercise of human rights and political participation both at home and abroad, to promote a climate more conducive to the Russian government’s corrupt and antidemocratic behavior. There are multiple lines of effort across the West—at the local, national, and supranational level—working to counter the Kremlin s malign influence operations and build resiliency in democratic institutions. The United Kingdom’s leadership has made resolute, public statements that Russian meddling is unacceptable and will be countered. The French government has worked with independent media and political parties to expose and blunt the dissemination of fake news. The German government has bolstered domestic cybersecurity capacities, particularly after the 2015 hack of the Bundestag. Estonia has strengthened counterintelligence capabilities and exposed the intelligence operations of its eastern neighbor. The Lithuanian government has made progress in diversifying its supplies of natural gas, and all the Baltic governments have worked to integrate their electricity grids to reduce dependence on Soviet-era electrical infrastructure. The Nordic countries have built resiliency across all elements of society, especially in their education systems. And the Spanish government has investigated, exposed, and cutoff significant money laundering operations by Russia-based organized crime groups. In the disinformation sphere, current multilateral efforts run the gamut from monitoring and fact-checking to promoting investigative journalism and media literacy. Monitoring and fact-checking initiatives area necessary and logical first step—the problem has to be identified and understood before it can be addressed. And as the Kremlin continues to change its methods and tactics in response to growing awareness and adaptation by its targets, it will be necessary to continue existing monitoring efforts to inform responses. However, monitoring and countering propaganda alone will never be sufficient. While a whole-of-government approach is necessary to identify the threat and sound the trumpet, a whole-of-society ap-
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154 proach is necessary to neutralize it. The EU, NATO, and member states ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and interior may develop tactical responses to the threat of disinformation, but it will ultimately be the education ministries, civil society, and independent news organizations that are most effective in inoculating their societies against fake news. In addition, no single country or institution has yet stepped forward to be the leader in coordinating efforts to build resilience against the Kremlin’s asymmetric arsenal and identifying and filling any gaps. The US. government has a unique capacity to lead the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy with individual countries and multilateral groups in Europe, like NATO and the EU, to counter and deter hybrid threats emanating from the Kremlin. While the Global Engagement Center (GEC) has begun outreach to allies in Europe, the US. government appears not to have a strategic plan to comprehensively counter Russian government influence and interference, including but not limited to disinformation. There are several institutions in Europe working on countering disinformation that could benefit from additional US. engagement, and US. leadership and coordination among donors could also help maximize the effectiveness of existing assistance. Yet despite the growing intensity of Russian government interference operations, President Trump has largely ignored this threat to democracy in the United States and Europe. The Trump Administration has also proposed cuts to assistance across Europe that could help counter the Kremlin’s malign influence, especially in the areas of good governance, anti-corruption, and independent media efforts. President Trump is squandering an opportunity to lead Americas allies and partners to build a collective defense against the Kremlin’s global assault on democratic institutions and values. But it is not too late. By implementing the recommendations below, the United States can better deter and defend against the Kremlin’s use of its asymmetric arsenal, while also strengthening international norms and values to blunt the effects of malign influence operations by any state actor, including Russia.

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