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| USA Today, Sept. 7, 2017. The countries included Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States. Mark Galeotti, Controlling Chaos How Russia Manages Its Political War in Europe, Euro- pean Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 1, 2017. 206 Alina Polyakova et al. The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses, Atlantic Council, at 4 (Nov. 2016). put it, What they do to us we cannot do to them . . . . Liberal democracies with a free press and free and fair elections are at an asymmetric disadvantage . . . the tools of their democratic and free speech can be used against them.’’ 201 The Russian government’s work to destabilize European governments often start with attempts to build influence and exploit divisions at the local level. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Russia’s influence campaign is built on longstanding practices. Moscow has been opportunistic in its efforts to strengthen Russian influence in Europe and Eurasia by developing affiliations with and deepening financial or political connections to like-minded political parties and Nongovernmental Organizations. Moscow appears to use monetary support in combination with other tools of Russian statecraft, including propaganda in local media, direct lobbying by the Russian Government, economic pressure, and military intimidation. 202 The US. State Department reports that the Kremlin’s efforts to influence elections and referendums in Europe include overt and covert support for far left and right political parties, funding front groups and NGOs, and making small, low-profile investments in key economic sectors to build political influence overtime and that its tactics focus on exploiting internal discord in an effort to break centrist consensus on the importance of core institutions.’’ 203 An analysis by the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy found that the Russian government has used cyberattacks, disinformation, and financial influence campaigns to meddle in the internal affairs of at least 27 European and North American countries since As one Russian expert puts it, the Russian government’s methods to pursue its goals abroad are largely determined by the correlation between the strength of the countries national institutions and their vulnerability to Russian influence.’’ 205 Whereas in what Russia considers its near abroad composed of the former Soviet Union countries, the Kremlin’s goal is to exert control over pliant governments or weaken pro-Western leaders, in the rest of Europe it primarily seeks to undermine NATO and the EU, while amplifying existing political and social discord. 206 The Kremlin also acts with more boldness in its near abroad than it does in NATO and EU states. But it still deploys its full range of malign influence tools throughout the rest of Europe and, increasingly, beyond Europe’s borders. These operations VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 39 European Parliament Resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Propaganda against it by Third Parties 2016/2030(INI), Nov. 23, 2016. Edward Lucas and Ben Nimmo, Information Warfare What Is It and How to Win It Cen- ter for European Policy Analysis (Nov. 2015). Rachel Oswald, Reality Rocked Info Wars Heat Up Between US. and Russia CQ, June 12, 2017. Testimony of John Lansing, CEO and Director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, The Scourge of Russian Disinformation, Hearing Before the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sept. 14, 2017, at 3. require relatively small investments, but history has shown that they can have outsized results, if conditions permit. New technologies, updated policy priorities, and a resurgent brashness in the Kremlin and among its oligarch allies have converged to enable an expanded range of disinformation operations in Europe. According to a resolution adopted by the European Parliament in November 2016, have the goal of distorting truths, provoking doubt, dividing Member states, engineering a strategic split between the European Union and its North American partners and paralyzing the decision-making process, discrediting the EU institutions and transatlantic partnerships and undermining and eroding the European narrative.’’ 207 Whereas the Kremlin’s propaganda inside of Russia glorifies the regime, outside of Russia, it aims to exploit discontent and grievances. Notably, the Kremlin’s disinformation operations do not necessarily try to convince foreign audiences that the Russian point of view is the correct one. Rather, they seek to confuse and distort events that threaten Russia’s image (including historical events, undercut international consensus on Russia’s behavior at home and abroad, and present Russia as a responsible and indispensable global power. Challenging others facts is simpler than the propaganda advanced by the Soviet Union—it is much harder to convince people that the harvest doubled in their local area than it is to plant doubt about what is happening thousands of miles away. Ben Nimmo of the Center for European Policy Analysis has characterized the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts as four simple tactics dismiss the critic, distort the facts, distract from the main issue, and dismay the audience. 208 At their core, the Kremlin’s disinformation operations seek to challenge the concept of objective truth. As the CEO of the US. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), John Lansing, put it, Kremlin messaging is really almost beyond a false narrative. It’s more of a strategy to establish that there is no such thing as an empirical fact. Facts are really what is being challenged around the world.’’ 209 For Putin and the Kremlin, the truth is not objective fact the truth is whatever will advance the interests of the current regime. Today, that means whatever will delegitimize Western democracies and distract negative attention away from the Russian government. It means subverting the notion of verifiable facts and casting doubt on the veracity of all information, regardless of the source—as Lansing also put it, If everything is a lie, then the biggest liar wins.’’ 210 Sometimes, it means going so far as using an image from a computer game as evidence of US. misdeeds, as Russia’s Defense Ministry did in November 2017 when it posted a screenshot from a promotional video of a computer game called AC Gunship Simulator Special Ops Squadron on social media and claimed that it was irrefutable proof that the US provides cover for ISIS combat VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 40 Computer Game as Irrefutable Proof EU vs. Disinfo, Nov. 15, 2017. The image also appeared on a government-sponsored TV station, presented as a news story. The EU versus Disinformation campaign is an anti-disinformation effort run by the European External Action Service East StratCom Task Force, created in response to the EU’s calls to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns. See Chapter 7. Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian ‘‘Firehose of Falsehood Propaganda Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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