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Chapter 5: Kremlin Interference in
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| Chapter 5: Kremlin Interference in Semi-Consolidated Democracies and Transitional Governments 388 The former states of the Soviet Union, as well as the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, remain perhaps the most vulnerable to Russian aggression. Geographically, the countries in Russia’s backyard have populations that are most receptive to Kremlin propaganda, and, in some cases, have their own Russian-speaking populations. They are also the most vulnerable to interference due to weak governing institutions, justice systems that allow for higher levels of corruption, and underdeveloped or beleaguered independent media and civil society. The Russian tactics of interference follow two main trends in this region. First, Russia aggressively targets countries that have taken tangible steps to integrate with western institutions like the EU or NATO in order to impede integration processes. Georgia, Ukraine, and Montenegro are the most recent cases in along history of Russian aggression along the periphery that stretches back generations and as they have drawn closer to NATO and the EU, they have been the focus of arguably the most brazen Kremlin efforts to keep them from sliding across the finish line. Montenegro’s accession to NATO in 2017 is an anomaly within this group, where, despite an onslaught of Russian pressure to deter it, the country was able to become a full member of the alliance. Second, Russian interference in places like Serbia is less visibly aggressive and focuses more on cultivating sympathetic elements of society to deter government efforts to integrate with the West. In addition to disinformation and the co-opting of political forces, Russia employs energy resources as a weapon to gain leverage in these countries. The Kremlin also targets NATO and EU members where corruption or vulnerabilities in the rule of law provide openings to erode their bonds to European values and institutions. This includes undermining their support for EU sanctions on Russia or NATO exercises on the continent. These tactics are most acute in VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 66 Bulgaria and Hungary. Hungary represents a case where the government has enabled space for Kremlin interference to shore up its own political strength, which is largely based on anti-migrant and anti-European integration policies. Finally, the country examples in the following two chapters are not an exhaustive compilation of Russian government interference throughout Europe, but an illustrative list of examples from recent years. The examples provide important lessons about tried and true Kremlin interference tools, as well as best practices to neutralize them. President Putin and the Russian government are not master strategists, nor are they always successful in their assaults on democracies. But a few notable qualities make the Russian Federation a considerable opponent scale, persistence, and adaptability. The United States and our allies, then, must also develop a more nimble, adaptable toolkit to deter and defend against continued meddling by the Kremlin. VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 67 Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid Wired, Mar. 3, 2016. The congressionally supported provision of lethal assistance to the Ukrainian military is long overdue and will hopefully increase the battlefield cost for Russian forces active in the country. 391 Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, at 89-90. 392 Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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