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| Ibid. at 91. 393 Taras Kuzio, Russian Policy Toward Ukraine During Elections, 13 Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 491, at 497-499, 512-513 (Sept. 2005). 394 Ibid. at 498. UKRAINE Perhaps more than any other country, Ukraine has borne the brunt of Russian hybrid aggression in all of its forms—a lethal blend of conventional military assaults, assassinations, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and the weaponization of energy and corruption. Russian government action on all of these fronts spiked after the Euromaidan protests of 2014 brought President Petro Poroshenko to power, and they have continued at an intense tempo in the years since. Ukraine has also been the target and testing ground for Russian cyberattacks that have crossed into direct strikes on physical infrastructure, such as its electricity grid. 389 As with Georgia, the goal of Russia’s interference appears to be to weaken Ukraine to the point that it becomes a failed state, rendering it incapable of joining Western institutions in the future and presenting the Russian people with another example of the consequences of democratization. The Russian military assault on Ukraine has been well documented since the illegal occupation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas began in This chapter will focus on those other elements of the Russian government’s asymmetric arsenal at play in Ukraine, namely its use of cyberattacks, disinformation, and corruption. Putin’s interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs was on full display in the 2004 presidential election between pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych and a pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yuschenko. Yanukovych’s campaign was supported by a large cadre of Russian political strategists, and just three days before the election, Putin attended a parade in Kiev where he stood alongside Yanukovych. 391 Putin’s interference created an unprecedented situation where ‘‘Yuschenko’s main rival in the elections was not Yanukovych, in fact, but Putin, who carried on as if it were his own personal campaign.’’ 392 And Russia’s secret services allegedly performed darker acts to assist Yanukovych. Most disturbingly, FSB agents were reportedly involved in the poisoning of Yuschenko in September 2004 with TCDD, the most toxic form of dioxin, which nearly killed him and left his face permanently disfigured. 393 And according to Ukraine expert Taras Kuzio, alleged FSB-hired operatives also planted a car bomb—large enough to destroy every building within a meter radius—near Yuschenko’s campaign offices. 394 But in spite of Putin’s best efforts, the Ukrainian people came to the streets to protect the ballot box, culminating in the Orange Revolution and the elevation of Yuschenko to the presidency. Yanukovych would later assume power in February 2010, and in 2014, as Ukraine sought to finalize an Association Agreement with the European Union, a key step in the EU accession process, VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 68 Will Englund & Kathy Lally, Ukraine, Under Pressure from Russia, Puts Brakes on EU. Deal The Washington Post, Nov. 21, 2013; James Marson, et al. Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych Driven From Power The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 23, 2014. Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,’’ Wired, June 20, 2017. 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid. 399 Ibid. 400 Ibid. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid Wired, Mar. 3, 2016. Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,’’ Wired, June 20, 2017. Yanukovych backtracked on the deal in response to pressure from Moscow. 395 The Ukrainian people rose up in a Revolution of Dignity in Kiev, which ousted Yanukovych, but also emboldened Russian forces to invade Crimea and eastern Ukraine under the pretext that Russian-speaking compatriots faced threats from Ukrainian nationalists. Using techniques honed during the invasion of Georgia, Russia expertly combined all the elements of hybrid warfare in its assault on Ukraine—conventional and unconventional forces, cyberattacks, and propaganda. Today, Russia continues to illegally occupy Crimea and maintains an active military presence in eastern Ukraine in support of separatists there. In that context, Ukraine seems to have emerged as Russia’s favorite laboratory for all forms of hybrid war. Cyberattacks have been a primary tool of Russia’s hybrid warfare operations in Ukraine. Virtually every sector of its society and economy—media, finance, transportation, military, politics, and energy has been the repeated target of pro-Kremlin hackers over the past three years. 396 According to Kenneth Geers, an ambassador to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence The gloves are off. This is a place where you can do your worst without retaliation or prosecution . . . Ukraine is not France or Germany. A lot of Americans cant find it on a map, so you can practice there.’’ 397 And the Kremlin has not wasted any opportunity to test and refine its cyber warfare skills. CyberBerkut, a pro-Russian group with ties to the hackers that breached the Clinton campaign and DNC in 2016, attacked Ukraine’s Central Election Commission website into falsely show that ultra-right presidential candidate Dmytro Yarosh was the winner. 398 The extent of attacks on Ukrainian institutions quickly widened to include the ministries of infrastructure, defense, and finance as well as the country’s pension fund, treasury, and seaport authority. 399 Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine have graduated from simply exfiltrating data and taking down websites to attacks on physical infrastructure. On at least two occasions, in December 2015 and December 2016, hackers have attacked Ukraine’s electricity distribution system, putting thousands of citizens in the dark for extended periods of time. 400 Cyber experts say that the sophistication of the attacks show a marked evolution. According to Marina Krotofil, an industrial control systems security researcher for Honeywell In 2015 they were like a group of brutal street fighters. In 2016, they were ninjas.’’ 401 The United States has sought to provide support to Ukrainian cyber defense efforts, but challenges remain. In the aftermath of the attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid, US. officials from the De- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 69 402 Ibid. 403 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Notification of Programs to Counter Russian Influence, Jan, 2017. Andrew E. Kramer, To Battle Fake News, Ukrainian Show Features Nothing But Lies Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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