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Link Turn – Opium Eradication
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- Link Turn – Incirlik
Link Turn – Opium EradicationEradication is the most cost-effective option Perl 3 (Raphael, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 10/16, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB88093.pdf) Proponents of vastly expanded supply reduction options, and specifically of herbicidal crop eradication, argue that this method is the most cost-effective and efficient means of eliminating narcotic crops. They maintain that, coupled with intensified law enforcement, such programs will succeed since it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities. Put differently, a kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500 kilograms of coca leaf that are required to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers will devote fewer economic resources to prevent their detection than to concealing more expensive and refined forms of the product. In addition, eradication successes have been recorded in individual countries. According to INL’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 2002, for example, Pakistan has reduced opium cultivation by more than 95% since 1995 and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan accomplished a similar feat in a single year, eliminating more than 62,000 hectares or 97% of the opium crop between 2000 and 2001. However, INL reports that cultivation surged again to 31,000 hectares in 2002 under the relatively weak Afghan political authority that succeeded the Taliban, suggesting that an effective central government presence in drug crop areas is critical to the success of eradication projects. Shift from eradication leads to interdiction Ward and Byrd 4 (Christopher and William, consultant and advisor for the World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/06/000012009_20050106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPER0AF100SASPR0no051Dec0171.pdf) The Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) was created in October 2002 to coordinate Afghanistan’s counter narcotics struggle. The Directorate has prepared a national strategy, signed by the President, which targets a 70% reduction in opium production by 2008, and its elimination by 2013. The mechanisms are an alternative livelihoods approach coupled with progressive enforcement of a cultivation ban, interdiction and prosecution of trafficking and processing, and forfeiture of drug-related assets. The strategy provides a sound framework for action. It acknowledges the difficulties faced and proposes many sound and necessary actions. It has a provision for action plans, coordination, monitoring etc. The proposals link to existing activities and programs rather than proposing yet more initiatives for an already overloaded system. Broad consultations are needed to get ownership of the strategy and to develop a sequenced action plan and investment program. The overall targets are ambitious, prompting the question whether the measures proposed are sufficient to achieve them. A “paradigm shift” may be needed to cope with such an unprecedented problem. Institutional capacity is another question, particularly the capacity of CND to do all that is expected of it. Strengthening of counter-narcotics institutions is under consideration, including the possibility of establishing a ministry responsible for counter-narcotics efforts. The International Counter Narcotics Conference in February, 2004 demonstrated the Government’s determination and top-level commitment, created some ownership, and put on the table a number of the more difficult issues. Key points from the strategy are now being worked out in implementation plans, although some implementation proposals appear at variance with the strategy, particularly the balance between eradication and interdiction, and the sequencing of alternative livelihoods programs and eradication. Interdiction is expensive Ward and Byrd 4 (Christopher and William, consultant and advisor for the World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/06/000012009_20050106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPER0AF100SASPR0no051Dec0171.pdf) Extensive regional and international cooperation around Afghanistan contributes to substantial seizures of opiates. International concern and action has intensified with concerns over the explosive growth of the Afghan heroin trade and its possible links to terrorism. International experience is that interdiction beyond the frontier increases risk premia but is expensive and can stop only a small proportion of the trade. Effectively, interdiction needs to begin within Afghanistan – evidence suggests that demand reduction or interdiction beyond the frontiers will do little to reduce the drug problem in major producing countries like Afghanistan. Without strong domestic interdiction, Afghanistan will continue to export increasing quantities of opiates. Export routes out of the country are many and shift quickly in response to attempts to suppress them. Trade and processing are even more “footloose” than production in terms of how quickly they can shift. Demand for heroin in Western Europe is not growing, but Afghan opiates are supplying expanding markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, and even the best organized states cannot really control trafficking or local demand. HIV/AIDS is growing fast in these new territories. Prospects for a reduction in aggregate demand or producer price through increased risk premia beyond Afghanistan’s frontiers are poor. Link Turn – IncirlikWe would redeploy Bolme 7 (Selin M, SETA Ankara & Ankara University, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7057/is_3_9/ai_n28498510/pg_7/) Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the Bush Administration will be able to convince the House. In 1975, despite the opposition of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger plus two vetoes, Congress passed the arms embargo against Turkey. (29) Hence, it can be said that the Armenian Genocide Resolution may still pass despite Turkey's Incirlik card. On the other hand, is there any plan as to what happens after closing the Incirlik Air base as a response to possible passage of the Armenian Resolution or inadequate American support in the fight against PKK? During crises of embargo in 1975, the bases were opened again to the US use after the lifting of the embargo. But the Armenian Genocide Resolution is a different matter in that there would be no reversal of the process once Congress passes the resolution. So, if Incirlik is vital for the U.S., they may play other cards against Turkey, like a new arms embargo. Such a card is likely to cause difficulties for Turkey in her fight against PKK. Turkey needs to consider all scenarios before taking any action. Furthermore, Incirlik is not the only base or facility that is used by the US. According to US Department of Defense Base Structure Report in 2004, air bases in Batman, Cigli and Mus are active bases of US Air Force without permanent personnel. There is an administration office with 43 personnel in Ankara. Izmir Air Station is another active facility with 117 military members. Izmir Storage Annex No 2 and Yumurtalik Petroleum Products Storage Annex are other installations that are mentioned on the report. The name of the twelve other installations are not mentioned as they are too small (less than 10 acres in area or their plant replacement value are under $10 million) According to the report, total military members of those facilities is 14. Redeployment costs billions Abercrombie 5 (Neil, hairs the House Armed Services subcommittee on air and land forces, http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_backtalk_redeploy_071105/) There is broad agreement that thoughtful planning is needed for the eventual redeployment of our troops. Yet most people are unclear about the feasibility of redeploying more than 160,000 troops, support personnel and equipment out of a hostile country. Some argue that strategic redeployment is too slow. Others want to “stay the course,” and claim that such redeployment plans are pointless. But redeployment is a complex military operation demanding serious thought and planning, especially if we have forces under fire or caught between factions in a civil war. One hundred and eighty-one House Republicans have joined 169 Democrats to pass legislation that would require the Bush administration to report to Congress on its planning for redeployment from Iraq. The companion measure was quickly introduced in the Senate by Ken Salazar, D-Colo., and Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., and also has solid bipartisan support. Our legislation requires that redeployment planning addresses: Protecting U.S. forces in Iraq. Protecting U.S. civilians, contractors, third-party forces and Iraqi nationals who have assisted the U.S. Maintaining and enhancing the ability of the U.S. to eliminate and disrupt al-Qaida and other terrorists. Preserving military equipment necessary to defend U.S. national security interests. It also specifies that missions for the troops remaining in Iraq should be limited to: Protecting U.S. national security interests. Conducting counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Protecting U.S. civilians and U.S. diplomatic and military facilities. Supporting and equipping Iraqi forces to take responsibility for their own security. One of the first issues is deciding which military units will be redeployed, in what order, from which geographic areas and over what time period. This includes the possibility of consolidating bases and relocating some units within Iraq during redeployment, deciding which forces might have to stay in Iraq and Kuwait and for how long. We’ll need detailed cost figures. Some experts estimate as much as $10 billion will be needed to get our forces and most of their equipment home from Iraq. By comparison, we’re spending about $10 billion every month to stay there. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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