Latin American and Caribbean countries are already experiencing the negative consequences of climate change. Moreover, under current trends those impacts are likely to become much more severe over the next decades. The region’s rich biodiversity, in particular, is at great risk, and agricultural productivity is likely to suffer dramatically as conditions become intolerable for current product varieties.
The impact of climate change will vary greatly across Latin American countries and sub-regions, not only with their level of exposure to climatic shocks, but also with their ability to adapt. Caribbean nations, for instance, are likely to be hit on multiple fronts, including through more intense natural disasters and the dieback of marine ecosystems. As a result, those nations stand to suffer relatively more, with permanent economic losses reaching by some estimates several percentage points of their Gross Domestic Product. Other countries will likely experience negative consequences in only some regions – e.g. farmers in drought-affected areas of Brazil’s North-East and water deprived valleys of Central Chile – and, in some cases, the effects could be positive – e.g. the South of Brazil and some of Chile’s northern regions which could benefit respectively from higher temperatures and increased water availability.
Because many of the climatic shocks that are likely to hit the region are to a large extent inevitable – due to inertia and the long lag times in the Earth’s climate system – the region’s Governments have to consider appropriate adaptation policies and investments. The uncertainties regarding the nature and locations of climate change impacts mean that for some kinds of responses there is value in waiting. This is true especially for investments to respond to specific effects about which the science is not yet clear (e.g., the magnitude of sea level rise). Responses to ongoing impacts are more urgent. Fortunately, good adaptation policy is largely congruent with good development policy. In other words, many adaptive measures can be described as "no regrets" in the sense that they should be undertaken anyway, as part of an overall development strategy. Examples include actions to improve the region’s natural resource management systems and incorporate climate related threats into the design of long-term infrastructure investments. In addition, Governments can also play an important role in facilitating private responses to climate change by increasing households’ flexibility and options by, for example, improving weather monitoring and forecasting, enhancing social safety nets so as to allow households to better cope with climate shocks, and enhancing the functioning of land, water, and financial markets.
Beyond adaptation policies, there is a strong case for Latin America to be an active part of a broader effort to mitigate climate change by means of drastically reducing the world’s GHG emissions. As argued in this paper, for such a coordinated global mitigation effort to be effective and efficient, it must entail emission reductions also in the developing world, particularly the larger middle-income countries. Effectiveness calls for Latin American participation because even a reduction in emissions by high-income countries to zero would not suffice to keep the stock of GHG below “dangerous” thresholds. Efficiency also requires Latin American involvement because much of the low-cost large-impact mitigation potential is located in emerging economies. However, coordinated global efforts that can engage constructive contributions by middle-income countries, including from Latin America, require a framework consistent with equity considerations – that is, a framework where the site of mitigation can be delinked from the financier of the mitigation effort and where mechanisms exist to allow countries to share the costs of climate change mitigation on the basis of their differentiated levels of “responsibility” and “capability.”
Given its past record of low carbon development, its wealth of natural resources and its intermediate levels of income – when assessed on a global scale – many Latin American countries are well placed to take a leadership role in the developing world’s response to the climate change challenge. This is not only possible; it is also in Latin America’s best interest. Indeed, many of the actions needed for reducing the growth in the region’s emissions are of a “no regret” nature: they would be socially advantageous regardless of their impact on climate change mitigation. In addition, adopting a low carbon development path would benefit the region’s long-term competitiveness to the extent that the world’s technological frontier moves in the direction of low carbon technologies.
Taking advantage of these opportunities, however, requires an appropriate international policy environment in which a critical mass of high-income countries take a global leadership role. This is important not only to make such a global framework equitable, thereby lending it credibility, but also to generate sufficient incentives and momentum for the private sector to invest in low carbon technologies. In addition, for the world to benefit from Latin America’s efficient mitigation contributions, the international climate framework needs to be responsive – and welcoming – to the region’s potential contributions in the areas of forest conservation, renewable energy sources and environmentally sustainable biofuels. Finally, while taking advantage of these opportunities will require specific domestic policy actions, it is critical that the international community develop climate financing mechanisms that go beyond the project-based approach of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, and provide support to climate friendly development policies at large.
Annex 1: Mitigation Potential by Country and
Type of Emissions
Table A1. Relative Importance of Mitigation Potential in Energy and Non-Energy-Related Emissions Based on Emissions Growth Rates and Ratio of Emissions to GDP111
Table A2. Relative Importance of Mitigation Potential in Energy-Related Emissions Based on Energy and Emissions Growth Rates and Ratio of Emissions to Energy112
Table A3. Relative Importance of Mitigation Potential in Non-Energy-Related Emissions Based on Emissions Growth Rates and Ratio of Emissions to GDP113
Figure A1. Emissions Growth Rates and Ratio of Emissions to GDP