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ZIMBABWE


Constitution of Zimbabwe13

Article number: 20

(1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference with his correspondence.

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be in contravention of subsection (1) to the extent that the law in question makes provision -

(a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or public health;

(b) for the purpose of -



  1. protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings;

  2. preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence;

  3. maintaining the authority and independence of the courts or tribunals or the Senate or the House of Assembly;

  4. regulating the technical administration, technical operation or general efficiency of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless broadcasting or television or creating or regulating any monopoly in these fields;

  5. in the case of correspondence, preventing the unlawful dispatch therewith of other matter;

or

(c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers: except so far as that provisions or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

(3) No religious denomination and no person or group of persons shall be prevented from establishing and maintaining schools, whether or not that denomination, person or group is in receipt of any subsidy, grant or other form of financial assistance from the State.

(4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law be held to be in contravention of subsection (3) to the extent that the law in question makes provision -

(a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning, or

(b) for regulating such schools in the interests of persons receiving instruction therein; except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

(5) No person shall be prevented from sending to any school a child of whom that person is parent or guardian by reason only that the school is not a school established or maintained by the State.

(6) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not be held to confer on any person right to exercise his freedom of expression in or on any road, street, lane, path, pavement, side-walk, thoroughfare or similar place which exists for the free passage of persons or vehicles.


S v Hartmann 1983 ZLR 186 S Crt: lawyers, held a press conference on behalf of their detained clients: convicted of contempt of court: whether there was a real risk as opposed to remote possibility that the publication was calculated to prejudice a fair hearing.

Georges CJ:


Section 20 of the constitution protects freedom of speech. Although this freedom may be limited in terms of s20(2) for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the courts, this inroad into the right of freedom of speech should not be wider or deeper than is required for the achievement of the declared objective. Appellants, both lawyers, held a press conference on behalf of their detained clients declaring their loyalty and innocence and protesting against torture used against their clients. The lawyers were convicted of contempt of court. Held that the South African test of ‘a tendency to prejudice or interfere with the administration of justice’ would make too great an inroad with the right of freedom of expression. The English test should be applied, namely whether there was a real risk as opposed to remote possibility that the publication was calculated to prejudice a fair hearing.
Locate the following 2 cases:

In re Munhumeso & Others 1995 (1) SA 551(ZS) at 557C-D


In re Chikweche 1995 (4) SA 284 (ZS)

Retrofit (PVT) LTD v Posts and Telecommunications Corporation 1996 (1) SA 847: applicant requested the defendant to issue it with a licence for the purpose of establishing a mobile cellular telephone service. The respondent refused to grant the licence on the ground that the service was one over which it enjoyed a monopoly. Act was inconsistent with the right to freedom of expression.


Gubbay CJ:
In July 1993 the applicant requested the defendant to issue it with a licence for the purpose of establishing a mobile cellular telephone service. The respondent refused to grant the licence on the ground that the service was one over which it enjoyed a monopoly in terms of s26(1) of the Postal and Telecommunication Services Act Chap 250. The applicant contended that authority for the issue of the license existed in terms of the Radiocommunication Services Act Chap 252. The applicant sought (1) a declarator that s26(1) of the Postal and Telecommunication Services Act was inconsistent with the right to freedom of expression in terms of s20(1) of the Constitution and (2) an order directing the respondent to issue the applicant with a licence.

Held that freedom of expression was an indispensable condition for a free and democratic society. It serves the broad special purposes of helping an individual to obtain fulfilment, assisting in the discovery of truth, strengthening the capacity of an individual to obtain self-fulfilment and providing a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change.


Held that s20(1) of the Constitution enjoined not only that persons were free to express themselves but that they were not hindered in the means of expression: an examination of foreign jurisprudence showed that restriction upon the means of communication abridged the guarantee of freedom of expression; a fortiori any monopoly which had the effect of hindering the right to receive and impart ideas and information, violated the protection of this paramount right.
Held that it was axiomatic that for respondent to monoplise telecommunication services in Zimbabwe, and then to furnish a public switched telephone network of notoriously poor worth, available only to a small percentage of the population, manifestly interfered with the constitutional right of every person to impart ideas and information by means of the telephone network. Persons in every walk of life were entitled to a telephone service which affords them a rapid and reliable means of communication. A public monopoly which failed to fulfil that essential role imposed a severe restraint upon the constitutionality protected freedom of expression.
Held that s26(1) of the Act, insofar as it vested in the defendant with the exclusive priviledge of establishing a mobile cellular telephone service was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The objectives of the legislation as claimed by the respondent in maintaining a viable telephone service, providing universal service, instilling of investor confidence and permitting the orderly development of the telephone service were not of sufficient importance to warrant a serious inroad into the constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Held that the measures designed to meet these legislative objectives were not rationally connected to it. Monopoly service was not the least drastic means by which the legislative objectives could be accomplished: the respondent would still be able to provide a comparatively inexpensive, good quality cellular telephone service to both urban and outlying communities, together with the ability to control an excessive intrusion into the field by the private sector.


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