Contractual Obligations – Prof. Helge Dedek Introduction 1



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Damages



Mechanisms to limit recovery:

Common law 

[1] Remoteness/Foreseeability (Hadley, Victoria Laundry, The Heron II)

[2] Mitigation of Damages: Victim can only recover for losses he could not have avoided

by taking reasonable steps

[3] Reasonableness of damages (Ruxley)


Civil law 

[1] Foreseeability and Cause (Art. 1607, Art. 1613)

[2] Mitigation of Damages (Art. 1479)






















      1. Damages in CVL


Restitution: unwinding the terms of the contract, one is not richer after the contract

Damages flowing from an injury Art. 1607, 1611 –right to profits that he has been deprived of


Art. 1607 – same damages for contracts and extra-contractual obligations

Article 1607

The creditor is entitled to damages for bodily, moral or material injury which is an immediate and direct consequence of the debtor’s default.


Art. 1611 – allows for loss of profit



Article 1611

The damages due to the creditor compensate for the amount of the loss he has sustained and the profit of which he has been deprived.


Future injury which is certain and able to be assessed is taken into account in awarding damages.




Art. 1613

In contractual matters, the debtor is liable only for damages that were foreseen or foreseeable at the time the obligation was contracted, where the failure to perform the obligation does not proceed from intentional or gross fault on his part; even then, the damages include only what is an immediate and direct consequence of the non-performance.



Art. 1479 - Obligation on victim to do what is reasonable to avoid the loss or mitigate damages



Art. 1479

A person who is liable to reparation for an injury is not liable in respect of any aggravation of the injury that the victim could have avoided.


Note that generally speaking, most contentious damages are LOSS OF PROFITS.

Note that goal of damages is COMPENSATION. No damages awarded if no loss.
CVL - Why do we give expectation damages?

One reason  Efficient Breach: Party breaches knowing that cost of breach < benefit of breaching.

It will rarely be more efficient to breach if you are forced to pay expectation damages (vs. just paying for losses).
Mitigation of Damages - Examples

Farmer has K to buy seeds - they are not delivered. Can he sue for entire loss of profits from crop? NO. He could have mitigated his loss by finding another source of seeds and claiming damages (i.e. difference in price)



CVL - Ciment Quebec Inc. v. Stellaire Construction, 2002 Cour d’appel, CB2: 299


Jurisdiction

Quebec

Facts

A Hydro Quebec dam needed to be reconstructed. Stellaire was hired to do the job, Hydro engineers supervised while Ciment was hired to deliver the cement. Very specific type of cement was needed; 20SF which was uncommon in the industry, written into the contract with Ciment. Stellaire man came to pick up cement, saw the word “silicone,” asked about the discrepancy and was told by Guimont it was the same thing. It was deemed both truly knew nothing about the product. Stellaire treated the product as cement and used it in construction. It was only after it dried that the error was realized by hydro and a whole reconstruction was needed. Stellaire sued Ciment for costs and loss of gains ($1 million in lost profits, $431 000 in additional costs of breaking down and rebuilding). The value of the concrete was $160, Ciment now being sued for $1.4 million.

Issues

Was there fault resulting from breach of contract? Is Stellaire entitled to costs? Is Stellaire entitled to loss of gains?

Holding

Holding  Yes, Yes, No

Reasoning

Chamberlain J:

Fault:


  • Ciment faulted because both parties involved in obtaining the cement were unaware of its difference with silicone, even if so, it takes a lab to distinguish the two. Only Ciment was in a position to detect that error. Agrees with trial judge

Damages:

  • Agrees with trial judge that Stellaire should be entitled to costs associated with deconstruction and reconstruction because the above fault was foreseeable to the reasonable cement dealer and was a direct and immediate consequence of the fault (see below).

Loss of Gain Damages:

  • Loss of insurance, orders and reduction of Ks followed, for Stellaire argued they were penalized for being a young company with incidental finance troubles.

  • Stellaire must prove that the loss of gains was a direct and immediate consequence (1607 CcQ) of Ciment’s fault and that it was foreseeable (1613 CcQ).

  • Determination dependent on judicial discretion (draws line in possible never-ending chain of causation)

  • It differs from the extra-contractual standard because it is adapted to contracts where risks should be foreseen and contracted for

  • Test is whether the reasonable and prudent contractor would have foreseen the consequences of his actions stemming from the breach

  • There is no doubt that there is a correlation between the error and loss of insurance however there were other factors that crept in too; e.g. weak capitalization, which ruptured this chain. Stellaire brought forth no proof of a direct connection to this end and it was not foreseeable that a slip up in a small quantity of cement would lead to these disastrous consequences.

  • Direct and immediate are strongly linked to foreseeability; the damage is not direct and immediate because the company’s fragile state intervened, and it is not foreseeable because the diligent contractor would not know that his actions would lead to a loss of insurance



Ratio

The quantum of contract damage must be a direct and immediate cause of the contracting fault AND it must be reasonably foreseeable to the diligent and prudent contractor in the shoes of he who is at fault.

Comment

  • An exception to this rule comes through when there is intent behind the fault. When there is bad faith, even if the damage is not reasonably foreseeable, the bad faith party is still found to be liable for whatever happens.


      1. Damages in CML



General Rule:

Hadley v. Baxendale: Amount of damages a party can get when K breached is EXPECTATION DAMAGES - what it would have gotten if K had been kept. [Use $ to put plaintiff in position he would have been in but for breach]
BUT…not all profits will be recoverable  law has mechanisms to limit scope of recovery (the breach is not supposed to allow the plaintiff to enjoy a windfall.)
We have to limit liability, so that someone cannot make outrageous claims about the amount of money that could have been accrued were it not for breach.
Mechanisms to limit recovery:

Common law 

[1] Remoteness/Foreseeability (Hadley, Victoria Laundry, The Heron II)

[2] Mitigation of Damages: Victim can only recover for losses he could not have avoided by taking reasonable steps

[3] Reasonableness of damages (Ruxley)
CML – Limiting Liability – Remoteness
2 principles from Hadley

1. (objective element) Rule of the loss being “reasonable foreseeablity” by the parties at time of entering the agreement



  • Baron Alderson from Hadley

    • “Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonable be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it.”

  • High threshold “usual course of things,” “probable result” of what was within “the contemplation of both parties”

2. (subjective element) Damages must not be too remote, would only be foreseeable if the fact had been communicated to the breaching party

    • “For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them”




  • Hadley-rule” still starting point of the analysis of “remoteness”

  • What kind of damages?

    • Consequential damages (this is now moving beyond the realm of expectancy, perfect performance)

  • What are the two branches of the Hadley rule?

    • “Naturally flowing damages” – within the natural course of things

    • Damages reasonably foreseeable (in the contemplation) by both parties at the time of entering into the contract

      • What was communicated? If something specific, then that would be within the scope of liability.

  • What reasons are given for the distinction?

    • Carrier has no knowledge of the workings of a mill  can’t be held liable for damages he would not foresee

  • Is the ruling surprising? Does the type of contract influence the outcome?

    • You would think that if someone needed a part replaced “urgently”, that it would be expected that they would be impeded from continuing their enterprise... but would a carrier have to know that?

    • There was no sophisticated corporate law that would limit liability, no bankruptcy law to ensure that you would not be ruined as a result of this sort of liability  courts wanted to protect carriers from excessive penalties



CML – Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch. 341: CB2 211


Jurisdiction

UK

Facts

H (flour mill owner) sent shaft by B’s shipping company to be replaced. B ships the part by canal instead of by rail. H did not explain that without the shaft the mill could not operate. Shipping was delayed; H had to close its mill for five days, tries to hold B liable for lost profits.

Issues

Is B responsible for lost profits? How should damages be calculated?

Holding

No. See ratio.  Baxendale

Reasoning

  • Plaintiffs only told defendants that they wanted to ship a broken mill shaft, not that urgency was needed or that profits were at stake.

  • Loss of profits can’t be considered a consequence of breach, given reasonable expectations in ordinary circumstances, since the sending of a broken shaft to third parties by a carrier under ordinary circumstances would not produce the stoppage of the mill.

  • If special circumstances are known to both parties, damages owing from breach would be those that would ordinarily follow under these circumstances; where special circumstances are not known by both parties, damages are those that would be expected to arise generally.

Ratio

Where a K is breached, damages should be 1) those arising “naturally” (i.e. “according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself”) or 2) such as both parties, when making K, may be supposed to have considered would result from breach

Comments

  • Continues to be the leading authority for breach

  • No reason not to think that slow shipping would have consequences – this was not the kind of product that is reasonably expected to be essential for the operation of a busines

  • First part of rule is objective; second part is subjective

  • This was in the early days of working out the relationship between a company and its agent, i.e., when a company “knows” something (today, if an agent is given information, that’s enough)

  • The threshold for damages in Hadley is quite high because at the time, the defendant would not enjoy limited liability, but rather would be found personally liable for the damage (there was no bankruptcy law in England at the time). Thus, the court wanted to protect the individual from liability. We see a lowering of threshold in the 20th century Victoria Laundry case.


R. Danzig: “Hadley v. Baxendale: A study in the industrialization of the law CBII: 212

The circumstances of the breach in this case reflect a half-way modernized society, since the breach occurred because the broken shaft was sent via an early industrial transport form. Indeed, the facts of the case offer a glimpse of an economic world in transition. For example, as opposed to claiming damages based on a specific contract, Hadley sought damages based on Baxendale’s failure to effect delivery “within a reasonable time.” This is inconsistent with a move from status to contracts in the mid-1800s.


In the case, the carrier, Baxendale, is held liable for the act of a clerk. Danzig argues that there was an uncertainty in the rudimentary law of agency as it existed at the time, which plays itself out in determining whether a carrier can be liable for the act of an employee. The case was “probably seen and shaped by its authors in the context of uncertainties about the law of agency and conflicts about the shape of the law of liability which are now forgotten.”
Moreover, the case emerged at a time when limiting liability was the most hotly contested legal issue in England. Under these circumstances we can understand why there is a severe restriction of scope of damages in this contract action. There was a growing acceptance of limited liability and yet the case was a situation of unlimited personal liability for commercial misfeasance.
The case’s importance is also a product of the bifurcation of the County and Superior Court systems in England. In drawing out new jurisdictions for each court system, previously unimportant considerations of damages began to receive attention, not because these rules were considered important as matters of substantive law but because they were important as rules of jurisdiction. By identifying the criteria for damages, the court in Hadley, enhanced the predictability of damages and therefore the correct allocation of cases between the County and Superior Courts.
Also, the courts’ large dockets pushed them to seek to establish a “crystallized delineation of instructions for dispute resolution.” The crystallization of the damages rule established in Baxendale was heavily influenced by the fact that 2 of the 3 the judges hearing the case had ties to Pickfords, Baxendale’s company. By establishing a clear rule of procedure, the case shifted power from juries to the judges who articulated the rule. Thus, the case served to limit the costs and biases of juries, while offering “substantial rewards to the judges who promulgated and later reaffirmed the rule established in the case.”




CML- Modern Doctrine on Limiting Liability

  • Victoria Laundry defines actual and imputed knowledge (1.actual – is knowledge of special circumstances outside the ordinary course of things that, if communicated to the other party, may attract second rule in Hadley, 2. imputed – reasonable man standard of what everyone is presumed to know

  • Lowers threshold of liability from requirement that consequences of breach be foreseeable to the extent that it is naturally arising, to a standard that consequences a “serious possibility” or a “real danger” or “on the cards”

  • Articulates 6 principles (listed in case summary)

  • Modern formulation of the Hadley-rule: What is the distinction made here as to the knowledge of the parties?

  • What kind of damages were sought?  lost profits

  • Which branch of the Hadley rule applies?  knowledge of specific circumstances giving rise to liability (under the first branch of Hadley, nothing would have been awarded)

  • Note the discussion of Hadley! Significance of the “type” of contract

  • What is “reasonably” foreseeable? “It is enough if he could foresee that it was likely so to result”

  • Note that only a “type” of damage has to be foreseeable, not the particular extent of the loss sustained

    • Subtle distinction – what damages are awarded here?  not everything (lost contracts, extremely lucrative business) but loss of normal profits – only that which is in the scope of foreseeability

      • Take this very BROADLY WORDED test – and apply it to the specific facts at hand, and apply the general foreseeability (from the first branch of the test) to the second branch of the test as well.



CML – Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528: CB2 220


Jurisdiction

UK

Facts

NIL K’d with VL to deliver a boiler, knowing that VL wanted it for immediate use in a laundry business but did not know the precise role for which the boiler was needed. NIL was slow in delivering, damaged the boiler, etc.  20+ weeks late. Plaintiff claims loss of profits they would have received had the boiler been delivered on time, including the regular business that they would have enjoyed and the additional revenue that they would have earned because of a number of lucrative dyeing contracts that they could have gotten.

Issues

Can VL claim for loss of profits that they would have made were the boiler to have been delivered on time? Could VL claim loss of lucrative dyeing contracts?

Holding

Yes/No  Victoria Laundry.

Reasoning

Asquith J:

  • Hadley v. Baxendale applies.

  • British Columbia, etc., Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship added to Hadley that where knowledge of special circumstances is relied on to enhance damages, this knowledge must have been “brought home” to defendant at time of K in circumstances where defendant agreed to bear special losses connected with these circumstances.

  • Cory v. Thames Ironworks Co. added that when parties are not ad idem in their contemplation of the use to which an article will be put, damages will be based on the “ordinary” use.

  • No supplier would reasonably not foresee that loss of business would result from delayed delivery of an item like this [implication: we assume that anything bought or sold could be used for profit].

  • VL claims damages for loss of specific Ks that NIL didn’t know about – doesn’t preclude some general recovery for lost business.

  • Case referred to a referee to assess damages.

  • The purpose of boiling water for washing or dyeing is the obvious one. The notion that the boiler might only be needed as a stand-by was negatived by the letter sent by VL that said that they wanted to put the boiler to immediate use.

  • A reasonable person in defendants shoes most be taken to foresee that a laundry which invested a lot of $ in a boiler which they intended to put to immediate use would be likely to suffer financially because of a 5 month delay in delivery. The defendant would have had to know about the specific terms of the dyeing contract, for the plaintiff to recover damages for them, however, the plaintiff can still recover a general sum for loss of business in respect of dyeing Ks and laundering Ks to be reasonably expected.

  • Moreover, more damages are rewarded in cases where defendant defaults in supplying a self-contained profit-earning whole than when he defaults in supplying a part. The boiler was a self-contained whole.

  • This case is distinguished from Hadley because here “there was ample means of knowledge on the part of the defendant that business loss of some sort would be likely to result to the plaintiff from the defendants’ default in performing their K.”

Ratio

1) Governing purpose of damages is to put the creditor in a position as if his rights had been observed – but this can be too harsh, so

2) Creditor is only entitled to damages equating with loss reasonably foreseeable, at time of K, arising from breach

3) Reasonable foreseeability depends on knowledge of parties (or of breaching party)

4) Knowledge can be imputed (“ordinary”: Hadley rule #1) or actual (special circumstances: Hadley rule #2  possibility for additional recovery)

5) Debtor need not have asked self what loss was liable to result from breach – damages based on what he would have contemplated, as a reasonable man, had the question been asked

6) Need not prove that debtor could have foreseen that a breach would necessarily result in that loss – enough that the loss was likely to result. The loss “has to be on the cards.”

Comments

  • Seems to reduce the second rule from Hadley in favour of the first; suggests that parties should take it upon themselves to think fairly imaginatively about how their goods can/will be used

  • Normal profits are compensable; exceptionally lucrative profits (the special dyeing Ks) are not

In the case, the court contemplates what is “foreseeable.” Does being foreseeable require a certain amount of probability? It has to be likely, “on the cards,” a “serious possibility” or a “real danger.” These expressions lower the liability threshold from Hadley and give rise to significant dispute in the House of Lords.


We thus see a slight reformulation of the Hadley rule. In Victoria, foreseeability comes into the court’s assessment of both the subjective and objective elements of the Hadley test since the court only needs to show that with a given state of knowledge, loss is reasonably foreseeable. Thus, Hadley can be reformulated with foreseeability coming into play twice:

1 - What would have been foreseeable given no notice?



2- what was foreseeable given the information that was known?
Note that only a “type” of damage has to be foreseeable, not the particular extent of the loss sustained
Heron II and Limiting Liability

  • Heron has extensive but inconclusive question on Asquith L.J.’s Victoria Laundry formulation of a lower threshold – but in the end survived

  • Decided that the standard of foreseeabilty in a contract claim of higher degree than that required in a tort claim, as the victim of a breach can secure protection from an unusual risk by signifying the existence of the risk to the other part – but in tort law, the victim cannot seek this kind of protection

  • In Heron it was entirely foreseeable that he would earn less money if it was delivered late – market is fluctuating

  • After this case, carriers added liability clauses to their contracts

  • “The formulation of the rule in Hadley set forth in Victoria Laundry appears to have survived the scrutiny of the House of Lords in Koufos unscathed. At the same time, no clear consensus has emerged from the court as to whether the foreseeability threshold has been reduced over time.”

  • It is, however, clear that

    • It is not necessary to establish “odds-on liability” – not necessary to only award damages for something that was more likely to happen (so market falling would still be within the scope, even if it was more likely that the market would go up)

    • The threshold is, however, higher than in torts cases. Why?

      • In contracts, parties can allocate risk – they have the option of insuring themselves by an explicit agreement, they could have communicated their expectations

      • In torts, foreseeability only excludes the most unlikely events

Critics of Heron II (Koufos)

  • What if the market was up in when they delivered it late? The carrier does not get the windfall, but he is liable if the market is down

  • “Reasonableness” can be spun as the judge likes

  • Drafters of contracts beware!



CML – Koufos v. C. Czarnikow (The Heron II), [1969] 1 A.C. 350: CB2 224


Jurisdiction

UK

Facts

K chartered CC’s boat to deliver a load of sugar. CC arrived nine days late; in the meantime, price of sugar had fallen and K lost money relative to what he would have made if CC had arrived on time.

Issues

Is CC liable for fall in market value (i.e. should damages include this fall)?

Holding

Yes  Koufos.

Reasoning

  • CC must have realized that it was not unlikely for market price to fall (though could equally have risen), and it was not unlikely that the sugar would be sold in the market at market price on arrival.

  • Hadley intended to lay down a rule that a result which, though foreseeable as a substantial possibility, would happen in a small minority of cases should not be regarded as having been in the parties’ contemplation.

  • In cases like Hadley, or the present case, the crucial question is whether on the info available to the defendant when the K was made, he should, or a reasonable man would, have realized that such loss was sufficiently likely to result from the breach of K to make it proper to hold that the loss flowed naturally from the breach or that loss of that kind should have been within contemplation.

  • Modern tort rules impose much wider liability

  • Victoria Laundry goes beyond established authorities by bringing a tort concept, reasonably foreseeability, into assessment of damages. It has never been enough in contracts that a loss was “foreseeable as a serious possibility or a real danger or as being on the cards.” To use these notions from VL would be to extend liability for breach of K beyond what is reasonable or desirable.

  • Damages are not to be considered too remote just because they might arise from a situation with a “less than even chance” – it’s enough that event was not unlikely

  • Thus, without relying on VL, and taking the principle from Hadley into account, the loss of profit in this case would not be too remote

Concurrence (Lord Pearce)



  • Underlying CML rule is that damage will place creditor in same position as if K had been performed – but this is too harsh, so Hadley has stepped in to limit liability.

  • Some cases debate which of Hadley’s two rules applies – sometimes both apply

  • It is argued that Victoria Laundry was an erroneous departure from Hadley in that it allowed damages where the loss was a serious possibility or a real danger instead of holding that loss must be probable. These expressions, however were used correctly, not inconsistent with Hadley, as the language in Victoria clarifies the vague notion of the “natural course of things” in Hadley.

  • Where sale of goods is delayed, prima facie rule is that damage is difference between value of article K’d for at time when it ought to have been and time when actually delivered

  • Facts of present case lead to the view that the loss of market arose naturally according to the usual course of things from the ship-owners deviation.

  • Some argue that shipment by sea is different because of The Parana (1877) and uncertain timing, but the rule should be no different, and modern technology permits more accurate estimation of sea travel

  • Loss of market will usually be found within contemplation of parties

Ratio

Damages for a breach of K will be assessed based on events or circumstances that the debtor considered not to be unlikely.

Comments

  • Central issue: is a falling market part of the foreseeable loss? (here, yes)

  • This is in contrast to the older idea of Ks as exchanging things (in which case you wouldn’t expect immediate resale) – how normal is it that things should be resold?

  • Think of what would have happened if something had gone slightly differently: if ship had arrived late and market had risen, buyer would have kept the windfall (no basis for sharing)

  • Two Js disagree over whether Asquith’s judgment in Victoria was a radical reformulation or a correct interpretation of Hadley



The judges in Heron II engage in semantic discussion of what constitutes “probability.” The judges don’t erect a threshold for establishing foreseeability but they say that however low the threshold is in K law, it is higher than in ECO law because in K law, parties enter into agreement voluntarily and can therefore plan for certain contingencies. If parties know that losses might occur then they are expected to include appropriate clauses in contract to protect against losses. Thus, there must be a higher foreseeability threshold in awarding damages in contracts than in ECO.


It is very hard to synchronize the law of damages with will theory, since will theory is premised on the notion that you are required to give what you promise in an agreement. It is hard for 19th century K ideology to understand why someone should be liable for value beyond what they have promised in an agreement. In the realm of damages we see an inherent limitation of will theory.

How to calculate expectancy?

  • Comparing situations – actual situation after the breach in comparison to the situation expected upon performance of the contract

    • “Where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.”

  • Expression of a “more fundamental principle, [...] to make ‘compensation’ for ‘injuries’”

    • Leads to a granting the expectancy as the typical measure for contract damages


Example: Contract for the Sale of Goods

Seller breaches by unexcused non-delivery:

Damages = (market price for substitute goods) - (contract price)



  • Rationale: “I negotiated a better price than what the market offered me, so I should get the profit”

  • If a seller doesn’t deliver oranges, get substitutes which means I pay market price

  • I am deprived of the benefits of the deal

  • If the market price is cheaper, then you should be happy (Cehave) bad deal, cannot claim deprived of a benefit


Buyer breaches by unexcused non-acceptance:

Damages = (contract price) - (market price)



  • Promisee must not benefit from a windfall – you are only entitled to liquidated damages if you are in a worse position as a result of the breach


Alternative measure of damages: Reliance Measure

    • Put the innocent party in the position as if he had never relied (Security Stove)

    • It cannot be more than the expectancy – you cannot benefit from someone breaching the contract (cannot be put in a better position than you would be if the contract had been performed)

    • THE PROMISEE CANNOT HAVE BOTH – can’t benefit from the contract AND save the expenses!


Torts Damages vs. Contracts Damages

Tort Claim for Damages (Restitutio in integrum)


* Party has incurred a loss as a result of

breach of contract

* Is entitled to damages to the restore

Pre contract himself to the position in which he would have

been had the contract never existed

* Principle of restitutio in integrum, party

Post Contract does not benefit from the breach




Contractual Claim for Damages


* Party has received some of the benefit he

Expectancy bargained for but through the breach or

partial or inadequate performance of the

other party, he has been deprived of a

benefit

Post-Contract * He is entitled to the difference of what was



expected and what he actually received

Pre-Contract





Hawkins v. McGee Claim for Damages

Expectancy

* The boy has a claim for the

100% Good Hand difference between a burned hand

and a 100% good hand


Pre-Contract Burned Hand



Post Contract Burned and Hairy Hand



EXPECTANCY IS ALWAYS THE UPPER LIMIT OF DAMAGES IN A CONTRACTS CASE
Hawkins v. McGee

  • First step – need to interpret the intention of the party (use reasonable man standard – was the promise to give a 100% good hand a legally binding warranty) – Yes, was an expert, induced the father by repeating the warranty

  • “The rule of the common law is, that were a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.” Baron Parke, Robinson v. Harman

    • Doesn’t receive pain and suffering from the surgery, because he would have incurred this price for the perfect hand

    • The “injury” is that the boy didn’t get a %100 hand (the breach is the not fulfilling the promise)

    • “Compensation for a breach, measured in the terms of the contract” (Hawkins v. McGee)



CML - Hawkins v. McGee Supreme Court of New Hampshire 1929 - CB2: 245


Jurisdiction

USA

Facts

Before performing an operation to remove and replace scar tissue from a patient’s hand, he guaranteed to make the hand 100 percent perfect. Proof of their utterance would establish the giving of a “warranty.” Defendant argues that no “reasonable man” would understand that these words were used with the intention of entering into any “contractual relation” and they simply expressed his belief in strong words that the operation would be a success. Also for the plaintiff there was the fact that the defendant repeatedly solicited the patient’s father to perform the operation, which leads us to believe he was in fact making a guarantee to the patient.

Issues

What damages is the plaintiff entitled to recover?

Holding

Entitled to the difference in value of a perfect hand to what he has, plus the difference between what he had before the surgery (burned hand) and what he has now (hairy hand), thus he has a tortious restitution claim for damages, and a contractual claim for damages (not being enriched)

Reasoning

  • Authority for any specific rule of damages is lacking, but when tested by general principle and by analogy it appears the instructions were erroneous

  • In contract law, “damages” is intended compensation for breach, measured in terms of the contract (Davis v. Company)

  • The purpose of law is to “put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been had the defendant kept his contract” (Hardie Co. v. Company)

  • As a general rule, the measure of the vendee’s damages is the difference between the value of the goods as they would have been if the warranty as to quality had been true, and the actual value at the time of the sale, including gains prevented and losses sustained, and such other damages as could be reasonably anticipated by the parties as likely to be caused by the vendors failure to keep his agreement, and could not by reasonable care on the part of the vendee have been avoided (Union Bank v. Blanchard)

  • Therefore damages in this case  difference between the value to him of a perfect hand / good hand, such as the jury found he was promised, and the value of his hand in its present condition, including any incidental consequences fairly within the contemplation of the parties when they made their contract

Ratio




Comments

What might be problematic?

  • What about the “positive ill effects”?

  • What about pain & suffering?

  • We have the pain and suffering regardless of whether or not the result of the operation was favourable – he would have suffered even in the event of perfect performance

  • Additional pain and suffering, caused by the faulty performance, was not addressed – mental anguish, etc.

  • Exact calculation – uncertainty? How could uncertainty be prevented?


What about limitations?

  • Reasonableness – not held liable for every possible consequence – limits to civil liability (scope of risk) (e.g. if the kid wanted to be a hand model and is claiming lost future income)

  • Limits by statute?


Is being deprived of an “expectancy” truly an “injury” the creditor has to be “compensated” for?

Idea of inducement into the contract by the expectancy -

The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages – L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue – CB2: 167

Very influential contracts article

Even though the title is Reliance Interest, it’s actually Expectation Interest that is explored in detail: it is the default rule of contract damages. The authors explore the reasons why this is.



  • Expectation Interest is an unusual form of “compensation” in the sense that the courts are compensating the plaintiff for something he never had (versus tort law, which seeks to restore the plaintiff back to his previous state).

  • There are three broad main purposes in awarding contract damages:

1) Restitution Interest: promisor is not to be unjustly enriched. If the promisor has received something from the promisee, but has not fulfilled his promise, he must disgorge it. (In the event of payment before performance, this is also reliance interest.)

2) Reliance Interest: to compensate the promisee for any detrimental reliance (the promisee changed his position) based on the assumption that promisor would perform (e.g. the promisee did not enter into other contracts as a result of the promisor’s promise [“gains prevented”]; or the promisee had to spend money investigating the seller’s title [“losses caused”]). The object is to put the promisee in as good a position as before the promise was made.

3) Expectation Interest: to grant awards that put promisee in position he would have been in had the contract been performed. This could be specific performance or the equivalent money value. (Nb: this could, like reliance, also include “gains prevented” or “losses caused” [as awarded in V.K. Mason]. An example of “losses caused” that would be covered by expectation: the defendant failed to put his ads on billboards as promised; the plaintiff had to pay to place “fillers” on the boards.)

Lost opportunity cost could be under reliance interest (if we have proof to show that there was another opportunity, we can get the cost for performance. If we don’t have proof, we can seek damages through expectation interest). For example, doctors will charge full price for a missed appointment: they can prove they would have filled that slot with another patient. (The doctor has relied on the patient, but this also falls under expectancy.)
Why is expectation seen as an injury?

1) There is a psychological sense of disappointment (when we’re promised something, we feel “injured” when it’s not fulfilled).

2) Will theory holds that law gives contracting parties a private legislative power, which should be enforced.

3) “Economic or institutional approach” – locates rationale for the expectancy principle in modern credit economy. The essence of a credit economy is that future values collapse into present values (your future promise has current value to me) – thus future breach constitutes a present loss in the sense that economic modes of thought underlying the credit economy will have attributed value to the promise of future conduct that has now been lost – thus law is not creature but, by enforcing the value of promises, is a creator of social institutions.

4) “Juristic” explanation – the courts have found it wise to enforce expectation interests, for the following reasons:

1) Expectancy actually offers the most effective protection of reliance interest (reliance includes opportunity cost). It’s hard to prove existence of opportunities, which can be necessary for reliance: thus expectancy is generally better (e.g. ignoring the fact that you could have entered into another contract if the promiser hadn’t lied, how much should you have made from the contract you actually entered into? It’s generally easier to put a price tag on this, and [I think] it’s assumed that the opportunities you forewent were worth less than the one you ultimately went with. So expectancy can put you in a better position than the opportunities you missed out on).

2) Expectancy acts as a better sanction against breach of contract, since it’s more easily administered, and this stimulates business activity (because we can enter into contracts of an economic nature with confidence).




Section 90 of (Old) Restatement - Idea of inducement into the contract by the expectancy

Ground for liability is reliance – I changed my position for the worse because I relied on you (lack of consideration) to my detriment – natural measure of damages is expectation


2nd Restatement - Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forebearance

(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.


CML – Security Stove

  • The defendant must pay for all the expenses that the plaintiff incurred in preparing for the show (these include expenses he made even before he entered into the contract) – reliance measures as he was not expecting to make money off the stove, but the opportunity to meet future customers (this expectancy is impossible to calculate)

  • Dedek is very critical of this case – why should a shipper be held liable for promises made before their contract, why should the carrier pay for all the expenses – he did not bargain for this

  • Dedek sees this case as lack of reciprocity, closer to past consideration

  • Dedek says that the court sees damages flowing from the breach, but strictly speaking the loss does not flow from the breach



CML - Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., USA – CB2: 181


Jurisdiction

USA

Facts

Security Stove (plaintiff) wanted to ship a new furnace to a convention. They contracted American Ry. Express (defendant) to do so, and clearly stipulated the date by which the furnace must arrive. The defendant failed to ship an essential part: the plaintiff could not display their furnace, thus the whole trip to the convention was useless for them. The plaintiff is seeking damages to compensate for the costs they incurred in sending the president and another employee to the convention, and the cost of the rental fee for the convention booth.

Issues

Did the defendant owe damages in the form of lost expenses?

Holding

Yes  Security Stove

Reasoning

  • Ordinarily the rule for damages where the carrier fails to deliver within a reasonable time, is the difference in market value of the goods at the time of delivery and the time when they should have been delivered

  • However where the carrier has notice of peculiar circumstances under which the shipment is made which will result in an unusual loss, the carrier is responsible for the real damage sustained from such delay if the notice is given is of such character, and goes to the extent, in informing the carrier of the shipper’s situation, that the carrier will be presumed to have contracted with reference thereto

  • The general rule is that where there is a breach of contract, the party suffering the loss can recover only that which he would have had, had the contract not been broken, and this is what the defendant relies on (although in some instances the injured party may recover expenses incurred in relying upon the contract)

  • The problem is that there are no lost profits here, as the plaintiff was not planning to make a sale. The only way to measure damages here is in terms of the plaintiff’s expenses

  • “Unless the plaintiff is entitled to recover the expenses that it went to, which were a total loss to it by reason of its inability to exhibit the furnace and equipment, it will be deprived of any substantial compensation for its loss”

  • Although certain expenses were initiated before the contract, (rental fee) they were done in reliance on the product being shipped in a timely fashion, it can therefore be fairly said that the damages or loss suffered by pltf grew out of the breach of contract, for had the shipment arrived on time, he would have had the benefit of the contract, which was contemplated by all parties.

Ratio

While expectancy interests are the default rule for damages, in some cases (e.g. when expectancy interests don’t produce a dollar figure) reliance interests may be used instead: “the injured party may recover expenses incurred in relying upon the contract, although such expenses would have been occurred had the contract not been breached.”

Comments

BRITISH CASE LAW:

  • Pre-contractual expenses – will usually be reimbursed, see Anglia Television v. Reed [1972] 1 Q.B. 60 (C.A.)

ANNAMARIA: the court should consider when the last point was that the plaintiff could have cancelled his expenses (if he had been unable to find a carrier willing to transport his product)

  • Recall that the default rule in damages is expectancy, but if it is impossible to quantify expectancy, such as in this case, you can shift to reliance damages.

  • There is a limit to reliance damages – they cannot exceed the expected benefit of the promise!! (If you relied $1million as a result of a contract that would benefit you $100, you cannot claim $1million in reliance damages!!)













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