Control of Speech in Japan and Germany Censorship under the American Occupation
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- Planning of Censorship Policy for Japan
- In the Pacific
Planning for JapanDrafting Occupation Policy in WashingtonIn the autumn of 1942, the Group of Far Eastern Affairs (FEA) in the Special Research Division of the State Department was formed.59 The chief of the group was George Blakeslee, supported by nine junior officers in total.60 They were familiar with Japan and Japanese Studies, and all of them were American. In terms of initial occupation policies, disarmament and demilitarization were most important, including demobilization.61 Nevertheless, the summer of 1943, FEA submitted a mass of documents to the Territorial Subcommittee. These documents tried to not only define the framework of the occupation but also examine the Japanese politics and economics. These documents presented prototype sentences of the Potsdam Declaration and the Presidential policies (T357).62 By May 9 1944, Hugh Borton’s “Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes” had been approved by the Postwar Programs Committee, which planned a massive reorientation of Japanese thinking on the role of the individual in politics and economics that could begin with the granting freedom of speech and liberal education.63 It indicated that they would use the press, radio, and motion pictures to explain the meaning of personal liberties in a democracy. Borton believed that in order to prevent re-militarization of Japan, the combination of military defeat and “changes in the organizational structure of the government” would be essential. Although Borton also worried about the influence of Communism from the Soviet Union and China, he insisted that a Japanese revolution should be moderate, and Japanese ex- politicians who could be supported by the public should be rehabilitated and brought back into service.64 As an indirect result of the frictions created by the Morgenthau Plan inside of the Roosevelt Administration and the resignation of Cordell Hull, policies for Germany affected inevitably those for Japan. Joseph Grew, who became the Under Secretary from November 1944, brought several Japanese specialists into the State Department, such as Joseph Ballantine as the Director of Far Eastern Affairs, and Eugene Dorman as the Chief of SWNCC.65 This would allow plans created by Japan specialists to stay in motion until they were considered or modified at a higher level of command. In addition, the death of Roosevelt meant that Japan lost one strong reason to be punished severely. In July 1945, however, high-level officials in the American government began making a draft of the Potsdam Declaration, which declared the “indirect governance” of Japan. Yet, this high-ranking activity was not told to the Post-War Programs Committee of the State Department or the SNWCC working staff.66 Thus, when they finally completed writing the final documents on some main policies on 20 August 1945, the premise of “direct governance” after the collapse of the Japanese government was dropped. After commencement of the occupation in Japan, governance was executed through a process of trial and error.67 Despite long years of preparation, occupation plans were not established nor shaped in time for the end of the war. The landing of General MacArthur on the Japanese mainland and the materializing of occupation plans took place simultaneously. At the time of surrender, Japanese authorities only knew that their government was to continue to function, though completely subject to the orders of SCAP. Finally, SWNCC sent its “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (SWNCC 150/3) on 29 August.68 Eventually the technical directive “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS1380/15)” was barely issued on 3 November.69 Planning of Censorship Policy for JapanIn WashingtonWashington’s media policy for Japan by the end of 1944 was to encourage the media and Japanese people by providing: a(3) Propagation of liberal thought through the press radio cinema and schools, and it was slightly changed into taking Japanese spontaneity, b(3) Encouragement of democratic thought through the press radio cinema and schools”.70 Notably enough, at the time, American policy makers perceived the “one newspaper per one prefecture system,” which was forced to integrate by the Imperial Japanese government, as a useful way to control newspapers. In addition, the policy makers predicted that this system of a small number of newspapers would continue after the defeat of the Imperial Japan. That is, the American policy makers did not think that lifting wartime controls over the Japanese media would bring on a flood of new publications.71 Inside the Post-War Programs Committee (PWC) of the State Department, some found potential problems in limiting freedom of speech. Therefore, an instruction (PWC-288b), in November 1944, stipulated that control of the mass media would be necessary for the first stage of occupation, but that this should be loosened in further stages. Another problem was the fear that reform activities would overburden the occupation forces and that it might indeed be difficult to successful impose democracy and free speech in Japan.72 Although media policy for occupation was discussed in the PWC, by June 1945 a new sense of things came to the upper echelons of the SWNCC. They came up with the idea of trying to reeducate Japanese, something that followed what they had already been trying to do in Italy and Germany. It was in fact the failure of these policies in Germany and Italy that prompted policy makers in Washington to revamp their plan for Japan and to now mobilize not only formal education but also all the mass media as well, something they had not yet done in the other two countries. SWNCC thus concluded that the extant Japanese newspaper companies would continue, but they did not decide whether the sole public national radio station, NHK, would be suspended or not. Ironically, executives of the major the Japanese mass media during the war feared that afterwards they would be eliminated and punished by the Americans.73 In the PacificOn 24 May 1944, the American Army drafted “Censorship of Civilian Communication in Pacific-Asiatic Theater (JCS-373),” which was originally suggested by Byron Price. By the end of 1944, the Army drafted “Censorship of Civilian Communications in Areas Occupied or Controlled by the Armed Forces,” which included collecting information, espionage, and censorship of the press. It did not include censorship on newspapers and magazines. In contrast to the debate taking place in Washington, the American Army in the Pacific had already experienced with civil censorship and control freedom of speech in the occupation regions. On 20 September 1944, MacArthur organized the first unit for civil censorship in the American Army to act in Philippine, and Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD), which would become the central organization of the American censorship in Japan.74 “The Plan of Civil Censorship in Japan” was approved by the General Head Quarters of the Army in the Pacific, which consisted materialize the organization of censorship in Japan, on the premise of military direct occupation. After commencement of the occupation in Japan, control of the freedom of speech and propaganda was executed through a process of trial and error. In the first days of the occupation, MacArthur had only CCD, which was for the military operation and espionage, but now CCD was suddenly inset in a high-level occupation policy.75 The technical directive (JCS1380/15) of 3 November defines how to control the mass media as follows: 9. Political Activity a. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form will be prohibited and completely suppressed. … b. You will establish such minimum control and censorship of civilian communications including the mails, wireless, radio, telephone, telegraph and cables, films and press as may be necessary in the interests of military security and the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in this directive. Freedom of thought will be fostered by the dissemination of democratic ideals and principles through all available media of public information.76 Here, the necessity of comprehensive censorship by the Americans was presented explicitly in the form of a high level instruction to MacArthur, although actual censorship of the news companies, radio (NHK), and newspapers had already begun. 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