Control of Speech in Japan and Germany Censorship under the American Occupation
Inconsistencies between the Framework for Occupation and Information Control?
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- Enforcement: American Military Governments’ Organization and System
- Allied Occupation
- GHQ/SCAP in Japan: Sprawling Organization
- OMGUS in Germany
Inconsistencies between the Framework for Occupation and Information Control?Since different groups were in charge of different parts of planning, there emerged inconsistencies between American policies in Japan and Germany. These were problems that President Roosevelt did not try to manage or remedy. High-level official groups were interested in the concept of demilitarization and democratization, but they did not focus on a concrete execution plan or pay much attention to its feasibility. In addition, planning was not completed by the end of war and no one could predict what would happen when they tried to actually manipulate a whole country’s administration. Though several basic occupation policies were finally elaborated in SWNCC, each plan kept the spirit of the original plan. Each plan was made in the different groups, which consisted of the area specialists. The planners had not been much concerned with the blueprints of a post war world, but they focus much more on each society’s history and culture. To be sure, the basic policies for Germany and Japan were also different, despite of some level of information exchange between the research groups. For Japan, the grand framework was made by Japan specialists for the occupation who aimed to rely on the moderate elements of the ex-Japanese establishment and the tradition of Japanese democracy. Concrete plans for control of the press and public opinion developed during the war in the Pacific and emphasized the security of American military and intelligence. On the other hand, the occupation plan for Germany was created at first by German émigrés and German-Americans, who thought German society could not change solely on its own. By the end of war, however, a different kind of plan, JCS1067, which sought to punish Germany, was approved. Concrete plans for nurturing freedom of speech were produced at different levels of planning in the German and Japanese cases, accounting for some differences. Simultaneously, the War, and Army and Navy Department had to prepare more concrete planning for the disposition of soldiers, civil officers, and all supplies. Different from traditional occupations, which aimed to keep social security and order until a conclusion of a peace ensued, democratization would require far much more officers, money, and time. In sum, the U.S. attempted to make its occupation plan before the termination of the war, but these plans could not be integrated by Washington as parts of a larger blueprint or master plan for a ‘new world order’ owing to the absence of presidential leadership and concessions to other Allied Powers like the U.K. In addition, respective instructions and implementation in Japan and Germany were not always consistent with grand occupations plans. Both occupations for Germany and Japan were implemented by trial and error, according to the actual situation. The actual situation will be briefly described in the next chapter. Enforcement: American Military Governments’ Organization and SystemCensorship in Japan was conducted through an elaborate apparatus within GHQ from September 1945 through September 1949, and continued in altered forms until Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952.98 In Germany, American censorship functioned officially from May 1945 until May 1949, when West Germany was established, but it also substantially continued until its formal recovery of the sovereignty in 1955. From this chapter, we will see how to enforce American censorship and propaganda in Japan and Germany. As American policymakers in Washington were not a monolith, in the occupied countries the Americans were not unity. In this chapter, I will focus on the American factors in Japan and Germany, such as the organizations and regulations of censorship, as well as the influence of the existence of the American media in both countries. Allied OccupationThe occupation of Japan was officially carried out by the Occupation Council for Japan, which consisted of the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and Australia.99 Its direction, however, was taken over by the U.S. government, acting through the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur. The Allied censorship and information control policies were almost completely decided and implemented by the Americans. Thus, generally, Japanese called it the “American Occupation.” Edward Martin left a note in 1948, “During the first months of the occupation, however, inter-Allied machinery for this purpose did not exist, and policy formulation was exclusively in the hands of the United States Government.”100 On the other hand, in Germany, after the defeat of Nazi government, Germany was divided into four zones, which were respectively governed by the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union, and France. The Occupation Council consisted of the same big four, and it had been working for whole the occupation period, 1945-1949. The council could not decide any grand framework for governing Germany, because the interest of each of the four countries was not always the same. Consequently, in each zone, the respective country had an exclusive power, although its governance was often interfered with by the other occupying powers. GHQ/SCAP in Japan: Sprawling OrganizationGeneral Headquarters had a double function as General Headquarters of the U.S. Army in the Pacific (GHQ), and of Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP). Much like MacArthur, many American officers held positions in both organizations.101 MacArthur took responsibility, in May 1945, for preparing civil censorship in Japan. The death of Roosevelt brought a change of many staff in the State Department again. Joseph Grew, for example, was replaced by radical reformists who supported China. Within the site of Japan, the Japanese specialists were from the first rarely to be seen since MacArthur favored letting specialists in fields other than Japan work with him. Colonel Charles Kades, who would play a pivotal role in the occupation, recalled, “I had no knowledge whatsoever about Japan’s history or culture or myths…I had no knowledge other than what one would glean from a daily newspaper about Japan.”102 As already suggested, by contrast, the occupation of Germany directly involved many German specialists German émigrés who were actually now working in Germany. Upon his arrival of 30 August 1945, MacArthur authorized the establishment of the Information Dissemination Section (IDS) of GHQ. The SWNCC and OWI guidelines made clear that IDS would be in charge of an information policy whose goal was the reeducation of the Japanese people through the media.103 On 22 September, IDS became the Civil Information and Education section (CIE), headed by Brigadier-Colonel Kermit Dyke, who was famous as liberal, and who worked for the advertising section of the OWI and for the Southeast Pacific Army as head of the Information and Education Division during the war.104 CIE would carry out propaganda, expediting “the establishment of freedom of religious worship, freedom of opinion, speech, press, and assembly by the dissemination of democratic ideals and principles through all media of public information.”105 The “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” also declared its principal views about freedom of speech: The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.106 On 1 September, two days after the landing of MacArthur, the Japanese government Information Bureau issued a directive to each Japanese newspaper company ordering the suppression of news about problems created by American soldiers. Two days later, 3 September, the Bureau changed its order to permit the publishing of news of violence and other problems caused by American military personnel, as long as “it does not exaggerate, and adheres to the clear facts.”107 On the same day, CCD began to be in charge of censoring the Japanese media as well as private letters and telecommunications.108 The Press, Pictorial, and Broadcasting Division (PPB) of CCD was set up on 10 September. Mainichi Shimbun reported on 10 September 931 cases of crimes committed by the American soldiers. It claimed 9 rapes, 3 injuries, 487 thefts of arms, 411 thefts of money and possession, 5 burglaries, and 16 others, during the first week of the occupation.109 This infuriated SCAP and, the same day, MacArthur issued his first civil liberties directive on “freedom of speech and press,” in which he explicitly declared that “there shall be an absolute minimum of restrictions on freedom of speech” so long as the mass media “adhere to truth,” and did not disturb “public tranquility:”110 5. The supreme commander will suspend any publication or radio station, which publishes information that fails to adhere to the truth or disturbs public tranquility. By then, GHQ did not have a clear goal of censorship. They prepared the minimum level of censorship to secure the security of the soldiers and prevent the revolt of Japanese people. MacArthur was worried about the militaristic propaganda by the ex-Japanese militarists or nationalists. GHQ expected the Japanese major media to spontaneously cooperate in line with the American intention.111 The budget, organization, and staff for censorship were still ambiguous. Not adhering to MacArthur’s suggestive commands on public order, the Japanese press continued to report incidents of American misconduct in Japan and this continued to anger MacArthur. On 14 September a press code was issued and the occupation’s Government Section, the command center for carrying out policies to democratize Japan, was established on 2 October 1945.112 Toshio Nishi, Japanese political scientist argues that “this directive only confused the Japanese mass media,” because the GHQ campaign of democratization included encouraging of freedom of speech. [...] GHQ, however, found this confusion most convenient for its program of combining democracy with censorship.”113 Censorship was extended to every form of media and theater expression; newspapers, magazines, books, textbooks, radio, film, plays, private coterie magazines, and picture-story shows.114 In such a short term, the purpose of American censorship transformed rapidly from the minimum militaristic censorship to broader one covering the whole media to control speech in the Japanese society (see Table 1). Table 1: The Number of Censored Materials by PPB in the end of 1947115
At first, CCD did not have the sufficient number of personnel for inspection. Along the rapid enlargement of the task, CCD had to recruit the appropriate staff that could read Japanese and English. CCD employed over six thousand individuals nationwide at its peak, and totally more than ten thousand, the great majority of whom were English-speaking Japanese nationals (see Table 2). They identified and then translated or summarized questionable material before passing it on to their superiors. Most of these Japanese censor officials were highly educated and played an active part in Japanese society after the occupation, but they did not record their GHQ activity, or confess the fact that they worked for CCD itself.116 Table 2: The Numbers of CCD Staffs117
The number of bureaucracy of CCD was sprawling and its numerical peak was in 1948, while the State Department of the U.S. had complained that the censorship operation had “the effect of continuing the authoritarian tradition in Japan.”118 The high level officers of the U.S. home government realized that the security required some kind of censorship, but they were aware of the contradiction of the democracy and press censorship. In addition, some staff of GHQ, who created the new Japanese constitution that declared freedom of speech, also noticed the conflicts, while the other believed strongly that censorship was useful for collecting opinion of people, and protecting the reputation of GHQ.119 OMGUS in GermanyShortly after German defeat, the Allies began to transform their wartime organizations to meet the demands of governing Germany. In mid-July 1945, SHAEF was dissolved, including PWD. In the American zone, PWD was replaced by the Information Control Division (ICD), which took over its personnel. ICD consisted of six branches to control radio, press, film, theater and music, publications, and intelligence. General Robert McClure, who led the PWD during the war, became director of the ICD. In Germany, the Office of Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) was given responsibility in the American zone. OMGUS took over all newspaper publishing companies, printing plants, and newsgathering agencies. Soon after the victory, with authorization of OMGUS, ten army newspapers, which would give announcements of the American military government to the Germans, began publishing in the German language in the American zone.120 As no German government was functioning, the military governments worked to get a new German government organized.121 According to Harold Zink, an American political scientist, there was no intention for the American military government to operate in Germany directly. OMGUS set up the Länderrat, staffed by the Germans under the American supervision.122 General Lucius D. Clay was until 1947 a deputy military governor and then the military governor of the American zone.123 Under the command of Clay, ICD aimed to make individual Germans renounce Nazism and militarism, and to help them take their place in a democratic world “to assist in the reestablishment of a free German media on a sound basis and reorient the German spirit.”124 Clay was very concerned about the paper’s circulation, but he was a soldier, not an editor. According to Gienow-Hecht, Clay would have liked to use the paper as a tool to mold public opinion, but simultaneously he supposed “U.S. officials could only assume a protective role, e.g. preventing the selection of former Nazi editors and the spread of fascist propaganda. He believed that without freedom of the press Germany would not become “wholeheartedly” democratic. In December 1945, he wrote to Brigadier General Robert McClure, the Chief of ICD, and “There is no easy way to democracy ... The Germans must find it themselves.”125 Certainly, not all staff in the OMGUS supported Clay’s belief. Some like McClure and those in the intelligence section suspected if one attempted to control anti-fascist journals, this might instead plant the seeds for new “propaganda ministries.”126 McClure was one of the few “authentic” soldiers in ICD, while most of his staff were civilian from academia, the media, and the advertising business. Colonel Luther Conant, the head of the press branch of ICD and licensing the local press, had been a liberal journalist in New York before joining the army. Although American officials in Germany were not called New Dealers like those in Japan, according to Ralph Willett, a British linguistics and literary scholar, New Deal ideology in the Operational Plan for Germany issued in 1945 was evident in the lists of feature films they selected and/or made.127 Therefore, their mental conflict had increased. Clay recalled later, “I did not have very much experience in the field myself, never having voted myself,” and, “I had no policy given to me as to what kind of democracy we wanted.” The American soldiers needed clear orders rather than ideal slogans, but they had only their own image of American democracy without a concrete definition of what was to be implemented in the German case.128 This disunity and hesitation by American officials actually helped the debate by the Germans to proceed and supported the regaining of the freedom of press. 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