Major Differences in the Continuity of Individual Journalist

Major Differences in the Continuity of Individual Journalist

On the other hand, new German licensed journalists basically replaced Nazi-journalists on the orders of the American military government. New journalists consisted of ex-Weimar journalists and new candidates without any particular experience. But American high-level officials did not have full confidence about whether they would actually follow the policies of democratization. It seems that the Americans did loosen their grip fearfully in Germany because firstly Clay and some his staff thought about democratization seriously and secondly the existence of the Neue Zeitung did already have considerable freedom to depict German culture and criticize German policy. However, each journalist or editor had already been selected based on their thought and ideology, meaning that there were few sudden conversions. Those who were against the occupation could intentionally keep silent.

5. Enforcement: Censorship and the Press

1. Censorship in Japan

It was also during this period, on 14 September 1945, the Occupation Authority ordered a twenty-four hour business suspension of the Dōmei News Agency. Consequently, Asahi Shimbun on 18 September, Nippon Times on 19 September, and Toyo Keizai Shimpo on 1 October, received the order of suspension for some hours. Jun Etō and other critics asserted that these threats “obviously affected the tone of argument of Japanese newspapers, magazines so that they would all be in unison on subjects relating to the occupation.”¹⁷⁵

1. Press Code and Secret Key Logs

Etō himself located documents, or “key logs,” about censorship by the CCD in the U.S. National Archives, which listed thirty specific items, prohibited from being published (see Appendix 2).¹⁷⁷ As this long checklist indicates, the province of impermissible expression was extensive. The list prohibited all criticism of SCAP and the Allies and blocked the free expression of opinion on the Tokyo Tribunal as well as the fact that the new Japanese constitution was first drafted by the Government Section of GHQ.¹⁷⁸

The most problematic of these was the “Reference to Censorship” (No.4 criteria of key logs, see Appendix 2). The key logs itself were treated very secretly by staff of the CCD. In other words, no Japanese journalists and editors knew the precise criteria for unacceptable expression. The editors could only guess from actual examples of deleted or suspended sentences. The existence of censorship was itself one of significant taboo in public expression and made an explicit target of American censorship, something which Etō himself took aim at, as shown earlier. H. E. Wildes, who was a member of the Civil Administration Bureau of GHQ, likewise criticized these forms of censorship after the occupation was over, and charged that it was excessive to ban all derogatory comments about the occupation.¹⁷⁹

John Dower explains that SCAP officials were acutely aware that their give-and-take approach to democratization involved a delicate balancing act. He also claims that the censorship policy must be a positive emphasis on the freedom of speech and breaking up of official government controls over the media. Victor’s censorship, however, sometimes replicated earlier campaigns of the imperial government against “dangerous thought.” From the beginning, the media were gradually brought under the CCD’s pre-publication censorship and made concretely aware of the new taboos they were now required to observe.¹⁸⁰ Some argue that SCAP was “so sensitive to criticism” it banned reports of the affects of the atomic bombs, so that Japanese knew about them only after the occupation.¹⁸¹

Any type of argument or debate in public could not refer to any hint of the existence of censorship. Immediately after the establishment of censorship, all editors and publishers received a confidential notification as follows:

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to make certain that all publishers in the jurisdiction of this censorship office understand fully that no publicity regarding censorship procedure is desired.

2. While it is assumed that all publishers understand that in the make-up of their publications no physical indication of censorship (such as blackened –out print, blank spaces, pasted-over areas, incomplete sentences, OO’x, XX’s, etc.)

3. No write-ups concerning personnel or activities of any censorship group should be printed. This pertains not only to press censorship personnel and activities, but also to those of radio, motion-picture and theatrical censorship.

4. Notations such as “Passed by censorship,” “Publication permitted by Occupation Forces” or any other mention or implication of censorship in CCD must not be made…¹⁸²

There were certain threats used to back these policies up, such as the threat of hard labor in Okinawa, which was sometimes actually carried out. There were also three cases of military tribunals. In total, such cases drove home the political message to journalists and others interested in exercising complete freedom of speech.¹⁸³

Within the CCD’s four years, 330 million private letters and 800 thousand private telephone conversations were censored. At the four bureaus in Japan, mail was randomly checked by GHQ censors, who numbered 4,000 people at peak, most of who were non-elite staff workings under supervision of the Americans.¹⁸⁴

Although public reference to censorship of the press and movies was severely prohibited, the censorship on letters was not concealed. In fact, mail opened by the inspectors was stamped in back with the seal “opened by CCD” (see Photo 1). ¹⁸⁵ After about “three years of occupation, most people realized that letters were being read and censored by the authorities.”¹⁸⁶ This form of censorship was thus the least hidden and most well known.

GHQ mail inspectors had three purposes; to probe into Japanese public opinion; to prohibit the spread of information seen as damaging to the security of the occupation; and to foster self-control among those seen as antagonist to the government and as well as ordinary people. Just as in its censoring of the press, GHQ did not make public the criteria for its censorship.¹⁸⁷ The ex-Japanese mail examiner Motohiko Hirao claimed “GHQ wished to restrain communication of criticism of GHQ and make people more psychologically uncertain by not disclosing the criteria or purpose of censorship.”¹⁸⁸

Photo 1: Seal on Envelope¹⁸⁹

2. Pre-Censorship to Post-Censorship

3. Pre-publication Censorship from 1945-1949?

Graph 1: The Number of the Articles and Books with Censorship¹⁹¹

Graph 2: The Number of the Newspaper Companies with Censorship¹⁹²

Graph 2 shows us that the numbers for pre- and post-censorship were different, although the fluctuations were quite similar. This might indicate that GHQ could not afford to inspect a vast numbers of newspapers. Actually, some of many owners of new newspapers intentionally issued small magazines, which contained their political opinion, so that when GHQ ordered tried to collect them after publication, they were already sold out and self-closed. In this way, more than 10,000 newspaper companies must have been beyond the reach of American policy makers. This also meant, furthermore, that the secrecy about the existence of censorship was a just myth; for an enormous number of Japanese people were involved in the press and publishers, as well as in GHQ as checkers or inspectors.

4. Post-publication Censorship from 1949-1952

After August 1948, most scripts of radio programs were not required to receive pre-censorship. In September 1948, the remaining fourteen companies were also free to be pre-censored. All major newspapers and news services had been moved from pre-publication censorship by the end of July 1948. By October 1948, all but fourteen book publishers were designated candidates for post-censorship. All but twenty-eight magazines were placed on post-publication surveillance status by December 1947, with exceptions remaining subject to pre-censorship until October 1949 (see Appendix 3).

The same transition could be seen in the movie industry. Pre-censorship of Japanese film projects and scripts had continued from October 1945 to June 1949, at which time pre-production censorship ended. The censorship of the completed films of both all Japanese and, foreign movies, however, was in place from the beginning of the occupation until 28 April 1952.

There were two contradictory opinions about the transformation from pre-censorship to post-censorship. The first one was from “the American point of view [and held that] the taping off of formal censorship posed a dilemma, for it coincided with adoption of the conservative ‘reverse course’ in occupation policy and a predictable heightening of left-wing criticism.” The second maintained, “The very process of moving away from the initial procedure of pre-publication censorship had involved the explicit stigmatization of the left as the new enemy of democracy.”¹⁹³ Some American high officials expressed their concern about the turn to the left by the mass media, but finally most high officials in GHQ had confidence that the Japanese mass media would be submissive to the American military authority.¹⁹⁴

5. Self-Censorship

“More subtle and pernicious, in the print media in particular, the shift from prepublication to postpublication censorship had a chilling rather than a liberating effect on many publishers, editors and writers.”¹⁹⁶ When they violated the press code or key logs, GHQ ordered either an immediate suspension of publication or confiscation of the undesirable issue. This treatment brought about severe financial loss to the publishers. Gradually major publishers, editors and journalists became much more careful and obedient, and the smaller became more shrewd.

The same phenomenon was seen in the cinema industry. According to Hirano, the influence of the occupation and its censorship programs was to continue long after 28 April 1952. Hirano contends that self-censorship was strengthened and perpetuated by the bilateral U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed eight months before the occupiers departed.

The film producer Akira Kurosawa took some masterpieces even during the occupation period, but that does not mean that what he shrugged out was only the suppression of GHQ. The Japanese TV commentator Tetsuya Chikushi made a series of interviews with Kurosawa in his later years in 1990s, and Chikushi writes:

Dower argues, “the easing of formal controls was misleading, for censorship assumed new forms after 1947 and did not end in 1949.”¹⁹⁸ Jun Etō also insisted strongly that post-publication censorship brought about in the Japanese mass media a habit of self-censorship.¹⁹⁹ However, as the press club example shows the characteristics of the Japanese media have changed over time. As Yamamoto points out, even during the term of pre-publication censorship, the major national newspapers, such as Asahi, did have rarely cases that violated the key-logs.²⁰⁰

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