Chapter 1: Business and politics in Japan

Chapter 1: Business and politics in Japan

1.1 Introduction

The rapid economic development of Japan after the Second World War, especially the high-speed growth that began in 1955, captured the attention of Western scholars, intrigued by the Japanese “miracle” and searching for its causes. The publication of Johnson’s seminal book MITI and the Japanese Miracle in 1982 represented a turning point for the study of the rapid economic development of this country. Indeed, Johnson introduced the concept of the developmental state and argued that the bureaucracy, in particular the MITI, was dominant in the policy-making process.

Since this publication, numerous scholars have referred to this book in their investigation of the relationships between the state and business in Japan. Some scholars have expressed their agreement with the thesis of the dominance of the bureaucracy (Evans, 1995; Vogel, 1996; Weiss, 2000) whilst others have contested such claim by emphasizing the role of private business actors or the domination of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Okimoto, 1989; Calder, 1993; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993).

This chapter provides a literature review on the concept of the developmental state. The literature on government-business relations in Japan is also reviewed, including studies investigating the relationships between the state and the cultural industries. The first section deals with the features of the developmental state, the conditions that made possible its emergence, the debate on which states can be labelled as developmental states and the motivations for its establishment. This section addresses the literature on the varieties of capitalism as well, because the discussion on the developmental state is inseparable from the debate on the diversity of capitalism nowadays. The evolution of the developmental state, a paramount issue in relation to this thesis, will be examined in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.

The second section focuses on the relationships between the state and business in Japan. The thesis of the iron triangle composed of close ties between the LDP leaders, the bureaucracy and the big business community and the dominance of the bureaucracy in the policy-making process have been challenged by a series of studies (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987; Samuels, 1987; Callon, 1995). Some scholars have preferred focusing their attention on the characteristics of state-business relations in Japan. They have especially researched on the mechanisms that nurture these relationships. This section also discusses the terms “cultural”, “content” and “creative” industries and explains the distinctiveness of the cultural industries compared to other industries. Against the background of Cool Japan, few studies have been published on the relationships between the state and the cultural industries in Japan.

This chapter argues that, to the knowledge of the author of this thesis, the concept of the developmental state has not been used to study Cool Japan and the state-cultural industries relations in Japan. Scholars have relied on such an analytical framework for the examination of a lot of industries, but not those considered in this research. Furthermore, the literature review on state-cultural industries relations demonstrates that this topic is underinvestigated. It is still an emerging field. The reactions of the anime industry has been examined by Choo (2009), but she did it before the establishment of the J-LOP⁸ and the Cool Japan Fund. It seems that no-one has conducted research on the reactions of the manga and video games sectors to the Cool Japan policy.

1.2 The developmental state

1.2.1 The concept

The main features of the developmental state identified by Johnson are “(firstly), the existence of a small, inexpensive, but elite bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial talent available in the system […] (secondly), a political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively […] (thirdly), the perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy […] (and finally), a pilot organization like the MITI” (1982: 315-19). This pilot organization is in charge of industrial policy (Johnson, 1982: 320). Central to the definition is the commitment of the developmental state to intervene in the economy in order to guide and to generate economic development. In his book, Johnson (1982) examines how the Japanese developmental state nurtured the development of industries such as steel, textile and shipbuilding.

After its publication, he realized that it “was an ideological red flag to the bull of Anglo-American cold war orthodoxy about economic correctness” (1999: 34). His concept of the developmental state is at odds with Walt W. Rostow’s claim (1960) that economic development occurs through five linear stages: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption. In this sense, Johnson reactivates Alexander Gerschenkron’s analysis of the late industrialization of European countries at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, this scholar speaks about the advantage of backwardness and the changing roles of institutions with degrees of backwardness. Institutions such as banks and the state play a vital role in initiating industrialization process (Gerschenkron, 1962).

Throughout the 1980s, several scholars analyzed the economic development of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, drawing upon Johnson’s concept (Lim, 1983; Haggard and Moon, 1984; Koo, 1984; Gold, 1986; Deyo, 1987; Whang, 1987; Rodan 1989). It was at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s that studies of the developmental state were at their zenith (Stubbs, 2009: 2). For example, in 1989, Alice H. Amsden stressed that the Korean state selected some industrial sectors, and within them, a group of companies to receive capital. The Korean state also established strict performance criteria to make sure that resources were mobilized in an efficient way (Amsden, 1989).

The same year, Garry Rodan emphasized the catalytic role of the Singaporean state for Singapore’s Second Industrial Revolution. Rodan (1989) also paid particularly attention to the central role that the state played in the support of the service sector after the recession of 1985-86. More recent works, for example Pekkanen (2003) on the commercial space launch industry also attest that the developmental state has been applied outside of the sort of industries Johnson focused on. In the same vein, Linda Weiss explains that, in the 1990s, the MITI continued to identify new “sunrise” industries such as the environmental industry and to promote their development (2000: 27-8). This shows the ongoing relevance of the Japanese developmental state, a key point examined fully in Chapter 2.

In the Taiwanese case, Robert Wade showed that the government directed capital to a few key industries and companies. Therefore, they could benefit from a comparative advantage when they entered into the global competition. Wade (1990) also argued that the state, in economies such as Taiwan, needed to intervene in the functioning of the market to correct its failures. In the same year, Stephan Haggard (1990) noted that Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan offered a mix of markets with strong state intervention to conduct their industrialization. The year after, Meredith Woo-Cumings (1991) studied how the Korean state mobilized its financial resources to foster quick economic development.

The success of the developmental state as an analytical concept has to be related to the broader debate on the state that was developing at this moment in the social sciences. Indeed, social scientists were reconsidering the role of the state and its relations with society. As a result, the American 1982–83 Social Science Research Council Committee on States and Social Structures was set up to coordinate the study of this topic by scholars from different disciplines. The result of their research was published in the classic Bringing the State Back In (Evans et al., 1985). It is important to point out that two contributors to this collective book, Amsden and Peter B. Evans, would subsequently nurture our thinking on the developmental state in East Asia (Amsden 1989, 1994; Evans 1992, 1995).

According to Richard Stubbs, two books are worth considering when we want to identify the impact of the “Bringing the State Back In” debate on the understanding of the developmental state (2009: 4). Firstly, Joel S. Migdal, in his book Strong Societies and Weak States (1988), addressed the following contrast: how to explain that the successful economies of East Asia have strong states and weak societies, in contrast to the majority of new Third World countries? He identified four conditions to explain strong states: “(first), a world historical moment in which exogenous political forces favour concentrated social control […] (second), the existence of a serious military threat from outside or from other communal groups inside the country […] (third), the existence of a social grouping with people sufficiently independent of existing bases of social control and skillful enough to execute the grand designs of state leaders […] (and finally), skillful top leadership must be present to take advantage of the conditions to build a strong state” (1988: 271-5).

Secondly, another contributor to the book Bringing the State Back In, Charles Tilly, with his 1992 Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992, is also relevant for this review of the developmental state. Based on his thesis that “war makes states” (1985: 170), he argued that the interaction of coercion and capital is crucial in the development of the state in Europe over the centuries. More precisely, the state’s development is influenced by the origins of the resources used by the state in the preparation for war or waging war, and how the state mobilizes them. Indeed, the idea that strong states can emerge only if they have sufficient resources such as money, technical knowledge and skilled manpower underlies Tilly’s argument (1985). Johnson concurred with Tilly about this point (1989: 5-6).

Surprisingly, many writings on the developmental state are not accompanied by a definition of this key concept.⁹ Its definition varies considerably among scholars (Stubbs, 2009: 4). For instance, Mark Beeson notes that the developmental state has turned into “a generic term to describe governments that try to actively “intervene” in economic processes and direct the course of development rather than relying on market forces” (2007: 141). In the same vein, Weiss contends that “nowadays, the term “developmental state” is so loosely applied that it has become virtually synonymous with “the state in East Asia”” (2000: 23). This represents for her a serious mistake (2000: 23).

Scholars using the concept of the developmental state define it by stressing its institutional, relational and ideational features (Stubbs, 2009: 6). According to the first criterion, the developmental state has a set of institutions with a relative autonomy to carry out industrialization (Johnson, 1982: 315-20). A second characteristic of the developmental state is its relational aspect. For instance, Woo-Cumings argues that the developmental state is “a shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia” (1999: 1). The third one stresses that the developmental state has an ideational element. Studies in this vein mainly focus on nationalism and (neo)mercantilism. For example, Manuel Castells holds that a “state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development” (1992: 56-7). Elizabeth Thurbon insists that “developmentalism is first and foremost a political and economic philosophy (a worldview), which impacts on decision-makers’ assumptions on what goals to favour and on the role of the state to achieve them” (2014: 66).

Rather than relying on one element of the developmental state, scholars tend to emphasize the different aspects of the developmental state. For example, whilst Johnson’s analysis is primarily institutionalist (1982: 315-20), it does not mean that he overlooks the ideational element of the Japanese state. Indeed, Japanese policy-makers have prioritized economic development for more than fifty years (Johnson, 1982: 305-6). Even if Thurbon puts forward the ideational feature of the developmental state, she acknowledges that the institutional framework matters as well (2014: 65). Others scholars also mix in their studies of the developmental state its ideational, institutional and relational aspects (Leftwich, 1995; Deans, 2000; Weiss, 2000).

The characteristics of the developmental state are often listed with the conditions that make possible its birth. Johnson listed four main conditions necessary for the emergence of the developmental state: “(1) a receptive social environment; (2) determined leadership; (3) technical competence; and (4) money (i.e., capital)” (1989: 4). According to this scholar, “the order is important; pouring aid money into places without either a receptive social environment or determined leadership or technical competence will not produce development but only corruption” (1989: 4).

Drawing upon Johnson, Stubbs identifies four conditions necessary for the rise of the developmental state in East Asia (2009: 6-7). Two conditions are domestic. Firstly, state-society relations are of paramount importance. A strong state cannot develop unless there is the presence of a weak society unable to resist the rise of the developmental state. A weaker society facilitates the formation of a strong state, in other words, the constitution of a skillful autonomous bureaucracy in charge of planning and carrying out economic development, and also the ability of the state to maintain domestic social order. Secondly, the concept of the developmental state must be promoted within the society and embraced by determined political leaders (Stubbs, 2009: 6-7).

The two other conditions revolve around the regional and international context. Firstly, the appearance of the developmental state must be related to the regional and international security environment. In East Asia, there is little doubt that the threat represented by communism during the Cold War helps to explain the formation of the developmental state (Woo-Cumings, 1998; Zhu, 2002, 2003). Furthermore, the American hegemon actively promoted strong states in East Asia to contain communism (Cumings, 1984). Secondly, the regional and international economic context facilitated the creation of the developmental state in East Asia during the Cold War. Not only did the US pour capital (military and economic support) into the region and opened its national market to industrial products from its East Asian allies, but it had also to rely massively on raw materials and manufactured goods necessary to conduct wars in Korea and Vietnam. Several authors have stressed this point to explain the emergence of the developmental state in Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (Harland, 1993; Stubbs, 2005).

The debate on the conditions leading to the rise of the developmental state paves the way for two other issues. To begin with, what states can be qualified as developmental states? Clearly, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (Johnson, 1999; Pempel, 1999) are qualified as such. There is no consensus for the group of countries composed of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. For example, some scholars refuse to consider them as developmental states (Doner and Hawes, 1995; Booth, 2001). Johnson rejects that Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia are developmental states but asserts that the Philippines will transform into one because the Americans left this country (1998: 653-4). He concurs with Weiss (1998) that East Asian countries can be classified in two categories: “North-east Asian transformative states and South-east Asian pilotless states” (1998: 654).

Scholars claiming that Thailand and Malaysia are developmental states stress their strong state bureaucracies which conducted several industrial policies of in the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s (Riggs, 1966; Nuechterlein, 1967; Esman, 1972; Stubbs, 2005). Martin Rhodes and Richard Higgott prefer qualifying Malaysia as a semi-developmental state (2000: 7). Some authors even apply the concept of developmentalism outside the area of East Asia. For instance, whilst they acknowledge that Kazakhstan does not exactly match the ideal type of the developmental state, Joachim Ahrens and Manuel Stark assert that the Kazakh state shares some common key characteristics. Thus, they label it as a hybrid developmental state (2014: 109). Juhana Vartiainen (1999) extends the concept to Austria and Finland, and Ben R. Schneider to Latin America (Brazil and Mexico) though noting that the desarrollista state in Latin America differs from its East Asian counterpart in terms of the structure of bureaucracy (1999: 276-9). Michael Loriaux speaks about the developmental state in France as a myth and moral ambition kept alive by domestic institutions and discursive practices (1999: 237).

The second issue concerns motivation. As put it by Haggard, “East Asian states may have been “strong”, but ultimately we want to know why they embraced relatively efficient, outward-oriented, growth-promoting polices” (2004: 70, emphasis in the original). The institutionalist literature on East Asia puts forward four possible explanations. The first option is to focus on the ideology of state decision-makers about how to promote development. As they controlled material and organizational resources, they could conduct developmental policies based on their underlying ideas (Haggard, 2004: 70). Some authors have pointed out the diffusion of Japanese ideas about industrialization in East Asia (Haggard, 1990; Vogel, 1991). Johnson holds that non-economic reasons such as political ideology, the resistance to neocolonialism or national security usually push states to carry out plans of intentional economic development (1989: 6). Some scholars have preferred stressing culture, in particular Chinese culture and Confucian values (McCord, 1989: 209-11; Harland, 1993: 10 and 13; Lingle, 1996: 390-1).

The second explanation lies in international pressure that constrained political elites in East Asia. Bruce Cumings and Woo-Cumings have consistently advocated this point. They note in their analysis that first the Japanese imperial system and thereafter an American-dominated regional order impacted on the formation and the policies of the state (Cumings, 1984; Woo-Cumings, 1991). External pressures can also take the form of resource constraints (Haggard, 1990) and security threats (Kang, 2002: 29-40). The third option is the material advantages that elites have benefited from adopting economic growth policies (Haggard, 2004: 71).

The last answer revolves around state-business relations. The developmental state approach, since its inception, has been the target of criticisms for its excessive emphasis on state institutions and its relative lack of interest on non-state actors, particularly business actors (Doner, 1991; Moon and Prasad, 1994; Evans, 1995; Fields, 1995). A number of East Asian states made a political deal, be it explicit or implicit, with some parts of the business sectors. These political agreements represented the basis of rapid economic development (Campos and Root, 1996). Weak or non-existent labour movement no doubt facilitated these bargains (Deyo, 1989).

1.2.2 The varieties of capitalism literature

One paramount issue remains: how has the developmental state evolved since the 1980s against the background of the end of the Cold War, the neoliberal wave and economic globalization? Can we still speak about the developmental state? Johnson (1982) ended his analysis of MITI’s industrial policy in 1975. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Japan stopped supporting its industries in 1975. He wanted to emphasize that after the mid-1970s, the role of Japan’s industrial policy was no longer to catch up with Western economies, but rather to foster new high-tech industries (1999: 56).

Since the 1980s, the developmental state has faced a different international context. The US has put significant pressure on its allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) to deregulate their economies. With the end of the Cold War, it could no longer ignore the neomercantilist protectionist policies of its East Asian allies. It is why it began to campaign for the deregulation of their economies using persuasion and its influence within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. The process of neoliberalization, in other words deregulation, privatization and the retreat of the state, coupled with the globalization of the economy, contradicts the state interventionist ideas of the developmental state (Stubbs, 2009: 10-1). Although some neoliberal policies have been carried out in Japan since the 1980s, it is incorrect to hold that the developmental state has disappeared. Its evolution will be discussed in Chapter 2 to demonstrate its current relevance.

The debate on the evolution of the developmental state has to be placed in the broad “discussion on how and to what extent the functions, forms and modes of operation of the state have changed in the context of globalization and global governance” (Bieling, 2007: 3). Two different phases of the debate can be distinguished. The feature of the first phase, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, was a complete disagreement on the impact of globalization on the role of the state (Bieling, 2007: 3).

On the one hand, many scholars asserted that globalization deprives the state of political capacities (Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996). In this radically changed context, the state has no other choice but to adjust to global competition. Such authors tended to stress such things as the increased and accelerated capital flows, fluctuations of global financial markets, new transnational security threats, and so on. Unsurprisingly, liberal economists above all portrayed globalization as an unstoppable systemic process driven by technological innovations as well as international transport and communication (Drucker, 1997; Friedman, 2000).

On the other hand, many scholars (Panitch, 1994; Weiss, 1998) contested the argument above based on two elements: firstly, they pointed to the enduring capacity of the state to exercise power through action such as the rates of public spending and of social provisions within the OECD, the use of public policy tools in the fields of money, financial and trade policy, and, in particular, the capacity of the state to implement and to ensure the compliance of other actors with political decisions (Hirst and Thompson, 1996); secondly, they rejected the simplified description of the state as a passive victim of the globalization process. In their view, it is more accurate to claim that globalization is the outcome of deliberate political decisions and strategies (Helleiner, 1994; Gritsch, 2005). In this vein, globalization is not an external force imposed on states, but is actively influenced by political forces.

In the second phase from the late 1990s, this debate has converged somewhat on a middle ground (Bieling, 2007: 4). Scholars have argued that globalization is a powerful transformative force that is fundamentally reshaping state, social and economic institutions (Held et al., 1999; Leibfried and Zürn, 2005). Yet, it has been accepted that this phenomenon should not be perceived exclusively as penetrating passive states, but also as a process endorsed, promoted and shaped by domestic actors (Bieling, 2007: 4). Nowadays, globalization still remains a concept at the center of a fierce debate (Bieling, 2007: 4; Azaïs, 2010: 12-5).

For instance, the idea that capitalism is diverse does not enjoy consensus. Indeed, Jeffry A. Frieden explains that “we may not for [advanced industrial countries] speak of a diversity of capitalism […] The differences that count between the industrial countries have nothing to do with their economic institutions; they concern their economic policies, their public policies and the manner in which they react to political decisions” (Quoted in Lorenzy, 2008: 37).

Nevertheless, numerous researchers have made an empirical analysis of the diversity of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Boyer, 2005). They have shown that this diversity concerns the principles of the functioning of different national economies. Thus, they have suggested several typologies. For example, Michel Albert (1993) makes the difference between liberal capitalism and Rhine capitalism. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (2001) prefer opposing liberal and coordinated capitalism, the starting point for the varieties of capitalism approach. Regardless of their typologies, all these researchers have refuted the assumption that globalization means the convergence of national economies.

The danger that the varieties of capitalism approach faces is to provide a purely descriptive, rather than theoretical analysis of this diversity (Lechevalier, 2014: 4). To avoid this pitfall, scholars have advanced two theoretical foundations of the diversity of capitalism: firstly, institutional complementarities; secondly, history (path dependence). The former means that “the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 17). In particular, complementarities between institutions that are in separate economic fields are interesting to examine. The most famous form, notably studied in the case of the Japanese capitalism at the end of the 1980s, is the institutional complementary between long-term employment and bank finance. Aoki Masahiko (1994) argues that such promise to employees is more feasible where the financial system is not inclined to short-term profit. Institutional complementarities imply that institutions of a particular form of capitalism should be considered related to each other. It follows that reforming one institution gives positive results if, at the same time, other institutions which are complementary are also reformed. This represents a difficult task (Lechevalier, 2014: 4).

The second theoretical foundation relies on path dependence which can be defined as “historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000: 507). Historical evolution is crucial to understand the varieties of capitalism and, in particular, the persistence of this diversity. Many studies have demonstrated the importance of path dependence on institutional development (Mahoney, 2002; Katō, 2003; Thelen, 2004; Sasada, 2013), countering thus the thesis of the convergence of national economies due to globalization. However, by focusing on path dependence, scholars may overlook institutional evolution. To avoid this pitfall, recent research has combined the acceptance of institutional change with a degree of inertia (Garud and Karnoe, 2001; Deeg, 2005; David, 2007).

Within this literature, it is not easy to locate Japanese capitalism (Lechevalier, 2014: 12). The capitalist nature of the Japanese socio-economic system was even brought into question. For instance, Sakakibara Eisuke (1993) defined it as a non-capitalist market economy. One reason for the difficulty in positioning Japanese capitalism is that scholars of the varieties of capitalism have paid more attention to the Anglo-Saxon and the European types of capitalism, and have neglected until recently the forms of capitalism in Asia and other areas (Storz et al., 2013).

Another reason lies in the influence of cultural interpretations, an approach very popular among the Japanese themselves. The proponents of this perspective argue that Japanese capitalism cannot be compared with other forms of capitalism because it is based on some unique cultural and structural foundations. Morishima Michio (1982), with his well-known book Why Has Japan ʻSucceededʼ?: Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos is representative of this approach. Inspired by the famous thesis of Max Weber (1930) on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Morishima (1982) claims that the particular characteristics of the Japanese economy stem from Confucianism. The main weakness of the cultural explanation is its inability to explain the historical trajectory of the Japanese economic system (Lechevalier, 2014: 11). As demonstrated by historians, the Japanese economy was very close to the liberal market capitalism in the inter-war period, in particular if we consider the primacy of short-term employment relations and funding of the economy by financial markets (Gordon, 1985; Koike, 1988; Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1999).

In the vein of the varieties of capitalism approach, Weiss challenges the view that states have lost their capacity to govern their national economy, suggesting that globalization is not merely constraining but also politically enabling. Facing the pressures of the international political economy, states pursue policies to compensate for the uncertainties, instability, and systemic risks created by interdependence. Domestic institutions matter because they mediate both the enabling and constraining effects of global markets. They influence how states react to their impacts and produce distinctive policy patterns (Weiss, 2003: 26-7). Her argument is based on two assumptions. First, “domestic institutions, depending on their characteristics, can hinder or enable states to respond to new challenges and accomplish new tasks, thus softening, neutralising, or exaggerating the potentially constraining effects of global markets” (2003: 27-8). Not only is it unnecessary to converge towards one institutional optimum, but also one best form does not exist to achieve both short and long-term economic goals (Hall and Soskice, 2001).

Secondly, confronted with the enabling logic of globalization, states conduct different policies, depending on the normative-organizational (institutional) framework. For instance, if trade liberalization harms a specific segment of the population, governments may respond by allocating domestic compensation. The existence and the nature of the response, either fiscal tightening or sustained social protection, depend on both the normative and the institutional features of the existing structures, as well as the political and economic organization of the affected actors (Weiss, 2003: 28).

Following Weiss, Stubbs contends that, in spite of changes in the external environment and major shifts in the domestic economies, the developmental state has proven to be particularly durable. He advances two factors to explain the stickiness of the developmental state. To begin with, the neomercantilist ideas underpinning the developmental state and its policies have become firmly embedded in the government’s formal institutions and its informal practices. The developmental state has still its proponents in key locations of the bureaucracy (Stubbs, 2009: 12). A team of METI bureaucrats initiated the process that led to the creation of the Cool Japan Fund (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4). The bureaucrats still assume that the Japanese state has to secure the competitiveness of the Japanese economy, in that case the sector of cultural industries.

The developmental state has also adherents in a lot of companies and quasi-governmental organizations because a state interventionist actions have been beneficial to them. In addition to a system of institutions and policies, it has created a complete set of economic, political and social institutions that have become entrenched in East Asian countries. Secondly, the developmental state is resilient because it has provided security against foreign attacks in East Asia, social stability and widespread prosperity. Its success has enhanced its legitimacy and widespread support, nurturing pressure so that it continues policies for economic growth (Stubbs, 2009: 12-3).

Another way to investigate the evolution of the developmental state is to focus on ideas. Vivien A. Schimdt posits the explanatory power of ideas and discourse to explain the change and continuity of institutions. She labels this turn to ideas and discourse the discursive institutionalist, the fourth new institutionalism, different from rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (2008: 304-5).

Following this discursive institutionalism, Thurbon emphasizes the ideational element to characterize the developmental state. Policy-makers share a strong consensus on the necessity of the catch-up of the national economy and on the competitiveness of some industrial sectors defined as strategic. The state has an active role to perform through a long-term industrial policy (Thurbon 2014: 68). If the developmental state is understood not exclusively but primarily as a set of ideas about the finality of the national economy, the aims and the role of the state, authors can grasp the evolution of the developmental state. Instead of its dismantlement, it is more illuminating to conduct research on the political conditions required to maintain the developmental state among decision-makers (Thurbon, 2014: 69).