State actors and the development of the cultural industries overseas

5.2 State actors and the development of the cultural industries overseas

5.2.1 The Cabinet Office

In February 2002, in his annual speech to the Diet, then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (2002) announced that the government would conduct a national policy of intellectual property to boost the international competitiveness of Japanese industries and that his intention was to set up the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property to advance the necessary policies. One month later, this body, led by the Prime Minister, related ministers and experts in the private sector was created. Coincidentally, in May 2002, that is to say three months after the speech by Koizumi, McGray (2002) published his influential article “Japan’s Gross National Cool”.

In July 2002, The Intellectual Property Policy Outline was published (Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, 2002). According to this document, the goal of the government is to make Japan a “nation built on intellectual property” in order to restore the competitiveness of the Japanese economy which is suffering from the competition of East and Southeast Asian countries due to their cheap labour costs. Broadly speaking, a “nation built on intellectual property” means connecting the results of creativity in several fields such as technology and culture with the development of industries (Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, 2002: 1). Among the different action plans was listed the support for the creation of outstanding media contents, i.e. motion pictures, animation and computer graphics (Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, 2002: 23).

In November 2002, the Diet passed The Basic Law on Intellectual Property, and it became effective at the same time (March 2003) as the establishment of the IPSH (Basic Law on Intellectual Property, 2002). Previously, in January 2003, in his annual speech to the Diet, Koizumi (2003) had welcomed the international success of Miyazaki’s animated film Spirited Away symbolized by the Golden Bear for Best Film of the 2002 Berlin International Film Festival and the 2002 New York Film Critics Circle Award for Best Animated Film. For the first time, a prime minister referred to a work of popular culture in his annual address to the Diet. One year later, again in his annual speech to the Diet, he reiterated his willingness to establish Japan as a “nation founded on intellectual property” (Koizumi, 2004). He stated that the government would support Japanese films, animation and game software abroad (Koizumi, 2004). The successive addresses to the Diet provide evidence of the firm commitment of the authorities to promote the cultural industries.

Interestingly, in the initial stages, the IPSH did not consider its function to be related to the cultural industries (Choo, 2009: 140). Yet, in April 2004, the release by the IPSH of The Policy Proposals for the Promotion of Content Business: National Strategy in the Age of Soft Power meant that it soon changed its stance (IPSH, 2004b). Indeed, the IPSH claimed that the content industries should be considered as the cornerstone of the national strategy due to their market size, their economic ripple effects and the projection of Japan’s soft power abroad (2004b: 2). The report stressed that despite amounting to ¥11 trillion, Japanese content industries represent only 2 per cent of Japan’s GDP compared to 5 per cent in the US and an international average of 3 per cent (IPSH, 2004b: 2). The IPSH urged that Japan’s diplomatic missions, the JETRO and the Japan Foundation should assist in the dissemination of Japanese pop culture overseas (2004b: 6). The focus on the content industries was confirmed by The Intellectual Property Promotion Plan 2004 in which the term “intellectual property” encompassed technology, design, brands and content products such as animation, music, films and game software (IPSH, 2004a: 2-4).

In June 2004, the Japanese government expressed again its support for the content industries by promulgating The Content Industries Promotion Law (2004). In this law, the term “content” refers to anime, music, video games, manga, drama and movies. After its enactment, the MOFA, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), the MLIT, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the JETRO and the Japan Foundation joined the initial actors of the Cool Japan policy, namely the Cabinet Office, the METI, the Agency for Cultural Affairs and the MIC (Choo, 2012: 89).

The law clearly states that the IPSH is in charge of supervising the entire policy to support the cultural industries (Content Industries Promotion Law, 2004). Reflecting the successive Diet annual speeches of Koizumi, IPSH’s budget steadily increased between 2004 and 2008, from ¥115.7 billion to ¥122.8 billion. However, after the DPJ became the ruling party in 2009, IPSH’s budget decreased sharply (Choo, 2012: 90).
Figure 5. Annual budget of the IPSH (2004-2010)
Source: Choo, 2012: 90.
A few days after the devastating earthquake of March 2011, the IPSH issued The Action Plan to Promote Cool Japan (2011), a document revised in May of the same year. Like many governmental documents, this plan formulates two goals for the policy Cool Japan: on the one hand, the reinvigoration of the Japanese economy through ripple effects as a result of the dissemination of Cool Japan products; on the other hand, the increase of Japan’s soft power abroad (IPSH, 2011: 1). Through such efforts, the Japanese state aims to raise the market size of the industries related to Cool Japan (video games, manga, anime, fashion, Japanese food, craft, design, robots and high-tech products) from ¥4.5 trillion in 2009 to ¥17 trillion in 2020 (IPSH, 2011: 2). This demonstrates that the government considers this policy as an industrial one. In this official document, the definition of Cool Japan like the current one is encompassing (IPSH, 2011).

Even if the IPSH does not get involved in directly assisting any content industries, it is responsible for directing, coordinating and regulating the policies implemented by the concerned ministries to promote the content industries. In particular, it is in charge of channeling the funds to each ministry or agency. The IPSH acts as a mediator when conflicts arise between ministries in their policies to promote the Japanese cultural industries. Most of the tension arises out of the struggle of each ministry to obtain more budget from the Cabinet Office (Choo, 2012: 89-90).

The Cabinet Office tries to regulate the competition among ministries to secure more funding. Its position makes it possible for it to analyze the involved ministries’ and agencies’ reports and policies, and thus to recommend some ministries and agencies to change their policies. Yet, such recommendations by the Cabinet Office are often in vain. As an official of the IPSH, Ōji Masahiro, confirmed: “Theoretically it is the case where each ministry accepts our requests or asks us for help when needed. But, we are often told that things cannot be done when we ask them to do things” (Quoted in Choo, 2009: 145). Furthermore, there is a lack of communication between the ministries and agencies involved in the Cool Japan initiative (Choo, 2009: 145).

In Japan, when one ministry starts carrying out one policy such as Cool Japan, other ministries will often copy it to protect their jurisdictional competences, their budget and the number of their bureaucrats. The different bureaucracies are locked into a system of competition due to sectionalism. They want to maximize their budget, their administrative domains and their number of civil servants (Matsui Takeshi Interview, 03/09/2014). For Cool Japan “as in other fields when different governmental ministries and agencies are involved, there is routine competition over resources, overlapping responsibilities, lack of coordination, and struggle over prestige” (Otmazgin, 2012: 52). With so many state actors involved in Cool Japan, it is not a surprise that Cool Japan is a complex policy, even for METI’s bureaucrats (METI Official 1 Interview, 02/09/2014).⁷⁶

From December 2012 until September 2014, Inada Tomomi was the minister, among other tasks in her portfolio⁷⁷, of the Cool Japan strategy in the Abe government. In September 2014, Yamaguchi Shunichi⁷⁸ became his successor. He was then replaced by Shimajiri Aiko⁷⁹ in October 2015. Since August 2016, Tsuruho Yōsuke⁸⁰ has been minister of state for the Cool Japan strategy. Without a ministry, that is to say without a specific bureaucracy, it is questionable whether these ministers have been able to coordinate all the state actors involved in Cool Japan. As detailed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1, sectionalism is strong in Japan (Boyd, 2006; Yoshimatsu, 2007). Ministries and agencies tend to be conservative. They are reluctant to collaborate with other governmental bodies because they want to remain masters in their own jurisdictions. They have different cultures, different mentalities. It is why the coordination between ministries has been poor (Kondō Seiichi Interview, 12/12/2013; Agency for Cultural Affairs Official Interview, 21/05/2014).

Apart from sectionalism, the collaboration between the ministries and agencies involved in Cool Japan is made difficult because the bureaucrats in charge of promoting the cultural industries occupy their position for a limited length of time. In the METI, the appointment term lasts two years. Yet, it varies according to the ministries. Most of the time, when bureaucrats become knowledgeable about Cool Japan, they are transferred to a different division within their respective ministry. The reappointment takes place by the time bureaucrats become acquainted with their counterparts of other ministries. Collaboration and communication between governmental bodies are thus rendered complicated because new officials need time to learn about Cool Japan (Choo, 2009: 172-3).