State actors and the improvement of Japan’s soft power

5.3 State actors and the improvement of Japan’s soft power

Nye defines the concept of soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction” (Nye, 2011a: 19). Thus, soft power is linked to the second face of power⁹⁷ (agenda-setting) introduced by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and the third one (shaping the preferences of others) developed by Lukes (1974, 2005). It is mainly based on three resources: culture, political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2011b: 84). Whereas the previous state actors, with varying emphases, promote the expansion of the Japanese cultural industries into other countries, the MOFA and the Japan Foundation regard Cool Japan as a way of presenting a friendly image of Japan abroad. The exports of the cultural industries contribute to the restauration of the attractiveness of Japan which has been seriously tarnished in the aftermath of Fukushima nuclear power plant accident (Cool Japan Advisory Council, 2011: 1).

5.3.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In the early years of Cool Japan, the MOFA was not deeply involved. However, with the appointment of Asō Tarō as minister of Foreign Affairs in October 2005, the support for anime and manga became more conspicuous. It is well-known that Asō is an avid manga fan. He was even given the nickname “Rōzen Asō” after he was seen reading the manga Rōzen Meiden (Choo, 2012: 95). He wrote a book Totetsumonai Nihon (Incredible Japan) on Japan’s great potential of soft power (Asō, 2007b). The same year, on his personal blog, he published an article on the global popularity of manga. Similar to other Japanese words such as sushi, tsunami and karaoke, the term “manga” has spread around the world (Asō, 2007a).

In his speech A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy: A Call to Japan's Cultural Practitioners delivered at the Digital Hollywood University, Asō argued in favour of the use of pop culture in the pursuit of Japanese cultural diplomacy: “I think we can safely say that any kind of cultural diplomacy that fails to take advantage of pop culture is not really worthy of being called cultural diplomacy” (Asō, 2006). Urging the Japanese cultural practitioners to assist the government in improving Japan’s soft power, he explained that the more foreigners have a positive image of Japan, “the easier it becomes for Japan to get its views across over the long term. In other words, Japanese diplomacy is able to keep edging forward, bit by bit, and bring about better and better outcomes as a result” (Asō, 2006). In this sense, the Japanese government hopes to tap into Japanese pop culture to advance its national interests. Given its global popularity, Japanese officials as expressed by Asō deem that pop culture is a powerful tool for Japanese diplomacy.

The personal interest of this politician was the catalyst for the MOFA to start its “pop culture diplomacy”. Under his leadership, the MOFA began to rely on pop culture in addition to Japanese traditional culture and arts as a tool to conduct cultural diplomacy based on the logic of soft power. In 2007, the International Manga Award was created in order to recognize foreign mangaka contributing to the diffusion of manga abroad (MOFA, 2013). For the 8th International Manga Award in 2014, 317 candidates from forty-six countries sent in applications. The majority of applicants came from Brazil (ninety-five), Thailand (thirty-six) and Taiwan (thirty-one) (MOFA, 2015). Since 2007, the MOFA (2013) has awarded the prize for the best cosplay at the World Cosplay Summit.⁹⁸

In March 2008, the minister of Foreign Affairs Kōmura Masahiko appointed Doraemon as Japan’s anime ambassador. As this anime character is much more popular in East Asia than in Europe and the US, the choice made by the MOFA underscores an orientation towards East Asia (Condry, 2013: 18). At the ceremony, a person wearing the costume of this anime character claimed that “I hope through my cartoons I will be able to convey to people overseas what ordinary Japanese people are thinking, what sort of life we are leading and what sort of future we are trying to create!” (MOFA, 2008).

Finally, in February 2009, the ministry named three girls as Trend Communicators of Japanese pop culture, or kawaii ambassadors. Each of these girls was wearing a different style of cute fashion: Lolita, Harajuku and schoolgirl uniform (MOFA 2009b). This raises the issue about how Cool Japan relies on highly gender-specific strategies (Choo, 2012: 95). The MOFA assigned them “to transmit the new trends of Japanese pop culture in the field of fashion to the rest of the world and to promote understanding of Japan by their attending cultural projects carried out by the Japanese Embassies and the Japan Foundation” (MOFA, 2009a). The first event that these ambassadors attended was a lecture on Japanese fashion at the Japan Festa in Bangkok in March 2009. Then, in July 2009, they participated in the Japan Expo in Paris (MOFA, 2009a).

One of the difficulties that this ministry faces when it comes to disseminating Japanese pop culture abroad lies in the fact that a part of this culture contains some anti-establishment elements. In particular, some manga, anime and video games can be violent and/or include sexual contents. Even if the government respects the freedom of art, it does not imply that it is willing to promote such kind of cultural products (MOFA Official Interview, 04/12/2013). The government is evidently concerned by the image of Japan it projects abroad and fears foreign negative reactions if it disseminates controversial contents.

The MOFA tries to collaborate with other state actors. For instance, when the Agency for Cultural Affairs sent to Cairo some of Japan’s Cultural Envoys, in this case craftsmen specialized in traditional Japanese paper making (washi), the MOFA via its Egyptian embassy helped them to organize an exhibition. It also acted as the go-between by arranging interviews of these Cultural Envoys with Egyptian newspapers and TV stations (MOFA Official Interview, 04/12/2013).

The MOFA hopes to raise the affinity of foreigners with Japan by using Japanese pop culture. MOFA’s approach to soft power is political. The ultimate objective of Japan’s public diplomacy consists of enhancing Japan’s presence in the international community and advancing its diplomatic agenda (MOFA Official Interview, 04/12/2013). Yet, despite the reliance of this ministry on pop culture as a tool of soft power, it has not necessarily meant political support for Japan. Although Japan’s pop culture has been massively embraced in China and South Korea, Japan is still considered very negatively in both countries. According to a poll, respectively 79 per cent of Koreans and 90 per cent of Chinese hold a negative view of Japan (BBC World Service, 2014: 21). This no doubt results from the ongoing struggle over the memory of the Second World War as well as more recent incidents such as the salience of territorial conflicts between Japan and its neighbours. Chinese and South Korean student fans of Japanese pop culture harbour conflicting attitudes towards Japan. On the one hand, they really appreciate dramas, anime, manga etc. for their artistic value. On the other hand, most of them are very critical of how the Japanese state deals with its colonialist and militarist past. Rather than erasing negative opinions, the consumption of Japanese popular culture has made more complex their view of Japan with the juxtaposition of both negative and positive stances (Nakano, 2008: 113 and 120; Otmazgin, 2008: 94-6).

Whilst Japan was the leader of the BBC World Service ranking in 2012, it dropped to fourth place in 2013, and to fifth place in 2014. Yet, on average, 49 per cent of people see Japan positively. Out of the twenty-three countries surveyed in 2014, nineteen consider Japan’s influence as positive versus three negatively (China, South Korea and Germany), and one (India) is divided (BBC World Service, 2014: 21).

Converting the global success of Japanese pop culture into political support for Japan’s diplomatic agenda is a thorny issue. The MOFA has not found a solution to this challenge yet. As aptly stressed by Jing Sun, “commercial successes do not necessarily smooth over diplomatic hostilities” (2012: 9). The specific context of the relations between Japan and the target country certainly matters (MOFA Official Interview, 04/12/2013). Nye highlights the paramount importance of context for the success of soft power (2011a: 19). In others words, to take an example, the relations between Japan and China differ from the ones between Japan and Britain. Thus, the ways of translating affinity into political support are not the same.

5.3.2 The Japan Foundation

The Japan Foundation was created in 1972 in the context of the two “Nixon shocks”: first, Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing to start the normalization process of US-China relations; secondly, Richard Nixon’s decision to unlink the value of the dollar from the price of gold. The Japanese government had not been previously informed of these two initiatives of its closest ally (Vyas, 2012: 15). There was a real “feeling of crisis that Japan would become isolated in international society” (Okamoto, 2000: 12). Thus, it appears that the initial motivation for the establishment of the Japan Foundation was to deepen Japan-US relations in order to avoid future communication gaps and cultural misunderstandings (Zemans, 1999; Katzenstein, 2002). The purpose of the Japan Foundation is to promote better understanding of Japan among other nations by the implementation of a series of activities which revolve around three major fields: arts and cultural exchange, Japanese-language education overseas, as well as Japanese studies and intellectual exchange (Japan Foundation, 2013b: 6). It strives to show the diversity of Japanese society, views, and cultural activities to foreign audiences. For instance, it organized the screening of Japanese pornographic movies in South Korea (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013).

Since its establishment, its relation with the MOFA has been an issue. At the beginning, MOFA’s officials were worried about the Japan Foundation because they believed that it would become a competitor in the field of foreign policy (Umesao et al., 2002). Nevertheless, their concern was dispelled after they realized that cultural exchange could be an additional tool of foreign policy (Vyas, 2006: 138). In fact, the Japan Foundation has always worked in close cooperation with the MOFA. Originally set up as a “special agency” (tokushu hōjin), its legal status changed in 2003 to an “independent administrative agency” (dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin). Rather than enhancing the independence of the Japan Foundation, the evolution of its legal status was carried out to increase its administrative efficiency, to increase the alignment of its activities with MOFA’s policies and to attract more funding from private actors. Therefore, the Japan Foundation continues its close coordination of its activities with MOFA’s policies (Vyas, 2012: 17).

As the Japan Foundation is under the supervision of the MOFA, the minister of Foreign Affairs appoints the president of the Japan Foundation. Nevertheless, the MOFA does not intervene in the recruitment of the Japan Foundation’s staff (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013). On the finance side, the Japan Foundation is still heavily dependent on government subsidies. Reflecting the Japanese state’s budgetary difficulties, its subsidies to the Japan Foundation have decreased between 2003 and 2012 from ¥14.3 billon to ¥12.8 billon (Japan Foundation, 2004: 90; Japan Foundation, 2013b: 57). It is why the Japan Foundation has tried to secure more funding from the private sector (individual or corporate donations) in recent years. To ensure some independence from the government, it has also its own fund (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013). Despite its heavy dependence on public subsidies, it has proven that it is not totally pledged to the MOFA. It has not let the government interfere in the choice of scholars or artists invited to its events despite, in some cases, the opposition of the MOFA to some participants (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013).

In 2003, the Research Committee on International Exchange set up by the Japan Foundation was one of the first in official documents to cite McGray’s article (Research Committee on International Exchange, 2003: 9). Until the second half of the 1990s, the national image of Japan was based on a dynamic economy and a social system. Yet, at the beginning of the 2000s, Japan’s national image became negative. To restore Japan’s image, the report recommended to stimulate the Japanese economy and to use the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture such as manga, animation and video games (Research Committee on International Exchange, 2003: 17-8).

In 2008, the Japan Foundation indicated under the section “New Development of Activities” that it “is proactively disseminating contemporary Japanese culture in response to requests from many people overseas who wish to know more about Japanese manga, anime, food, etc.” (2008: 2). Under the presidency of Ogoura Kazuo, a special section dedicated to pop culture was set up (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013). Nevertheless, it does not mean that the Japan Foundation disregarded previously Japanese pop culture. For instance, in 2003, the Japan Foundation organized a Japanese Animation Film Festival in Malaysia and in Mexico. In North America, it held lectures on animation films (2004: 18, 24 and 30). The 2004 annual report noted that Japanese otaku culture (manga, anime and video games) captures global attention abroad (2005: 12). In 2005, it gave Miyazaki, the world-famous Japanese anime feature movies director, the Japan Foundation Award for “conveying the universal appeal of Japanese culture and capturing the hearts of young people around the world” (2007a: 8). And the president of the Japan Foundation, Ogoura Kazuo, in his annual message, observed the global appeal of Japanese pop culture (2007b: i).

The MOFA, Japanese embassies and the Japan Foundation have collaborated to promote Japanese pop culture outside of Japan. In fact, 90 per cent of the discussions between the Japan Foundation and the MOFA deal with the projects submitted by Japanese embassies to promote Japanese culture. Coordination is the issue at stake. Indeed, the Japan Foundation has its own local offices and tries to conduct its projects on its own, whilst Japanese embassies every year submit to the MOFA a list of events that they wish to carry out. Then, the MOFA decides which projects have priority, and starts discussions with the Japan Foundation to coordinate overseas events (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013).

There are several instances of collaboration between the Japan Foundation and the MOFA as part of the Cool Japan policy. After the creation of the International Manga Award in May 2007, the Japan Foundation invited the winners to Japan from the 1^st July to the 10^th July 2007 to receive their prize and to visit manga- and anime-related museums, as well as manga publishers and artists (2008: 11). Since then, it has invited to Japan the winners of this prize (2009: 13; 2010-2012: 43; 2013: 50). Following the appointment of Doraemon as Japan’s anime ambassador in March 2008 by the MOFA, the Japan Foundation organized overseas screenings of Japanese DVDs subtitled in local languages from 2008 until 2011 (2009: 13; 2010-2012: 43).

The ultimate aim of introducing Japanese culture is not the same for the Japan Foundation and the MOFA. The former tends to disseminate Japanese culture, including pop culture, not only as an asset of Japan but also as an asset of mankind (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013). The latter sees Japanese culture in an instrumental way to advance its diplomatic agenda. Its goal is not to introduce ikebana, tea ceremony or pop culture per se, but to convert affinity with Japan into political support (MOFA Official Interview, 04/12/2013).

In other words, the Japan Foundation has to conciliate between politician’s short-term interests and its long-term interests. The Japanese government puts pressure on the Japan Foundation to explain its activities in terms of accountability. Yet, it is a complicate issue to demonstrate the impacts of cultural activities. Tensions were particularly important during the DPJ government because this political party tried to change the structure of the administration, including the Japan Foundation (Former Senior Official of the Japan Foundation Interview, 27/11/2013). This point has been covered in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.