Gosudarstvennoye Kratsrochoye Obyazatel'stvo
; government short term obligations) designed to entice foreign hot money by paying 150 percent interest
, at a time when it could not cover its budgetary expenses with tax revenues hopelessly in arrears. Yeltsin insiders knew that the obligations couldn't be met, but also saw opportunities for self-enrichment and played the situation that way. They secured a 22.6 billion IMF rescue package on July 13, swapping GKOs for long-term Eurobonds to string the process out, before finally repudiating their GKO and Euro-denominated obligations, and abruptly devaluing on August 17, 1998. In the Asian case, foreign capital fled because private sector risks had increased. By contrast, in the Russian case it fled because carry traders realized that the Russian government was intent on ripping them off. The only question was when, not if, the Kremlin would strike. See Goldman (2003), Aslund (1995), Rosefielde and Hedlund (2009).