Ddi 2011 1 Space Mil Case Neg
Peaceful Reunification Now – no risk of conflict
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- A shift in power won’t cause war
- China F/L (3/3) Status quo solves miscalculation – plan makes it worse
- To maintain deterrence, Wash- ington may then feel compelled to increase military assistance
- Turn-- China First Strike Missile Defense will cause China first strike.
- US space weaponization leads to Chinese miscalculation and space wars Chase 11
Peaceful Reunification Now – no risk of conflict Robert S. Ross, 2006, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, March/April 2006, (Foreign Affairs, Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement, p. Lexis) Political developments in Taiwan over the past year have effectively ended the independence movement there. What had been a major source of regional instability – and the most likely source of a great-power war anywhere in the world -- has become increasingly irrelevant. The peaceful transformation of relations between China and Taiwan will help stabilize eastern Asia, reduce the likelihood of conflict between China and the United States, and present an opportunity for Beijing, Taipei, and Washington to adjust their defense postures -- all without hurting Taiwan's security or threatening U.S. interests. A shift in power won’t cause war James Fearon, 95, “Rationalists Explanation of War” International Organization Volume 49,slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/fearon-io1995v49n3.pdf It frequently is argued that if a declining power expects it might be attacked by a rising power in the future, then a preventive war in the present may be rational. Typically, however, preventive war arguments do not consider whether the rising and declining powers could construct a bargain, perhaps across time, that would leave both sides better off than a costly and risky preventive war would.ll The incentives for such a deal surely exist. The rising state should not want to be attacked while it is relatively weak, so what stops it from offering concessions in the present and the future that would make the declining state prefer not to attack? Also, if war is inefficient and bargains both sides prefer to a fight will exist, why should the declining power rationally fear being attacked in the future? The standard argument supposes that an anticipated shift in the balance of power can by itself be enough to make war rational, but this is not so. China F/L (3/3) Status quo solves miscalculation – plan makes it worse Aaron L Friedberg, Fall 05, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Volume 30, Number 2, pg 7-45, Project Muse As regards Taiwan, China’s goal may be only to prevent that island from sliding toward independence. The PRC’s leaders may be perfectly willing to live with the status quo indeanitely, but they may believe that they have to is- sue periodic threats to prevent Taiwan from breaking free. The U.S. objective may be only to prevent forceful reuniacation. But China’s threats and ongoing military buildup may increase fears that Beijing will eventually feel capable of achieving its objectives through the use of force. To maintain deterrence, Wash- ington may then feel compelled to increase military assistance to Taipei and to take other measures designed to make it appear more likely that the United States would intervene if Taiwan were attacked. But these steps will almost certainly make the PRC more fearful of a Taiwanese bolt for independence, which will cause Beijing to further intensify its military efforts and heighten its rhetoric, and so on.43 China’s aim in deploying large numbers of theater ballistic missiles may be primarily to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. But those deploy- ments inevitably appear threatening not only to Taiwan but also to Japan, the United States, and others in the region. Conversely, the U.S. aim in moving to- ward deployment of some kind of theater missile defense (TMD) system may be to provide a measure of protection to U.S. friends and allies and to its bases and forces in the Western Paciac. But the possibility of such a deployment is obviously deeply threatening to the Chinese, who see it as undermining their ability to prevent unfavorable regional developments, especially if a U.S.- orchestrated TMD system is extended to include Taiwan. Beijing’s concerns about TMD will be further heightened by the deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system, which the Chinese could see as reducing their ability to deter an attack on their own territory. The Chinese response to these developments is likely to include steps to augment both their theater- and intercontinental-range strike forces, which will tend to heighten U.S. anxieties about their intentions Turn-- China First Strike Missile Defense will cause China first strike. Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom at Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government. Spring 2006. “Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective” Vol. 2, Iss. 1, pg 34. < http://www.amacad.org/hui3.pdf> Even a limited missile defense system could in principle neutralize China’s twenty single-warhead ICBMs capable of reaching the United States.49 Chinese officials realize this danger. “It is evident,” said Ambassador Sha Zukang, who until recently was the director general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “that the U.S. NMD will seriously undermine the effectiveness of China’s limited nuclear capability from the first day of its [NMD] deployment. This can not but cause grave concerns to China.”50 Many Chinese fear that whether or not U. S. missile defenses are as effective as planned, decision-makers could become incautious in their actions, willing to risk a disarming first strike because they believe they have the capability to intercept any surviving Chinese missiles.51 US space weaponization leads to Chinese miscalculation and space wars Chase 11 (Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor and Director of the Mahan Scholars Program at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. “Defense and Deterrence in China’s Military Space Strategy” Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 5. 3-25-2011 2011 01:22 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37699&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244) A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as inherently threatening to China’s interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weapons in, or from, space to establish global superiority" [7]. Similarly, according to Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others" [8]. Given that China must protect its own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes" [9]. Chinese writers also assert that U.S. space war exercises reflect the growing militarization of space. Yet Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the realm of policy statements and war games. Indeed, some Chinese strategists appear to believe that other countries are actively developing counter-space capabilities that could threaten Chinese satellites. Some Chinese writers discussed what they characterize as a long history of ASAT research, development, and testing in the United States and Russia dating back to the Cold War [10]. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese writers divide these potential threats into two major categories: "soft kill" and "hard kill" [11]. Soft kill threats can cause temporary loss of the effectiveness of space systems, causing them to be unable to carry out operational functions. According to Chinese military researchers, the main methods of soft kill anti-satellite attack include electronic warfare and computer network attacks [12]. In contrast to soft kill threats such as jamming, hard kill capabilities are intended to cause permanent damage to spacecraft. Chinese writers identify kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers as the main hard kill ASAT threats. Other Chinese writings offer more detailed discussions of perceived threats from a wide range of systems, such as kinetic energy interceptors, laser ASAT systems, nuclear ASAT systems, microwave weapons, and space planes that could be used to disable or destroy an adversary’s satellites [13]. In addition, some Chinese authors assert that U.S. missile defense interceptors provide the United States with an inherent ASAT capability [14]. In all, according to Chinese analysts, as a result of the actions of the world’s major space powers, space war is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Indeed, they argue that it is already more a reality than a myth. Consequently, they conclude that China must be prepared not only to degrade an adversary’s ability to use space, but also to protect its own space capabilities. Chinese writings suggest that Beijing would consider doing so through a combination of defensive measures and deterrence. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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