Department of the navy (don) 17. 1 Small Business Innovation Research (sbir) Proposal Submission Instructions introduction

PHASE I: The company will develop a concept for multi-sensor data fusion of acoustic data from both the volume and side-scan sensors, including SAS, to reduce false classifications. They will provide detailed technical performance specification and design, in-tow-body processing and data collection requirements for back-end PMA processing. The company will detail the feasibility of developing the advanced algorithms required to fuse acoustic data from both volume and side-scan sensors. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will address technical risk reduction and provide performance goals and key technical milestones.

PHASE II: Based on the results of Phase I and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), the small business will develop a prototype for evaluation and delivery. The prototype will be evaluated to determine its capability in meeting the performance goals defined in the Phase II SOW and the Navy requirements for the Advanced Minehunting Sonar Data Fusion in the description. System performance will be demonstrated through prototype evaluation and modeling or analytical methods over the required range of parameters including numerous deployment cycles. Evaluation results will be used to refine the prototype into an initial design that will meet Navy requirements. The company will prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology to Navy and potential commercial use.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: The company will be expected to support the Navy in transitioning the technology for Navy use. The company will further refine the Advanced Minehunting Sonar Data Fusion algorithm(s) according to the Phase II SOW for evaluation to determine its effectiveness in an operationally relevant environment. The expected transition of the prototype is into minehunting systems such as the AN/AQS-20 and AN/AQS-24. The company will support the Navy for test and validation to certify and qualify the system for Navy use. Private Sector Commercial Potential: Towed active acoustic sonar systems have been successfully towed from small 11-meter boats. As these sensor systems become more compact due to breakthroughs with robust computing processors, the need to automate signal processing of the increasing number of sensors is quickly expanding. Techniques developed under this SBIR may transition to commercial use for application in search and rescue systems deployed around littoral regions of the world.

REFERENCES:

1. Urick, R.J., Principles of Underwater Sound. McGraw–Hill Book Company, New York, 1983

2. David L. Hall & James Llinas, Handbook of Multisensor Data Fusion. CRC Press LLC, 2001.

3. Eric J. Tollefson, Advanced Minehunting Sensors, 2016 Naval Post Graduate School Mine Warfare Technology Symposium, 24-26 May 2016.-

KEYWORDS: Minehunting acoustic systems; multisensor data fusion; underwater acoustics; side-scan SONAR; AN/AQS-20; AN/AQS-24.

Questions may also be submitted through DoD SBIR/STTR SITIS website.

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Battlespace, Electronics, Sensors

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: Surface ASW Combat System Integration, 1916: Surface ASW System Improvement

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Develop a closed-loop active adaptive sonar to improve detection, localization, and classification performance and reduce manning requirements.

DESCRIPTION: Active sonar control on Cruisers, Destroyers, and Littoral Combat Ships currently requires a tremendous amount of hands-on operator involvement, multi-faceted decisions informed by models, and in-situ observations and training. Thus, active sonar may operate at times in a degraded mode. Development of a closed-loop active adaptive sonar will improve sonar and combat system performance, and streamline the tasks for transmit control that will provide improved detection, localization, and classification performance as well as reduced operator workload and staffing.

The concept of Fully Adaptive Active Sonar (FAAS) seeks to exploit all available degrees-of-freedom to adapt the transmitted waveform and receive processing in order to maximize target detection performance. This area of study has received great interest in radar application where it has shown to produce 3 to 10 dB improvement in target signal-to-noise ratio. Adaptive receive beamforming has been employed for underwater imaging and in medical ultrasound applications. It is a logical extension to consider the benefits of joint transmit and receive adaptation for both pulsed active sonar (PAS) and continuous active sonar (CAS).

Closed loop sonar operation is replete with open problems spanning a broad gamut of research areas in detection, tracking, and classification. The focus of this effort is the optimal sonar target detection problem in environments with unknown spectral properties. Two important issues that arise in the context of FAAS for adaptive target detection are deriving the performance limit (optimal performance) afforded by FAAS, and developing the criteria for adaptive processor performance to lie within a prescribed level of possible optimal performance.

Development of FAAS is more difficult than solving the radar problem due to the relatively slow propagation speed of sound, and potentially by the small number of transmissions available in a given time-span. Key metrics are probability of detection and probability of false alarm for the optimal processor for the target transmission types (single pings, multiple pings, and continuous active waveforms). Other important metrics are latency to achieve optimization parameters, the required training data support, false alarm probability, robustness of detection performance to parameter mismatch, and computational footprint.

This technology should increase mission capability by improving sonar performance through automating and streamlining the task of active sonar transmit control and improving the target signal-to-noise ratio. Adaptive feedback will provide real-time optimizations for waveforms, transmit patterns, and receive processing. This will allow sonar operators to focus on acoustic analysis with improved target detectability.

It is anticipated that Phase II and Phase III work will require a Department of Defense (DoD) security clearance.
The Phase II effort will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If need be, data of the same level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.

PHASE I: Develop initial concept and model key elements of fully a adaptive active sonar. Feasibility will be determined through analysis and modeling of the improved detection, localization, and classification performance as well as reduced operator workload and manning. A simulation will be developed using simulated data and will be analyzed for use in the AN/SQQ-89 system. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial system specifications and a capabilities description to build the prototype in Phase II.

PHASE II: The company will develop, demonstrate and validate a prototype closed-loop active adaptive sonar. Techniques using SQS-53C mono-static, SQS-53C/Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA) quasi-mono-static, and/or Littoral Combat Ship Variable Depth Sonar (LCS-VDS) active sonars employing pulsed and continuous waveforms will be used to validate the prototype’s capabilities. Performance analysis and validation of the adaptive technique with respect to the training data support, false alarm probability, robustness of detection performance to parameter mismatch, and computational cost are sought. Performance validation must be analyzed using simulated and measured data sets. Secure access to classified data will be required in Phase II. The company will prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology for Navy and potential commercial use.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: The company will be expected to support the Navy in transitioning the technology for Navy use. The company will further refine a fully integrated closed-loop active adaptive sonar and assist in operational testing and integration of the technology into current AN/SQQ-89 combat system future builds via ACB-19/21 and other systems such as LCS-VDS or Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Compact Low-Frequency Active (SURTASS CLFA). Private Sector Commercial Potential: Commercial applications that currently utilize various forms of active acoustic transmission and reception that could benefit from a fully adaptive active approach include oil exploration; seismic survey; rescue and salvage; and bathymetric survey.

REFERENCES:

1. Guerci, J.R. "Cognitive Radar: The Knowledge-Aided Fully Adaptive Approach." Artech House Inc., Norwood, MA, 2010.

2. Gini, F. and Rangaswamy, M. ed. "Knowledge-Based Radar Detection, Tracking, and Classification." Wiley Interscience Series, May 2008.

3. Ward, J. "Space-Time Adaptive Processing for Airborne Rada.," MIT/LL Technical report 1015, 13 Dec, 1994.

4. Dursun, Safiye, Austeng, Andreas, Hansen, Roy E., and Holm, Sverre. “Minimum variance beamforming in active sonar imaging.” In Bjørnø (ed.) John S., Papadakis & Leif, editor, Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference & Exhibition on Underwater Acoustic Measurements: Technologies and Results, pages 1373--1378, 2009.

5. Synnevag, J. F., Austeng, A., and Holm, S.. “Adaptive beamforming applied to medical ultrasound imaging.” Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics and Frequency Control, IEEE Transactions on, 54(8):1606 --1613, August 2007.-

KEYWORDS: Fully adaptive active sonar; sonar waveform; adaptive signal processing; cognitive radar; AN/SQQ-89 combat system; ACB-19/21 system

Questions may also be submitted through DoD SBIR/STTR SITIS website.

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare System (PEO IWS) 1.0 – AEGIS Combat System; PEO IWS 10.0 – Ship Self Defense System (SSDS)

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Develop a virtualization capability that provides cyber resiliency for the AEGIS and Ship Self Defense Ship (SSDS) Combat Systems.

DESCRIPTION: Cyber resilience is about the management—not the elimination—of risk. Not only is eliminating risk impossible, but it impedes agility; an environment with an acceptable level of risk supports innovation. Cyber resiliency techniques that help a system combat a cyber-attack (an attempt by hackers to damage or destroy a computer network or system) are essential in today’s cyber environment. Without these techniques, systems are susceptible to a wide range of accidental or malicious events. In computing, virtualization refers to the act of creating a virtual (rather than actual) version of something, including virtual computer hardware platforms, operating systems, storage devices, and computer network resources. Successful use of virtualization to implement cyber resiliency capabilities will help manage a cyber-attack.

Virtualization presents a new set of risks to organizations adopting it and it is vital to be aware of risks and information security risk management strategies when implementing a virtualization strategy. The Navy’s current cybersecurity capabilities are for complex, system-of-systems surface combat systems. They currently focus on the protection and detection phases of the cyber-kill chain. The ability to combat a cyber-attack today is manual and limited due to the complexity of identifying and confirming the attack and the limited options available to restoring the system back to a trusted state in a timely manner. Identifying how virtualization can be used to implement cyber resiliency capabilities to help the combat system - detect cyber-attacks, initially react to the cyber-attack (triage) and restore the system to a trusted state during a cyber-attack - will augment the various techniques used to support cyber resiliency.

The Navy seeks an innovative technology that integrates and employs multiple cyber resiliency techniques in a virtual space. These techniques include:

(1) The Adaptive Response technique, which provides the ability to respond to a detected cyber-attack.

(2) The Heterogeneity technique, which utilizes diverse technologies to minimize the impact of attacks and simultaneously require adversaries to attack multiple different types of technologies.

(3) The Distributive Allocation technique, which positions critical assets, sensors, and processing in order to provide an unpredictable attack surface to the adversary and make it more difficult for the adversary to successfully locate, target, and compromise a cyber-asset.

(4) The Redundancy technique, which deploys multiple protected instantiations of mission critical information or cyber assets.

(5) A Coordinated Defense technique, which is a variety of distinct cybersecurity controls to defend mission dependent resources against adversary actions.
These integrated techniques better position surface navy combat systems to combat and recover from a cyber-attack. The virtual environment established will enable fast failover (< 1 second) with low latency (milliseconds) in communications.

The Phase II effort will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If need be, data of the same level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.

PHASE I: Develop concepts using virtualization in support of the cyber resiliency techniques identified in the Description section of this document. The company will also develop a Plan of Action, Milestones (POA&M) to design, develop, test and integrate the proposed architecture into both the AEGIS, and SSDS combat system environments. Navy subject matter experts (SMEs) will establish feasibility through evaluation and its applicability to the cyber resiliency defined techniques for integration into the combat system environment. For the purpose of Phase I the combat systems environment is a real-time environment with high availability requirements requiring fast failover (< 1 second) and low latency communication requirements (milliseconds). The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype in Phase II.

PHASE II: Based upon the results of Phase I and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), a prototype approach using virtualization to implement features of cyber resiliency will be developed, delivered, and implemented at a Land Based Test Site (LBTS), which represents a combat system environment. The prototype must be capable of demonstrating the implementation and integration of the five cyber resiliency techniques into the combat system environment. All of these capabilities shall be able to execute with little to no impact to the performance of the combat system environment under test. The company will provide requirements, test plans and procedures to demonstrate the product meets the attributes described in the Description section of this document. The company will prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology for Navy and potential commercial use.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: During Phase III, the company will be expected to support both PEO IWS 1.0 and 10.0 in system integration of the developed cybersecurity framework from Phase II. This will be accomplished by incorporation of the cyber resiliency techniques into each combat system’s (AEGIS and SSDS) baseline modernization process. This will consist of integrating into a baselines definition, incorporation of the baselines existing and new cybersecurity capabilities, validation testing, and combat system certification. Private Sector Commercial Potential: These cyber resiliency techniques implemented by virtualization could support any environment that is able to use virtualization and has a need to fight through a cyber-attack. Examples would be safety systems or financial systems in which availability and integrity are paramount.

REFERENCES:

1. Lockheed Martin, “The Cyber Kill Chain.” 15 April 2016. http://cyber.lockheedmartin.com/solutions/cyber-kill-chain.

2. Bodeau , D. and, Graubart, R. “Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework.” September 2011. www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/11_4436.pdf.

3. Nicholas, M. J. and Christopher, O. S. “Building the Theory of Resilience.” January 2013. URL last accessed 15 April 2016. http://cybersecurity.pnnl.gov/documents/Theory_of_Resilience-V15.pdf.

4. “Department of Defense Defense Science Board Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat,” January 2013. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf”-

KEYWORDS: Cyber-kill Chain; Cybersecurity; Cyber-attack; Information Security; Cyber Resilience; Virtualization for Cybersecurity

Questions may also be submitted through DoD SBIR/STTR SITIS website.

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) 1.0 – AEGIS Combat System; PEO IWS 10.0 – Ship Self Defense System (SSDS)

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Develop a modular, extensible, open, and updateable software-based cybersecurity framework for the AEGIS and Ship Self Defense Ship (SSDS) Combat Systems used to integrate multiple cybersecurity capabilities.

DESCRIPTION: U.S. Navy Combat Systems are required to address cybersecurity. The combat systems use cybersecurity capabilities that detect, prevent and react to cyber threats in today’s cyber environment. Without these capabilities, systems are susceptible to a wide range of accidental and/or malicious events. To address cybersecurity within surface ship combat systems, cybersecurity capabilities are needed to implement a Defense-In-Depth approach. Two common challenges associated with these capabilities are 1) the complicated and unique interfaces to use and manage them and 2) the need to update capabilities frequently to maintain their effectiveness against the threat. Developing a framework that provides a simple and consolidated interface and the ability to update with little or no impact to the combat system will help ensure a more effective Defense-in-Depth cybersecurity solution.

Cybersecurity capabilities available today are challenging to integrate and sustain for complex, system-of-systems surface navy combat systems. These cybersecurity capabilities, both COTS (e.g. anti-virus scanners, file integrity checkers) and GOTS (network integrity checkers, Security Information Event Managers (SIEMs)), are developed as standalone solutions with their own design and architecture. Most of these capabilities offer vendor-specific (known as vendor-lock) client-server architectures that assume computing environments with synchronous update cycles under a single programmatic authority. Such solutions present challenges. Adoption of vendor-specific technologies typically locks the combat system into the expertise and capabilities of that single vendor or solution provider, making it challenging to leverage the unique strengths of various companies across different domains. Vendor-lock also prevents developers of various combat system sensors and weapon systems from contributing tailored monitoring solutions to the overall cybersecurity solution set. An example of this would be the Navy-mandated Host Based Security System (HBSS). It provides a static list of capabilities, which are not executed on the combat systems hardware and operating system.

Asynchronous modernization and fielding timelines across various combat system elements make coordinated fielding of new cybersecurity capabilities (additional clients) or improvements (improved/updated clients) extremely challenging. The combat system’s flexibility to provide rapid updates to detect emerging attack techniques is limited.

The Navy seeks an innovative software-based solution for a modular and extensible cybersecurity framework for surface navy combat systems. The framework’s registration scheme will permit only validated and authenticated endpoint solutions to connect with the framework. It should have a simple and consolidated interface. The approach shall be modular with the ability to update with little or no impact to the combat system performance. To prevent vendor-lock it should be a communication standard solution to allow plug-and-play of new capabilities in the framework.

The benefits of this technology will enable surface navy combat systems to field cybersecurity-monitoring capabilities more rapidly than the typical multi-year cycle while eliminating the need for costly software deliveries and installations.

The Phase II effort will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If need be, data of the same level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.