Department of the navy (don) 18. 1 Small Business Innovation Research (sbir) Proposal Submission Instructions introduction

State-of-the-art cryocoolers of the appropriate size scale have Carnot efficiencies of 13-25% of Carnot at 77 K and require maintenance every 6,000 to 10,000 hours. Innovations are needed to efficiently increase the effective cryogenic cooling capacity available for shipboard application and reduce or eliminate routine maintenance. Increasing the Carnot efficiency of the cryocooler reduces the electrical burden of the HTS degaussing system. The Navy is expecting to improve efficiency to greater than 30% of Carnot at 50 K with a heat lift greater than 300 watts. Integrated cryocooler heat exchanger solutions are desired that will yield heat exchanger effectiveness greater than 98% at flow rates of 10 grams/sec with a cryogenic heat lift that exceeds 600 Watts at 50 K measured at the cold finger. The HTS degaussing system is predicted to reduce the acquisition cost of a traditional LPD-17 class system degaussing system by nearly $10m per ship.

All solutions must consider the objective of low-maintenance requirements and induce no acoustic emission penalty while achieving a 30-year effective service life. System should be designed to pass shipboard qualification testing including shock (MIL-S-901D) and vibration (MIL-STD-167-1A).

PHASE I: Develop a design concept for an improved capacity and high-efficiency cryogenic cooling system meeting the requirements identified in the description while considering the cryogenic and vacuum compatibility of selected materials and safety aspects in handling the intended working pressure of the cryogen. Demonstrate technical feasibility through modeling, analysis, and bench-top experimentation. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype solution in Phase II. Develop a Phase II plan.

PHASE II: Develop, fabricate, and deliver a prototype system based on the Phase I work and Phase II Statement of Work (SOW) for demonstration and characterization of key parameters and objectives. Deliver the Phase II prototype to the Navy for further performance testing. Based on lessons learned in Phase II through the prototype demonstration, construct a complete advanced prototype to include updated drawings that will pass Navy qualification testing.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Support the Navy in transitioning the technology for Navy use, including initial production level manufacturing capabilities and providing a fully qualified cryocooler system. If successful, the cryocooler system will transition to the LX(R) Amphibious Ship Program. The company shall develop manufacturing plans to facilitate transition to the Navy.

All superconducting cable systems require cryogenic cooling. The cryogenic system being developed under this topic will be appropriately sized for many applications requiring cryogenic cooling for the Navy and the commercial world. In addition to HTS cables, military and commercial motors and generators are also applications that will benefit from a high-efficiency, low-cost, cryogenic system.

REFERENCES:

1. Kephart J., Fitzpatrick B., Ferrara P., Pyryt M., Pienkos J., and Golda E.M. “High Temperature Superconducting Degaussing From Feasibility Study to Fleet Adoption.” IEEE Transactions on Applied Superconductivity, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pg 2229-2232, June 2011. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5672800

2. H. Rodrigo, F. Salmhofer, D.S. Kwag, S. Pamidi, L. Graber, D.G. Crook, S.L. Ranner, S.J. Dale, and D. Knoll. “Electrical and thermal characterization of a novel high pressure gas cooled DC power cable.” Cryogenics 52 (2012) 310. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0011227512000501

3. Chul Han Kim, Jin-Geun Kim, and Sastry V. Pamidi. "Cryogenic Thermal Studies on Cryocooler-Based Helium Circulation System for Gas Cooled Superconducting Power Devices." Cryocoolers 18, International Cryocooler Conference, Inc., Boulder, CO, 2014. http://cryocooler.org/proceedings/paper-flies/C18papers/067.pdf

KEYWORDS: Cryocoolers; Superconducting Degaussing Cables; Superconducting Power Cables; High Temperature Superconductor; Helium Circulation Fan; Cryogenic Heat Exchanger

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Battlespace, Electronics, Sensors

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: PMS435- Submarine Electromagnetic Systems

OBJECTIVE: Develop a ruggedized connector for use with commercially available high-speed switches and network interface cards that is low cost, maintains high data rates, operates in harsh environments, and has high mean time between failures to be utilized by Next Generation Architecture (NGA).

DESCRIPTION: The focus of this topic is to increase the durability of Fiber Optic (FO) high-speed network connectors Quad Small Form –factor Pluggable (QSFP+) in harsh military environments (submarine environmental qualification test). The connector should have cost and support data rates comparable to COTS products but survive in harsh environments, and have higher mean time between failures than COTS.

As a part of the Submarine Electronic Warfare (EW) Next Generation Architecture (NGA) multi-layered system approach, a high-speed optical network is required. Currently, the architecture utilizes commercially available Ethernet (10 GbE, 40 GbE, and 100 GbE) and 56 Gbps Infiniband interfaces.

All current high-speed optical network connection methods suffer from an identical vulnerability point: they all utilize a very fragile conversion and transport mechanism in the form of FO cables and fragile interface connectors (Quad Small Form – factor Pluggable – QSFP+) that may not survive the rigors of installation and operation aboard undersea platforms.

The Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable (QSFP+) connector is a compact, hot-swapped transceiver used for telecommunication applications. It interfaces with a network device motherboard; such as a switch or router, to a fiber optic or copper networking cable This type of connector is prevalent in the high-speed backbone of the Electronic Warfare Next Generation Architecture (EW NGA) systems.

The commercial QSFP+ connector has certain failures, which have to be mitigated. The Electrical Interface and Pin-Out (edge of the transmitter) is exposed, and during normal handling, the connection with a 38-pin edge is being damaged causing the transceiver to fail. As previously mentioned, the transceivers are fragile components and when dropped, the Electrical Interface and Pin-Out can easily be damaged causing the interface to malfunction. More failures are anticipated when the QSFP+ connector is being operated under shocks, vibration and electromagnetic interference (EMI) environment [Reference 1].

The Phase II and Phase III efforts will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If required, data of the dame level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.

Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. Owned and Operated with no Foreign Influence as defined by DOD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor and/or subcontractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances, in order to perform on advanced phases of this contract as set forth by DSS and NAVSEA in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material IAW DoD 5220.22-M during the advance phases of this contract.

PHASE I: Develop an innovative concept to prevent connector failure in the high-speed backbone of future submarines EW systems operating conditions due to harsh environment, such as, shock, vibration, and EMI. Develop a concept for advanced networking interface that meets the requirements as stated in the topic description. Demonstrate the feasibility of the concept through modeling analysis and testing and will establish that the concept can be developed into a useful product for the Navy. The Phase I Option, if awarded, must include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype in Phase II. Develop a Phase II plan.

PHASE II: Based on the results of Phase I and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), develop and deliver a prototype rugged connection interface for evaluation to determine its capability in meeting the performance goals and the Navy requirements for a Next Generation Architecture EW Networking Layer for submarine. System performance will be demonstrated through prototype evaluation and modeling or analytical methods over the required range of parameters including numerous deployment cycles. Using evaluation results, refine the prototype into an initial design that will meet Navy requirements. Prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology to Navy use.

It is probable that the work under this effort will be classified under Phase II (see Description section for details).

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: If successfully demonstrated in Phase II, support the Navy in transitioning the technology for Navy use. Develop a Next Generation EW Rugged Interface Connection for submarines for evaluation to determine its effectiveness in an operationally relevant environment. Support the Navy for test and validation to certify and qualify the system for Navy use.

Commercial use of this technology includes telecommunications applications in electronic devices, particularly transferring high data through-puts for a dense environment. These systems use the data to be transported across a network fabric for further processing.

REFERENCES:

1. Department of Defense Test Method Standard “Mechanical Vibrations of Shipboard Equipment.” MIL-STD-167-1A. http://www.dtbtest.com/pdfs/mil-std-167-1a.pdf

2. "Cisco 40-Gigabit QSFP+ Transceiver Modules Installation Note." Cisco Systems, 03 Oct. 2012. http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/interfaces_modules/transceiver_modules/installation/note/OL_24862.html

3. Xiang, Haifei, Song, Jian, Iiu, Fengman, Gao, Wei, Li, B. and Wan, Lixi. "Failure analysis and test for high speed packaging, HDMI packaging and QSFP packaging." 2010 11th International Conference on Electronic Packaging Technology & High Density Packaging, Xi'an, China, 2010, pp. 1158-1161.

4. Ammendola, R. et al. "High speed data transfer with FPGAs and QSFP+modules." IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium & Medical Imaging Conference, Knoxville, TN, 2010, pp. 1323-1325. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5873983&isnumber=5873695

KEYWORDS: Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable; QSFP+ connector; High Speed Network Interface; Digitized Spectrum; Infiniband Interfaces; High Speed Network Transceiver.

N181-043

TITLE: Quantitative Cybersecurity Risk Assessment (QCRA)

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: Office of Naval Research Science & Technology. Division 311.

OBJECTIVE: Develop an automated tool to determine the levels of cybersecurity risks quantitatively to enable allocation of cybersecurity solutions in the early design stage such as Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase and reduce the time to implement cybersecurity requirements.

DESCRIPTION: Cybersecurity is the prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. As Cybersecurity is an emerging concern worldwide and is one of the focus areas in NAVSEA today, it is critical to integrate cybersecurity into our products in early design stage to protect our Naval Control Systems (NCS) such as weapons systems, navigation systems, and Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical systems. Protecting NCS requires risk assessment that identifies and prioritizes cybersecurity risks in terms of cyber threats, mission impact, vulnerability, and cost. A software tool that encompasses a design for the construction of a complex software system that continuously maintains confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information structures for NCS is needed in the early design stage. Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities change frequently. As a result, cybersecurity requirements will also change. Therefore, there is a need for the software tool to be tailorable.

There are existing processes, tools, and methodologies in various enterprises. As indicated in References 1, 2 and 3, risks are assessed based on risk factors such as threat models, probability, vulnerabilities, and impacts. However, they lack security metrics where the levels of risks are determined quantitatively and the risk factors vary from one another. Some tools require detail information of systems, which may not be available when systems are in the early design stage. The current state of the technology includes algorithms that automatically categorize and quantify security risks from disclosure of information. However, the tools are not explicitly for NCS and do not satisfy the requirements of Department of the Navy (DON) cybersecurity policies, and processes.

The current risk assessments that are widely used by NAVSEA are qualitative analysis that use a relative scale of “Low, Medium, High” to measure risks in terms of impact and probability. The qualitative analysis and assessment are subjective as they depend heavily on knowledge from subject matter experts (SMEs). However, the current approaches could potentially introduce subjective assessments that could vary by different SMEs and take time, as it is a manual process of human-in-the-loop. NAVSEA, therefore, needs a standardized and automated tool to assess cybersecurity risk quantitatively to avoid subjective analysis and assessments and reduce design time. The risk factors such as threats, system vulnerabilities, mission impacts, technical performance, schedule, and cost need to be considered as a part of risk assessment process. Success will depend on the verification and validation of the requirements for each of these factors. The recommended cybersecurity solutions to mitigate risks should be produced for the systems based on the risk factors and high-level architecture designs. In addition, the tool should incorporate DON Cybersecurity requirements and policies and leverage available public sources such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Teams (ICS-CERTs) Advisories.

Risk identification and mitigation with appropriate cybersecurity solutions should be integrated throughout the lifecycle. Given the constraints such as budgets and schedule, the proposed tool can be used to ensure cybersecurity solutions, prioritization and cost tradeoffs occur as early as possible in the acquisition lifecycle. This early design decisions and changes yield reductions in production costs. This tool can also aid in determining and eliminating potential threat vectors to future depot capability and workforce safety, thereby reducing the shipyard operations and maintenance costs. Reductions in operational costs have an impact on the maintenance schedule, which in turn results in reduction of planning hours.

The end goal of this proposed tool is to protect afloat systems by allocating cybersecurity solutions to mitigate cybersecurity risks in the early design stage during the acquisition lifecycle so that cybersecurity is “built-in” systems rather than “bolt-on” systems after the systems are already built which could be more expensive. This can affordably integrate cybersecurity into our current and future products and reduce cybersecurity costs in the acquisition lifecycle by 50%. Development and use of this tool throughout the acquisition process will ensure appropriate accountability for cybersecurity risk management.

PHASE I: Define a concept of quantitative cybersecurity risk assessment that accounts for potential threats, vulnerabilities, mission impacts, costs, and cybersecurity policies. Develop a concept for an automated tool that determines the levels of cybersecurity risk quantitatively and provides recommended cybersecurity solutions. Demonstrate the technical feasibility of the concept by using models of control systems similar to NCS. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype solution in Phase II. Develop a Phase II plan. It is essential that a detailed letter of support for a Phase II proposal is provided to describe to what algorithm/software will transition and when.

PHASE II: Based on the results of Phase I and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), develop and deliver a prototype system and validate it with respect to the objective stated above. Produce prototype software based on Phase I work, and demonstrate the operations of the prototype using models of high-level ship architectures. Evaluate the prototype by verifying and validating the requirements. Follow the U.S. Navy Afloat Control Systems Cybersecurity Classification Guide to classify the tool appropriately. Provide the prototype to the Government for testing upon completion of Phase II.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Support the Navy in transitioning the technology to Navy use. Produce a final product technology that is mature and usable in the context of its proposed application. NAVSEA will use the product during ship design in cybersecurity efforts such as Risk Management Framework (RMF) and Navy Cybersecurity Safety (CYBERSAFE). The technology must meet critical Navy needs by supporting the cybersecurity effort throughout the entire acquisition process. The product will be validated, tested, qualified, and certified using requirements, systems, and In-Service Engineering Agents (ISEAs).

The tool should be tailorable. Therefore, the systems, databases, standards, specifications, and documents used in the development of the tool can be tailored for systems other than NCS.

REFERENCES:

1. Mulligan, M. R. “State Methods for a Cyber incident.” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 2012, page 15. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA579645&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

2. Morgeson, J. D., Brooks, P. S., Disraelly, D. S, Erb, J. L., Neiman, M. L., Picard, W. C. “Doctrinal Guidelines for Quantitative Vulnerability Assessments of Infrastructure-Related Risks Volume I.” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA558820

3. Shiva, S., Dasgupta, D., & Wu, Q. “Game Theoretic Approaches to Protect Cyberspace.” The Office of Naval Research. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA519126

KEYWORDS: Quantitative Risk Assessment; Quantitative Cybersecurity Risk Assessment; Risk Mitigation for Cybersecurity; Naval Control Systems; Early Design Stage of Navy Ships; Quantitative Risk Metric

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Battlespace, Electronics, Sensors

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: PMS435 Integrated Submarine Imaging System

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Develop an algorithm to remove atmospheric-caused blur and contrast reduction caused by atmospheric scattering.

DESCRIPTION: Naval imaging presents unique challenges to imaging systems operating near the ocean surface. Some of these challenges include systems operating near the ocean surface that experience atmospheric turbulence from differing effects such as large-scale shear, buoyancy, and the proximity to the water surface significantly affect interactions among scales in atmospheric boundary layer turbulent flows that do not occur in the upper atmosphere. The imaging system algorithms may have limited or no ability to in-situ profile the atmosphere, and any algorithm to correct for turbulence must operate in near real-time. There has been substantial effort in aerial or space-based turbulence reduction in imaging, but far less effort near the ocean surface. Atmospheric turbulence causes a reduction both in effective system resolving power and in contrast, resolution, and these effects are not compensated. Existing efforts—both commercial and military—focus on every part of the atmosphere except near the ocean imaging. To improve system performance, the Navy requires innovative approaches to reducing the impact of the atmosphere by reduction of blur due to atmospheric effects, and reduction of the loss of contrast between target and background due to atmospheric scatter. The Navy would like reduction to the maximum extent possible, and prospective vendors should propose what is achievable. Algorithm development can be supported by basic weather data such as temperature and humidity but not by atmospheric profilers. In addition, the algorithm must operate in near real-time. Candidate standard definition and high definition imaging systems include visible light, short wave infrared and thermal infrared systems. For the purposes of this research, processing of high-definition video within 150msec on a central processing unit (CPU)- or graphics processing unit (GPU)-based system will be sufficient. The algorithm will be transitioned to the submarine combat system via the technical insertion – advanced processor build (TI-APB) process.

The Phase II effort will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If need be, data of the same level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.

Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. Owned and Operated with no Foreign Influence as defined by DOD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor and/or subcontractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances, in order to perform on advanced phases of this contract as set forth by DSS and NAVSEA in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material IAW DoD 5220.22-M during the advance phases of this contract.