Department of the navy (don) 18. 1 Small Business Innovation Research (sbir) Proposal Submission Instructions introduction

The virtual assistant will demonstrate >50% improvement over an unassisted operator (on average) in the number of tracks that the operator can efficiently handle.

The Phase II effort will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If need be, data of the same level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.

Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. Owned and Operated with no Foreign Influence as defined by DOD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor and/or subcontractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances, in order to perform on advanced phases of this contract as set forth by DSS and NAVSEA in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material IAW DoD 5220.22-M during the advance phases of this contract.

PHASE I: Develop a concept for a virtual assistant tool for combat system console operators. The concept will describe the improvements and efficiency of the tool and show it provides recommended actions using AI. Feasibility will be established by modeling and analysis and through evaluation of estimated human performance improvements as described in the description. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype in Phase II. Develop a Phase II plan.

PHASE II: Based upon the results of Phase I and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), design, develop, and deliver a prototype virtual assistant tool. The prototype will demonstrate the capability to perform all parameters described in the description after implementation and integration into the combat system environment. The demonstration will take place at a Land-Based Test Site (LBTS), which represents an AEGIS Baseline 9 or newer combat system environment. Prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology for Navy combat system and potential commercial use.

It is probable that the work under this effort will be classified under Phase II (see Description section for details).

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Support the Government in transitioning the virtual assistant tool for Navy use. Implementation will be a fully functional tool incorporated into the AEGIS combat system baseline modernization process. This will consist of integrating into a baselines definition, validation testing, and combat system certification.

The potential commercial applications for this technology include Automated Air Traffic Control, Public Highway traffic management, Emergency traffic management and evacuation planning, and Unmanned/Assisted Vehicle control.

REFERENCES:

1. Vasudevan, Vijay. “Tensorflow: A system for Large-Scale Machine Learning.” Usenix Associaton. 2 November 2016. USENIX OSDI 2016 Conference. 2 November 2016. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi16/osdi16-abadi.pdf

2. Vasudevan, Vijay. “TensorFlow: Large-Scale Machine Learning on Heterogeneous Distributed Systems.” Usenix Association. 2016. 8 March 2017. http://download.tensorflow.org/paper/whitepaper2015.pdf

3. Schmidhuber, Jürgen. “Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An Overview.” Science Direct. 9 March 2014. Vol 61, Neural Networks Journal. Jan 2016. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0893608014002135

4. Schmidt, Douglas. “A Naval Perspective on Open-Systems Architecture.” SEI Blog. 11 July 2016. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. 27 March 2017. https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2016/07/a-naval-perspective-on-open-systems-architecture.html

KEYWORDS: Artificial Intelligence; Console Operator Virtual Assistant; Deep Learning; AEGIS Console Operator Overload; Learned Behavioral Patterns; Large-scale Saturation Raids.

N181-034

TITLE: Surface Ship Fat Line Towed Array Cut-Resistant Vibration Isolation Module (VIM) Hose

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Battlespace, Electronics, Sensors

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: PEO IWS 5.0, Multi-Function Towed Array

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Develop a cut-resistant hose for surface ship fat line vibration isolation module (VIM) that retains existing VIM hose properties.

DESCRIPTION: A surface ship towed array VIM hose that is resistant to cuts, abrasions, perforation, and other mechanical damage is needed by the Navy. The surface ship fat line VIM is a fluid filled hose that reduces the low frequency vibrations experienced by towed array sensors by attenuating the vibration through the VIM and especially through the hose wall. However, the soft hose material used in current VIM hoses is susceptible to cuts from floating materials such as fishing lines. A cut-resistant towed array VIM hose would increase the availability of existing surface ship towed arrays and reduce lifecycle costs. Reducing or eliminating this failure mode would improve surface ship towed array availability by as much as 25%, with a corresponding reduction to lifecycle costs (repair, sparing, time off station). Current commercial hose solutions, such as hydraulic, pneumatic, and fire, do not meet the needed performance to alleviate this costly failure problem because the materials and constructions developed for those hose types do not address the damping (attenuation) and other environmental unique requirements of a towed array hose.

The Navy seeks innovative approaches to providing vibration isolation to TB37 surface ship towed arrays, while reducing or eliminating susceptibility to cutting or puncturing hazards often experienced during towing, deployment, and retrieval operations. Successful solutions would meet all current VIM requirements related to passing data (6 optical single mode fiber data paths at ~ 100 Mbps) and power (500 Vdc, 2.5 A) and attenuating low frequency mechanical vibrations by ~ 20 dB.

The proposed solution must also meet all form-factor and environmental requirements (MIL STD 810G) such as array diameter (3.5 inches), working tensions up to 5000 pounds, compatibility with towing at sea for a five-year period, and prevent seawater from migrating from the exterior to the interior of the hose over the five-year life. The solution should either improve the hose resistance to cuts, abrasions, and punctures; or otherwise eliminate the consequences of said damage to the structural integrity of the primary seawater seal by sealing the cut or tear. Cut resistance will be evaluated using ASTM F2992-15 (information available online) or an equivalent test developed by the Government. Any solution for sealing will be evaluated using environmental testing (temperature and pressure IAW MIL-STD-810Gand under tow with a full array system). Water intrusion will be evaluated using the insulation resistance between the wires in the VIM.

The Phase II effort will likely require secure access, and NAVSEA will process the DD254 to support the contractor for personnel and facility certification for secure access. The Phase I effort will not require access to classified information. If need be, data of the same level of complexity as secured data will be provided to support Phase I work.

Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. Owned and Operated with no Foreign Influence as defined by DOD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor and/or subcontractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances, in order to perform on advanced phases of this contract as set forth by DSS and NAVSEA in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material IAW DoD 5220.22-M during the advance phases of this contract.

PHASE I: Develop a concept to address the key design elements of the cut-resistant VIM hose. The approach will show it is feasible for meeting current VIM hose standards as described in the description. Feasibility will be demonstrated by analysis and modeling of key elements. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype in Phase II. Develop a Phase II plan.

PHASE II: Based on the results of Phase I modeling and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), design, develop, and deliver a prototype cut-resistant VIM hose that demonstrates resistance to damage based on the requirements listed in the Description. The demonstration will take place at a Government- or company-provided facility. The Navy will also conduct its own independent functionality and environmental testing of the prototype, which requires delivery to the Government of one VIM hose example for testing. Prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology for Navy production and potential commercial use.

It is probable that the work under this effort will be classified under Phase II (see Description section for details).

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Assist the Government in transitioning the fully functional, cut-resistant VIM hose to allow for further experimentation and refinement, and finally to Navy use. Support installation of the VIM hose in a TB37 surface ship fat-line towed array and provide assistance during laboratory and shipboard test events.

A cut-resistant towed array hose would be of great interest to the seismic oil exploration industry. Increasing the reliability/availability of towed systems in high-clutter areas, such as commercial fishing areas, would reduce costs for these companies by lowering their required spares and increasing the useful life of their existing arrays.

REFERENCES:

1. Lemon, S. G. "Towed-Array History, 1917-2003." IEEE Journal of Oceanic Engineering, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2004, pages 365-373. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1315726/

2. Urick, R. J. “Principles of Underwater Sound for Engineers.” New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. https://www.amazon.com/principles-underwater-sound-robert-urick/dp/0932146627

3. Burdic, William S. “Underwater Acoustic System Analysis.” New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991. https://www.amazon.com/underwater-acoustic-system-analysis-william/dp/0932146635

KEYWORDS: TB-37; Vibration Isolation Module (VIM); VIM Hose; Acoustic Self-noise; Low Frequency Mechanical Vibrations; Towed Array Sensors

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Information Systems

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: PEO Ships AM, Acquisition Management

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Develop a capability to monitor industrial controls system (ICS) communication networks and identify abnormal traffic that may indicate the presence of a cybersecurity threat or unusual system behavior that may indicate that maintenance is required.

DESCRIPTION: The U.S. Navy is expending significant effort to secure its computer-based systems, both its business and management information systems (IS) and its ICS, which operate platforms such as ships, aircraft, and shore-based facilities such as shipyards, manufacturing facilities, and power plants. Although there are many similarities between information technology (IT) systems and ICS, the differences in hardware, software, and operating environment and requirements make securing ICS more difficult. The Government and private industry have made significant investment in and implementation of cybersecurity tools and applications for IS. Although initial research and proposed solutions associated with cybersecurity of ICS has occurred, little has been accomplished concerning prototyping and productionizing, and much less in operating such tools on deployed ICS.

A fundamental way to portray the difference is by looking at the priority of three basic characteristics of computer-based systems: integrity, confidentiality, and availability. IT systems stress confidentiality, integrity, and then availability in that order, or CIA. The order for ICS is the opposite, stressing availability, integrity, and then confidentiality, or AIC. For example, if an IT system encounters a problem, a typical solution is to restart it. The operator can perform another task while waiting several minutes for the system to become operational again. If a problem occurs in the steering system of a ship, one cannot interrupt operation for even a few seconds. The operator must troubleshoot the problem and rectify it while the system is running. Significant investment has been made to develop cybersecurity applications for IS; however, because of the differences between IS and ICS, the tools developed for IS need to be modified to work on ICS.

Comparison of IS and ICS:

Performance Requirements:
• Information System = Non-real time, High throughput is demanded, High delay and jitter may be acceptable. Industrial Control System = Real-time, Response is time-critical, Modest throughput is acceptable, High delay and/or jitter is not acceptable.

Availability Requirements:

Communications:

Change Management:

Managed Support:

Component Lifetime:

Access to Components:

The application to be developed under this effort will ideally work in real-time; however, during development it can analyze prerecorded data. Measures of effectiveness of the application include the time and amount of data required to identify normal operation of a system, time from start of an anomaly to notification of the anomaly, accurate identification of the anomaly, and the ratio of correct versus false indications, to name a few. Examples of anomalies that could be associated to cybersecurity threats are traffic from a newly introduced piece of equipment, inappropriate commands coming from a component not normally expected to direct other components, and a component flooding the network with traffic meant to overwhelm and slow the system. When provided with system data, the application would be able to make predictions on system failures. Examples of anomalies that may indicate maintenance is required are the unusually frequent cycling of a cooling pump, indicating a problem with the system or a loss in efficiency of the pump.

Current cybersecurity of commercial ICS is inadequate despite incidents that are regularly reported in the press, such as the shutdown of an electric distribution grid described in Reference [4].

Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. Owned and Operated with no Foreign Influence as defined by DOD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor and/or subcontractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances, in order to perform on advanced phases of this contract as set forth by DSS and NAVSEA in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material IAW DoD 5220.22-M during the advance phases of this contract.

PHASE I: Develop an initial design specifications and capabilities document with particular attention paid to the hardware and software requirements for the technology to run on Navy ICS. Develop a Plan of Action, Milestones (POA&M) to design, develop, test, and integrate the proposed technology concept into Navy ICS environments. The Phase I Option, if awarded, will include the initial design specifications and capabilities description to build a prototype solution in Phase II. Develop a Phase II plan.

PHASE II: Based on the results of Phase I and the Phase II Statement of Work (SOW), refine the design specification and develop a prototype. The prototype will, at a minimum, analyze pre-recorded network traffic data but will ideally run with real time data collection. Demonstrate the prototype on the company’s own real or virtual ICS. Provide requirements, test plans, and procedures to demonstrate that the product meets the attributes in the Description section of this document without interfering with the normal operation of the ICS. Prepare a Phase III development plan to transition the technology for Navy and potential commercial use.

It is probable that the work under this effort will be classified under Phase II (see Description section for details).

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Support the Navy in transitioning the technology to Navy use. Transition the prototype to operate on a land-based or virtual Navy test facility. The prototype will operate using real-time collection of network data and not interfere with the normal operation of the ICS. The company will develop a transition plan to describe how the technology will be installed on a Navy asset to be determined during Phase III, most likely a Navy surface ship.

Navy and commercial ICS hardware and software have much in common. Since cybersecurity of ICS is a nationwide defense issue, it is in the Government’s best interest to make cybersecurity technologies developed by this topic available in generic unclassified form to U.S. companies. The current cybersecurity of commercial ICS is inadequate despite incidents that are regularly reported in the press, such as the shutdown of an electric distribution grid described in Reference [4]. Therefore, there is a large potential to transition this technology to private sector manufacturing, processing, transportation, and other concerns that use ICS.

REFERENCES:

1. “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security.” National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-82 Rev. 2, May 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r1

2. Miller, Charlie and Valasek, Chris. “Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle.” 2015. http://illmatics.com/Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf

3. Luallen, Matthew E. “Critical Control System Vulnerabilities Demonstrated - And What to Do About Them.” 2011 SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/517731/hacking-industrial-systems-turns-out-to-be-easy/

4. Walters, Riley. “Russian Hackers Shut Down Ukraine’s Power Grid.” Newsweek, January 14, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/russian-hackers-shut-ukraine-power-grid-415751

KEYWORDS: Industrial control systems; cybersecurity; computer network traffic analysis; anomalous network traffic detection; network traffic maintenance indications; network intrusion detection

N181-036

TITLE: Hydrodynamic Control of a Towed Vertical Array

TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Battlespace, Electronics, Sensors

ACQUISITION PROGRAM: PMS 485, Maritime Surveillance Systems Program Office