Eeoc: ada case Law Update Joyce Walker-Jones
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- 2. Record of Disability No new cases added. 3. “Regarded as” Coverage a. “Regarded as” Coverage Not Satisfied
- (2) Impairment Was “Transitory and Minor”
- b. “Regarded as” Coverage Satisfied
- B. Definition of “Qualified Individual with a Disability” 1. Essential Functions a. Employer Judgment/Job Descriptions
- b. Limited Number of Employees
- c. Time Spent Performing Function/Consequence(s) of Non-Performance
- d. Rotating Among Job Functions No new cases added. e. Attendance and Work Schedules
- f. Mandatory Overtime No new cases added. g. Public Safety No new cases added. h. Ability to Handle Stress
- i. Interacting with Others No new cases added. j. Travel No new cases added. k. Modified Positions
- 2. Statements Made in Benefits Proceedings
- a. Plaintiff Still May Be a Qualified Individual with a Disability
v. Stuttering No new cases added. w. Vision Impairments No new cases added. x. Other impairments Bob-Maunuel v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 936, 2014 WL 185978 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2014). The plaintiff, a general manager trainee, alleged that he was discriminated against based on his hernia, hypertension, eye disease, and kidney disease when his management training ceased and he was terminated. In response to the complaint, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s alleged medical conditions were not disabilities as defined by the ADA because they were “either fictitious, temporary, or [did] not limit any major life activity.” The court held that although the plaintiff’s hypertension and kidney disease were not disabilities, his hernia and eye disease were, in that they substantially limited major life activities. Specifically, the court found that because the plaintiff’s doctor restricted him from lifting more than ten pounds because of his hernia, the plaintiff was substantially limited in lifting. Additionally, because the plaintiff contended that his eye disease interfered with his vision, prevented him from driving, gave him headaches, made it difficult for him to read voluminous documents, and caused his eye to leak fluid, he showed that he was substantially limited in seeing. Howard v. Steris Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. Ala. 2012), aff’d, 550 F. App’x 748 (11th Cir. 2013). An assembly line worker alleged that he was discriminated against based on his disability (obstructive sleep apnea and Graves’ disease) when he was denied an accommodation and terminated for sleeping on the job. Prior to ruling on the merits in the employer’s favor because it had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s disability, the court noted that, “for better or worse,” the expanded list of major life activities “makes a person afflicted with a common, minor condition ‘just as disabled as a wheelchair-bound paraplegic – if only for the purposes of disability law.’” Thus, based on the plaintiff’s doctors’ testimony that the plaintiff’s sleep apnea interfered with his ability to sleep and that Graves’ disease also can cause difficulty sleeping, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s impairments substantially limited his ability to sleep. 2. Record of Disability No new cases added. 3. “Regarded as” Coverage a. “Regarded as” Coverage Not Satisfied (1) Action Not Taken “Because of” Impairment McNally v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Co., L.L.C., 2014 WL 300433 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014). The employer did not “regard” the plaintiff as an individual with a disability, because there was insufficient evidence that the employer knew or thought the employee had depression or any other medical condition. The employer’s statements to the effect that the employee should seek professional counseling to deal with his personal issues was a reference to the employee’s having shared that he had experienced a house fire and was going through a child custody dispute. Cobb v. Florence City Bd. of Educ., 2013 WL 5295777 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 18, 2013). The plaintiff, who was not selected for five positions for which he had applied, could not demonstrate that he was “regarded as” an individual with a disability, where the non-selections occurred more than a year after he had returned to work without any limitations following orthoscopic knee surgery. Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 2013 WL 121838 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013). The plaintiff, a third-year medical resident, was not renewed, following a seven-month absence for pregnancy-related and post-partum complications. A letter sent by the Residency Program Director indicated that the plaintiff’s medical residency contract was not renewed “[d]ue to medically complicated pregnancy and significant concerns regarding her academic progress.” While concluding that the plaintiff’s impairments could plausibly be found to substantially limit a major life activity and thus allowing her to proceed with a disability discrimination claim under prong 1, the court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss any claim based on “regarded as” coverage, concluding that the ADA does not permit “mixed motive” claims, and therefore a termination because of both an impairment and problems with academic progress could not meet the “but-for” causation standard required to find that the termination was “because of” disability. Rocha v. Coastal Carolina Neuropsychiatric Crisis Servs., P.A., 979 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D.N.C. 2013). The plaintiff, an employee of an outpatient mental health treatment facility, was terminated for failure to reveal his three prior felony drug convictions. Termination for this reason did not demonstrate that the employer “regarded” him as an individual with a disability, i.e., terminated him because of an actual or perceived impairment of drug addiction. (2) Impairment Was “Transitory and Minor” Reynolds v. Ocean Bio Chem/Kinpak, Inc., 2014 WL 495354 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2014). The plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that her supervisor regarded her as having a disability, notwithstanding his remark that she should “go home and get her foot better” and that she should return “in a couple of years if we have a position.” The court concluded that the plaintiff’s fractured ankle, which occurred in February and was expected to limit her ability to stand or walk until early June, was “transitory and minor.” Kruger v. Hamilton Manor Nursing Home, 2014 WL 1345333 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014). Even if the plaintiff’s allegations were more detailed, as required to state a claim, the defendant’s motion to dismiss would be granted because the plaintiff’s broken arm was “transitory and minor.” In so concluding, the court noted that the plaintiff, a licensed practical nurse who claimed that a shift transfer constituted a demotion, admitted that her activities had been only “temporarily impacted.” Cobb v. Florence City Bd. of Educ., 2013 WL 5295777 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 18, 2013). Orthoscopic knee surgery causing a three-month absence from work for recovery was “transitory and minor.” The court noted that the plaintiff was thereafter able to return to work without restrictions, resume his lawn care business, and walk approximately four miles twice per week. Hutcheson v. General Motors Corp., L.L.C., 2013 WL 6799954 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2013). A back injury lasting one month was held to be “transitory and minor.” Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401 (W.D. Pa. 2013). An ankle/foot sprain requiring a walking cast/boot for five months, but no other treatment, was held to be “transitory and minor.” b. “Regarded as” Coverage Satisfied Stahly v. South Bend Transp. Corp., 2013 WL 55830 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2013). The plaintiff, a bus driver, challenged her termination on various grounds, including perceived disability. Denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment on coverage, the court rejected the employer’s reliance on pre-ADAAA case law, ruling that it could be concluded that the termination was “because of” a perceived impairment, given that management knew that the plaintiff was taking medication and suffered an anxiety attack for which she was admitted to an emergency room, that she took FMLA leave, and that she was referred by the employee assistance program to a stress recovery center. LaPier v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 2013 WL 497971 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2013). The plaintiff, a student police officer, alleged that the county discriminated against him when it deemed him physically unfit for duty because of his blood disorder. Although granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the merits because the plaintiff was held not to be qualified, the court ruled as a preliminary matter that a reasonable juror could conclude that he was regarded as an individual with a disability, because the employer had medical documentation of his blood disorder and relied on it in concluding that he was unfit for duty. See also LaPier v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 2012 WL 1552780 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2012). Lafata v. Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist. No. 7, 2013 WL 6500068 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2013). The employer’s decision to rescind a conditional job offer based on a post-offer medical opinion of the applicant’s impairment by the employer’s contract physician which imposed restrictions on climbing ladders and lifting more than 40 pounds, demonstrated that the employer “regarded” the applicant as an individual with a disability. Kiniropoulos v. Northampton Cnty. Child Welfare Serv., 917 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D. Pa. 2013). The same month that the plaintiff, a county child welfare caseworker, notified his employer of limitations due to a leg injury and requested FMLA leave, he was suspended and subsequently terminated for alleged infractions and misconduct. While granting the employer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA claim on the grounds that he was not “qualified,” the court first ruled that his allegations were sufficient for purposes of “regarded as” coverage. Although the plaintiff did not expressly allege that his injury would last six or more months, it was not apparent on the face of the pleadings that it would not. Moreover, case law permits an inference that an employer’s action was based on disability where there is temporal proximity between the action and the time that the employer learned of the employee’s medical condition. B. Definition of “Qualified Individual with a Disability” 1. Essential Functions a. Employer Judgment/Job Descriptions Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2014). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court noted that the job description did not identify lifting or any other physical fitness requirements for a machine operator, thus suggesting they were not essential functions. The plaintiff had congestive heart failure, dilated cardiomyopathy, and diabetes. He requested and was denied FMLA leave and reassignment to less physically demanding jobs. Ultimately, he was terminated. The court noted that while there was evidence that the plaintiff was unable to perform certain physical tasks at the time of his deposition, there was no evidence that he was unable to perform those tasks at the time he was terminated. Indeed, the plaintiff’s supervisor testified that the plaintiff was performing satisfactorily at the time of his termination and that he was not fired for performance problems. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2014). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether driving a fire apparatus under emergency lights was an essential function of a firefighter. After the plaintiff developed monocular vision, the defendant fired him. Initially, the department doctor who examined the plaintiff released him to return to work, but the chief medical officer reversed that decision after receiving a call from the Fire Chief complaining about the decision. Although the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidelines list the ability to operate a fire apparatus in an emergency mode as an essential job task of a firefighter, evidence did not show that the defendant had adopted those guidelines. The record also suggested that the chief medical officer was unfamiliar with the NFPA guidelines and did not use them in determining that the plaintiff was no longer qualified. While the ADA states that courts should give “consideration” to an employer’s judgment in determining the essential functions of a position, it does not require courts to defer to such judgment or to ignore the other statutory factors to be considered in identifying the essential functions. The plaintiff stated that the consequences of excusing him from driving an apparatus during an emergency would have been minimal, that this task was not highly specialized, and that there were enough other firefighters available to perform this function. Multiple firefighters noted that not everyone was required to drive an emergency vehicle. Supporting this evidence, the job description, under “essential functions,” mandated performance of all listed job duties but also stated that a person “may” need to drive in an emergency. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff’s statement that he would feel compelled to drive an emergency vehicle if ordered to do so did not make it an essential function, noting that a central purpose of the ADA is to prohibit employers from requiring employees with disabilities to perform tasks that the law deems nonessential. Henschel v. Clare Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 2013). As the result of an above-the-knee leg amputation necessitated by a motorcycle accident, Henshel was no longer able to haul an excavator using a truck with a manual transmission, a job function he had performed routinely before the accident. Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that a genuine issue of fact existed whether hauling an excavator was an essential function of the excavator operator position, because the job description did not list this particular duty. Hauling an excavator was listed in the position description for a truck/tractor driver, but not in the plaintiff’s excavator operator position. The defendant argued that hauling an excavator fell under “other duties assigned” and that this covered assignment of any job duty from any other job description. The court disagreed, reasoning that not every duty that may be assigned is automatically an essential function, because to conclude otherwise would make the job description meaningless. Essential functions must be fundamental to a particular position, not marginal. Finally, while an employer’s judgment carries weight in determining whether a function is essential, it is only one factor to be considered. Majors v. General Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2013). Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the court held that the ability to lift objects weighing over 20 pounds was an essential function for a position requiring an employee to inspect, test, and audit a variety of purchased components and internally manufactured parts for conformance to engineering specifications and quality standards. As a result of a work injury, the plaintiff was unable to lift more than 20 pounds and could not raise her right arm above shoulder level. The job description noted that the position required “intermittent movement of heavy objects.” In addition, a person who used to work in the position and a manager who supervised others in the position confirmed that someone in the position needed to be able to lift parts and materials weighing more than 20 pounds. Finally, the defendant’s labor resources manager and an ergonomic technical specialist verified that objects that the plaintiff would have to lift weighed more than 20 pounds. Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2013). Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the court held that it was an essential function of a location general manager to be DOT-qualified to drive a delivery truck. The position description stated this requirement, as did the plaintiff’s conditional job offer. After a penetrating eye injury, the plaintiff was required to undergo a medical examination and recertification pursuant to DOT regulations that apply to drivers of commercial vehicles. The doctor refused to give the plaintiff the certification or a waiver, and the company fired him. Other supervisors testified that managers drove delivery trucks to deliver products and to train new employees. Exempting managers from these duties would have resulted in fewer products being delivered and therefore a drop in sales, as well as having to restructure how new drivers were trained. Although managers may have driven these trucks infrequently, all other managers had the DOT certification, and nobody could legally drive a truck without it. The plaintiff also conceded that he drove the truck before his injury. Although the company had permitted the plaintiff to remain in his position for several months after the injury (without driving a truck), the ability to obtain DOT certification remained an essential function. The company had hoped that the plaintiff’s eyesight would improve and therefore delayed having him undergo the medical examination. The court concluded that the defendant was not required to exempt the plaintiff from obtaining DOT certification so that he could drive the delivery trucks. b. Limited Number of Employees Henschel v. Clare Cnty Rd. Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 2013). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that a genuine issue of fact existed whether hauling an excavator to a worksite was an essential function of an excavator operator position, even with only one semi-truck driver available to whom this function could have been reassigned. As the result of an above-the-knee leg amputation necessitated by a motorcycle accident, Henshel was no longer able to haul an excavator using a truck with a manual transmission, a job function he had performed routinely before the accident. The semi-truck driver testified that, in addition to his other duties, he would have been able to haul the excavator. A former excavator operator testified that there would have been minimal consequences to operations if this duty had been assigned to the one available semi-truck driver. The former excavator operator also testified that he had not routinely driven the excavator to the worksite (though there were two semi-truck drivers available at that time). Finally, the former operator noted there were a number of other employees besides the semi-truck driver who were qualified and able to transport the equipment, if necessary. c. Time Spent Performing Function/Consequence(s) of Non-Performance Samson v. Federal Express Corp., 746 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2014). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether test driving trucks was an essential function of a mechanic, given the minimal amount of time that was spent performing this function. The job description required all mechanics to have a commercial driver’s license for interstate driving. To obtain this license an individual must pass a DOT medical examination. Due to his insulin-dependent diabetes the plaintiff failed the examination, and the employer withdrew its job offer. The court noted that requiring a commercial license might mean that test driving was a “highly specialized” job function and that a mechanic’s need to be able to repair a truck might involve test driving the vehicle. However, the person eventually hired for the mechanic position testified that in three years he had only test driven trucks three times and that on at least one occasion he had someone else test drive a truck while he sat in the passenger seat and diagnosed the mechanical problem. This mirrored the experience of mechanics in similar jobs in other facilities, who test drove an average of under four hours per year. The court reasoned that if test driving were an essential function, it would be performed with more regularity by mechanics. The court also noted that although Samson would have been the only mechanic at the facility, there were nine other licensed truck drivers who could have test driven vehicles. Henschel v. Clare Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 2013). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding the amount of time the plaintiff had spent hauling an excavator, thus calling into question whether this job duty had been an essential function of his excavator operator position. As the result of an above-the-knee leg amputation necessitated by a motorcycle accident, Henshel was no longer able to haul an excavator using a truck with a manual transmission. Although Henshel had performed the function 70% of the time before his accident, the record did not address how much time he had actually spent transporting the equipment. The excavator was not transported every day and could remain at a worksite for weeks at a time. In fact, Henschel testified that the excavator remained at a job site 90% of the time. d. Rotating Among Job Functions No new cases added. e. Attendance and Work Schedules EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 29 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1140, 2014 WL 1584674 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that there was a genuine factual issue whether physical attendance in the workplace was an essential function of a resale steel buyer. As a result of irritable bowel syndrome, Jane Harris requested authorization to telework on an as-needed basis as a reasonable accommodation. Ford denied the request and proposed several alternative accommodations which Harris declined; eventually it terminated Harris. While the court acknowledged that many positions “undoubtedly” require physical attendance in the workplace, it stated that recent technological developments meant that there was no longer a reason to assume that presence in an employer’s “brick-and-mortar location” was always “synonymous” with workplace attendance. The real issue was not whether attendance was an essential function but whether an employee’s physical presence in the Ford facility was an essential function of the resale buyer position. The court was not persuaded that the teamwork required for this position necessitated Harris’s physical presence in the facility. While Ford managers stated that the job required face-to-face interactions to facilitate group problem-solving, the court emphasized that an employer’s business judgment was only one factor to consider in determining the essential functions of a job. In Harris’s experience, most communication with internal and external stakeholders was accomplished via conference call, even when she had been present in the facility. While Harris was required to make occasional site visits, Ford presented no evidence that she would be less able to do so if she worked partially or even primarily from home. Moreover, the company permitted others in the same job to telecommute, although less frequently than Harris had requested. Finally, the court emphasized its decision was not a rejection of “the long line of precedent” recognizing predictable attendance as an essential function of most jobs. McMillan v. New York, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013). Reversing summary judgment for the defendant, the court held that a reasonable juror could find that arrival at work at a specific time was not an essential function for a city case manager. The agency’s flex-time policy permitted employees to arrive between 9 and 10:15 a.m. A supervisor could approve or disapprove a late arrival; if approved, the employee could apply accumulated leave or “banked time” – additional hours worked – to cover the time missed. Due to medication taken for his schizophrenia, the plaintiff was drowsy and sluggish in the morning, often resulting in arrival after 11 a.m. For a period of at least 10 years, the plaintiff’s tardy arrivals were explicitly or implicitly approved, and he was allowed to use banked time to make up for his late arrival. But, in 2008, management decided to stop approving the plaintiff’s late arrivals, prompting the plaintiff to request repeatedly that he be given a later start time. The agency refused, stating that the plaintiff could not work past 6 p.m. without a supervisor present. The agency began disciplining the plaintiff and ultimately issued a 30-day suspension. The appeals court concluded that physical presence at or by a specific time is not, as a matter of law, an essential function for all jobs. Although a specific arrival time would be an essential function for many jobs, the district court had failed to do a “penetrating factual analysis” to determine whether arrival at a specific time was an essential function of the plaintiff’s job. The appeals court observed that for 10 years the agency had routinely approved the plaintiff’s late arrivals and that the agency’s flex-time policy permitted all employees a window of over one hour to arrive at work, suggesting that punctuality might not have been essential. Cases cited by the agency and district court were distinguishable because they involved facts that supported a finding that arrival at a specific time was an essential function. Finally, on remand the district court would be required to consider whether the plaintiff could perform his essential functions by working longer hours on certain days so that he could bank time for days he was tardy and still work 35 hours per week. f. Mandatory Overtime No new cases added. g. Public Safety No new cases added. h. Ability to Handle Stress Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 2013). Affirming summary judgment for the Arkansas Department of Human Services, the court held that handling stressful cases was an essential function of a family service worker. Hill, who had depression and anxiety, asked to be removed from a case after being subjected to a client’s harassment and verbal abuse, including racial slurs. The court deferred to the employer’s judgment that the ability to handle a difficult case or a stressful client is the “nature of this business” and noted that the plaintiff’s job description explained that an employee will experience “frequent exposure to physical and verbal abuse,” warned of a “stressful environment,” and emphasized that “regular contact with clients” is part of the job. Permitting individual caseworkers to choose among case assignments based on their toleration of stress could wreak havoc for management, especially because the agency was already short staffed. Koessel v. Sublette Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 717 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2013). Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the court held that a deputy sheriff unable to handle stress, which was an essential function of his position, was not qualified for the job. After the plaintiff had a stroke and returned to work, colleagues expressed concerns about his behavior, including that he had become flustered while making a traffic stop because he could not remember a particular word and he had lost his temper while on the job. While a neurological fitness-for-duty examination did not find any problems, the doctor referred him to a neuropsychologist because of possible problems with cognitive functioning. The psychologist found mild to moderate fatigue, episodes of lightheadedness, and episodes of weeping, from which he concluded the plaintiff should be in a low-stress position in which he would not have regular contact with the public. The plaintiff introduced no evidence contradicting the psychologist’s findings that he had lingering psychological problems that interfered with the ability to handle stress. Evidence that he was physically capable of performing the job was irrelevant. Similarly, the fact that his scores on a standard psychological test were unchanged since he first took them years ago did not conflict with or undermine the psychologist’s findings. The defendant’s removal of the plaintiff from his job was based on an individualized assessment stemming from observations by fellow officers and two medical examinations. Finally, the fact that the plaintiff performed other essential functions without incident did not undermine the psychologist’s findings, because those functions did not involve exposure to stressful situations. i. Interacting with Others No new cases added. j. Travel No new cases added. k. Modified Positions No new cases added. l. Question for Jury/Factual Issue Keith v. County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2013). Reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether hearing was an essential function for a lifeguard at a wave pool and whether the plaintiff was otherwise qualified without the ability to hear. Although the court presumed that communicating was an essential function of the lifeguard position in order to supervise water activities, enforce safety rules, maintain water areas, and teach swim lessons, the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that hearing might not be necessary to communicate effectively. His most compelling evidence came from experts with knowledge, education, and experience regarding the ability of deaf individuals to be lifeguards. In addition, evidence showed that a purely visual technique is used by lifeguards to scan the area for any distressed swimmers. Several experts testified that such detection is almost completely visually based. Moreover, to obtain his lifeguard certification, the plaintiff had to demonstrate the ability to detect distressed swimmers. With a “modest” modification, he would also be able to communicate with other lifeguards during lifesaving. The defendant itself had proposed a reasonable accommodation that it thought would improve communication generally between lifeguards in signaling an emergency situation. Evidence also showed that verbal enforcement of safety rules is generally impractical in a noisy water park and that most lifeguards use whistles and physical gestures to maintain safety. The defendant also had proposed having the plaintiff carry laminated cards to aid basic communication with the public. (The court suggested that some of this communication was possibly a marginal function because attendants were available throughout the water park to assist patrons with basic needs and questions.) 2. Statements Made in Benefits Proceedings Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff, whose back injury limited her ability to stand, bend, or stoop, was told that she would be transferred from her literary-specialist position to a kindergarten teaching position the following school year. After aggravating her back injury, the plaintiff took extended FMLA leave, drew private disability benefits, and requested reinstatement to her literary-specialist position or transfer to another non-teaching position requiring minimal movement, as a reasonable accommodation. The request was denied, and the plaintiff applied for disability retirement under the Nevada Public Employees’ Retirement Systems (PERS). The court held that statements that the plaintiff had made on her FMLA, private disability, and PERS applications did not preclude a lawsuit alleging unlawful denial of reasonable accommodation, because, under the standard set by Cleveland v. Policy Management System Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), she had provided an adequate explanation of their apparent inconsistency with the claim that she was “qualified” for purposes of her ADA claim. Her statements that she was “totally disabled” and “could do no work at all until released by a doctor,” she explained, were made on her FMLA and private disability benefits applications and were therefore meant to describe a temporary, rather than permanent, inability to work. The statements on her PERS application that she could not perform the duties of a kindergarten teacher or a literary specialist, that she was “unable to work due to injury or mental or physical illness,” and that she wished to apply for “total and permanent disability,” she explained, were not intended to address her ability to work with a reasonable accommodation. Further, the plaintiff’s failure to indicate on the PERS form an ability to work “in a limited capacity” did not jeopardize her claim, because being able to work in a limited capacity is not the same thing as being able to work with a reasonable accommodation. a. Plaintiff Still May Be a Qualified Individual with a Disability No new cases added. Directory: sites -> default -> files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations files -> Nstructions for Acquiring Excess Equipment online, through the 1033 Program files -> Occupational health and safety files -> The Black Panther Party’s Ten Point Program files -> International programs roel profile files -> Fermi Questions a guide for Teachers, Students, and Event Supervisors Lloyd Abrams, Ph. D. DuPont Company, cr&D/ccas experimental Station Wilmington, de 19880 files -> Personal Information Name: Maha Al-Ammari Nationality: Saudi Relationship Status Download 187.87 Kb. 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