Elections Disad – Core – Hoya-Spartan 2012
Strikes Solve – A2 Multiple Locations
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- US Air Force can handle multiple locations
- Strikes Solve – A2 Can’t find
- Satellite and other Intel is accurate - strikes can target and destroy nuclear ambitions
- Current intelligence is enough to cripple their nuclear program
Strikes Solve – A2 Multiple LocationsStrikes solve - Only Isfahan and Natanz Matter – prefer our evidence, it cites a consensus amongst expertsBrown, 2006 (Drew “No easy military option to stop Iran, experts say”, Knight Ridder Newspapers, http://www.nineronline.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2006/01/26/43d8fa1950455) Many analysts say that in that case, an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would be relatively easy to carry out. With U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with war planes and ships scattered throughout the Persian Gulf, U.S. forces essentially have Iran hemmed in on three sides. U.S. cruise missiles and stealth aircraft with precision-guided bombs likely would overwhelm Iran's air defenses. The key questions, however, are whether such an attack would be very effective and how Iran and the rest of the world would respond. Some experts say an attack would delay, not destroy, the Iranian program and would only reinforce Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Iran, taking lessons from the Israeli air attack that destroyed Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981, has dispersed its atomic research and development facilities in dozens, if not hundreds, of locations above and below ground. Regardless of the total number of Iran's nuclear facilities, Isfahan and Natanz are the most important because they constitute the "two weak links" in Iran's program, Cliff Kupchan, an Iran expert and former State Department official in the Clinton administration said. Isfahan, a facility that converts uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride gas, could be bombed easily, said Kupchan, now at the New York-based Eurasia Group, a political risk advisory and consulting firm. The other, Natanz, is a research facility where experts are trying to master the technique of converting uranium hexafluoride gas into enriched uranium. Low levels of enriched uranium are used for civilian nuclear plants, and more highly enriched fuel is used in nuclear weapons. International inspectors found the facility after they were tipped off by an Iranian dissident group in 2002. Iran recently resumed research at Natanz and said it was for peaceful purposes, but analysts have expressed doubt because of Natanz's size and the fact that part of it has been constructed underground. During a 2003 visit, Iran advised International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei that it had almost completed construction of a pilot uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, according to a report by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. The test plant will consist of 164 centrifuges, machines that spin uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds, but it isn't fully operational, according to a January report by the Institute for Science and International Security. The group said Iran would need six months to a year to complete the process needed for enrichment. Of greater concern at Natanz are underground chambers that are expected to house an estimated 50,000 gas centrifuges, enough to produce weapons-grade uranium for several nuclear weapons per year, according to experts. While it's unclear what other capacities exist at the site, "what is obvious is that the pilot facility is above ground and would be easy to take out," Kupchan said. Bombing the facilities at the two locations "would set the Iranians back by two to three years," he said. "It wouldn't be that hard to do," said Kupchan. "You'd be picking a helluva fight, though. Iran is a sophisticated country with a very sophisticated leadership. It has a range of retaliatory options that are extremely unpleasant." US Air Force can handle multiple locationsInbar, 2006 (Efraim, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, “THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN” March, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html) While Iran has spread out its nuclear facilities and built a large part of the nuclear complex underground in order to protect it from conventional air strikes, technological advances in penetration of underground facilities and increased precision might allow total destruction. The difficulties in dealing a severe military blow to the Iranian nuclear program are generally exaggerated.[38] A detailed analysis of the military option is beyond the scope of this paper, but the American military definitely has the muscle and the sophistication needed to perform a preemptive strike in accordance with its new strategic doctrine, as well as the capability for a sustained air campaign, if needed to prevent the reparation and reconstruction of the facilities targeted. Strikes Solve – A2 Can’t findIntelligence solves – multiple reasons secret facilities are unlikely and Iran won’t be able to rebuild afterKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) A FEASIBLE TARGET A nuclear Iran would impose a huge burden on the United States. But that does not necessarily mean that Washington should resort to military means. In deciding whether it should, the first question to answer is if an attack on Iran's nuclear program could even work. Doubters point out that the United States might not know the location of Iran's key facilities. Given Tehran's previous attempts to hide the construction of such stations, most notably the uranium-enrichment facilities in Natanz and Qom, it is possible that the regime already possesses nuclear assets that a bombing campaign might miss, which would leave Iran's program damaged but alive. This scenario is possible, but not likely; indeed, such fears are probably overblown. U.S. intelligence agencies, the IAEA, and opposition groups within Iran have provided timely warning of Tehran's nuclear activities in the past -- exposing, for example, Iran's secret construction at Natanz and Qom before those facilities ever became operational. Thus, although Tehran might again attempt to build clandestine facilities, Washington has a very good chance of catching it before they go online. And given the amount of time it takes to construct and activate a nuclear facility, the scarcity of Iran's resources, and its failure to hide the facilities in Natanz and Qom successfully, it is unlikely that Tehran has any significant operational nuclear facilities still unknown to Western intelligence agencies. Satellite and other Intel is accurate - strikes can target and destroy nuclear ambitionsSevakis, 2006 (Dennis, wrtier for the American thinker, flew fighter jets for the USAF “Iran – to bomb or not to bomb?”, Feb. 1st http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=5210) In contrast to the facilities required to produce biological and chemical weapons, nuclear fuel cycle and reprocessing plants are not easily hidden nor built surreptitiously during the dark hours of the diurnal cycle. Detection by satellite of such projects is a near certainty. These facilities are large, expensive and, if hidden, still visible during the construction cycle. You can’t have a major construction site without roads, excavation debris, and a whole lot of activity. To have the building of a nuclear materials processing facility remain undetected would demand a very slow “ship in a bottle” approach to both the excavation and plant construction. Possible, but hardly likely. Also, buried facilities are not necessarily undetectable. The U.S. has long had the capability to map subsurface geological features using ground penetrating radar. Similar technology will be used to map planetary subsurface features from the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter. These underground “maps” were used to program guidance and flight path information into cruise missiles before the advent of the GPS system. Unlike surface soil and sand, the sub-surface features are stable and unlikely to be affected by natural forces or human activity. This mode of guidance may still be a backup to GPS and/or inertial systems. We may have the whole country of Iran subterraneanly scouted. A nuclear plant buried under the sand would probably already be on the charts. If a plant is buried in a mountain, well, I don’t believe we have any sensors up to that task. But the Iranians still had to build it. And that would have been extremely expensive and time consuming with the construction cycle still subject to detection. We probably know where the entrances are located. The Iranians and their foreign enablers still have to get themselves and materials in and the product out. Even if one cannot destroy a facility, denying access can be just as effective and may be easier. We can certainly obliterate any surface facilities. We’ve shown ourselves to be quite adept at that task while minimizing, though not eliminating, collateral damage. The deeply buried bits? Well, supposedly we’ve cancelled the development our mini-nuke, super-bunker-buster bomb program. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean we don’t have any. Current intelligence is enough to cripple their nuclear programInbar, 2006 (Efraim, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, “THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN” March, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html) While it is probably true that intelligence services cannot provide military planners with a full and comprehensive picture of the Iranian nuclear program, what we know seems to be enough to allow identification of the main targets. The military capability to hit all targets is important, but a partial destruction would be enough to cripple Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb in the near future. Moreover, no large-scale invasion is needed in order to do the job, but only a sustained bombing campaign with commando strikes. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.41 Mb. Share with your friends:
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