Epa vaapuu, Appellant, V. American samoa government, Appellee


ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES SMALL



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ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES SMALL

BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Plaintiff
v.
AMERIKA SAMOA BANK, Defendant
High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division


CA No. 68-98
April 29, 1999

[1] In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may look only at the pleadings.


[2] Where Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is made, but Court looks beyond the pleadings, it is considered a Motion for Summary Judgment.
[3] A subordination agreement is to be interpreted according to ordinary contract principles.

[4] If a contract’s language is plain and unambiguous, the intention expressed controls, rather than whatever may be claimed to have been the intention of the parties


[5] Where the language is plain and unambiguous, the meaning of a contract should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids.
[6] The requirement that mortgage creditors be paid according to the priority of their liens is statutorily mandated.
[7] Where entity was not initial party to foreclosure proceedings, but subsequently intervened, and where it had waited five years before bringing its own suit on delinquent debt, court found delay to be unduly dilatory and denied it prejudgment interest.
Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice, TUA`OLO, Chief Associate Judge, and ATIULAGI, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiff, Brian M. Thompson

For Defendant, Jennifer L. Joneson


ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT



(COUNT I—BREACH OF CONTRACT)
On December 8, 1998, plaintiff Administrator, United States Small Business Administration (“SBA”) filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and or for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim (Count I) against defendant Amerika Samoa Bank (“ASB”). The motion was heard on March 5, 1999 with counsel for both parties present.
[1-2] A motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is made under T.C.R.C.P. 12(c). In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may look only at the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings only has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.” 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998). Because this court looked beyond the pleadings, this court treats the motion as one for summary judgment. In a motion for summary judgment, the court may examine “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits.” T.C.R.C.P. Rule 56(c).
At issue in this motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim is the interpretation of the subordination agreement, specifically, the following paragraph:
SBA does hereby subordinate and does hereby declare to be subordinate to 68% of ASB’s mortgage covering the restaurant building known as Soli & Mark’s Family Restaurant. In no event however, shall this subordination exceed 68% of the principal amount of ASB’s loan to Borrower for One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Five Dollars ($183,705.00) plus interest, fees, or costs applicable to the bank loan or mortgage.
Subordination Agreement at 3.
[3-5] A subordination agreement is to be interpreted according to ordinary contract principles. In re General Homes Corp. 134 B.R. 853, 864 (Bankr. S.D. Tx. 1991) cited in In re Exec Tech Partners, 107 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 1997). Ordinary contract principles provide that if the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous, the intention expressed and indicated controls, rather than whatever may be claimed to have been the actual intention of the parties. 17A AM.JUR.2d Contracts § 337 (2d ed 1991 & Supp. 1998). Where the language is plain and unambiguous, the meaning of a contract should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. 17A Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 337.
In this instance, the express intention of the subordination agreement was that SBA subordinated itself to ASB, thereby changing lien priorities with ASE. The subordination agreement, however, did more than change lien priorities. The agreement also subjected the lien priorities to certain restraints. ASB’s lien priority changed to first upon this agreement, but only up to 68% of the original principal loan amount plus interest, fees, or costs applicable to the loan or mortgage. SBA, as the creditor with a second lien priority, was entitled to all or an appropriate portion of the amount exceeding the 68% limitation. ASH, therefore, is contractually allowed to receive no more than 68% of the initial principal loan amount plus applicable interest, fees or costs. As such, the subordination agreement was not a fully performed contract. The allowance of receiving only up to the amount of the 68% limitation remained to be performed.
SBA is further eligible to receive the contractually specified amount from ASH based upon A.S.C.A. § 37.1103. A.S.C.A. § 37.1103 provides:
Mortgage creditors shall be entitled to payment according to the priority of their liens, and not pro rata; and the judgments of foreclosure shall operate to extinguish the liens of subsequent mortgages of the same property, without forcing prior mortgages to their right of recovery. The surplus after payment of the mortgage foreclosed shall be applied pro tanto to the next junior mortgage, and so on to the payment, wholly or in part, of mortgages junior to the one assessed.
[6] The requirement that mortgage creditors be paid according to the priority of their liens is statutorily mandated. SBA, therefore, is entitled to receive its share of the sale price according to A.S.C.A. § 37.1103.
ASH claims that SBA failed to receive funds from the foreclosure sale due to its failure to fully and timely assert its interest as a competing lienholder. As a result, ASH asserts that SBA missed its opportunity to collect from Soli Corporation on its debt. Even if SEA missed its opportunity to collect from the Soli Corporation, SBA has not missed its opportunity to collect from ASH as contractually allowed.
The subordination agreement allowed ASH to receive no more than
68% of the principal amount of ASH’s loan to Borrower for One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Five Dollars ($183,705.00) plus interest, fees or costs applicable to the bank loan or mortgage.

SEA’s share, therefore, is calculated as follows:

(1) ASB’s original loan (principal amount of

subordination limitation) $183,705.00

(2) Interest to November 9, 1992 $14,803.32

(3) Interest from November 10, 1992 to

January 24, 1994 (foreclosure sale date) 31,397.00

(4) Total interest 46,200.32

(5) Fees and costs 9,572.71

(6) Total subordination limitation $239,478.03


(7) Credit Bid $176,254.71

(8) Minus 68% x 239,478.03 162,845.06

(9) Surplus over subordination limitation $13,409.65
[7] SBA wants, in addition, simple interest at the rate of 6% from January 24, 1994 on the amount exceeding the subordination limitation. However, SBA was an intervenor party to this action when the foreclosure sale was conducted, and it then waited five years before instituting this suit against ASH. We consider SBA’s delay in bringing this action to be unduly dilatory. We can, in our discretion, deny prejudgment interest in outlandish situations, including delay in bringing suit. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28, 43 (Trial Div. 1994). Thus, we will not grant any prejudgment interest to SBA.
SBA is entitled to receive $13,409.65 from ASE. Therefore, SBA is granted summary judgment in the sum of $13,409.65 against ASH.
It is so ordered
*********



TCW SPECIAL CREDITS, INC., Plaintiff
v.
F/V KASSANDRA Z, OFFICIAL NO. 6553390,

Her Engines, Nets, Furniture, Etc., Defendant in Rem
and
KASSANDRA Z FISHING CO., Defendant in Personam

_________________________________
AND RELATED CLAIMS-IN-INTERVENTION.
High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division


CA No. 92-96
May 7, 1999

[1] Summary judgeent is appropriate only when the pleadings and supporting papers show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.


[2] In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view all pleadings and supporting papers in the light most favorable to the opposing party, treat the opposing party’s evidence as true, and draw from such evidence the inferences most favorable to the opposing party.
[3] When court is asked to deem certain facts established in movant’s favor as a sanction for discovery violations, but such sanction would effectively work a dismissal or judgment in movant’s favor, court will apply same standards as if movant were directly seeking dismissal.
[4] As a general principle, policy and due process concerns favor resolution of a case on the merits.
[5] Dismissal will only be ordered in response to Rule 37 violations as a last resort, and only where less severe sanctions would not be effective.
[6] The Trial Court Rules of Civil Procedure, used in American Samoa Courts, do not follow Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding special masters.

[7] Although deposition was rancorous and terminated prematurely, Court refused to impose to impose artificial regulations of conduct beyond those already provided by the Trial Court Rules of Civil Procedure, but instead warned that such rules were to be followed.


Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, and TUA`OLO, Chief Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiff TCW, Craig Miller and Barry I. Rose

For Plaintiffs-in-Intervention Michael Datin, et al., William

Banning and William H. Reardon

For Defendant Kassandra Z, Virginia L. Sudbury

For Intervenor A. Sardina, Brian M. Thompson

For Intervenor Shell Guam, Inc., Tautai A.F. Fa`alevao


ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND OTHER REQUESTED RELIEF


On April 12, 1999, a hearing was held in this matter on eight different motions, with all counsel listed above present. A brief history and description of those motions, in chronological order of filing date, follows:
1. Plaintiff TCW Special Credits, Inc.’s (“TCW”) Motion for Summary Judgment as to Amounts Owed Crew on Trips Nos. 20-26, filed January 21, 1999. In this motion, TCW outlines a history of alleged discovery abuses on the part of Plaintiffs-in-Intervention Michael Datin, et al., (“the Crew”). TCW urges the court to apply T.C.R.C.P 37 to sanction the Crew by finding any would-be material issues of fact in TCW’s favor and, accordingly, to enter summary judgment for TCW.
2. TCW’s Motion to Quash Notice of Deposition, filed January 21, 1999. TCW seeks to quash the notice of deposition for Raymond Falante, originally noticed for January 20, 1999, with amended notice for January 22, 1999. According to the memorandum filed by the Crew on March 31, 1999, the deposition was renoticed for April 2, 1999, and counsel for TCW agreed to attend. There was no argument on this motion at the April 12, 1999 hearing, and the issue now appears to be moot.
3. TCW’s Motion for Order (1) Directing that Settlement Offers be Communicated by Special Master; and (2) Examining Legal Fees of Crew Counsel, filed February 19, 1999. TCW asserts a conflict of interest between the Crew and its counsel, the Booth Banning firm, expressing concern that settlement offers were not communicated to members of the Crew and that the fee arrangements between the Crew and its counsel are exorbitant and unfair.

4. TCW’s Motion for Order Governing Deposition Conduct and for Sanctions For Discovery Misconduct, filed March 12, 1999. Based on conduct which occurred at the February 1, 1999 deposition of Gojko Milisic, TCW seeks sanctions and an order establishing guidelines for future depositions.


5. TCW’s Motion for Approval of Settlements and Assignment of Claims Between TCW, Clipper Oil and Shell Guam, filed March 22, 1999. TCW seeks approval of the settlement reached between these parties on the various trade claims.34
6. TCW’s Second Motion to Quash Notices of Crew Depositions in Italy, filed March 25, 1999. This motion was denied by our order of April 14, 1999, on grounds that the court wished to rule on summary judgment before allowing these depositions to go forward.
7. Defendant Kassandra Z’s (“Kassandra Z”) Motion to Compel, filed March 26, 1999. This motion, requesting an order to compel discovery responses on the personal injury claims, was withdrawn on April 7, 1999.
8. The Crew’s Motion for Order Issuing Reporters Commission and to Allow De Bene Esse Depositions to be Used for Trial, filed March 29, 1999. The Crew seeks approval for de bene esse depositions of the individual members of the Crew.35
Discussion
As noted above, the motions identified in paragraph numbers 2, 6 and 7 above have been effectively resolved. In brief, and to the extent necessary, we now discuss those remaining motions below.
A. TCW’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[1-2] Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings and supporting papers show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” T.C.R.C.P. 56; Etimani v. Samoa Packing Co., 19 A.S.R.2d 1, 4 (Trial Div. 1991). In ruling on a summary-judgment motion, the court must view all pleadings and supporting papers in the light most favorable to the opposing party, treat the opposing party’s evidence as true, and draw from such evidence the inferences most favorable to the opposing party. Id.
In its motion, TCW requests that the court take the most drastic of steps as a corrective to alleged discovery abuses on the part of the Crew: apply T.C.R.C.P. 37 sanctions to find against the Crew on all issues of material fact, and to enter summary judgment in favor of TCW. Although we share TCW’ s frustration with the status of discovery in this case— indeed, we find both parties to have exhibited an unfortunate lack of cooperation and goodwill throughout this process—we are not prepared to take such extreme measures at this time.
Under Rule 37, the court may impose, inter alia, the following sanctions for failure to comply with a court order:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party[.]
T.C.R.C.P. 37(b)(2).
[3] TCW does not purport to seek an outright dismissal or a default judgment, both of which are provided for in subsection (C) above, but rather requests an order pursuant to subsections (A) or (B), finding certain material facts in its favor or refusing to allow the Crew to defend certain claims. Summary judgment would logically follow from that more limited order, however, thereby achieving the same result as a dismissal or default judgment. When deeming certain facts as established is tantamount to a dismissal or default judgment, we will proceed to apply the same standards for application of Rule 37 as we would were TCW directly seeking dismissal of the Crew’s claims. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Noble Metals Int’l, 67 F.3d 766, 770-772 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied (Rule 37 sanctions resulting in grant of summary judgment were reviewed as if court had dismissed claims outright or entered default judgment).36

[4-5] Courts will weigh many different factors in deciding whether to dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 37. As a general principle, policy and due process concerns favor resolution of a case on the merits; accordingly, a dismissal will only be granted as a last resort, and only when less severe sanctions would not be effective. Wouters v. Martin County, Fla., 9 F.3d 924, 934 (11th Cir. 1993) (award of attorney’s fees was less drastic sanction that could have forced compliance with court order); United States for the Use and Benefit of Wiltec Guam v. Kahaluu Constr. Co.., 857 F.2d 600, 605-606 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal reversed on appeal when trial court neglected to consider intermediate-level sanctions); F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissal sanction reversed as abuse of discretion).
In addition, courts have developed other requirements which must also be met before imposing a dismissal sanction, including: a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or substantial fault (National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640 (1976) (per curiam)); an explicit prior warning from the court that continued noncompliance would result in dismissal (Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997)); evidence that the moving party had suffered significant prejudice (In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)); and, in at least one circuit, proof that the violation of the discovery order was attributable to the client rather than its counsel (F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Although the discovery process in the instant case has been fraught with hostility, intransigence and inappropriate delay, the overall circumstances simply do not rise to the level of those required for dismissal to be proper. Both TCW and the Crew appear to have done their part to thwart the free exchange of information contemplated by Rule 26; nevertheless, without additional information, we are not prepared to say that either party has acted in bad faith. Furthermore, even if the Crew has failed to comply with the court’s discovery orders, there has been no warning that a dismissal sanction might result therefrom, nor do we have any reason to believe that lesser sanctions could not elicit the discovery sought. Finally, this court is not prepared to penalize the individual members of the Crew for transgressions—if any—which occurred through no fault of their own, but rather resulted from the litigation tactics of their counsel.
As nearly a month has elapsed since the April 12, 1999 hearing (and counsel for TCW was apparently served with some supplemental answers to interrogatories on the morning of that hearing), the court cannot properly evaluate the adequacy of discovery at this time. However, if TCW is still not satisfied with the Crew’s responses to certain interrogatories or other discovery requests, then it may bring a more narrowly-tailored motion to address those issues. Summary judgment on this basis, however, is denied.
B. TCW’s Motion for Order (1) Directing that Settlement Offers be Communicated by Special Master; and (2) Examining Legal Fees of Crew Counsel
Although we are mindful of our unique responsibility towards seaman (and, for that matter, other litigants whose circumstances may require some degree of special attention), the court is not prepared to intrude into the relationship between the Crew and its counsel at this time.
[6] Significantly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding special masters, Rule 53, has been omitted from the Trial Court Rules of Civil Procedure which govern practice in this jurisdiction. Even were we to follow the federal rules, however, we are not convinced that the “exceptional conditions” which they require have been met in this case, as TCW’s concerns are largely speculative in nature. F.R.C.P. 53(b).
If at any point the members of the Crew have concerns about their treatment by counsel, they have an existing remedy: they remain free to bring suit on their own behalf. Based on the information which has been provided to this court, however, we will not interfere in the attorney-client relationship at this time.
C. TCW’s Motion for Order Governing Deposition Conduct and Sanctions
[7] This motion is also denied. Although we are indeed disturbed by the rancor which characterized the Milisic deposition of February 1 and 2, 1999—and in particular by the possibly premature termination of TCW’s examination of the deponent—we refuse to impose artificial regulations of conduct beyond those already provided by the Trial Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
We do, however, take this opportunity to issue a warning. Counsel for both the Crew and TCW are experienced attorneys who are well aware of the basic rules and procedures governing the discovery process. Be forewarned that any future allegations of improper practice will be carefully scrutinized, and this court will not hesitate to impose heavy sanctions where appropriate.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, the following orders shall enter: TCW’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; TCW’s Motion for Order (1) Directing that Settlement Offers be Communicated by Special Master and (2) Examining Legal Fees of Crew Counsel is DENIED; TCW’s Motion for Order Governing Deposition Conduct and for Sanctions For Discovery Misconduct is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
***********




MAFA TUIKA, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN SAMOA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

dba RAINMAKER HOTEL, RIMONI TAGA`I, ELISA TUISAMATATELE, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.
High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division


CA No. 42-97
August 10, 1999

[1] The determination of whether an employee is wrongfully terminated depends initially on whether the person’s employment is a just cause or an at-will relationship.


[2] The employee has the burden of proving the existence of a contract and all the facts essential to a wrongful termination cause of action, and to establish a breach of employment contract claim based upon violation of personnel rules, the employee must prove that a personnel manual actually became part of an employment contract and that the terms of the manual were breached.
[3] Considerations relevant to weighing the provisions of an employee handbook or manual in a wrongful termination claim and whether contractual rights result from them include their language, whether they contain a detailed progressive discipline scheme, a list of transgressions that would result in dismissal, a requirement that the employee sign the handbook or manual, a setting out of mutual commitments, which, in sum, would justify an employee’s expectations.
[4] Relevant to a wrongful termination claim are any representations made by the employer, and the course of dealing between the employer and employee.

[5] A statement in a manual that certain violations subject employees to “disciplinary action up to and including immediate discharge for cause” does not, by itself, lead to contractual rights.


[6] Where a manual provides for certain internal, managerial termination procedures which the employee’s supervisors must follow for terminating personnel, and such procedures do not require the employers to provide the employees with notice of termination or allow for a hearing of any kind, those procedures do not support a claim that the employment was one of just cause.
[7] Where a handbook contains only random sentences specifying causes which result in immediate termination, does not provide for any discipline scheme or signatures by the employee, or contain any other relevant guidelines to support a finding that a just-cause employment relationship had been formed, the employee was an at-will employee whose employment could be terminated for any reason or even no reason, regardless of the merits of the grounds assigned as the basis of this result.
[8] Although an employee was not afforded any opportunity to pursue the employer’s customarily established post-termination grievance procedure, without express terms conveyed to an employee, an employer is not legally bound to treat each employee in the same fashion based upon past policies and practices, especially where causes for termination listed in a handbook resulting in immediate dismissal do not require post-termination grievance procedures.
[9] Although an employer is not obligated to immediately terminate an employee once a decision to terminate has been made, the employer must act in good faith and notify the employee of this decision in reasonable and timely manner.
[10] Where a notice of suspension informs an employee that the suspension is indefinite, the employee should affirmatively inquire as to her employment status after a reasonable period.
[11] An agent is not liable for lawful acts done within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of a disclosed principal, and the acts of investigating and terminating an employee are presumed to be acts done within the scope of authority granted by the employer; a principal is solely liable for acts of its agent committed in the course of or within the scope of the agent’s employment.
Before Richmond, Associate Justice, LOGOAI, Associate Judge, and ATIULAGI, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiff, Virginia Sudbury

For Defendants, Fiti A. Sunia, Assistant Attorney General


OPINION AND ORDER
On April 9, 1997, plaintiff Mafa Tuika (“Tuika”) filed a complaint for wrongful termination against defendants American Samoa Development Corporation, dba Rainmaker Hotel (“the Rainmaker”), Rimoni Taga`i (“Taga`i”), and Elisa Tuisamatatele (“Tuisamatatele”).
Tuika was employed by the Rainmaker from 1989 to May of 1996. No employment contract was ever signed between Tuika and the Rainmaker. At the time of employment, Tuika received a copy of the Rainmaker’s Operations and procedures Manual (“the Manual”) that, among other matters, delineated the Rainmaker’s polices regarding promotions, transfers, vacations, conduct, hiring, severance, and termination procedures. A subsequent handbook, the Rainmaker’s Employee Handbook (“the Handbook”), was then published and distributed. No procedures regarding termination, however, were included in the Handbook.
On May 9, 1996, Tuika was presented with a written notice of suspension by the Rainmaker. At the time of her suspension, Tuika was the Rainmaker’s purchasing officer. The suspension was to allow time for an investigation into accusations concerning the contents of three particular containers and irregularities occurring in the Purchasing Office. Tuika was formally terminated on approximately May 21, 1996. The reasons given by Taga`i, the Rainmaker’s controller, included spreading false stories and rumors, dishonesty and stealing, and various failures to perform duties in a satisfactory manner.

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