Ergenekon case

The trial started by the reading of the indictment.

 

17 Aralık 2008

Council of State attack case was merged with the Ergenekon investigation.

Supreme Court of Appeals decided that May 2006 Council of State attack case should be merged with the Ergenekon investigation. 11th Branch of the Ankara Court for Serious Crimes, which was ruling the Council of State attack case approved this decision in 19 April 2009. Finally 13th Branch of the Istanbul Court for Serious Crimes, which rules the Ergenekon case, merged the two cases.

7 January 2009

During the police raids that had been conducted simultaneously in twelve provinces around the country, 37 people were arrested. The former General-Secretary of the National Security Council (MGK) Tuncer Kilinc, retired Major General Erdal Senel, the former head of the Special Operations Unit, Ibrahim Sahin, the former president of the Higher Education Board, Prof. Kemal Gürüz, writer Yalçın Küçük, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Dönmez who is still on duty (disappeared during the operations but surrendered five days later), retired General Kemal Yavuz are among the detainees. The operation started when the police noticed that Ibrahim Şahin ordered the assassination of the leaders of the Armenian community in Sivas.

Security teams also searched the buildings of the İSTEK Foundation and Yeditepe University owned by former Istanbul Mayor Bedrettin Dalan and the home of Sabih Kanadoğlu, honorary chief judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals. At 20 of April, large amounts of weaponry and explosives were found in the lands belonging to İSTEK Foundation.

08 January 2009

Turkish police launched a series of searches after sketches were found at the home of İbrahim Şahin, who was arrested a day before. The largest cache of weaponry and explosives were found in the Gölbaşı district of Ankara. Police also found explosives in Sincan Ankara, based on the sketches found at the house of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Dönmez, another Ergenekon detainee of tenth wave. The grenades found in Sincan were identical to the grenades that had been found in Ümraniye at 12 June 2007. Other than these two, smaller arms caches were unearthed at Ankara, Trabzon, Antalya, Sakarya and Sivas.

At 19 June 2009 military prosecutors confirmed that the sketch found at the house of Dönmez was drawn by him and filed charges against Dönmez, demanding up to 12 years in prison. Additionally, in the indictment prosecutor stated that hand grenades found in Dönmez's home had been supplied to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) by the state-owned Turkish Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE).

14 January 2009

One of the key suspects of the Ergenekon case, retired Brigadier General Levent Ersöz, who fled to Moscow when he learned he was wanted, was apprehended at an Ankara hospital yesterday. He has been wanted by police since July 2008. Later day, police found wiretapping records of former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök’s phone conversations at Ersöz’s home.

15 January 2009

Interrogation of Tuncer Kılınç evoked a new debate on “Encümen-i Daniş” (Consultation Council)

After it is revealed that the Ergenekon prosecutors questioned former General-Secretary of the National Security Council (MGK) Tuncer Kılınc, a detainee of tenth wave, about Encümen-i Daniş, this led to a new public debate on whether Encümen-i Daniş is the high council of the Ergenekon or not. Encümen-i Daniş which means Consulation Council, consists of all high profile members like retired top commanders, retired bureaucrats, diplomats and former politicians. Members of the Council confirmed the bi-weekly secret meetings, but denied any link with Ergenekon.

22 January 2009

A total of 20 police officers from the Special Forces unit and army officers, who have connections with former police chief İbrahim Şahin, were detained in operations waged in 15 provinces within the scope of the 11th wave of operation Ergenekon. The operation, which was conducted 15 days after the 10th wave, covered major cities such as Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, as well as Turkey's southeastern provinces. Mustafa Özbek, the chairman of Turkish Metal Union, Erhan Göksel, the chairman of Verso Center of Political Research, were among the latest detainees in the operation.

27 February 2009

A voice record belonging to the Former Chieff of Staff Hakkı Karadayı started circulating through internet. In this recorded speech, Karadayı unravels how he intervened in the presidential election process and also he talks about the roles he undertook during the previous coups in Turkey.

06 March 2009

08 March 2009

At 8 March, upon the request of the public prosecutor, acid wells claimed as death wells, were opened for investigation in the Cizre district of Sirnak. At 14 March, 22 bones and a human skull aside some clothing were found. At 23rd of March, Cemal Temizöz who served in the region during 1990-1996 was arrested at Kayseri.

 

10 March 2009

Second indictment was submitted.

Second indictment was submitted. The trials of this indictment will start at 20 July. This indictment, nearly 2000 pages covers the detainees from the sixth wave to ninth wave. A third indictment will be prepared for the later waves.

The indictment is composed of five chapters. The first chapter summarizes the first indictment and the second gives information about the "Ergenekon" organization. The third and the fourth chapters list activities and crimes committed by the organization. And the final chapter includes individual acts of the suspects.

13 April 2009

At least 18 people, including the current Başkent University rector and three former university rectors, were detained. Mehmet Haberal current rector of Başkent University, Professor Fatih Hilmioğlu, former rector of İnönü University in the southeastern province of Malatya, Professor Ferit Bernay, former rector of Ondokuz Mayıs University in the Black Sea province of Samsun, and Professor Mustafa Yurtkuran, former rector of Uludağ University in the western province of Bursa, are among the detainees. Professor Erol Manisalı, daily Cumhuriyet columnist and retired lecturer at Istanbul University, was also detained in Istanbul.

20 April 2009

Many weapons and bombs were unearthed in an excavation that was conducted as part of the Ergenekon probe on land that belonged to the İSTEK Foundation in Istanbul’s Poyrazköy district. The items found included 2,000 bullets, five booby traps, 10 hand grenades, 13 fog bombs, 11 light anti-tank weapons, 23 emergency flares and a number of 50-millimeter bomb fuses. The foundation said it was a protected area and a military training zone, implying that weaponry should be belonging to military. At 29 April, military disproved this statement, and also claimed that none of the weapons found belonged to the military. However, a 10-page report by the supplier Makina Kimya Enstitüsü sent to the Prosecutor’s Office showed that the weapons found in Poyrazköy were sent to the army, navy, air force, gendarmerie and special forces.  Owner of the foundation, Bedrettin Dalan is an Ergenekon fugitive currently in USA.

18 May 2009

Türkan Saylan, whose house had been raided during the twelfth wave, died of cancer. Her funeral at 19 May, attracted large crowds

4 June 2009

Twenty people, including 16 army officers on active duty, were detained in simultaneous operations conducted in five Turkish provinces. It was claimed that the detained soldiers had ties to retired major Levent Pektaş who was earlier arrested in relation to the arms cache found in Poyrazköy, Istanbul.

 

10 June 2009

Hundredth hearing in the Ergenekon trial was held.

Ergenekon trial which started at 20 October 2008, held its hundredth hearing in 10 June 2009. Thus hundred hearings had been held in this 233 days.

12 June 2009

Few days later, at the 16th of June, JDP filed a criminal complaint with the prosecutors, and prime minister said that his party would not remain silent. Military also started an investigation, but the military prosecutors ruled at 23rd of June that the document was a forgery and there was no need for the prosecution of Dursun Çiçek.

25 June 2009

Turkish Parliament paved the way for civilian courts to try military personnel.

Turkey's parliament has passed legislation aimed at meeting European Union membership criteria to ensure military personnel are tried in civilian courts during peacetime rather than in military courts. The legislation passed on Friday requires civilian courts to try members of the armed forces who are accused of crimes including threats to national security, constitutional violations, organizing armed groups and attempts to topple the government. The change to the penal code also says civilians cannot be tried in military courts unless the country is in a state of martial law or at war.

At 26th June, İlker Başbuğ, the Chieff of Staff, made a press conference reflecting the unrest of military with regard to the debates on the action plan published by Taraf, and the legislative changes that enables the military personnel to be tried by civilian courts. Despite voting affirmatively for the legislation, secularist Republican People's Party (CHP) later applied the top court at 13 July in order to annul the law. At 23rd July, the top court accepted to deal with the change.

30 June 2009

Following the military prosecutor’s ruling that there is no need for the prosecution of Colonel Dursun Çiçek, Ergenekon prosecutors started an investigation of Çiçek and eight other colonels within the scope of Ergenekon probe. Dursun Çiçek was arrested by court order the same day, but was released by a higher court a day later.

16 July 2009

The most comprehensive case dealing with the unsolved murders in Turkey's southeast started with a court in the southeastern province of Diyarbakır asserting a serious claim about Col. Cemal Temizöz, the head of the provincial gendarmerie forces in the central Anatolian province of Kayseri. The court alleged that Temizöz forced confessors to kill 20 people within the scope of the "fight against terrorism" when he was commissioned in Cizre town, in the southeastern province of Şırnak.

18 July 2009

Turkey’s highest court announced that there was no need to launch an investigation of the court’s vice president, Osman Paksüt, regarding his alleged involvement with suspects in the ongoing Ergenekon probe and leaking court information. The decision constitutes a precedent in the ongoing Ergenekon case.

Discussing the case on Friday, the top court concluded that court member Osman Paksüt leaked information to the third parties on the closure case of the AKP but decided not to launch an investigation into him on grounds that the collected evidence was illegal as he had his phone tapped without court approval. The top court voted 10-1 against any investigation into Osman Paksüt.

 

20 July 2009

The Istanbul High Criminal Court has begun trying 56 suspects under the second indictment of the "Ergenekon" probe. The 1909-page indictment includes accusations against 56 suspects including retired generals Hursit Tolon and Mehmet Sener Eruygur. 16 of those suspects have already been under arrest. Prosecutors demanded aggravated life imprisonment for 13 suspects of the Ergenekon probe. The court is expected to decide first whether to merge the second case with the first one in which 86 other people are already on trial for their alleged involvement in the organization. They are also accused of planning assassinations and bombings to sow chaos and overthrow the government.

 

20 July 2009

Third Indictment was submitted to the court.

The Ergenekon prosecutors submitted the third indictment of the Ergenekon probe to the İstanbul Higher Criminal Court, where the current hearing of Ergenekon suspects goes on. The indictment is 1454 pages and indicts 52 people 37 of whom are still under arrest. The suspects were arrested between Jan. 10, 2009 and April 17, 2009. (11th wave and later on)

27 July 2009

Earlier, members of HSYK demanded the reassignment of the judges and prosecutors of the ongoing Ergenekon probe, while Justice Ministry resisted this demand. This led to a three week deadlock which was finally resolved on 27 July with the decision that Ergenekon prosecutors would keep their positions, but a second name, Istanbul Vice Chief Public Prosecutor Olcay Seçkin, would also be assigned to the prosecution team. Ministry of Justice would launch an inquiry into the complaints and charges against the Ergenekon prosecutors, if sufficient evidence exists. Three week deadlock created a huge public controversy, while both HSYK and ministry accused each other for exceeding their powers. The debates were triggered when the photos of a meeting between Ali Suat Ertosun, a member of HSYK, and Engin Aydın, an Ergenekon suspect, appeared on the journals.

 

Munitions
A common objection raised by detractors of the investigation is that the group does not have the wherewithal to carry out large-scale militant acts. This section aims to clarify what is known about the munitions presented as evidence. This is also of relevance to linking acts allegedly carried out by the organization, as it has been alleged that weapons of the same type and serial number were found in several locations. Debate has focused in particular on the grenades, which can be uniquely identified by the fuse type (Turkish: fünye grubu) and batch number (Turkish: kafile numarası).[159]

According to police officials, "HGR DM 41" indicates German origin, SPLITTER denotes a fragmentation grenade, "COMP-B" means composition B, "LOS" indicates European production up to NATO standards, while the number following "FMP" indicates the batch.[160]

One of the two grenades recovered in Akhisar, Manisa had the serial number HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 24. Another grenade from Eyüp, İstanbul had the serial number HGR DM 41 COMP-B LOS FMR-24.[160]

One of the ten grenades had the serial number HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 16.[160]

Two grenades used in the Şemdinli incident on 9 November 2005 were found to bear the serial number HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 134.[161]

Alparslan bombed the offices of the newspaper Cumhuriyet in May 2006. The grenades did not go off in his first two attempts; he succeeded on his third. The NATO standard, Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKE) model 44 grenades had the following serial numbers:[159]

1. 
   TAPA M 204 A 2/KF-MKE-91 12-77 (5 May 2006)
   
2. 
   TAPA M 204 A 2/KF-MKE-173 9-85 (10 May 2006)
   
3. 
   TAPA M 204 A 2/KF-MKE-91 12-77 (11 May 2006)
   

The serial numbers of some of the 27 grenades found in Ümraniye are:[161]

4. 
   HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 16
   
5. 
   HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 24
   
6. 
   HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 22
   
7. 
   TAPA M 204 A2/KF-MKE-169 5-85^[159]
   

The recovered materiel included 11 kg of C-3, a telescopic rifle, a Kalashnikov, a shotgun, M-16 shells, 12 grenades (10 from the MKE), smoke bombs, 12 210g TNT setups, 6 500g TNT moulds, a 1.5 kg TNT mould, a 1 kg demolition block, ignition munitions. This is sufficient to flatten a twelve-floor reinforced concrete structure, with each floor over 400 m2.[163] The grenades have serial number TAPA M204 A2/KF-MKE-91 12-77, matching the ones from the Cumhuriyet attack.[104][159]

With the help of a tip-off on 3 December 2008,[164] the Trabzon police found nine grenades of the same batch number as those in Ümraniye. In nearby Yomra, the police seized a gun and eight 7.65 mm bullets for it, a Kalashnikov rifle and three chargers, a total of 420 7.62 mm Kalashnikov bullets and a grenade. In the city, eight grenades were found; seven hidden inside a washing machine, and another in an oven. Trabzon governor Nuri Okutan said that none of the suspects were public officials or members of the military.[165] The serial numbers of the Trabzon grenades are:[161]

8. 
   HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 143
   
9. 
   HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 197
   
10. 
    HGR DM 41 SPLITTER COMP-B LOS FMP 125
    

22 grenades, over 100 bullets, 1 Kalashnikov, and 4 pistols were found in Dönmez's vacation house in Sakarya.[104]

 

Ergenekon Terror Organization Against the Law and State

As an illegal armed organization, ETO exhibits several similarities to other terrorist groups operating in Turkey in terms of its organizational goals, foundation, structure and activities.

ETO, like other terrorist organizations in Turkey, violated the laws in chapters 4 and 5 under section 4 of Turkish penal code (TCK). For example, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has committed the crime of “Weakening or Destroying or Seizing the Authority of the State”, Article 302; other terrorist organizations like Turkish Hizballah and DevSol (DHKP/C) have violated the laws at Article 309 of penal code, which specifies the “Crimes against the Constitution.” In a similar way, ETO has violated the crimes defined under the Article 311 and 312, which state the “Crimes against the Legislative and Executive Branches” in the Turkish Penal Code.

ETO was designated as a terrorist organization by the Turkish National Police and National Intelligence Organization (MIT).

ETO established a hierarchial organizational structure, but relies heavily on cooperative relationships among its members.  The presence of ex-military and retired flag rank officers within the group membership made it easier for the organization’s paramilitary structure.

The organization operates with a dual structure, the first was established formally and the second informally.  Both continued to operate professionally in accordance to ETO’s goals. When all political and societal activities were managed and conducted by its formal branch, whereas all other illegal activities were directed by its covert  informal branch in great  secrecy. It was discovered during the investigation that both members of formal and informal branches have never appeared in public together, however, the relationship continued between the leadership of these branches at a certain level; in fact the leadership of these two branches has managed to establish an equal authority for management of the organization. The investigation revealed that some gang members used aliases and secretly kept in touch with other members on a regular basis, however, when these people were asked about such meetings, they insisted othwerwise.  

ETO works on a highly detailed doctrinaire discipline. Documents found in the homes of its leaders later revealed that the organization was strictly faithful to this doctrinaire discipline; it managed all its activities based on the stated purposes by employing the exact tactics that were instructed on these same documents.

The similarity in modus operandi of these two branches of ETO, formal and informal, was understood from the these same documents as well as their action plans. For example, while assassination plans against the people who would not serve their purpose were instructed as a modus operandi for its informal branch, whereas to group and involve the civil society organizations more often in their influence to political decision making process was suggested as tactics in these documents and all were succesfully employed by ETO. That’s why ETO’s modus operandi must be analyzed hand in hand with its instructional manuals. For example, ETO’s peaciful looking mass civil meetings, which was coordinated by its formal branch, coincided to the time of the assassination of a Council of State Judge, which was committed by its informal branch, indicated the ETO’s plans as in form of violent and non-violent nature.

ETO was also distinguished itself from other terrorist groups operating in Turkey in some aspects.  Unlike typical terrorist groups in Turkey that aimed to destroy the “constitutional order” and “territorial integrity” of the country, ETO emerged as a group that has attacked the democratic order.  To reach its aim, the terrorist organization has established different work areas and created its membership from various fields.  ETO members interfered into presidential elections of some political parties; formed bogus terrorist organizations; extended its operations from underground crime world to the entertainment world. The organization was able establish a network from retired soldiers to ex-soldiers and ex-cons to white-color occupations. The government tactics that were employed successfully against other similar terrorist organizations did not work against the ETO; in fact, such attempts were always curtained professionally by some hidden ETO members who were inside the government structure, political arena, press and the organized crime. Many investigations went into dead end and left the perpetrators unknown.  This once more proved that the organization had the capability of postmodern structure which went beyond the detection of classical counter-terrorism tactics and standard security assessments. To achieve its goals, ETO showed a great skill of an organizational-operational structure to commit crimes nationwide; it has the ability to eliminate the legislative and executive organs by force; adequacy in terms of its armed and unarmed members and determination to commit acts in terms of intensity of attacks.

One of the most striking aspects of ETO is its intelligence network as well as the use of its network efficiently. In this context, ETO has leaked into some target groups and was able to gather intelligence via professional methods.

ETO has used the religious and national feelings of the people to reach out its political purposes by abusing the sensitive issues like Cyprus and flag in their rhetoric’s professionally.

The most striking aspect that distinguished ETO from other similar groups is its strong structure and effects to decision making process within the state mechanism. Because of its configuration and construction, ETO has not been detected through all these years. During the searches in the homes and offices of ETO members with search warrants, a lot of documents and notes were seized. These documents later revealed how the organization was able to reach its hands into the top secret government documents and to monitor the highest members of the government. More surprisingly, seized weapons and explosives belonging to the Turkish Armed Forces indicated the level of danger created by ETO to the national security.

In detection and exposure of ETO, a new code within the Turkish Criminal Procedure Law, which was passed on June 1, 2005, provided a big help to the Prosecutors, who were given special authority. Judge-approved warrants that allowed prosecutors a big power to use evidences retrieved via physical trace, wiretapping, forensic investigation methods, and secret witnesses. Several other officials assisted judges and prosecutors in many stages of this legal process. Such provisions led the arrest, questioning and detention of many suspects within the rule of law.  

Today, ETO has been on trial based on two reasons. First, the organization has been accused of eliminating the democratically elected legislative and executive organs of the state by force; second, using its covert agents within the government, ETO has managed to pose a great danger to the national security and Turkish government officials by putting their lives in grave danger.