Executive Order Counterplan
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- Answers to “Need External Checks”
- Answers to Counterplan gets Rolled Back
- Answers to Past Executive Orders Made Things Worse
- Answers to “Permutation”
- (__) “Authority” derives from other actors – curtailing must done by another actor – not the executive branch
Answers to Aff ResponsesAnswers to Need Statutory/Congressional Change(__)(__)Don’t need statutory reform – need the executive to answer what they SHOULD be doing not what they COULD be doingSchlanger, Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan, 15 [Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap, Harvard National Security Journal, 6 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 112] Much of the reform action is, and should be, devoted to substantive interventions. Congress should itself ask the "should" question, and can insist on, for example, tighter rules governing bulk collection, requiring more-individuated justifications for data acquisition, analysis, and use. Or to rephrase the point using the familiar vocabulary of rules and standards, n343 [*190] Congress, and the President, can design and promulgate new rules to serve the overarching standard--that liberty should be prioritized where it carries no, or acceptable, cost to security--and these rules can then be enforced by a compliance regime. But what about implementation of the underlying standard itself: the idea that liberty should be prioritized where it carries no, or acceptable, cost to security? I argued in Part III that surveillance secrecy and the very significant changes over time mean that some opportunities to further that standard are likely to remain untouched by the Constitution, statutes, and executive order. So while I am far from opposed to additional statutory and regulatory-type rules, there remains an additional opportunity to further individual liberty and privacy with less legalistic, more standard-like interventions. This opportunity is the thrust of the last category of reforms, which propose to institutionalize within the Executive branch, the question of "should" rather than "can": . The President announced in August 2013 that the NSA would "put in place a full-time civil liberties and privacy officer." n344 The job announcement went up in September, n345 and as already described, the new NSA Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, Rebecca Richards, began work in January. n346 Answers to “Need External Checks”(__)(__) Executive employs internal constraints – case studies proveMICHAELS, Professor, UCLA School of Law, 11 [Jon, “The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond,” Virginia Law Review, http://www.virginialawreview.org/content/pdfs/97/801.pdf] These are revealing case studies, weighty in their own right and interesting complements to one another. They give us insight into how these strategically important, but largely unknown, responsibilities are administered. They show how the Executive, rather than the Executive’s usual rivals—Congress and the courts—can constrain public administration, through mechanisms within the administrative state and outside of it. And, they suggest why the Executive might welcome those constraints (and possibly others as well). The studies bring into focus a new template, one with significant descriptive attributes and predictive power. They reveal an underappreciated phenomenon where (1) legal constraints and political accountability checks over administrative responsibilities are disabled, inapplicable, or dangerous; (2) the Executive seems surprisingly hamstrung by virtue of the absence of constraints; and (3) the Executive appears to take steps to impose an alternative regime of administrative discipline to better carry out the responsibilities in question. Combined, the studies reveal two alternative paths to compensate for the lack of conventional accountability assurances. With In-Q-Tel, the Executive uses an external institutional redesign seemingly to insulate the technology incubation process from perverse political pressures and to better align principal-agent interests. With CFIUS, the President employs an internal institutional redesign with the apparent effect of limiting White House control, both for the good of the parties engaged in the foreign-investment deal and in service of the President’s larger foreign-policy goals. Taken in tandem, In-Q-Tel and CFIUS present a challenge to the dominant view of the Executive as power-aggrandizing. Equally important, however, is the fact that the acts and mechanisms of self-constraint are not obvious or celebrated. The Executive’s subtlety in these domains thus itself serves as testament to the durability and primacy of the dominant understanding. Answers to Counterplan gets Rolled Back(__)(__)Executive position taking is binding – EVEN IF the executive wants to change their positionTomz, Professor at Stanford University, 07 [Michael Tomz, October 2007. Stanford University. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization 61.4.] What makes international commitments credible? The answer may lie, in part, at the intersection of foreign affairs and domestic politics. Recent models of international relations assume that leaders would suffer “domestic audience costs” if they issued threats or promises and failed to follow through. Citizens, it is claimed, would think less of leaders who backed down than of leaders who never committed in the first place. In a world with audience costs, the prospect of losing domestic support—or even office—could discourage leaders from making empty threats and promises. The concept of domestic audience costs is now central to theories about military crises, and researchers have incorporated similar ideas into models of alliances, economic sanctions, foreign trade, foreign direct investment, monetary commitments, interstate bargaining, and international cooperation more generally. 1 Despite the prominence of audience costs in international relations theories, it remains unclear whether and when audience costs exist in practice. Most empirical work on the topic is indirect. Fearon conjectured that audience costs are higher in democracies than in autocracies and explained why this gap would cause the two types of regimes to behave differently. 2 Researchers have, therefore, checked for correlations between democracy and foreign policy. 3 Although valuable, these tests do not reveal whether the effects of democracy stem from audience costs or from other differences between political regimes. One could try to study audience costs directly, perhaps by examining the historical fate of leaders who issued threats and then backed down. The problem, which international relations scholars widely recognize, is strategic selection bias. 4 If leaders take the prospect of audience costs into account when making foreign policy decisions, then in situations when citizens would react harshly against backing down, leaders would tend to avoid that path, leaving little opportunity to observe the public backlash. It would seem, therefore, that a direct and unbiased measure of audience costs is beyond reach. This article aims to solve the empirical conundrum. The analysis is based on a series of experiments embedded in public opinion surveys. In each experiment, the interviewer describes a military crisis. Some participants are randomly assigned to a control group and told that the president does not get involved. Others are placed in a treatment condition in which the president escalates the crisis but ultimately backs down. All participants are then asked whether they approve of the way the president handled the situation. By comparing approval ratings in the “stay out” and “back down” conditions, one can measure audience costs directly without strategic selection bias. In the remainder of this article, I demonstrate that constituents disapprove of leaders who make international threats and then renege. I further explain why many leaders regard disapproval as a political liability. Finally, as a step toward deepening our theoretical as well as empirical understanding of audience costs, I investigate why citizens react negatively to empty threats.
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(__)Past executive orders have all been ANTI civil liberties – that is different from the counterplan which would be pro-rightsSchlanger, Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan, 15 [Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap, Harvard National Security Journal, 6 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 112] 3. Executive Order Efforts to implement most of the Church Committee's substantive recommendations as statutory law failed; they entered American law instead as part of Executive Order 12,333. As already quoted, the Executive Order does expressly state (in language unchanged from its 1981 promulgation): "Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests." n301 That is, one of 12,333's purposes is to fill the civil liberties gap left by constitutional and statutory law. But 12,333 cannot live up to that goal. For one thing, the rules' status as part of an executive order renders them both less visible and more easily weakened. The 2008 amendments to 12,333, for example, for the first time allowed inter-agency sharing of signals intelligence "for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is [*181] relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it," pursuant to potential "procedures established by the Director in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and approved by the Attorney General." n302 This change received no attention by non-governmental commentators. n303 More important, even if Executive Order 12,333 adequately covered civil liberties interests in 1980, it--along with its associated AG Guidelines--has grown out-of-date in subsequent decades. Unsurprisingly, given the generally low visibility of intelligence matters, there was little appetite to update either Executive Order 12,333 or other sources of executive self-regulation to address new challenges to liberty, until the Snowden disclosures. Thus notwithstanding the enormous changes that have taken place in the scope of surveillance since 1980 and the advent of "big data" methods, there have been no substantive liberty-protective changes ever made to the Executive Order. Some procedural protections have been added, n304 and notable efforts to weaken the protection of U.S. Person information were fended off. n305 But whatever further substantive protection might be useful in light of technological or other changes, all that has been added since 1980 is new hortatory language swearing fealty to (already binding) other laws: "The United States Government has a solemn obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law." n306
(__)(__) To curtail means to put a restriction on something. The affirmative must put a restriction on the action. The counterplan only stops the action.VOCABULARY.COM 14 [http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail] curtail To curtail something is to slow it down, put restrictions on it, or stop it entirely. If I give up cake, I am curtailing my cake-eating. Curtail is an official-sounding word for stopping or slowing things down. The police try to curtail crime — they want there to be less crime in the world. A company may want to curtail their employees' computer time, so they spend more time working and less time goofing around. Teachers try to curtail whispering and note-passing in class. When something is curtailed, it's either stopped entirely or stopped quite a bit — it's cut short. (__) “Authority” derives from other actors – curtailing must done by another actor – not the executive branchHill, JD – Hastings College of Law, 13 [Gerald Hill, The People's Law Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2478] authority n. permission, a right coupled with the power to do an act or order others to act. Often one person gives another authority to act, as an employer to an employee, a principal to an agent, a corporation to its officers, or governmental empowerment to perform certain functions. There are different types of authority, including "apparent authority" when a principal gives an agent various signs of authority to make others believe he or she has authority; "express authority" or "limited authority," which spells out exactly what authority is granted (usually a written set of instructions) "implied authority," which flows from the position one holds and "general authority," which is the broad power to act for another. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 165.99 Kb. Share with your friends:
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