Explanation of this affirmative


Past regulations empirically prevent HSR



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Past regulations empirically prevent HSR




Lack of planning and outdated regulations have doomed previous proposals; must have good planning and policy exploration to be able to solve



Perl 2012 (Anthony, Political Science Department & Urban Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, Canada Assessing the recent reformulation of United States passenger rail policy Journal of Transport Geography 22 (2012) 271–281 www.elsevier.com/locate/jtrangeo)
4. The legacy of stagnation: challenges in improving the Northeast Corridor A revealing perspective on the limitations arising from the atro- phy of high-speed passenger train design and construction capac- ity in the years following Amtrak’s creation is offered by the Acela project. Between 1996 and 2003, the federal government A. Perl / Journal of Transport Geography 22 (2012) 271–281 275 276 A. Perl / Journal of Transport Geography 22 (2012) 271–281 invested $3.2 billion in a second, and much more ambitious, at- tempt to realize Senator Pell’s vision of a bullet train serving the Northeast (United States General Accounting Office, 2004). By elec- trifying the tracks between Boston and New Haven and ordering 20 new electric trainsets adapted from the TGV’s design, the launch of true high-speed train service between the nation’s capital, New York City, and southern New England appeared to be imminent. Acela was initially billed as America’s long awaited analog of the Tokaido Shinkansen and the Paris–Lyon TGV, namely a breakthrough project that would open the door wide to high-speed rail in the United States. But that was not how the project turned out. The Acela trains turned out to be the heaviest high-speed trains ever built, to comply with Federal Railroad Administration safety regulations requiring its rolling stock to withstand 800,000 lb of collision force. This standard was based upon the anticipated impact of a head-on crash with a freight train, and was derived from a regulation that had been introduced by the US Postal Service for crash survivability of Railway Post Office cars that were put in service in the 1940s (Tyrell, 2002, p. 126). Since neither the Canadian builder nor the French designer of the Acela trains was a domestic manufacturer, their input to the development of ‘‘new’’ safety regulations was minimal. Development and testing were rushed to meet an ambitious production schedule, leaving little opportunity to identify design flaws that have since plagued Acela’s operations and stymied its performance as a true high-speed train. When Acela trains were pulled out of service for defective brakes and cracked suspension beams after less than 2years of operation, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was called upon to assess the project’s implementation. Their findings underscored that know-how for adapting global high-speed rail experience to the Northeast Corri- dor was significantly lacking. The GAO report concluded: (1) Amtrak’s management of this project was not comprehensive but was focused on the short term; (2) project management focused on separate components of the project, such as electrifi- cation and acquisition of the high-speed trains, and not the pro- ject as a whole; and (3) did not sufficiently address major infrastructure improvements needed to attain project trip-time goals. We also found that Amtrak lacked a comprehensive finan- cial plan for the project and that Amtrak did not fully integrate stakeholder interests (commuter rail authorities and state gov- ernments), even though work that involved stakeholders was critical to achieving project goals. The overall results of this poor management was that many critical elements of the project were not completed, project costs and schedules increased consider- ably, and the project goal (3-hour trip time from Boston to New York City) was not attained. (United States Government Account- ability Office, 2005, p. 13) To sum up, Amtrak can be seen to have filled the policy vacuum that existed at its inception in 1971 with a robust set of administra- tive and political fortifications designed to protect it from fiscal as- saults. While this configuration of policy instruments has worked to preserve a national network of conventional passenger trains, the capacity to develop and deploy a new passenger train technology that existed in the late 1960s has withered away. Opening a policy window to pursue fundamental redevelopment of the passenger train would have to contend with this diminished capacity.

Inconsistent support from past and present administrations

HSR has checkered past; gaining support now, but future is uncertain



Chen 2011 (Zhenhua, PhD student at the George Mason University, School of Public Policy, and is currently working as a graduate research assistant under the supervision of Prof. Jonathan Gifford in the area of transportation policy. Mr. Chen was awarded the Graduate Student Best Paper Award of the 51st Transportation Research Forum, “Is the Policy Window Open for High-Speed Rail in the United States: A Perspective from the Multiple Streams Model of Policymaking,” Transportation Law Journal Vol. 38:115)


High-Speed Rail ("HSR"), also known as an intercity passenger transport, can run at top speeds of at least 150 mph. Traditionally, rail- dominated countries such as Japan, Germany, and France use HSR to connect metropolitan areas and have achieved impressive social and economic successes due to their use of HSR. Countries such as Spain, Korea, and China have introduced HSR into their transportation systems and are also beginning to see the results of HSR after years of projects. As a result of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act ("IS- TEA") of 1991, America has initiated the creation of a concrete HSR plan. The High-Speed Rail Development Act ("HSRDA") of 1994 took further clear steps to bring HSR to the United States. However, during previous administrations HSR had "faded" out of the governmental agenda. In recent years, under the backdrop of soaring gasoline prices and increasing concerns about environmental protection, it has become clear that HSR is an ideal alternative for future transportation. HSR has gained new attention in the United States. Furthermore, because of the 2008 economic recession, job creation is the first priority of the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration has given HSR a new task-creating jobs. In February 2009, just a few days after his inauguration, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA") was passed, which apportioned eight billion dollars designated for a national high-speed rail investment. In April 2009, the United State Department of Transportation (USDOT) announced the national strategic high-speed rail plan, Version for High Speed Rail in America, which includes eleven high-speed corridors designed to accommodate maximum speeds of over 120 mph. On January 28, 2010, President Obama unveiled the High- Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program, which included several initial selected projects that would be awarded federal funds. These changes in policy and funding show that unlike other countries, the idea of HSR in the United States has been on and off public and presidential agendas because of different economic situations and political tides. Now supported by an innovative and ambitious president, the "faded" HSR seems on the verge of a comeback and ready to get on the right track. Yet, the answers to several fundamental questions are still unclear. Why is President Obama now pushing HSR instead of other alternative modes? What are the situational differences between the related HSR Acts that have passed during Obama's administration and that in Clinton's and George W. Bush's administrations? What role does HSR play in the United States, and what can be done to implement these long-term infrastructure projects efficiently and effectively?



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