Tradeoff irrelevant—space weapons are net better
Dolman and Cooper 11 – Everett C. Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Henry F. Cooper, Jr., Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense, March 7, 2011, “Toward a Theory of Space Power, Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/space-Ch19.pdf
A follow-on argument is rhetorical and usually takes the form, "Wouldn't the money spent on space weapons be better spent elsewhere?" It would be lovely if the tens of billions of dollars necessary to effectively weaponize space could be spent on education, or the environment, or dozens of other worthy causes, but this is a moot argument. Money necessary for space weapons will not come from the Departments of the Interior or State or from any other department except Defense. Any windfall for not pursuing space weaponization is speculative only and is therefore not transitive. This means that the funds for space weaponization will come at the expense of other military projects, from within the budget of the Department of Defense. This observation is the basis for criticism among military traditionalists, who see the advent of space weapons as the beginning of the end for conventional warfare.
Current conventional military forces and means are enough to ensure America's security needs, so why risk weaponization of space? The United States has the greatest military force the world has known; why change it when it is not broken? This argument is, obviously, tightly connected to the previous response, which points out that states failing to adapt to change eventually fall by the wayside. But more so, it shows a paucity of moral righteousness on the opposition's side. For the cost of deploying an effective space weapons program, America could buy and maintain 10 more heavy divisions (or, say, 6 more carrier battlegroups and 6 fighter wings). Let us suppose that is true. What would be more threatening to the international environment, to the sovereignty of states: a few hundred antiballistic missile satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) backed by a handful of space lasers, or 10 heavy divisions with the support infrastructure to move and supply them anywhere on the globe?
Space weapons are superior
Preston et al 2 – Bob Preston, former U.S. Air Force officer who is now with RAND, author of Plowshares and Power: The Military Uses of Civil of Space, Dana J. Johnson, Senior Analyst at the Northrop Grumman Corporation's Analysis Center, Sean Edwards, doctoral fellow at the RAND Graduate School and author of Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, Future, Michael Miller, mathematical consultant at The RAND Corporation, Calvin Shipbaugh, RAND physicist, 2002, “Space Weapons: Earth Wars,” RAND Corporation, http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/Space%20Weapons%20Earth%20Wars.pdf
Access and Reach
Here, access means access to a target without political constraints on overflight or passage of the platform carrying the weapon, and reach refers to the ability to engage a broader, perhaps global, range of targets than other weapons can. Space weapons share these attributes to a degree with ICBMs. Space weapons generally have global reach, although some weapons can reach into the northern or southern hemisphere using roughly half the weapons needed for global reach. ICBMs have roughly hemispheric reach. If there is some concern about limiting the countries that might feel threatened by a space weapon, reach could be a liability. Within a budget for the number and size of weapons and platforms, reach and responsiveness will be trade-offs.
Responsiveness
Even with relatively few space weapons and platforms, the time it takes to have one in position to attack a particular target will be less than the time needed for most terrestrial weapons—unless the terrestrial weapons have already been deployed to the theater of operations containing the target. It could take a few hours for a spacebased kinetic-energy weapon to strike its target after release, given weapon logistics comparable to those of terrestrial alternatives. It could take about 20 minutes after release for a space-based conventional weapon to be deployed in the vicinity of a surface target. In contrast, it takes a few days to some weeks for terrestrial weapons to reach a theater of operations from the United States. Long-range ballistic missiles, which reach their targets in times comparable with space weapons, are the exception. However, long-range ballistic missiles are strongly associated with weapons of mass destruction.
The responsiveness of space-based weapons may also be seen as a disadvantage. When the objective of owning weapons of mass destruction is to deter others who have weapons of mass destruction, shorter times make stable deterrence more difficult if they threaten the survivability of the opponent’s deterrent. Some have suggested that the timeliness of ground attack weapons from space would threaten the stability of nuclear deterrence. But this is not necessarily so. Because the deorbit times for practical space-based weapons are at best comparable with and generally longer than those of existing ballistic missiles, short warning times would degrade deterrence only if surveillance systems were unable to see space weapons deorbit and if the terrestrial nuclear deterrent forces were vulnerable to the space weapons. Surveillance of space for reliable attack warning is more difficult than surveillance of the earth for missile warning, but it is possible from space. However, warning of an attack is not absolutely necessary for preserving stable deterrence if enough of the opponent’s deterrent forces are survivable. Among terrestrial nuclear deterrent forces, only stationary or slow-moving surface platforms, such as silo-based missiles, would be vulnerable to a first strike from space. But thanks to accurate ballistic missiles, silobased missiles have been vulnerable for a long time, so most nuclear deterrent forces are at least partially based on mobile launchers or submarines to improve survivability. These measures are just as effective against space-based threats.
Distance
Distance from other weapons and basing modes may help to distinguish a space-based weapon from another kind. For example, spacebased kinetic or conventional weapons that might be more economically based on terrestrial ballistic missiles could be usefully differentiated from nuclear weapons normally based on terrestrial ballistic missiles, if others were confident that the space platforms did not carry weapons of mass destruction. The great distance from other things that is normal in space can improve the survivability of spacebased weapons. There is also a downside to distance. If the spacebased weapons were weapons of mass destruction, their physical distance from other targets might make stable deterrence more difficult by inviting a disarming first strike with less collateral damage. Also, distance and gravity are the sources of the logistic limitations we will see in the next section.
Space weapons are more effective than conventional ones
Tucker 8 – Dennis P. Tucker, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the 336th Recruiting Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, June 2008, “PRESERVING UNITED STATES DOMINANCE: THE BENEFITS OF WEAPONIZING THE HIGH GROUND,” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod.../display.aspx?...
Space-based weapons can provide a number of distinct advantages to include rapid response, overcoming access and distance limitations, and creating difficulties for adversary defense. The National Defense Strategy says that America’s ability to operate in and from the global commons, to include space, enables it to project power anywhere in the world and is critical to the direct defense of the United States and its partners.71 The key is that space weapons could attack targets that are inaccessible to other weapons, and can provide access to targets without concern for violating denied airspace. Throughout its current national strategy documents, the need for the United States to project force rapidly in denied access environments is emphasized, and there is no more comprehensive means than with space-based weapons.
Space weapons technologically superior
Lambakis 2 – Steven Lambakis, senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, July 2002, “Putting Military Uses of Space in Context,” kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/38949/.../06_Lambakis.pdf
Space can offer global reach and host a capability to strike targets in a timely manner. Given the great distances that missiles travel, a defender will have to operate in and from space to defend different areas around the globe. Lasers, or speed of light weapons, in space may provide an even better tool for conquering distance, in a very short span of time, perhaps allowing the defender to counter hostile missiles a few thousand miles away. Given adequate numbers of satellites, space also accommodates around the clock coverage of the earth, helping to provide early warning, track threat missiles, and discriminate target complexes.
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