Treaty of Surrender by General Stand Watie

Treaty of Surrender by General Stand Watie

"Treaty stipulations made and entered into this 23rd day of June 1865 near Doaksville Choctaw Nation between Sent. Colonel A. C. Mathews and W. H. Vance U. S. Vol. commissioners appointed by Major General Herron U. S. A. on part of the military authorities of the United States and Brig. General Stand Watie Governor and Principal Chief of that part of the Cherokee Nation lately allied with Confederate States in acts of hostilities against the Government of the United States as follows towit:

"ARTICLE I. All acts of hostilities on the part of both armies having ceased by virtue of a convention entered into on the 26th day of May 1865 between Major General E. R. S. Cantry U. S. A. Comdg. Mil. Division West Miss. and General E. Kirby Smith C. S. A. Comdg. Trans. Miss Department. The Indians of the Cherokee Nation here represented lately allied with the Confederate States in acts of hostilities against the Government of the United States.

"Do agree at once to return to their respective homes and there remain at peace with United States, and offer no indignities whatever against the whites or Indians of the various tribes who have been friendly to or engaged in the service of the United States during the war.

"ARTICLE II. It is stipulated by the undersigned commissioners on part of the United States, that so- long as the Indians aforesaid observe the provisions of article first of this agreement, they shall be protected by the United States authorities in their person and property, not only from encroachment on the part of the whites, but also from the Indians who have been engaged in the service of the United States.

"ARTICLE Ill. The above articles of agreement to remain and be in force and effect until the meeting of the Grand Council to meet at Armstrong Academy, Choctaw Nation on the 1st day of September A. D. 1865 and until such time as the preceedings of said Grand Council shall be ratified by the proper authorities both of the Cherokee Nation and the United States.

"In testimony whereof the said Lieut. Col. A. C. Mathews and adjutant W. H. Vance commissioners on part of the United States and Brig. General Stand Watie Governor and Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation have hereunto set their hands and seals.

Signed.

W. H. Vance, Adjr. Commissioners.

Stand Watie Brig. Genl.,
Governor and Principal Chief
Cherokee Nation.

Historical Atlas of Oklahoma
By John W. Morris, Charles R. Goins, and Edwin C. McReynolds²⁴
Map Thirty-Two:

Battle of the Washita
Indians on the Great Plains regularly avoided military campaigns during winter months. Lacking grain fro their horses, the most active raiders preferred the comfort of the lodge to matching their ponies, subsisting on meager winter pasturage, against the grain-fed mounts of the United States Cavalry. Furthermore, young warriors sometimes sought refuge in the winter camp of a peace friend. United States Army commanders were provoked to desperation by the elusive tactics of hostile Indian leaders.

The Battle of the Washita was the result of Black Kettle’s (Moke-ta-ra-to’s) loyalty to Indian friends who were wanted by United States officers, together with determined winter campaigning by General George A. Custer and the difficulty of communication between the two races. In effect, it was a surprise assault of United States troops upon a camp whose leader was well disposed toward the authority of the United States. Black Kettle had shown interest in the Peace Commission of 1867 and a strong tendency toward cooperation with N.G. Taylor, the Indian commissioner.

However, Custer had orders from General Philip Sheridan to conduct a cold-weather campaign. The blizzard that descended upon the Southwest in November 1868, offered the earliest opportunity for trial of the new policy, and Custer was the man chosen to attack the Cheyennes.

Custer and twelve troops of the Seventh Cavalry, a party of about 800 men, rode south. Ben Clark, California joe, Hard Rope the Osage, and Jimmy Morrison—all first-rate scouts—accompanied the soldiers. Custer knew the extent of the Cheyenne camp before he attacked. Two young Cheyenne raiders, Crow Neck and Black Shield, had recently come back from Kansas with fresh scalps as trophies. The young men were confident that white troops would not venture an attack on the camp during cold weather, but Black Kettle was in doubt and thought it best to post a sentry.

Approaching from the north, Custer waited for dawn behind a low hill. He divided his command into four bands of about 200 men each. Major Joel Elliot was sent downstream nearly three miles to approach the camp from the east. Captain William Thompson cut south across the Washita to come in from the southwest. The soldiers under Colonel Edward Myers advanced on the right, crossing the stream to approach the Cheyenne camp on the south bank as Custer’s band moved in directly from the northwest. With Custer rode forty sharpshooters under Lieutenant W.W. Cook.

The savage barking dogs aroused Double Wolf, the sentinel, who had slipped inside a log to warm himself; but the Cheyenne warriors did not get warning soon enough to catch their ponies and mount. A rear guard was outnumbered four to one. Black Kettle did manage to get on his pony and help his wife mount behind him, but a volley from Cook’s sharpshooters killed them both.

Custer learned from a captive, Black Kettle’s sister that there were one thousand Indian lodges farther down the Washita. He determined to pull out without pursuing the fugitives farther. His report showed that he had killed 103 warriors, 16 women, and “a few” children. The United States force last highly valued officers and men, including Major Elliot, Sergeant-Major Walter Kennedy, and Captain Louis Hamilton.

The Choctaw-Chickasaw treaty ceded the Leased District to the United States for $300,000. The Creek treaty ceded the western half of Creek lands—3,250,000 acres—for $975,168. The Seminoles ceded all of their land—2,169,080 acres—for $325, 362. The Seminoles further agreed to purchase 200,000 acres of land, a part of the tract of land recently acquired by the United States from the Creeks. The Seminoles would eventually purchase an additional tract of land in 1881, enlarging their new home to 375,000.

Settlements on land ceded by the Creeks and Seminoles also were limited to “such other civilized Indians as the United States may choose to settle thereon.”

Each of the Five Civilized Tribes agreed to admit two railroads—one rail line running east to west, the other north to south—across tribal lands.

Tribal settlements in the Cherokee Outlet as of 1889 were as follows: east of the Arkansas River, Osage and Kaw; west of the Arkansas, Oto and Missouri, Ponca, and Tonkawa. On Creak and Seminole land were the Sac and Fox, Pottawatomie and Shawnee, Iowa, and Kickapoo tribes.

The Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes occupied a reservation more than 3,000,000 acres in extent in the southeastern part of the Leased District. The Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation was west of the 98^th meridian and south of the Cherokee Outlet.

The region between the North Fork of the Red River and the 100^th meridian, about 2,300 square miles in extent, was still in dispute between Texas and the United States. Texas had organized the area as Greer County and admitted more than 8,000 homesteaders.

The Cherokee Outlet comprised over 6,000,000 acres not occupied by Indian groups. “No Man’s Land” had no legal settlers, and was not officially attached to any state or territory. Greer County was settled only in part. A fourth region, the “Unassigned Lands,” containing 1,887,796 acres, became the first area opened to non-Indian settlement in 1889. It was near the center of the present state.
Map Forty-Six:

Cattle Trails
The trails of the great cattle drives from Texas through the Indian Territory became well-established routes fro the transportation of cattle on the hoof. In 1866 the price of a fine steer in Texas was usually not more than $5; in Chicago and New York the same beef animal would sell for a price ranging from $65 to $90. The great need of Texas ranchers was a means for delivering their cattle to a point where railroad lines made connections with markets.

Railroads in Missouri and eastern Kansas determined the route of the first northern drives. As the rails were pushed westward in Kansas, however, cattle trails leading to them also were established father west.

The drives in 1866 followed the Texas Road, a trail filled with difficulties and dangers—deep streams that were hard to ford, Indians who resented cattle drives across their insufficient pasture lands, and rough, timbered areas where the wild Texas steers might cause endless delay by hiding in the brush. This was known as the East Shawnee Trail. From Fort Gibson a branch trail developed along the left bank of the Arkansas River, and many Indian ranchmen of northeastern Indian Territory followed this route into Cowley County, KS.

The West Shawnee Trail left the Texas Road at Boggy Depot toward the northwest, crossing the Canadian River near the site of Konawa, the North Canadian River near the site of Shawnee, the Cimarron River near the site of present-day Cushing, and continued to the west of the Arkansas, passing near the sites of Pawnee and Ponca City.

Eighty miles west of Colbert’s Ferry the Chisholm Trail crossed the Red River near Ringold, TX and extended north to the Kansas line. This famous route, slightly irregular because of the locations of the best fords, was roughly parallel to the 98^th meridian and to the line followed later by the Rock Island railroad and U.S. Highway 81.

This great artery of the northern drive was named for Jesse Chisholm, the trader. Jesse was son-in-law of the proprietor of Edward’s Post at the mouth of the Little River. The Chisholm Ranch, near the site of Asher, drove cattle nearly one hundred miles to King Fisher’s stagecoach station, where the Texas cattle passed on the way to Kansas. Jesse Chisholm, more interested in trade rather than livestock growing, hauled provisions south from Caldwell, KS to supply the crews on the great cattle drives. The Cherokee Indian trader thus became the best-known person on the trail, and it was natural to designate the route by his name.

The Great Western Trail, crossing the Red River within sight of Doan’s Store, TX ran almost due north to Trail and Cedar Springs, then northwest to the crossing of Beaver Creek and to the Kansas line beyond Sherman Ranch. The Great Western was relatively free of timber, and the Indians were willing to exchange pasturage for beef.

The northern objective was Dodge City, KS, which was called “the cow capital of the world” for a decade. Between 1866 and 1885 about 6,000,000 head of cattle were driven north from Texas to the Kansas railroad lines or to northern ranges in Nebraska, the Dakotas, Wyoming, or Montana. The Missouri, Kansas, and Texas railroad, completed in 1872, the Santa Fe line completed across Oklahoma lands in 1886, and other lines from Texas to Kansas quickly reduced the cattle drives to local operations.

Map Sixty-Four:

The Union Pacific planned a southern branch to connect eastern Kansas with the Gulf of Mexico, following the route of the old Texas Road. In 1869 the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway Company, charted by the state of Kansas, acquired the properties of this southern branch, and by 1873 had extended the line from Chetopa, KS across Indian Territory to the Red River near Colbert’s Ferry. Crossing the Arkansas River on a bridge 840 feet long, this first line in the land of the Five Civilized Tribes ran southwest through Muskogee, Eufaula, McAlester, Atoka, and Durant.

The Atlantic and Pacific had constructed a line from St. Louis to Seneca, Missouri, on the border of Indian Territory by April 1, 1871. This route extended its line southwest toward the Creek Nation. It formed a junction with the MK&T at Vinita on September 1, and stopped construction until 1882. By that time it had been reorganized as the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company. It bridged the Arkansas River by 1886 and established an important cattle-shipping center at Red Fork on the right bank. Between 1882 and 1887 the same company constructed a line from Fort Smith through the Choctaw Nation to the Red River south of Hugo.

The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad built south from Caldwell, KS in 1890, approximately along the line of the Chisholm Trail across the Cherokee Outlet and the Unassigned Lands to the border of the Chickasaw Nation. In 1902 the Rock Island Company bought the properties of the Choctaw, Oklahoma, and Gulf Railroad, which gave El Reno a connection with Oklahoma City, Shawnee, Wewoka, McAlester, and Wister Junction. Since the principal fuel for locomotives at that time was coal, access to the eastern Oklahoma mines was an important consideration for the MK&T, the Rock Island, and other routes.

The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, which was in operation before the opening of the Unassigned Lands, played a large part in the runs for homesteads and the location of town sites. The growth of population in the Twin Territories and the development of industry and agriculture were closely dependent upon railroads in Oklahoma, as in other parts of the American West.

By 1916, even before railroad construction was completed in Oklahoma, abandonment of unprofitable lines had begun. This phenomenon, due in part to the competition of highways and pipelines, parallels abandonments in the nation at large. For example, in 1972 a long MK&T line in western Oklahoma was abandoned. This route had extended from Altus to Woodward and then westward across the Panhandle to a point near Keyes in Cimarron County. The most recent abandonment was the dropping of the Santa Fe line from Pauls Valley to Lindsay in April, 1985.

To force the large Indian army back to the reservations, the Army dispatched three columns to attack in coordinated fashion, one of which contained General George A. Custer and the Seventh Cavalry. Spotting the Sioux village about fifteen miles away along the Rosebud River on June 25, Custer also found a nearby group of about forty warriors. Ignoring orders to wait, he decided to attack before they could alert the main party. He did not realize that the number of warriors in the village numbered three times his strength. Dividing his forces in three, Custer sent troops under Captain Frederick Benteen to prevent their escape through the upper valley of the Little Bighorn River. Major Marcus Reno was to pursue the group, cross the river, and charge the Indian village in a coordinated effort with the remaining troops under his command. He hoped to strike the Indian encampment at the northern and southern ends simultaneously, but made this decision without knowing what kind of terrain he would have to cross before making his assault. He belatedly discovered that he would have to negotiate a maze of bluffs and ravines to attack.

Reno's squadron of 175 soldiers attacked the southern end. Quickly finding themselves in a desperate battle with little hope of any relief, Reno halted his charging men before they could be trapped, fought for ten minutes in dismounted formation, and then withdrew into the timber and brush along the river. When that position proved indefensible, they retreated uphill to the bluffs east of the river, pursued hotly by a mix of Cheyenne and Sioux.

Just as they finished driving the soldiers out, the Indians found roughly 210 of Custer's men coming towards the other end of the village, taking the pressure off of Reno's men. Cheyenne and Hunkpapa Sioux together crossed the river and slammed into the advancing soldiers, forcing them back to a long high ridge to the north. Meanwhile, another force, largely Oglala Sioux under Crazy Horse's command, swiftly moved downstream and then doubled back in a sweeping arc, enveloping Custer and his men in a pincer move. They began pouring in gunfire and arrows.

As the Indians closed in, Custer ordered his men to shoot their horses and stack the carcasses to form a wall, but they provided little protection against bullets. In less than an hour, Custer and his men were killed in the worst American military disaster ever. After another day's fighting, Reno and Benteen's now united forces escaped when the Indians broke off the fight. They had learned that the other two columns of soldiers were coming towards them, so they fled.

After the battle, the Indians came through and stripped the bodies and mutilated all the uniformed soldiers, believing that the soul of a mutilated body would be forced to walk the earth for all eternity and could not ascend to heaven. Inexplicably, they stripped Custer's body and cleaned it, but did not scalp or mutilate it. He had been wearing buckskins instead of a blue uniform, and some believe that the Indians thought he was not a soldier and so, thinking he was an innocent, left him alone. Because his hair was cut short for battle, others think that he did not have enough hair to allow for a very good scalping. Immediately after the battle, the myth emerged that they left him alone out of respect for his fighting ability, but few participating Indians knew who he was to have been so respectful. To this day, no one knows the real reason.

Little Bighorn was the pinnacle of the Indians' power. They had achieved their greatest victory yet, but soon their tenuous union fell apart in the face of the white onslaught. Outraged over the death of a popular Civil War hero on the eve of the Centennial, the nation demanded and received harsh retribution. The Black Hills dispute was quickly settled by redrawing the boundary lines, placing the Black Hills outside the reservation and open to white settlement. Within a year, the Sioux nation was defeated and broken. "Custer's Last Stand" was their last stand as well.

Reno took a steady gallop down the creek bottom three miles where it emptied into the Little Horn, and found a natural ford across the Little Horn River. He started to cross, when the scouts came back and called out to him to hold on, that the Sioux were coming in large numbers to meet him. He crossed over, however, formed his companies on the prairie in line of battle, and moved forward at a trot but soon took a gallop.

The Valley was about three fourth of a mile wide, on the left a line of low, round hills, and on the right the river bottom covered with a growth of cottonwood trees and bushes. After scattering shots were fired from the hills and a few from the river bottom and Reno's skirmishers returned the shots.

He advanced about a mile from the ford to a line of timber on the right and dismounted his men to fight on foot. The horses were sent into the timber, and the men forward on the prairie and advanced toward the Indians. The Indians, mounted on ponies, came across the prairie and opened a heavy fire on the soldiers. After skirmishing for a few minutes Reno fell back to his horses in the timber. The Indians moved to his left and rear, evidently with the intention of cutting him off from the ford.

Reno ordered his men to mount and move through the timber, but as his men got into the saddle the Sioux, who had advanced in the timber, fired at close range and killed one soldier. Colonel Reno then commanded the men to dismount, and they did so, but he soon ordered them to mount again, and moved out on to the open prairie.

The command headed for the ford, pressed closely by Indians in large numbers, and at every moment the rate of speed was increased, until it became a dead run for the ford. The Sioux, mounted on their swift ponies, dashed up by the side of the soldiers and fired at them, killing both men and horses. Little resistance was offered, and it was complete rout to the ford. I did not see the men at the ford, and do not know what took place further than a good many were killed when the command left the timber.

Just as I got out, my horse stumbled and fell and I was dismounted, the horse running away after Reno's command. I saw several soldiers who were dismounted, their horses having been killed or run away. There were also some soldiers mounted who had remained behind, I should think in all as many as thirteen soldiers, and seeing no chance of getting away, I called on them to come into the timber and we would stand off the Indians.

Three of the soldiers were wounded, and two of them so badly they could not use their arms. The soldiers wanted to go out, but I said no, we can't get to the ford, and besides, we have wounded men and must stand by them. The soldiers still wanted to go, but I told them I was an old frontiers-man, understood the Indians, and if they would do as I said I would get them out of the scrape which was no worse than scrapes I had been in before. About half of the men were mounted, and they wanted to keep their horses with them, but I told them to let the horses go and fight on foot.

We stayed in the bush about three hours, and I could hear heavy firing below in the river, apparently about two miles distant. I did not know who it was, but knew the Indians were fighting some of our men, and learned afterward

it was Custer's command. Nearly all the Indians in the upper part of the valley drew off down the river, and the fight with Custer lasted about one hour, when the heavy firing ceased. When the shooting below began to die away I said to the boys “come, now is the time to get out.” Most of them did not go, but waited for night. I told them the Indians would come back and we had better be off at once. Eleven of the thirteen said they would go, but two stayed behind.

I deployed the men as skirmishers and we moved forward on foot toward the river. When we had got nearly to the river we met five Indians on ponies, and they fired on us. I returned the fire and the Indians broke and we then forded the river, the water being heart deep. We finally got over, wounded men and all, and headed for Reno's command which I could see drawn up on the bluffs along the river about a mile off. We reached Reno in safety.

We had not been with Reno more than fifteen minutes when I saw the Indians coming up the valley from Custer's fight. Reno was then moving his whole command down the ridge toward Custer. The Indians crossed the river below Reno and swarmed up the bluff on all sides. After skirmishing with them Reno went back to his old position which was on one of the highest fronts along the bluffs. It was now about five o'clock, and the fight lasted until it was too dark to see to shoot.

As soon as it was dark Reno took the packs and saddles off the mules and horses and made breast works of them. He also dragged the dead horses and mules on the line and sheltered the men behind them. Some of the men dug rifle pits with their butcher knives and all slept on their arms.

At the peep of day the Indians opened a heavy fire and a desperate fight ensued, lasting until 10 o'clock. The Indians charged our position three or four times, coming up close enough to hit our men with stones, which they threw by hand. Captain Benteen saw a large mass of Indians gathered on his front to charge, and ordered his men to charge on foot and scatter them.

Benteen led the charge and was upon the Indians before they knew what they were about and killed a great many. They were evidently much surprised at this offensive movement, and I think in desperate fighting Benteen is one of the bravest men I ever saw in a fight. All the time he was going about through the bullets, encouraging the soldiers to stand up to their work and not let the Indians whip them; he went among the horses and pack mules and drove out the men who were skulking there, compelling them to go into the line and do their duty. He never sheltered his own person once during the battle, and I do not see how he escaped being killed. The desperate charging and fighting was over at about one o'clock, but firing was kept up on both sides until late in the afternoon.

Reservations Not Accepted: Chief Joseph
By Alan Lockwood and David Harris²⁶
Centuries before the arrival of whites, American Indian tribes roamed freely throughout what is now the northwestern part of the United States. Animals were hunted for meat. Other foods, such as roots and berries, were gathered from the land. Among the tribes in the area were the Palouse, the Yakima, the Spokan, the Wallawalla, and the Nez Perce.

When Lewis and Clark explored the area in 1805-1806, the Nez Perce was one of the largest tribes. According to one estimate, there were four to six thousand Nez Perce living in bands in the area where the borders of present-day Oregon, Washington, and Idaho meet.

Lewis and Clark, as well as other whites, reported that the Nez Perce were friendly and helpful. As more and more whites came to the area, however, conflicts developed. There were significant differences between white and American Indians ideas about religion, property, and law.

Christian missionaries came to the Northwest in the early 1800s. They believed it was their duty to convert the various tribes to Christianity. Often the missionaries failed to understand the importance of Indian religious beliefs, or looked upon them as being of little worth.

The Nez Perce, and other tribes, held strong religious views. In general their religions were related to nature and the spirits they believed influenced human and animal behavior, as well as the climate and the weather. The Indians’ respect for the natural environment was partly a result of their religious beliefs. For example, each Nez Perce might have a personal guardian spirit or Wyakim. Each Wyakim was connected with some feature of the natural world.

The conflicts between whites and Indians often erupted into bloody battles. The Nez Perce were generally successful in avoiding violence. At time members of the tribe served as scouts for U.S. soldiers. Unfortunately, the Nez Perce’s time of war was to come.

As the United States moved westward, it was its policy to place Indians on reservations in an effort to control the Native American population. When Isaac Stevens became governor of the Washington Territory, he set out to establish reservations for the various tribes in the Territory.

In 1855 Stevens met with the leaders of many tribes, and, after much debate, a treaty was established. According to the treaty, large areas of land were set aside for reservations. The government promised to provide money and make certain improvements on the land, and no whites were to be allowed on the reservations without permission of the tribes.

The treaty provisions were soon violated. White settlers often moved onto tribal lands. Gold was discovered in the area, and miners began to enter the reservation areas. There were occasional outbreaks of violence.

Because of the treaty violations, a new treaty meeting was held in 1863. The chiefs of the Nez Perce bands had a major disagreement. Some were willing to draw boundaries for a new reservation while others were not. As a result, some Nez Perce bands signed a new treaty establishing reservations and other refused to sign. Those who refused to sign returned to the lands they had inhabited after the treaty of 1855.

One group of Nez Perce, which had refused to sign the treaty, returned to their lands in the Wallowa Valley. When the chief of the band died in 1871, he told his son Joseph: “When I am gone, think of our country. . . . Always remember that your father never sold his country. You must stop your ears whenever you are asked to sign a treaty selling your home. . . . Never sell the bones of your father and mother.” Joseph, holding his dying father’s hand, said that he would protect the land with his life.

Young Chief Joseph, now in his early thirties, tried to live in peace with the white settlers in the area. He occasionally ate dinner with the settlers and played with their children. He would explain why the land traditionally belonged to the Nez Perce. As more and more white settlers came into the area, however, tension increased.

Government policy did not reduce the tension. In 1873, President Grant issued an order prohibiting whites from settling on the Nez Perce land in the Wallowa Valley. The order was ineffective partly because the boundaries of the Nez Perce land were not clearly established. Then, in 1875, the President revoked the 1873 order, opening the valley to white settlers. The President’s decision was based on an incorrect report stating that Joseph and his group were willing to move onto the Nez Perce reservation.

Pressure to move the tribes onto reservations continued. In some parts of the Northwest, nonreservation Indians fought battles with whites. Throughout the area, a fear and distrust of nonreservation tribes grew among whites.

Efforts were made to persuade the nonreservation Nez Perce to move onto the reservation. General Oliver O. Howard was military commander of the area. At first he opposed moving Chief Joseph’s group. In 1875 he wrote the War Department: “I think it is a great mistake to take from Joseph and his band of Nez Perce Indians that valley . . . possibly Congress can be induced to let these really peaceable Indians have this poor valley for their own.” Howard’s advice was not followed.

Relations between Joseph’s band and neighboring whites reached a dangerous point. Two whites killed a friend of Chief Joseph’s whom they accused of horse stealing. Joseph was particularly outraged when it seemed that they two whites were not going to be brought to trial. At one point he treated to drive the white settlers out of the valley, and he demanded that the killers be turned over the Nez Perce. Eventually the killers were brought to trial by white authorities, but they were no convicted.

Soon after this crisis, Howard and other government officials were ordered to place the Nez Perce on the reservation. A meeting was arranged in November 1876.

At the meeting, Chief Joseph made his position clear:

The earth was my mother. . . . I could not consent to sever my affections from the land which bore me. I ask nothing of the President. I am able to take care of myself. I do not desire the Wallowa Valley as a reservation, for that would subject me to the will of another and make me dependent on him and subject to laws not of our own making. I am disposed to live peaceably.

General Howard and others argued that the U.S. government made the laws and that all the people must follow them. According to Howard, the Nez Perce were denying the proper authority of the government. Joseph and the other chiefs were not persuaded, and the meeting ended.

The time for discussion was over. The government ordered Howard to more the Nez Perce onto the reservation. Violence was to be avoided, but force was to be used if necessary. As Howard later wrote, “In fact the time for loving persuasion had now gone by. Positive instruction had come, and obedience was required.”

In May 1877, Howard again met with the nonreservation Nez Perce. It was an angry meeting. One chief challenged the general: “The Great Spirit made the world as it is and as He wanted it. . . . I do not see where you get your authority to say that we shall not live here as He placed us.”

The argument continued and finally Howard announced: “I stand here for the President, and there is no spirit good or bad that will hinder me. My orders are plain, and will be executed. I hoped that the Indians had good sense enough to make me their friend, and not their enemy.”

Many of the Nez Perce were furious and wanted to begin a war. Chief Joseph was angry also, but he opposed war. He believed a war could be disastrous for his people. The U.S. army had too many soldiers and weapons. After much discussion, the Nez Perce reluctantly agreed to move onto reservations.

General Howard wanted to be sure that they tribe would move as quickly as possible. He said the Nez Perce would have 30 days to move to the reservation. Then, it is reported, he gave a warning: “If you let the time run over one day, the soldiers will be there to drive you on the reservation, and all your cattle and horses outside of the reservation at that time will fall into the hands of the white men.”

It would be difficult for the Nez Perce to reach the reservation lands within 30 days. They owned thousands of horses and many heads of cattle, and they would have to cross flooded rivers and rocky terrain. Nonetheless, Howard insisted upon the 30-day time limit. Frustrated, sad, and angry, the Nez Perce began their move to the reservation.

As they moved, a warlike spirit grew in some of the Nez Perce. Young warriors of Chief White Bird’s band were especially agitated. Whites had made their lives difficult. One white had killed the father of Wahlitits, a young man of White Bird’s band, two years earlier. The memory of his father’s death fueled the flames of resentment in Wahlitits. One day a Nez Perce taunted Wahlitis: “If you are so brave, why don’t you go kill the white man who killed your father?” Before he died, Wahlitits’ father had told him not to seek revenge, but now Wahlitits could no longer restrain himself.

Wahlitis and two other young men rode out to seek revenge. They were unable to find the man believed to have killed Wahlitits’ father, but they knew other whites in the area who had mistreated the Nez Perce. The young warriors attacked and killed a number of white settlers. The next day more whites were killed.

Although the killings had taken place without the consent of the tribal leaders, Chief Joseph and others were certain the entire tribe would be blamed. Hopes for peace faded, and the Nez Perce prepared for war.

On June 14, the 30-day deadline for reaching the reservation had passed, and General Howard heard about the killings of the whites. He ordered troops to pursue the Nez Perce. Howard was convinced that Chief Joseph was the war leader of the tribe. He was incorrect. Joseph’s main responsibility was to oversee the protection of the women, children, and elderly. Other chiefs directed the war efforts.

The first battle was faught on June 17, 1877, and the Nez Perce were able to beat back the soldiers. The tribe then began a long series of maneuvers to avoid the troops. The plan that developed was to leave Idaho be crossing the mountains into Montana. Once in Montana, the Nez Perce hoped they could live in peace in the buffalo country. If not, they would cross the border into Canada as the Sioux had done after the defeat of Custer the previous year.

Peace did not await them. U.S. troops from the Montana side of the mountains surprised the Nez Perce at Big Hole on August 9. The Nez Perce suffered heavy losses including the death of many women and children. The troops were unable to capture the tribe, however, and the surviving Nez Perce moved on.

In the meantime, General Howard and his troops had made the difficult trek across the mountains and were about two days behind the Nez Perce. Public opinion began to turn against the former Union hero of the Civil War. Newspaper articles explained that Howard was moving too slowly; that he should have captured the Nez Perce by now. There were many fears that the Nez Perce would bring war against white settlers in Montana. General William Sherman, Howard’s superior officer, heard the fears and criticisms. He ordered Howard to pursue the Nez Perce more vigorously: “That force of yours should pursue the Nez Perce to the death, lead where they may. . . . If you are tired, give the command to some young energetic officer.”

Howard sent a reply to Sherman saying that the delay had been caused by the difficult march and the need to wait for supplies. He said that he and his troops would continue to chase the Nez Perce.

Grief-stricken from the causalities suffered at Big Hole, the Nez Perce continued to maneuver away from the troops. They moved through Yellowstone Park. On the way they encountered some tourists and killed them. The Nez Perce feared that they tourists would report their movements to Howard.

The Tribe then turned northward toward Canada. Howard’s forces were still two days behind, so the Nez Perce stopped to rest in a section near the Bear Paw Mountains. For many of them it would be their final resting place.

General Howard had sent a message ahead to Colonel Nelson Miles. Miles commanded a group of soldiers who were in a position to head off the Nez Perce. In late September, Miles and his men discovered the location of the tribe.

A battle began on September 30. Miles was eager to capture the Nez Perce. If he could defeat them before Howard arrived, he would get all the credit for the victory and probably a promotion to general. If Howard arrived before the defeat, Howard, as the superior officer, would receive credit for capturing the Nez Perce.

On October 1, Miles sent out a flag of truce and said he wanted to meet with Chief Joseph. Miles told Joseph he was in an impossible situation and that he should surrender at once. Joseph disagreed and refused to surrender. Fighting continued, and it began to look hopeless for the Nez Perce. Joseph and other leaders held a meeting. Chief White Bird wanted to attempt to escape to Canada; Joseph believed surrender would be best. They decided that each band could do as it chose.

When Howard and his troops arrived on October 4, Miles gave them a chilly reception. Howard assured Miles that he would receive full credit for the victory, and Miles quickly warmed up. Some Howard’s men were angry because they had suffered during the long march and believed they deserved the credit. Nonetheless, the general had his way.

On October 5, Joseph was invited to surrender. Miles and Howard told the chief that if he surrendered, his people and their remaining horses and cattle would be returned to the reservation in Idaho. Joseph accepted the terms of surrender and said: “I am tired of fighting . . . little children are freezing to death. . . . Hear me, my chiefs, I am tired; my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands, I will fight no more forever.”

After Joseph’s surrender, a number of Nez Perce led by White Bird escaped to Canada. Of the group that surrendered with Joseph, there were approximately four hundred of the over eight hundred Nez Perce that started out together in June. During the course of their 1,700-mile trek, approximately one hundred and twenty men, women, and children had been killed. About one hundred and eighty whites had died.

The surrender terms promised by Miles and Howard were rejected by General Sherman and other higher authorities. Howard agreed with their decision. He said that because White Bird and his group had escaped after Joseph’s surrender, the terms of the agreement had been violated, and the promise no longer counted.

Miles pleaded with his superiors to honor the surrender promise. Sherman and others would not agree. They said it would be too dangerous to send the Nez Perce to the Northwest. Violence might begin again. Miles apologized to Chief Joseph: “You must not blame me. I have endeavored to keep my word, but the chief who is over me has given the order and I must obey it or resign. That would do you no good. Some officer would carry out the order.”

The Nez Perce were taken to Kansas and then to Indian Territory in Oklahoma. The climate and other conditions were different from the cool, dry mountain air to which the Nez Perce were accustomed. Many of them died of malaria and other diseases.

Chief Joseph continued to apply for better treatment, and finally public opinion began to shift in favor of the Nez Perce. In 1885, the government returned the Nez Perce to reservations in the Northwest. Some were settled in Idaho; others, including Chief Joseph, were sent to a reservation in Washington.

Joseph made repeated efforts to persuade the government to return his group to their homeland. His appeals were rejected. In 1904, the sad, old chief died on the reservation in Washington.

In 1858 the Poncas gave up part of their territory in exchange for promises made by the government to guarantee them protection and a permanent home on the Niobrara River. But in 1876, Congress decided to include the Poncas in the list of northern tribes who were to be exiled to Indian Territory. The first news of the Poncas had of their impending removal was brought to them early in January 1877. The chiefs were united in their determination to hold the government to its treaty obligations and refused to be removed. The U.S. government authorized the use of troops (force) and by May of 1877, the Poncas began their five hundred mile walk to Indian Territory with guns at their backs.

Summer heat and biting flies plagued them for weeks, and then at last, on July 9, after a severe drenching in a thunderstorm, they reached their new homes and found a small group of Poncas who had preceded them living wretchedly in tents. The Poncas died so rapidly that by the end of their first year in Indian Territory they lost one fourth of their population. One of those who died was the oldest son of Chief Standing Bear. “At last I had only one son left; then he sickened,” Standing Bear said, “When he was dying he asked me to promise him one thing. He begged me to take him, when he was dead, back to our old burying ground by the Swift Running Water, the Niobrara. I promised. When he died, I and those with me put his body into a box and then in a wagon and we started north.”

Sixty-six Poncas made up the burial party, all of the Standing Bear’s clan, following the old wagon drawn by two starving horses. It was January of 1879. Standing Bear led his people over trails away from settlements and soldiers but a company of soldiers led by General George Cook intercepted the party and arrested them for leaving their reservation in Indian Territory. In his jail cell Standing Bear told his captors, “I thought God intended us to live but I was mistaken, God intends to give the country to the white people, and we are to die. It may be well; it may be well.”

With the help of sympathetic local Indian rights activists and even the officer who arrested him—General Cook—Standing Bear sued in U.S. District Court for his right to return home. The U.S. government claimed that Standing Bear did not have a right to habeas corpus because Indians “were not persons within the meaning of the law.”

Thus began in April 1879, the now almost forgotten civil-rights case of Standing Bear v. Cook. The Poncas’ lawyers argued that an Indian was as much a “person” as any white man and could avail himself of the rights of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. The climax of the case came when Standing Bear was given permission to speak for his people: “I am now with the soldiers and the officers. I want to go back to my old place north. I want to save myself and my tribe . . . May the Almighty send a good spirit to brood over you, my brothers, to move you to help me. If a white man had land and someone should swindle him, that man would try to get it back, and you, would not blame him. Look at me. Take pity on me and help me to save the lives of my women and children. My brothers, a power, which I cannot resist, crowds me down to the ground. I need help. I have done.”

The judge in the case ruled that an Indian was a “person” within the meaning of the habeas corpus act, that the right of expatriation was a natural, inherent, and inalienable right of the Indian as well as the white race, and that in time of peace no authority could transport Indians from one section of the country to another without the consent of the Indians or to confine them to any particular reservation against their will. The judge concluded the proceedings by ordering Standing Bear and his band be released from custody. They were free to return their homes in Nebraska.

As soon as the surviving 530 Poncas in Indian Territory learned of this astonishing turn of events, most them began preparations to join their relatives back in Nebraska. Through its agents the Bureau of Indian Affairs informed the Ponca chiefs that only the Great White Father in Washington could decide if and when the tribes might return. The Bureaucrats and politicians in D.C. recognized the decision as a strong threat to the reservation system; it would endanger the large group of entrepreneurs who were making fortunes selling bad food, shoddy blankets, and poisonous whiskey to the thousands of Indians trapped on reservations. If the Poncas were allowed to leave their reservation in Indian Territory and walk away as free citizens, this would set a precedent which might well destroy the entire reservation system.

Standing Bear’s brother, Big Snake, was determined to test the new law. He requested permission to leave the reservation and go north to join his brother. As he expected, permission to leave was refused by the Indian agent. Big Snake’s next move was not to leave Indian Territory, but to travel only a hundred miles to the Cheyenne reservation. With him went thirty other Poncas, making what they believed to be a gentle testing of the law which said that an Indian was a person and could not be confined to any particular reservation against his will.

The U.S. army arrested Big Snake and while he was in custody he was beat and shot by soldiers. The government first issued a statement that Standing Bear’s brother “Big Snake, a bad man [had been] shot accidentally.” The American press, however, growing more sensitive to treatment of Indians since the Standing Bear case, demanded an investigation by Congress. Nothing came of the investigation.

The Poncas of Indian Territory had learned a bitter lesson. The white man’s law was an illusion; it did not apply to them. And so, like many other tribes, the diminishing Ponca tribe was split in two—Standing Bear’s band was free in the north and the others were prisoners in Indian Territory.