Framework (Long)

1AC v1

Framework (Long)

The standard is consistency with trivialism – that means we affirm every proposition’s truth value. Four warrants.

1. Inescapable – providing an alternative viewpoint to trivialism is incoherent.

2. The principle of sufficient reason proves the existence of a trivial entity.

Kabay, Paul Douglas 2008,"A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, JS
Let us define a trivial entity as an entity that instantiates every predicate, i.e. an entity of which everything is true. One of the things true of a trivial entity is that it exists in a reality in which trivialism is true. Hence, if a trivial entity exists, then trivialism is true. But is it true that there exists a trivial entity? Here is an argument for thinking that it is true: 1) Every being (or entity or object) is either trivial or nontrivial 2) It is not the case that every being is nontrivial 3) Hence, there exists a trivial being107 By a nontrivial being I mean a being which instantiates some but not all predicates. Premise 1) exhausts the logical possibilities. But why think that premise 2) is true?
The reason why premise 2) is true follows directly from the truth of the PSR (the Principle of Sufficient Reason). According to the PSR “… nothing is, without sufficient reason why it is, rather than not; and why it is thus, rather than otherwise.”108 Or, to put it another way “… no fact can be true or existing and no statement truthful without a sufficient reason for its being so and not different …”109 Alternatively, it has been articulated as “Everything that is the case must have a reason why it is the case. Necessarily, every true proposition or at least every contingent true proposition has an explanation.”110 Now, if every object were nontrivial, then there would be a fact that would be unexplained, specifically the fact of nontriviality. That is to say, the nontriviality of nontrivial beings would be inexplicable. What I mean here is that one would need to explain why only some predicates are instantiated and not all predicates are instantiated. One could not cite the existence of another nontrivial being as the explanation for the nontriviality of other nontrivial beings, as this would be viciously circular. Likewise, one could not explain the nontriviality of a given being, B1, by citing the existence of another nontrivial being, B2, whose nontriviality is in turn explained by the existence of another nontrivial being, B3, and so on in an infinite series of nontrivial beings. Now either the infinite series (of nontrivial entities) as a whole is trivial or it is nontrivial. If it is trivial, then there exists a trivial entity. If it is nontrivial, then the nontriviality of the series as a whole has not been explained. But this cannot be so because nontriviality requires an explanation given the truth of the PSR. It follows then that the series as a whole is trivial. Therefore, there exists a trivial entity (the series as a whole) and trivialism is true. Of course, the only thing that will explain all this nontriviality is a trivial being. Any explanatory regress will cease in a satisfactory manner at the postulating of a trivial being. Such a being is not one way as opposed to another, that is to say there is no need to explain why only some predicates are true of it as opposed to others – all predicates are true of it. So, for example, it is not trivial as opposed to nontrivial, as its triviality also entails its nontriviality. Moreover, its existence really does explain the existence of nontrivial beings. After all, one of the predicates true of a trivial being is that it exists in a world in which there are nontrivial beings.

3. Possibilism – anything is possible, which proves trivialism. 2 warrants.

Kabay, Paul Douglas 2008,"A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, JS
The next argument for trivialism I wish to spell out can perhaps be dubbed a modal argument for trivialism and can be expressed as follows:
(1) Possibilism is true [prem.]
(2) If possibilism is true, then there is a world (either possible or impossible or both)99, w, in which trivialism is true [prem.]
(3) w is a possible world [prem.]
(4) It is true in w that w is identical to the actual world, A [(2)]
(5) If it is true that there is a world, w, and w is a possible world, and it is true in w that w is identical to A, then trivialism is true [prem.]
(6) Trivialism is true [(1)-(5)].
Is premise 1 true? Possibilism is the view that every proposition is possible and is to be contrasted with the view known as necessitarianism: the view that there is at least one impossible proposition. Possibilism has been seriously advocated by a number of philosophers in the last forty years or so.100 The doctrine is said to have a number of advantages over its rival, necessitarianism. There seems a genuine sense in which socalled necessary truths could have been false. Mortenson, for example, points out that if we make use of a model-theoretic account of necessity (i.e. truth in all models, whether these be understood as possible worlds or what not), it is easy enough to show that one can construct models in which anything fails to be true – so called impossible worlds, for example, if you understand models in terms of world semantics.101 In order for necessitarianism to hold true, one would need independent reason for restricting the relevant models.102 But such reasons, according to Mortenson, are usually not forthcoming. In addition, it has been claimed that possibilism has a range of epistemological advantages over necessitarianism. Mortenson sums this position up nicely in the following quote: … possibilism has the virtue of the generality and economy of epistemic monism. This term … refers to a wholly general method for establishing truths, namely the scientific method of empirical theory-choice using experiment and observation. There is no need to cater for the knowledge-base of an entirely distinctive set of necessary truths. The problem here is not that necessary truths could not be shown to be true by ordinary scientific means, for they obviously can. The problem is how one would come to know that they are necessary …103 According to Mortenson, there is economy of epistemology in committing oneself to possibilism. Given that scientific methods can not establish the necessity of a truth (perhaps because postulating such necessity adds nothing to the explanatory power of the truth), one would require something in addition to scientific method to establish this. One’s epistemology would thus lack the benefit of simplicity

4. Explosion – deductive logic means one true contradiction implies that all statements are trivially true.

Wilkinson, Tim, 2013, "One Law to Rule Them All," No Publication, https://philosophynow.org/issues/97/One_Law_to_Rule_Them_All JS
Writers on logic often refer to this notion that ‘anything follows from a falsehood’ but rarely explain why this is the case. Here’s a modern version of the medieval idea: suppose we would like to prove the proposition that ‘Bugs Bunny is an alien’. First, notice that if ‘A’ is any true statement, and ‘B’ is any other statement, whether true or false, then the combined statement ‘either A is true or B is true’ is true, because A is true. Second, if we know that ‘either A is true or B is true’ and we discover that A is false, then B must be true. These rules of propositional logic are known as disjunction introduction and disjunction elimination respectively. Suppose next that the Earth is flat, and also that it isn’t flat (a contradiction). Since the Earth is flat, the statement ‘Either the Earth is flat or Bugs Bunny is an alien’ is true, by disjunction introduction. But if ‘Either the Earth is flat or Bugs Bunny is an alien’ is true, since we also know the Earth is not flat, then Bugs must be an alien, by disjunction elimination. We can also prove Bugs is not an alien by a similar argument. Allowing a single contradiction thus results in logical Armageddon, where everything is true and everything is false – an idea that came to be called the principle of explosion or ex falso quodlibet, ‘anything follows from a falsehood’ (strictly, from a contradiction).

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