From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

No. 1023 D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 18th-20th March 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K.

Herewith copy of Robertson's latest, dated 2nd March. Mukaddas Aman is the son of Mulk Aman of the Yassin family, who died a refugee in Darel last year - vide Gazetteer, Yassin, p. 229. He was amongst the crew against Robertson in November, having to repay the hospitality he has received for many years by joining his hosts. I expect he took good care of his skin.

1 and 2 by a sister of Murid Dastgir killed in Latku the other day; third is the son of a Mulla's daughter and don't count. These genealogies are awful, but it is sometimes useful to know who is who.

You see from what Robertson says that he a for taking leave and departing from Chitral. Younghusband can run the Chitral coach, but we shall want Stewart for Yassin and a senior Assistant here, if the Chitral business is to be carried to its obvious conclusions.

________________

No. 24, dated Chitral, the 2^nd March 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand C.B.

The Mehtar has just received a letter from Mokaddas Aman asking for Yassin, and saying if it be not given to ..... the English are certain to take it for themselves.

Mokaddas declares he cannot remain in Darel any longer, as the people there have made up their minds, to go to Gilgit to salaam! I suppose this means they are beginning to feel anxious about their flocks and grazing grounds, and perhaps want time to devise some other "Shaitani."

Rumours come every day that Muhammad Sharif Khan is doing great things in Dir. that he has captured that place itself as well as Bibiyar, has killed forty of Umra Khan's men, and wounded Ghulam Khan of Asmar and his mother who were at Bibiyar. The Dir road is blocked, and we have nothing to go on in estimating the value of their reports, but I notice? That Nizam and his chief men do not place much reliance oh their statements. They quietly observe, after David, that all men are liars; only they make this remark at their leisure.

I am anxious to get an answer to my letter to Umra Khan; as I suppose, as soon as that part of the Chitral frontier, Narsat, is in a fair way for a settlement and my report is despatched, my work here will be over. In these hard times having two Political Officers here is an extravagance.

My report is finished, but it is of inordinate length and will-take a long time to copy. It is difficult to cut it down to more moderate limits, but I am thinking it over.

As you suggested I shall send it down by Dir if the road is safe, and send a duplicate to you to send on.

Chitral will be an anxious subject to .you for some time to come. The one point I am convinced of most firmly, is that officers and escort could not be left here with prudence unless Ghizr is occupied by Gilgit troops, other­wise it would be something like having troops at Kabul, while Sind and the Punjab were held by untrustworthy native allies.

Affairs here are much as they were. People still speculate amongst them­ selves whether the Afghans will come and turn us out, or whether we shall stay here permanently, or go away in the spring, leaving the Mehtar to his own resources. Each man settles these questions according to his own personal desires.

I imagine I noticed some small increase in fanatical feelings amongst the people since former days, but of course Shah Baba at Dir is uncomfortably near us.

___________________

No. 1065, D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 22nd-23rd March 1893.

From—Lieutenant A. F. Napier, Assistant British Agent at Gilgit,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Officiating Resident in Kashmir.

Herewith I enclose a demi-official, in original, from Colonel Durand, and copies of two demi-official letters from Mr. Robertson. In the latter's demi-official of 9^th March he says that another message has come in from Wakhan, confirming the report of Russians being in Sarhad-i-Wakhan. This news I have telegraphed to you; and will keep you informed of any further development of the situation.
Not forwarded.

___________________

[Demi-official.]

No. 25, dated Chitral, the 6^th March, 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B.

Things are much as they were, not unsatisfactory on the whole.

I sent you news yesterday by special messenger of the arrival of the Russians at Sarhad-i-Wakhan.

If there is any faltering note now in our Chitral policy, they will be here before long. That would mean a very heavy reinforcement of the Gilgit garrison, as well as general trouble and anxiety, and what a bill there would be to meet!

I am sending a man to Wakhan over the Baroghil to find out exactly how matters stand there at present. One of the Mughli Firs is managing it for me secretly.

There is just a fear that Nizam's intriguing propensities would lead him to make overtures to the Russians, if he were left alone here.

Muhammad Sharif Khan's adventures seem to have come to an end. They say his four brothers are now prisoners in Umra Khan's hands, although Muhammad Sharif himself has escaped.

Umra Khan has sent me no answer to my letter. The general idea is that he has sent on the document to Peshawar to the Shahzada to see if there is any divergence in policy between the Peshawar political authorities and ourselves.

It also gives him time to consider the question, and to see how affairs in his own country are tending.

News comes that he has made peace with the Nawagai Khan. The terms the latter is said to have accepted are not those accorded to a victorious General. He excuses himself from sending his son to Umra Khan as a hostage, but agrees to an offensive alliance against the Afghan Commander-in-Chief. He is said to have also assured the Mahmund headmen that the coming of the Afghans to Asmar was no work of his. He first of all seems to have intrigued with the Commander-in-Chief, asking* for a gun and shell ammunition, and requiring the Asmar family to be allowed to return to their own district. Both his demands were refused, and about the Asmar family he was told bluntly to mind his own business. He was told- however that he would be supplied with money to enable him to fight against Umra Khan.

Unfortunately our intelligence cannot be relied upon, and events taking place within two or three days' march of us are not heard of for several days after they occur.

Yet everybody is so venal in these parts that it ought not to be difficult to organize a trustworthy system for getting early information from the entire districts roundabout.

The Jemadar seems to have relied entirely upon the Mehtar's Mullas, a plan, which may have answered well, enough while Aman-ul-Mulk was alive, but is of little use now. It has the advantage of costing nothing, but has also the serious drawback that only so much news is sent to Gilgit as the Mehtar thinks it advisable for us to have.

At present it looks as if the spring, will find us with more or less excitement on all frontiers. The Russians at Wakhan, the Jandolis in Narsat, &c., will cause plenty of work for Political Officers as usual; but I clearly perceive that, if I do not get leave until all troubles and worries are at an end, I shall never get leave at all, so my application will go in at once.

Nizam is improving in many ways. He goes out now every second or third day shooting. The people however still hold him in contempt as a coward, and are said to be annoyed at his neglect of religious duties, not going to the mosque for Friday prayers, &c. Waffadar Khan is about as bad an adviser as he can well have, but there is no help for it at present.

They are very busy strengthening the fort, but all such measures are futile, if the Mehtar fails of make himself popular with the Adamzadas and the people. However, he is going on as well as we could expect.

At an entertainment at the fort the other day, my guard fired a couple of splendid volleys at a mark on a hill 950 yards away.

It made a great impression, and people are still talking about it with wonder, remarking how helpless they would be against sepoys from India.
[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

No. 29, dated Chitral, the 9th March 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B.

You will have seen the Jemadar long before this, and heard that Muhammad Wall refuses to come to Chitral and avail himself of my, good offices in effecting reconciliation between him and the Mehtar. It is, most foolish of him but the course he is now pursuing is the one everybody expected' he would take. I have now done everything in my power to help him accord­ing to my promise, but he will not be well advised. I now hope fie will go to you at Gilgit, and cease from troubling at least to some extent.

He has written a long and civil letter to the Mehtar, but he is quite resolved not to be friends, that is clear. His tone in speaking about his deter­mination not to come to Chitral, though polite, is perfectly clear.

You will see from my report which will go (a duplicate) to you by this post that I strongly advise Ghizr being occupied by troops, from Gilgit. Whether you can spare, men for this work it is for you to decide. If you can, and you can also obtain sanction for the movement as soon as the roads are fit to travel over, probably in a month's or six weeks' time, a very great advantage will have been obtained.

Our position here will then be greatly strengthened, and every thing should go on satisfactorily.

I shall deprecate Nizam's sending an armed force to drive out the rebel­lious Muhammad Wali. It would be most inconvenient on all grounds for there to be any fighting in Yassin, while our troops are occupying the country. "When bullets begin flying about, on-lookers are apt to get their full share of the casualties, and might be inclined to take part in the quarrel, while I have distinctly told everybody here that nothing would ever induce the Govern­ment of India to begin hostilities with their old friends and allies, the Chitrali people.

Muhammad Wali will very likely go to you at Gilgit. I know you will be kind to the misguided boy, for though he is wrong-headed and passionate with vast potentialities for cruelty in his disposition, yet he is a pleasant, plucky little chap and we must try and soften his fall for him. If he goes to, you, so much the better, but whether he does or not, the move of troops to Ghizr to maintain order and give feeling of security to the people, is in my opinion extremely important. Unfortunately it must be a long time before I shall hear if you can accomplish this advance, and in the meantime I must keep the Mehtar and his rascally adviser, Waffadar, as quiet as possible.

Waffadar, my most gushing and enthusiastic friend, is a great thorn in my side. He thinks it would be a good thing for him and the Mehtar with 'one other' to go with me, and 'one other' on five months' leave to England, the time he calculated in which the journey could be comfortably and profitably accomplished. I poured cold-water, iced water on this idea, and drowned and froze it to death. All the same if the precious pair would go anywhere right (out) of the country for five months, the situation would be greatly improved. Nizam is a fool Waffadar is a fool and a villain in equal proportions, although to speculate his rascality seems to vastly out weigh all his other attributes. We are doing very well here so far as appearances go. Another message has come from Wakhan ......................... the first report of the Russians being at ................. Wakhan but Nizam has either no heard the rumour or thinks it advisable to keep his information to himself. We shall know more in a few days.
[Demi-official.]

No. 1163 R.-D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 29^th March 1895.

From -Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr.

I send herewith copies of the last two demi-officials from Robertson. I have written to him pointing out that, at the present moment I have exactly 200 men whom I can move, and that for a month at least all idea of occupying Ghizr is out of the question.

I am not sure what do with Muhammad Wali I shall see him in a day or two, and point out that Nizam, has been, recognised as Mehtar and that I shall consider that any action taken against him is taken against us. This will keep him quiet. I cannot of course permit any fighting Yassin with our troops at Gupis and the mission in Chitrali and a veiled threat will be enough I believe.

I have received Robertson's official report, and will forward it a soon as I can Practically it comes to our having a Resident in Chitral with 120 men, holding Ghizr, Gupis and Yassin, and being responsible for the quiet of the Warshagam district, allowing Nizam to put in the Governor, but preventing oppression, &c., —much the same state of-things as in Hunza and Nagar in fact, —the recognition and formal installation of the de facto Mehtar, and the control of the foreign relations. A road to be pushed into - Chitral with telegraph as a matter of course. The increase of the Gilgit garrison, in my opinion as in his, is an absolute necessity, and I am inclined to think that with the road into Kaghari in our hands, we can supply, and should have at the least, two infantry regiments here, in addition to the three regiments of Kashmir Imperial service troops, the susceptibilities of the Darbar being met by their being considered as the British Agent's escort, and by their not moving through Kashmir, but by Kaghan arid the Indus valley road.

Government will not accede to this, they must face losing all hold on Chitral, seeing the Russians walk in any day it suits them, and, I am inclined to think, a retirement from Hunza and Nagar. From a military point of view, our position now is unsound, our prestige is enormous at present, and has pulled us through some Unpleasant' moments, but our prestige rests on our troops after all, and our present resources are too small for the work I have to carry out. No more strain can be put on them; frappez vite et frappez fort is in my opinion the only safe motto for the frontier. You must be in a position to hit out savagely in whichever quarter danger threatens, and we are not in-that position now. However there is no use writing about this now. I must get at Robertson's official report, and forward it with my suggestions as soon as possible.

________________

[Demi-official]

No. 30, dated Chitral, the 15^th March, 1893.

From - Surgeon-General G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C.B.

Your demi-official No. 718.

I agree with you that Yassin is rather a difficulty, but it is a difficulty, which must be faced.

What you say about our having forced Nizam on the Yassin people is quite true, but we have also forced Nizam on Chitral. He is probably equally disliked in both districts. The real cause of this you will se in my report.

We have however adopted a certain the of policy in connection with Nizam and must now do the best we can under the circumstances. The situation is however clearing, as we ought to be able to successfully carry through the line we have initiated. Above all we must be consistent and show no signs of vacillation or weakness.

I have already, as you know, conveyed to Nizam-ul-Mulk the congratulations of Government on his attaining the Mehtarship of Chitral. It would be impossible now to deprive him of his authority over Yassin - nearly half of his territory - and place it in the hands of Muhammad Wali Khan who is avowedly hostile to him.

Muhammad Wali, as you perceive, is irreconcilable and is a difficult boy to control. The majority of the Yassins in my opinion distrust the Khushwakt nearly as much as they dislike the Katur, although if they had to choose between the two evils, they would probably prefer the former. Mukaddas is already intriguing to get possession of Yassin. At present there are at least four factions of Yassin - (1) Muhammad Wali's (2) Mukaddas Aman's, (3) the factions hostile to both and desirous of our Government, pure and simple, (4) Nizam-ul-Mulk's. Ali Mardan Shah detests Muhammad Wali; Raja Akbar Khan & Co. dislike Nizam's rule, but are playing for their own ends. They think their lands are insufficient for all the brothers, and believe they will always be of more importance to us while the Punyal frontier is disturbed.

My solution of the difficulty is for us to occupy Ghizr and Yassin, guarantee good order and Nizam's tribute, and rule the country in the name of the Mehtar, or of some pageant Governor he may appoint.

If Muhammad Wall were in Yassin without strong restraining influence, it is any odds that he would start intriguing all round at once. He would try to get hold of Mastuj and the Chitral Kohistan. He originally had some arrangements on the point with Mukaddas. He would certainly make overtures to the Russians, as Nizam also will if he gets the chance, and we should have two men to watch instead of one as at present, or one and a half if you count Ali Mardan Shah, Akbar Khan, &c. Similarly Muhammad Wali would try and extend his influence with the Shinaki.

If Government accept my proposals, it will be a matter of indifference to us who is nominal Governor of Yassin.

Raja Akbar Khan requires watching. None of these people can cease from intrigues, it is the breath of their nostrils, the marrow of their bones. Keep all the Rifles in Gilgit on the excuse that they-have to be continually to keep them always ready for use. Only let Akbar Khan have twenty or thirty at a time for the frontier guards.

We are getting on satisfactorily here as far as we can see. There is some rumour of Nizam having received a round robin from the Yaghistanis, signed by the Baba Sahib, Umra Khan, and everybody else asking him to send us back or join in & "jihad" against us. They probably hate the idea of their being between troops in Chitral an troops at Peshawar. It is only a at present, bulls very likely to be true. Umra Khan has sent an evasive reply to my letter, pleading inability to answer it at length until the fighting in Dir on the Nawagai border is over.

He is said to have sworn never to leave Narsat unless he is forced to do so, and consequently is in no hurry to discuss the question of Chitral boundaries. He is reported to have made up his mind to drive out the Narsatis and replace them with his own people in a month or two. This seems rather a large order. The Chitralis are always hinting that they should be allowed to attack his men at Narsat, and drive them out while the passes are closed. Like all these people they are wonderfully resolute and decided in their consuls it is in action they would fall off.

No more news from Wakhan. Our intelligence is simply awful.

I hope when they get my report that Government will quickly come to a decision but I fear that impossible.
[Demi-official.]

No. 31, dated Chitral, the 19^th March 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Durand, C.B.

With this letter I send my report. I am keeping back for a day or two, and perhaps altogether, the copy which was going straight to Colonel Barr by Dir and Peshawar. Its despatch by that road will depend altogether on the state of the district, which just now appears to be sufficiently disturbed.

The delay on the road between here and Gilgit is excessive. It is a great nuisance not being up to date about frontier politics, the Jalalabad Mission. prospects, &c., &c. All one can do is to observe the greatest caution in all conversation on such topics, and keep on hoping for the daks which never arrive. I suppose you at Gilgit are not much better off in this respect than I am here.

I suppose it will be months before all the points raised in the report can be answered. Could you not wire for instructions about occupying Ghizr, instal­ling Nizam after the signature of an agreement, &c., &c.

Nizam is behaving very well on the whole, and looks very fit and happy. Of course he keeps worrying me about Warshagam and Narsat, but I decline to see the advantage of his sending an army to either place. The Chitralis may be good fighters, but I doubt it very much. They would probably make a poor show against Umra Khan's veterans.

Their line is of course to embroil the Government with Umra Khan. They all detest the Jandoli man, and in their hearts believe that all Muhammad Sharif's troubles and their own loss of Narsat are due to the support and countenance given to Umra Khan by us.

News came the other day that the Jandoli garrison are selling off their stores, also that the mission starts shortly from Peshawar, whether the Amir likes it or not, and that, if the latter shams illness, even that excuse will not prevent Lord Roberts going with a force to Jalalabad. Unless it is a ruse on Umra Khan's part, the selling of stores at Narsat and Sao may mean that he intends leaving Narsat either voluntarily by reason of pressure brought to bear on him from Peshawar, or because he is getting hard pressed by Nawagai on one side and Muhammad Sharif on the other. My letter was too neutral for it to have had any influence on his actions. In it I simply started a correspondence and suggested a meeting between us.

If Lord Roberts goes to Jalalabad, I might perhaps be allowed to go there also,' and so to India. With the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar, neither the difficulty nor the danger need be extreme, especially if Umra Khan and his fanatics are out of the valley. In that case Chitralis and. Kafirs could convey me to the Asmar frontier, where an Afghan escort could take me on to Jalalabad. Even if Umra Khan were in Narsat, he would probably give me a safe conduct through his part of the valley.

The Kam Kafirs are pretty well down on their luck and ready all kinds of promises. They suggest amongst other things that I should go and live amongst them in a stately mansion they will erect, and should take a Hakim as well, but I have explained the impossibility of my doing this. One of them has a claim in Chitral for a man to be sacrificed in the return for a Kafir shot by a Chitrall, as he was trying to follow a Pathan into the Nasrat fort in Aman-ul-Mulk's time. The old Mehtar agreed to give up a man to vengeance, but he died directly afterwards and nothing was done. The man who makes the demand now is an old friend to mine. He sends word that the does not want to make things unpleasant. He has eaten my salt and is my devoted servant and would sooner do anything than make me angry. So he suggests that any sort of man will do for his purpose, a slave or a ................. It is merely a matter of form that the family may not be put to shame. My friend is a man, named. Shyop, remarkable for his cupidity even amongst Kafirs, yet Sher Malik assures me he could not be satisfied with money even if a lakh of rupees were offered him. The manes of his dead brother must be propitiated with a victim. Pleasant people to have for neighbours, are they not? Recently another old friend of mine caught a Pathan. The prisoner was marched to Kamdesh, placed in front of the Gishtan for two or three hours, while the village sang its war song round him: he was them killed in front of Dan Malik's coffin box. The quite matter of fact stories my Kafir friends tell me would make this page crimson if they were recorded.

From - The British ............, Gilgit

To - The Resident in Kashmir

No. 1390

Robertson writes from Chitral on 30^th March. All well. He is moving to Shoghat. Mehtar and advisers not liking his going to Mastuj. Adamzadas all expect Sher Afzal back in ......... Many would evidently throw in their lot with Nizam if contain of our remaining. We can obtain no further news an to Russian move in Wakhan but one of the Chief Maulai pirs appear to be in content correspondence with them. Please try and obtain orders a soon as possible about British Officer's remaining permanently. If that is announced at once everyting will remian right and improve daily, Maulai pirs and other headmen ready to join our side the moment this is fefinitely settled but in present state uncertainty naturally will not openly. Ghulam Dastgir is in Yasin. No opposition has been offered. Mohamed Wali's family have come to Punyal. is the information that the snow is so bad that the Mehtar's men could not cross, and our private agents dared not make the attempt although, if what I have reported above is true, Shahzada Lais finds no difficulty in getting men across. The fact is the Moghli Pirs accept my tips, and would be helpful if they only had something to go on, if they were certain that Nizam would remain Mehtar, — that is to say, if we are certain to remain here. They do not want a bad record when a new Mehtar succeeds to the throne. One very influential Sayad said this to me plainly. If he were assured that the present Government would be permanent and the mission would never go back, ho would work for me heart and soul. At present he is gratified, and will do what he can secretly.