From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir



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Poor Nizam! He is surely the feeblest puppet prince imaginable so help­less and so fearful of giving offence. He has been terribly anxious, and cast down for two or three days. Now he knows I have given up the Mastuj project, he is happy again, and has gone out shooting gaily. His little attempt at authority he keeps carefully concealed lest I should not approve. You of course can form some idea of the directions all such' efforts take. It is pro­bably just as well that he does not proclaim them. He is a perfect mirror of courtesy and politeness, and talks to the meanest of his court, as though he were speaking to a great man. But he cannot win either their respect or their affection. He plays polo well and pluckily, is a good shot, and looks a prince, but he is a coward at heart and everybody knows it I imagine. If we stay here permanently, we could not have a better man for a pageant king; but if we leave, he would probably have to leave also. He is altogether too impres­sionable, and we could never trust him alone for long. l am most anxious of all to know what Government intends to do. I hope Chilas is not worrying you. Let me have early news if troubles are brewing in that direction.
No. 1682, dated Srinagar, the 1st May 1898.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel. D.W.K. Barr, Off. Resident in Kashmir,

To - The Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 1586, dated, the 26th April 1833,I have the honour to forward, for the Information of the Government of India, a letter No. 1272, dated the 6th April 1893, with its enclosures, received on the 80th April, from the British Agent, Gilgit, forwarding an extract from Chitral Mission Diary, dated the 21st March 1893.

_______________

No. 1272, dated Gilgit, the 6th April 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To - The Resident in Kashmir.

I have the honour to forward an extract, dated 21st March 1893, from the Chitral Mission Diary.

2. With reference to the reported coalition against us, I wish to point out that, so far as we know, the Tangiris, who suffered heavily at Chilas, have no wish to renew fighting. Further, Jemadar Rab Nawaz Khan pointed out, when I read the extract to him, that the news, so far as concerns Dir, is probably false. Patrak and other places named are under Umra Khan. It is also unreasonable to suppose that the Paindah Khel, &c., who are under the influence of the Baba Sahib and friendly to Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir, would dare to move unless Umra Khan joined the coalition, which is hardly likely. Muhammad Wali is of course in with the Sher Afzal's party and a friend of Mukaddas Aman's, hut I doubt, under present circumstances, the Yassinis joining him against us. Still I shall relax no precautions, and shall be prepared to move troops to Gupis in support of the detachment there, and, if necessary, towards Ghizr. The presence of Ghulam Dastgir in Yassin should also be in our favour.

3. The conspiracy against Nizam-ul-Mulk is evidently widespread, but for want of a marked leader may come to nothing. The present moment, when the passes are closed, and after the exceptionally heavy weather we have lately experienced are at their worst, seems unfavourable for the success of this undertaking. The condition of things in Chitral is certainly unsatis­factory, and such as must cause Mr. Robertson anxiety.

________________

Extract from Diary of Chitral Mission, dated the 21st March 1893.

Khushwakt has been told by Sultan Husain Khan of Sanoghar, Ghulam Hazrat of Buni, Muhammad Ali of Mastuj, and Mian San Shah of Buni (all of the Reza tribe) that the Darelis, Tangiris, Kheli, Brani Kal, Tarwal, Kalam, Uju and Utrol have agreed with Mukaddas Aman to make a general attack on the English through Yassin after the Ramzan; also that the people of Thal, Patrak, Lamutai, Kalkot, Bihar, Birkotu and Painda Khel have arranged with the Baba Sahib and Muhammad Sharif Khan, and also with the conveyance of many Chitralis to attack Chitral, destiny the league also. In the opinion of Khushwakt is informant, it would be better if the mission went to Mastuj and if he Yasin force were strengthened.

Khushwakt is also, responsible for the following. He has discovered through Muhammad Aziz Beg, Reza of Buni (his brother-in-law), that there is an extensive conspiracy afoot against the Mehtar. It appears that Nizam has sent for Nazrat Shah and his son-in-law, Abdul Kadir, and told them that the latter, a notorious ruffian and murderer, constantly employed by Aman-ul-Mulk, should kill the two brothers, Muhammad Aziz and Muhammad Asim, and added that all the disaffected Adamzadas would be destroyed in a similar way. The conversation was, as usual, overheard by Borne one who reported the danger they were in to the men on the Mehtar's black list. A secret combination has now been started to kill the Mehtar, after which the conspirators will run away to share Sher Afzal's fate, whatever that may be. The chief men involved are Muhammad Latif Khan, Reza of Damik, near Drosh, Nakhwak, Reza Daya of Shah-i-Mulk of Drosh, Niat Shah Reza of Ayeen, Muhammad Azim Khan, Kaza of Chitral, Muhammad Aziz Khan and Bahram, Rezas of Buni, Faridun, Reza of Varigan in Murikho, Rustam Shah and Khan, Rezas of Tirich and Turikho, Shahzada Khan, Reza of Broz, Durani, and 8 other Khushe Adamzadas of Rayun in Turikho, 25 Adamzadas of Bayiki tribe in Turikho, &c., &c. There are between 200 and 300 men involved. Fifteen men of Muhammad Begi tribe in Khusht are also believed to be implicated.

As mentioned above the object of this formidable conspiracy is to kill the Mehtar and his friends, such as Basul Charoel of Khusht, Bahadur Shah, Bahadur Khan, Waffadar and Shahzarin.


[Demi-official.]

No. 1683 D.-O., dated Srinagar, the 1st May 1893.

From - Lieutenant - Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To - Sir H. Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 1617, dated the 28th April 1893, I enclose the marginally noted demi-official letter, in original, with enclo­sures, received on the 30th April, forwarding copies of demi-official letters, dated, respectively, the 23rd and 24th March 1893, from Robertson, regarding the state of affairs in Chitral.
From Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand C.B., British Agent, Gilgit, No. 1271, dated 6th April 1893


______________
[demi-official].

No. 1271 D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 6th April 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. barr.

I forward herewith copies of Robertson's two last letters, dated 23rd and 24th March. The second modifies the first.

I am keeping Muhammad Wali here. His chief adviser has gone to make his peace with the Mehtar's Governor of Yassin, Ghulam Dastgir, the ablest of the old Mehtar's remaining sons, and another headman to bring the young gentleman's family to Gilgit.

I have sent the Jemadar back to Chitral with instructions to see Ghulam on the road, and to arrange with the latter that Muhammad Wali's family shall be permitted to leave unmolested. I have also written to Ghulam in the same terms.

We have had tremendously heavy rain for this place I never saw anything like it here, and our roads are coming to pieces in all directions, another twenty-four hours of it and nothing would have stood up mountains included. Luckily it is fine now. It is a good thins in one way, as it means the passes into the Indus valley being closed for some time to come.

I don't believe much in the coalition against us for reasons given in my official going with Robertson's diary, I believe it is something to do with the late business. If it comes and our boys sit tight, and don't repeat poor Daniell's mistake, we shall be all right, but I am naturally on the look-out.

I am sending off Robertson's report on Chitral as soon as possible, and telegraph to you the heads of his proposals to-day; his demi-officials will have prepared you for them. What will Government do I wonder? Is it to be a reversal of our policy or shall we grasp the nettle? No more news of the Russian moves; it is extremely difficult to get any information from Wakhan, now the passes are practically about their worst.

Roche of the 3rd Dragoon Guards left to-day. You will find him a very nice fellow and interesting if you meet him at Srinagar.

_______________


[demi-official]

No. 33, Dated Chitral, The 23rd March 1893.

From – Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To – Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C.B.

Things are not going altogether smoothly here, as the enclosed extracts from my diary will show you.

Concerning the rumoured combination of Shinaki and Yaghistanis who intend jointly to attack the English after the fast, there is only this to be said. We must always be prepared for all eventualities. It is very likely true. In any case they will attack us if they think themselves sufficiently strong to do so effectively. Of that we may be sure. It is impossible to say whether the talk about expelling us originated before the flight at Chilas or after that unhappy occurrence. No one seems, to know anything about it here. I mentioned it myself as a skirmish in which the Kohistanis had been heavily defeated and only memorable because a British Officers a friend of mine, had unfortunately been killed. The Sikhs get news of it by the post in the ordinary way.

By the way what a melancholy justification of a paragraph in my report, the whole affair seems to have been: that paragraph about officers leaving their strong places to fight a numerous enemy strongly posted.

The Body-Guard Regiment has indeed covered itself with glory. To retire slowly, keeping the enemy in check after losing more than a third of its' number in casualties, and all its officers, is a splendid performance.

As you say the enemy was probably not Shinakis. Nevertheless we must not despise Shinakis. The Nilt men are of the same breed. In the open or in attacking they are feeble enough, but in defending a position we have * every reason to thoroughly respect their prowess.

The alleged conspiracy against the Mehtar is a serious business, although luckily it wants a leader. The numbers involved seem to be many more than we first believed. Happily they are divided in their counsels. Some think, the mission will shortly come to the aid of the oppressed and the despoiled, and they advise delay, others talk vaguely of supporting Aman-ul-Mulk, now at Jandol, while other more or less conflicting opinions are also advanced.

I have nearly made up my mind to go to Mastuj. The move would have
had certain advantages in linking up our communications with Gilgit, until the
decision of Government could be received and the escort strengthened, preventing the possibility of the fort being held against us, giving us the opportunity of seeing how the Mehtar could row alone, getting us away from the Kafirs until something had been settled about Narsat getting us near the Baroghil and certain news of the Russians, lastly enabling us to try and quiet Yassin. But amongst other disadvantages, it might result in the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk, if indeed he consented to remain behind which, is doubtful.
* i.e. of Mastuj. - A.D.

Already my report is-getting out of date. The Mehtar Jao, referred to in it as Aman-ul-Mulk, should have been called Shah Afzal. I refer to the son of Humayun whose home is at Nagar.

It is a very hard matter to get at the proper names of big men in this country. They are known to very few, while it is considered most ill-bred to ask a man direct what his name is. There is no one in Chitral who knows the real name of Sher Afzal's son.

The difficulty in the future will be to get the Mehtar to rule decently instead of following, the advice of scoundrels like Waffadar, which will quickly lead to another general overturn, and yet, if the idea in the report is the right one, not to interfere in the government of the country.

The Mehtar himself is merely a libertine and an impressionable fool but Waffadar and ... are scoundrels, hopelessly incurable. Our chief interest now centres in the Warshagam and Muhammad Wali. But I have to go most cautiously until I hear what you have done about that young man what you said to him, and what he Jemadar's report on the country is. I am holding the Mehtar back from sending a huge force into the country nominally to exact obedience from the people but most likely or revenge and plunder. Inayat Khan had a long talk with me to-day in support of the view. My line of arguments was why send in army composed ............. Nizam can rely upon into Yassin with the possible .................................................

may be defeated, and then leave Nizam at .the mercy of the disaffected. Inayat Khan was clearly impressed with the view of the matter, and finally went away promising to counsel prudence and caution. The fallacy of my argument consists in this, that it would be exceedingly difficult for the Mehtar to collect an army however small, which might he relied upon to be faithful to him.

Nizam could not send a Governor to Yassin under present circums­tances unless that official were accompanied by a fauj—so he says. His tone is "Either get Muhammad Wali out of the country for me, or let me do as I like with my own people. In the latter case I will send a force, and kill or make prisoner the rebellious Khushwakt Prince; in the former case I do not object to giving Drosh to Muhammad Wali or some other district, provided there is no enemy between me and my Gilgit allies." Yesterday he suggested we should go together arid settle the Yassin question on the spot. This would not be a bad move if we had a detachment at Ghizr, and I first obtained a guarantee that no villainy should be practised under the supposed sanction of a British officer; but you know my idea on the future government of Yassin and the continued iteration must he a weariness of the flesh to you. What we want now is the decision of Government. In the event of an attack in the spring all along the line, and it is a terribly long line from Chitral to Chilas, we ought to be quite safe if our fighting officers will not chuck away the advantages they are provided with. If we attack hundreds with tens, especially when the hundreds are behind stone walls, well may they say with Cromwell at Dunbar "the Lord hath delivered this into our hands." We may still have to pay something more for the Nilt V. C's.

_______________
[demi-official ]

Dated the 24th March 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B.

Keep Muhammad Wali in Gilgit, otherwise he will be killed very likely. Ghulam Dastgir starts to-day for Ghizr as acting Governor until matters are fully arranged. He is the smartest man here, and has promised to do all he can to arrange affairs quietly, but of course if he is actually opposed, he must assert the authority of his master.

Please send back the Jemadar as soon as you can spare him. If we go to Mastuj or further, he will be useful at Chitral. Abdul Hakim does not want to succeed the Jemadar, although he declares he is willing to do anything he is told. He believes, and I think he is right, that this would be a terribly expensive place, while the pay is but small.

If a Political Assistant remains in Chitral, there would not be a news-writer as well in the meantime, until the decision of Government is known the Jemadar should remain at his post: I think, until at any rate, we know for certain that the post is to be abolished or not.

I am writing by this post to the officer commanding Thayar Last to warn him about coming events, and I shall also provide Ghulam with letters for the same officer.

Concerning the ultimate disposal of Muhammad Wali (if all goes well), nothing very definite can be suggested at present. The plan would be for him to make submission to the Mehtar and get some other place in Chitral but if he gives any trouble in Yassin now, there can be no hope of such a happy arrangement coming off. The we might pension him and so keep him quiet if possible. He is rather a dangerious young man I think and in moments of exasperation might be guilty of any enormity. He is not to be trusted. His advisers also are great scoundrels.
[Demi-official.]

No. 1758 D.-O., dated Srinagar, the 4th May 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To - Sir H.M. Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 1683, dated 1st instant, I enclose, in original, a demi-official, forwarding copy of a demi-official1 letter, dated 3rd April, from Robertson, regarding the state of affairs in Chitral.

______________


[Demi-official.]

No. D.-O.1479 R., dated Gilgit, the 16th April 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr.

Herewith Robertson's of 3rd April. The news is bad. I have telegraphed it on. This on the top of the Chilas business is unpleasant, but I hope that things will not turn out so badly as they promise. Robertson's letter has no address on it,' but I gather that he is still, or was rather, in Chitral. I wish he had carried out his intention of moving to Mastuj.

____________

[Demi-official.]

No. 38, dated the 3rd April 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson C.S.I.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C.B.

We seem to be on a volcano here, hut if so we recognize its muffled warnings.

I had news that a number of Adamzadas intended to run away on a certain night, and kill somebody, if possible, at the moment of departure.

I advised Nizam to stay indoors, and particularly not to go to the masjid in the evening. He and his friends treated the information as a mere rumour, but stayed in the fort all the same. They could not, however, believe there was; anything afoot.

Imagine their fortification, and anger at finding that 17 headmen, all Adamzadas, fled the very night I said they would go, and so proved the truth of my information. The Mehtar's counsellors are such, fools that they, know nothing of what is going on actually under their noses.

Matters are no longer improving; the atmosphere of Chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue.

The Baba Sahib is feeding 1,800 men daily we hear, an immensely large number for that furious fanatic to entertain. He prays daily for the utter destruction of the infidels, and declares there is more merit in fighting against the Chitralis than against anyone else, for they have brought the English into their country.

One of our warm friends, at heart a firm supporter of Sher Afzal remarked we ought to go to Mastuj before long and say in a month or so, before the weather in Chitral gets sultry. It is getting very sultry already in one sense.

I imagine the general desire is to get us out of the way, so that Nizam maybe disposed of.

It is probably thought that were he once killed, the road would be cleared for Sher Afzal.

Umra Khan has well thrashed Muhammad Sharif, and is said to be making, peace with Safdar Khan of Nawagai. I hear he is furiously angry with Nizam, and tells his friends that Nizam on fleeing to Gilgit, and subsequently through Waffadar, promised him the entire valley below Chitral if he would help him against Afzal. He swears he will take Chitral as far as Mastuj for Amir-ul-Mulk, whom he now forcibly prevents from returning to Chitral.

The last rumour about the Russians is that it was from Akfash that they asked for Kila Panja to be given them. The Afghans reply was that they must be mad to make such a request.

By the way, concerning the hint about Mastuj, I have let it be known that I think the suggestion a very sensible one, as no doubt the climate there will be much cooler than at Chitral, &c.

Except us, Nizam has no friends at all. The people seem determined to avenge on him the tyranny they suffered from his father. Poor fellow he does his best, but his beard (s.o.) is as poor as his brain.

I hope everything is all right in Chilas as it should be, so that the enemy may have nothing to encourage them. As you may imagine we keep our eyes well open here.

As an example of the strange rumours which are flying about, I add the following: -

A Mulla just arrived from Dir tells, Khushwakt that the Amir has sent an urgent message to Umra Khan and the Nawagai Khan, asking them to make peace. He says the English are enclosing him on all sides, and, if all are not united together against the common foe, all will be destroyed. On this message Umra Khan and Safdar Khan have made peace and are preparing for a religious war. The Mulla says that in every masjid in Bajaur, the people are talking of the war, which is to begin immediately the fast is over. If the Mehtar joins them, it will be well for him, otherwise he will be killed with the other infidels. The Baba Sahib is so delighted at the prospect that he fairly "dances" with joy, while Umra Khan is not one whit behind him in his fervid protestations.


Demi-official No. 1833, dated Srinagar, the 8th May 1893.

From - Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir,

To - Sir H. Mortimer Durand, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of,
India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 1756, dated the 4th May 1893, I enclose the marginally noted demi-official letter, received on the 8th May, forwarding copy of a demi-official letter, dated-the 6th April, from Robertson, regarding the state of affairs in Chitral.


From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Durand, C.B., British Agent, Gilgit, No. 1557, dated 20th April 1893.

_______________

Demi-official No. 1557, dated Gilgit, the 20th April 1893.

From - G.S. Robertson, Esq.,

To - Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B.

I send herewith copy of Robertson's last. I had repeated to him some of your remarks about him in a demi-official to me. He is about the most modest man I know, considering his extraordinary ability and force of char­acter.

His news is serious and corroborates that given in the last letter forward­ed. The difficulties and dancers of his position ale very great, and I feel much more anxious about him than he does himself apparently, though he evidently realises that the state of affairs is dangerous.

There is no use in offering any opinion on his letter. The storm, if it comes, will have burst before this reaches you. I only wish I knew whether troops are coming to the Babusar. I do not much like the look of things in Nagar, but trust I can keep things straight.

________________

Demi-official No. 39, dated Chitral, the 6th April 1893.

From - G. S. Robertson, Esq.,

To - Colonel A. G. Durand, C.B.

Our hours are beginning to drag a little after the incessant rain, have passed a most unpleasant week. There are again only hope for the best.

Colonel Barr is too kind in his remarks about Chilas. He and the Civil and Military Gazette teach me I am not too old to blush allover. It is fortu­nate that other people cannot estimate our merits with-the accuracy we ourselves possess.

All manner of extraordinary rumours are flying about, especially about Umra Khan's religious war against the infidels, and the Mehtar also lf necessary. A good deal of reflection leads me to think there is a substratum of truth in these reports, and that Bajaur and Dir are really in a more or less, red hot, state of fanaticism. I imagine the "Jihad" is directed chiefly against the Bashghal Kafir and not principally against us, although of course nothing would give the Baba Sahib more acute satisfaction than involving his followers in a general frontier war with the English. A friendly Sayad from Hassanabad, near Shogot, has sent me a letter of warning on the subject. He believes that we are the game at which the Baba Sahib and Umra Khan are flying, but such a view of the matter must not be accepted too easily. It is difficult to understand what advantage Umra Khan could possible obtains from openly breaking with the Government of India; and he appears, as far as we know, to be more of the astute politician than a rabid fanatic. However, it is always unexpected contingencies one has to be provided against, and we are not likely to despise any warning however improbable it may seem, nor on the other hand, to over estimate possible dangers.



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