From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir



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I can, if necessary, push up a couple of hundred levies and the same num­ber of infantry and a couple of guns to Gupis, but I sincerely hope there will be no need for this, and that Umra Khan may have his hands too move against Killa Darosh, &c.

Chilas affairs I telegraph to you about daily. There is a pause in life's pleasures at the present moment, and if it only continues for another ten days, all chance of an immediate attack is probably over, as the people will be beginning to move their flocks to the higher grounds as Robertson points out.

I hardly know that to think. I was certain an attack was coming, as was everybody down the Indus valley and here; but it seems half doubtful now: the next few days must settle it.

We have had a great week of entertainments for our kings and they have enjoyed themselves, and so far as I can judge, things are really satisfactory.

If things keep so, I should like to come down and see you at once, for, whether I am to be here next winter or not, I want to get home early.
Demi-official No. 44, dated the 17th April 1893.

From – G.S. Robertson, Esq., in charge Chitral Mission,

To – Lieutenant - Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit.

A trustworthy man has just returned from Dir and Bajaur, where I sent him. He saw the Baba Sahib and Umra Khan, but in the role he was playing he had small opportunity for lengthened conversation with either. The former asked about the English Mission, if it were likely to remain, and if is popular with the Mehtar and the people. He was told it spent much money and interfered with no one, and the Chitralis were rather pleased than otherwise at its presence in their county. The Baba Sahib then became very depressed, and said the. Kohistan was lost, lost fur good. Another holy man of the party began abusing the English, saying they should all be killed, and so on. A relative of the Baba Sahib stopped the speaker in his furious out pourings, remarking that it was no use talking; the Baba Sahib himself remained sad and thoughtful. My man saw Umra Khan, to whom he was introduced as a poor Mullah. They met, in a masjid. Umra Khan was also most anxious for news of the Mission and of its intention, lie was told that the speaker, a poor man, know in nothing of the intention of the great and rarely seeing them, could say nothing definitely, but all seemed well and quiet in Chitral. Perhaps after the country had settled down quietly, the English would go away again.

Irresponsible people at different times made many curious remarks to my emissary, which it is not worth while to repeat, as such vague rumours might obtain an importance they did not deserve. There was, however, nothing said which would lead to the idea that any general combination against us was now contemplated. Umra Khan is said to be boastful and full of the great deeds he will accomplish after the Eed. He first goes against Pamjan and Dir. To assist in the conquest of the former fort, he summoned the Bashkaris. The latter replied they were willing to give their help when the fighting was to be in cool climates, such as Laspur or Drosh, but that they could not act in hot places; so the story goes that they are to cross over and attack Killa Drosh in conjunction with Umra Khan after the latter has defeated Pamjan. Umra Khan is reported to be very obstinate about Amir-ul-Mulk getting Drosh. He says if the Mehtar gives it up with a good grace, well and good; otherwise he must be forced to do so. At the same time Umra Khan distinctly says Chitral is not to be attacked because the English are therein, but Amir-ul-Mulk must have Drosh. &c. It is said that a large deputation of Kafirs has one to make submission to the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar. I shall know all about this in a few days. It is very likely true, for the hatred and fear of the Kafirs for Umra Khan is intense, and they probably perceive that the Mehtar cannot go to war with Umra Khan on their account. Shazada Lais came to see me yesterday. He tells me he has been ordered to bring his family down to Shoghot, and hinted that he could be most useful to me at Arkari ; but if he were to be moved, he should like to be sent to Yasin. He bragged greatly, about his own and his late father's authority, and how it was entirely due to the latter that the. Amir took Shignan. The Ghizr men have arrived to make submission, and conciliation is the order of the day, I am happy to say.

The Mehtar wants first to build us a house, and then our skilled artisans to construct a famous hall of audience for himself. It seems that Afzal-ul-Mulk intended to expend 50,000 rupees on a similar scheme. This is the result of their visits to India. I believe Chitralis would civilize with wonderful rapidity if they had the chance, and a moderate tenth rate building here, a telegraph wire, bridge and other small triumphs of engineering skill would excite an awe and admiration of our skill and resources amongst the surrounding tribes which might be most valuable to us.

The Mehtar also sants a marble grave stone properly engraved for his father's tomb. This I have promised him. The spot just in front of the masjid has become a sanctuary, and in this way is most convenient. Any one wanting redress or pardon for past transgressions flies to the sacred place, and, as far as we know, no one has as yet been unsuccessful in getting Ms petitions favourably answered. Impairing the old masjid and small, actions of that sort would be probably very popular.

I wonder if the Indus valley people will make a determined attempt to turn us out of Chilas before the passes open. They may perhaps have one more try after the Eed, but the 'valley must be warming up now, and the Upper Kobistanis at any rate must be thinking of their "Ailaks" and be getting anxious about their flocks and herds. The Kaglian Sayad is no doubt working hard to keep their courage to the sticking points. He is the inveterate enemy I suspect. I should like very much to see Douglas report of the roads he went over, and to know bow far he reached on the Babusar way.

News has come that Mian Gul, of Swat, is dead. It came through my own man. The Mehtar has not mentioned the fact, if it be a fact. In any case it is of little importance to us.

If our prominent opponent dies, there arc always fifty to supply his place.

I find the Babu Sahib and his friends talked more freely than was first reported. Some fanatics in answer to his despondent remarks declared he was a saint, and could consequently organize a successful attack against the English. He replied, "I am only a poor fakir. I, too, greatly desired a religious war, but it is impossible now that our own Khan (Mohammad Sharif) is helpless and a fugitive. It he wore in power, it could be done, but all the Bajaur Khans are busy eating one another's flesh, so we can do nothing."

He was told that, in spite of the advice of the Mission, Nizam was secretly oppressing the people, selling their wives, and generally ill-using them. He and his friends praised the advice given to the Mehtar, and the Baba Sahib observed that the English were very just. Approbation from Sir Herbert Stanley is praise indeed. I like a thorough going straightforward enemy like this pestilent old priest, lie will cut your throat, or cause it to be cut when­ever be gets the chance; but he will never pretend he loves you. . If murderer, lie is a thorough going, sincere, old gentleman, and fills me with respect for the way he acts up to his principles always. The poor old fellow wants to try 'a cure' at the Lutko hot springs, but cannot lower himself to enter a country where an infidel's power is paramount. Kafirs, Moghlis, and Hindus he can tolerate and pity, but the stiff-necked Christians, those superior people who pity him, who are ever ready to be condescending and tolerant to his poor, ignorant beliefs, gently assured at his fanatical fervour, they can only be dealt with in one way, and that way how shall it be reached?

It is beginning to get warm here. Earthquakes are nearly as common as scorpions. A marvellous change has, occurred. It seems but yesterday we had "winter's wondrous frost and snow: " now it is" spring's soft heaven."

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Demi-official No. 45, dated Chitral, the 17th April 1893.

From - G.S. Robertson, Esq., C.S.I.,

To - Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B.

Your demi-official No. 1227 of the 3rd instant. It was most fortunate you returned to Gilgit in time to manage Mohamad Wali. I was on tenterhooks about the young man. It is all right about the Eshani Hazrat. He will be received back into the fold with open arms literally.

You know the particular force of love to the vanquished which is dealt out in Chitral. The next punishment to killing is the giving away of wives, children, and houses of the defeated to the faithful. We have practically had no killing at all. There have been one or two mysterious disappearances, but even those are now becoming ancient history. The donations of the wives and houses of fugitives has, however, been continued more or less openly especially since 'that scoundrel Waffadar has been in the ascendant. To day, in reference to Yasin, I acquainted the Mehtar with my views on the subject under the veil of giving advice. In support of my opinion I had prepared several arguments pointing out the inexpediency and impolicy of the practice, arid pointing to its ill success. Of course I took no high moral grounds, because these people imagine that when you adopt, that attitude, pure and simple, you are merely insisting on a proposition, which will not bear rational discussion; that you are, in short, bullying them.

But the Mehtar refused to listen to any arguments. It was sufficient for him that he understood my advice. It would be acted on at once, and he sent me a message to say that on any points he only wished to know my wishes, and they should be carried out at once. Surely a more docile prince it is impossible to imagine. He gives up everything, even his more cherished tyrannies and iniquities, at a word. May ho have his reward in our sticking to him, and may we have ours in winning the affections of all the people by our efforts in their behalf. I am no hot reformer: 'Festina lenle' is the motto in Chitral. The People must on no account be frightened by the idea that we intend making innovations in the management of the "sweet country." We could get everything we want gradually the abolition of slavery, the cessation of murdering to a great extent, and all other desirable objects of a similar kind.

There is still a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst the people, but the Mission seems to be extremely popular even with the Adamzadas. Wonder­ful, indeed, if it can be really credited, I hear 180 of the Turikho men, 40 from Khust, and several in Lutko and Ayin intend to bolt as soon as the passes are open. They say that even Abdullah Khan has gone over to the ranks of the disaffected. This will mean (if true) that all the Kezas are going solid against the Mehtar, a very serious business. I must try and get hold of Abdullah Khan. We are on the way of being great friends of several years standing. He may listen to my advice. If Government would accept my proposals, we ought to quickly put matters straight. It is the feeling of -uncertainty about tin; future of the country, and the suspicion that the Mission is only a tem­porary affair, which makes the people fear for the future and imagine that in the end the Amir's party may triumph.

Abdul Hakim wants three months leave this year to India, where he has important business. He has been away for four years, and has thoroughly earned his leave. He is, as you know, very anxious to be nominated as a can­didate for the post of Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab under statutory Civil Services Rules. You know how well he has always worked at Gilgit; but you cannot know the extreme value he has been to me up here. His tactful zeal and loyalty are beyond all praise. As you know, I am not given to over praising people, but it is only honesty to say that Abdul Hakim deserves anything we can do for him. I will mention to you personally many little matters to his credit, which it is unnecessary to put down here. I know you appreciate his work thoroughly, and beg you will do everything in your power to help him in his wishes.


Demi-official No. 2148, dated Srinagar, the 23rd May 1883.

From - Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir,

To - Sir H. Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 2111, of the 22nd May 1893. I enclose for information the marginally noted demi-official letter, with enclosure in original, received on the 21st May 1893, forwarding copies of demi-official letters from Robertson, dated the 24th and 27th April 1893, containing information in regard to the state of affairs in Chitral and Russian movements in the Pamir region.
From Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit, No. 1838, dated 9th May 1893.

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Demi-official No. 1838, dated Gilgit, the 9th May 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To - Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir.

I send you herewith Robertson's Nos. 48-49, dated 24th and 27th April.

The situation in Yasin, if we mean to take advantage of it, and I trust it will be convenient for Government to do so, though I fully realize the difficulties and disadvantages involved in our proposals, is, on the whole, very satisfactory. I have seen a good deal of the Yasinis lately, and I think Robert-­son has not in the least exaggerated our influence there. I am sending up Stewart at once to make friends with Ghulam Dastgir and the people, and if the former is withdrawn and Shuja-ul-Mulk sent, Stewart would have no difficulty in running Yasin and. in Arranging for the supply of our posts in the country.

The news about the Russians is most interesting. There is, I fancy, no doubt that a message calling on the Commander at Killa Panja to clear out was sent, and that the Russians were at Langar Kisht. There will be no ex­pedition to the Pamirs, but to be in a position to resist Afghan and Chinese aggression, strong reinforcements will be sent to Murghabi, and points of strategically importance occupied.

Umra Khan's attitude is puzzling, as you will see from the letters, the second of which rather modifies the first. Probably Robertson's idea is right, and Umra Khan wants to be asked by Government not to interfere in Chitral, so that Le may, by meeting its wishes, and at the same time doing what he really desires himself, be in a position to ask for some recompense.

I presume Robertson and I shall now come down together as things are so smooth at present.

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Demi-official No. 43, dated Chitral, the 24th April 1893.

From – Surgeon - Major, G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To – Lieutenant - Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit.

The situation remains unchanged. Everything is quiet. I have men in Badakhshan, Wakhan, &c., while others have started for Shignan and Bajour; but the severity of this winter's snowfall renders travelling tedions and slow.

The fugitives have given out that they intend to go to Sher Afzal. They do not believe he is imprisoned at Kabul; but if they find that to be actually the case they intent to return secretly through the Bashgal valley to try another night attack on Chitral. Their object is to kill Nizam and then to ....................... await the course of events. They argue that having no children, his death must expedite, the fulfillment of their political and private desires towards the Sher Afzal family.

They may or may not undertake this adventure. If they do, they will probably not use the Bashgal valley but the Lutkho road, which would be much more convenient unless it Were1 properly guarded.

I am anxiously awaiting news about Chilas to learn if the Kohistanis intend to make one more attempt on the place, now the Eed has passed and gone. If they do, their lesson should be final and decisive.

The Darelis and Tangiris are, I hear, thoroughly frightened, lest they be punished for their wanton attack on us in Chilas. But they are not greatly to blame. We may rest assured that Akbar Khan, Mohamad Wali, Safedulla, not to speak of Mokaddas Aman, will try their utmost to keep these tribes unsettled, as a peaceful settlement of the country would defeat all ambitious hopes and schemes. However, everything of the sort must fail if we maintain a strong hold on Yasin.

The Jemadar reports—and the observations are corroborated by many others—that the Yasinis are extraordinarily well disposed towards us. They, pretend no concealment of their desire that we should keep, their country? And employ them to carry loads on payment. They appear to have fully appreciated the high rates the Mission paid, as well as the way they were petted and made much of.

Indeed, everyone would be pleased, the villagers themselves. Nizam who is tremulous lest his road to Gilgit be barred by an enemy, the Mehtar's advisers, —all more or less openly advise it; while the hostile amongst the Chitralis recognise the fact that they would be powerless if Kashmir troops were cantoned in Ghizr, at Thayar Last, and in Yasin. It is an opportunity of strengthening our influence all round which should not be allowed to slip away.

We should, I believe, find no difficulty in supplying .the garrisons with grain, forage, and firewood. While Chitral is so hard pressed for food that I hare been compelled to lend grain to the Mehtar, as the fort had run out; of, supplies altogether, Yasin, in spite of invading armies and general disturbance has still surplus stores in hand. There 'is no export for its wheat or other cereals. The people are beginning to understand the value of money rates will-never be high.

One point about Yasin is that there the people are practically of one class—the turbulent independent upper ranks are conspicuous by their absence. It is hardly possible to overrule the advantage this peculiarity would afford us in ruling the country. If Chitral were similarly constituted, the Mission; would be a mere picnic.

No doubt what Government will shy at will be the detached posts. It is this which, makes the Chilas disaster so calamitous, yet I am convinced of the soundness proposition. Disciplined troops up here chiefly, used as we should use big guns. They should never be placed in positions where they could be captured or destroyed but should be employed to make our depots of stores, arms, and ammunition impregnable, unassailable. The loose hill skirmishing could less expensively and equally effectively be done by local levies. They are infinitely more rapid in their movements, and thoroughly understand how to advance against or defend a "darband" with the minimum of exposure and loss. But it will be a long time before we can safely employ levies in adequate, numbers, unless we have also strong forts where stores can be collected, and arms and ammunition rigidly guarded, except when actually required for instruction or for fighting.

I hope Williams will soon start for Baltistan and while working in and studying the district also try and discover if there be no fighting caste amongst the people from which Gilgit could be recruited.

In time and with improved roads we ought to be able to get a larger proportion of our grain and other supplies more of less locally, white if we could also get fair recruits enclose at hand, one of the chief difficulties in efficiency and cheaply maintaining Gilgit would be overcome.

Now for the Russians.—The Mehtar sent me a letter last night from the headmen of Zabak, Mulla Safar Doulat Beg, Safar Beg etc., to his address. They ask that the Mehtar should send them trustworthy men, not double dealing rascals who may cause their names to be "burnt." They assert their loyalty to Nizam, as they have eaten his father's salt, white Afzal-ul-Mulk destroyed their fond hopes by refusing to see or hear them. A summary of all the news we have received since Thursday last from beyond the passes amounts to this.

More than a month ago four troops of Afghan cavalry left Fyzabad for Sojan and Somti to guard the Oxus fords leading to Kolab.

The Russians in large numbers are at Murghabi, with detachments at Sarez and at Khargoshi on the Wakhan frontier. A party also visited Langar Kisht, but made only a short stay at that place. They have sent word to the people of Wakhan telling them not to cultivate the lands by the roadside, as there will be shortly much going to and fro of Russian troops. The Wakhis are promised compensation for the losses they will incur by obeying these instructions.

It is generally believed that this year the Russians will occupy Badakhshan. A Badakhshi prince, a son of Doulat Beg, formerly Mir of Shakuldarra, is with-the Russians, who are said to have promised Mm the whole of Shignan.

Three Kirghiz were lately sent by the Russian officers at the Pamirs with messages to the Afghan garrison, asking them to evacuate Kila Panja, and remarking that answers and objections should be made from Mazar. The Panja commandant sent on one of the Kirghiz to Fyzabad, where, after torture; he was placed in chains. The General sent orders to Mulla Ashur to send him the other two messengers, but the latter managed to get away in time. Mulla Ashur probably gave them the "office." He is suspected of being in with the Rus­sians. He has gone in nominal pursuit of the runaways, and been informed that unless he succeeds in capturing them he must not come hack again. The Russians are spending large sums" of money on the Pamirs.

Fifty Afghan sepoys from Shignan, on suspicion of intriguing with the Russians, have been imprisoned and transferred to Fyzabad.

The Afghan troops are said to be placed as follows: —There are 500 Afghan infantry and artillery in Shignan; 300 infantry at Pauja, under a commandant; 300 infantry at Minjan; two troops of cavalry, one regiment of infantry, and one of artillery at Fyzabad; 200 infantry at Ragh; 300 or 400 infantry at Rustak.

The Badakhshis are said to be most anxious to serve the Government of India and only want orders to do: anything they are told. The Badakhshi princes in Lutkho arid the Hassanabad Sayad all write to say that representatives of all the Badakhshi tribes are anxious and ready to come and to me at Chitral

You must remember I do not vouch for the truth of any of the information. I merely send it you for what it is worth; at present we have no means of testing its value, while you can make guesses quite as ingeniously as I can.

Sher Afzal's son with his Chitral followers have all been sent under escort to Kabul, after being deprived of their arms and horses. Their families are still at Fyzabad. Guards are placed over them at night to prevent money or property being taken away.

The Governor of Zebak has been instructed to find out what money was spend by Sher Afzal's son and his followers in that district, with a view, it is supposed to its being recovered from the people. Mohamad Esa, Sher Afzal's foster brother has been permitted to go and live at Warduj with his father-in-law.

Ali Mardan's wife has arrived in Chitral. She has been received with great respect by the Mehtar, who rode out to meet her. Her chief object in coming is said to be that Ali Mardan Shah be given the whole of Yasin. She is a terrible woman. You know she threatened to pay me a visit a Gilgit. She is now chamouring for revenge on her brother's murderers, the men who actually carried out Afzal-ul-Mulk's orders, while they intend to appeal to me, or, in the event of my not hearing them, to run away at once. A report has reached me while I write that twelve more men have bolted. It will be months before the people will be induced to believe that Sher Afzal is not coming back, and that they will not be punished for their complicity in his raid. Nobody in this country trusts the spoken or written words of their ruler. Aman-ul-Mulk taught them to place no reliance on princes.

Mulla Ashur is a close friend of Ali Mardan's. The latter will require watching this year.

From Dir we learn that the Baba Sahib has gone for religious funeral purposes to the grave of Mian Gul. Certain informants said he would remain there for five months, but it is more probable that fifteen days will be the duration of his visit. It is one or the other and all the same to the news-bearing Mehtarjaos.

Nizam has just received an urgent and secret letter from his half-sister, Umra Khan's wife. She pleads for her brother Amir-ul-Mulk that he may be given Drosh, but warns the Mehtar not to leave him there without strong guards. She declares Umra Khan is determined to put Amir-ul-Mulk in Drosh by force if necessary, and gives earnest warning that not a single day should be lost in strengthening and reinforcing that post. She writes sensibly and shrewd­ly, pointing out the importance of getting back Amir-ul-Mulk to Chitral. She is quite right undoubtedly. Nizam is just as anxious as she is to get Amir-ul-Mulk back again; the difficulty is how it can be managed. Umra Khan's desire is to put in Amir-ul-Mulk and use the boy as his own Governor. To attain this end he is nearly certain to try to send his own troops as Amir-ul-Mulk's guards, and make himself the real master of the district. It may be the whole business is a blind, and Umra Khan is trying to frighten the Mehtar (no very difficult matter), with the view of preventing his helping the Kafirs when the time comes for Umra Khan to attack them. Rumour has credited Umra Khan from a long time past with a fixed determination to get hold of Drosh; but knowing that wily Khan's duplicity, his fondness for trailing a herring across the scent, I have never given too much weight to such representations. This last communication on the subject, being written by the Mehtar's sister and couched in plain, unmistakable terms, cannot be lightly disregarded. Suppos­ing it is true that Umra Khan intends somehow to make himself master of Drosh, it must surely be trusted also that he and Safdar Khan have patched up a peace at the Amir's suggestion.

To estimate the value of the news I get, it is first of all necessary that I have information of the relations between Umra Khan and the Government of India, as well as those between it and the Amir, otherwise we are grouping in the dark. Will you kindly telegraph and find out if the Peshawar authorities have sufficient restraining influence over the Khan of Jandole to prevent his invading Chitral territory, and if they can obtain a guarantee from him to that effect? If they can, it would strengthen my hands greatly. We prevented the Chitralis attacking Umra Khan when their co-operation with his other enemies would have caused him the gravest embarrassment; we ought consequently to keep him from worrying the frontier now if we have the power to make our wishes respected.

Nizam has no General, nor any trustworthy fighting men. Nobody believes in him now respects his authority. The old feeling of security against an attack from Afghanistan has gone completely. No doubt the Jemadar is partly answerable for this. He kept declaiming to Afzal and the people that they need be in no anxiety from that quarter, for the Government of India would never allow the Amir to interfere in Chitral, &c. Sher Afzal's invasion has shattered their confidence. They all want to be the side of the victor, and on the whole think that Sher Afzal will be ultimately triumphant. They also desire that it should be so—at least the Adamzadas do. They latter think it would be the height of tyranny and oppression to treat high and low, rich and poor, with equal justice.

Please send me as soon as you can all the news you get of frontier I and wire for the special information I want about Umra Khan

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Demi-official No, dated Chitral, the 27th April 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit.

Everything seems to be satisfactory. Umra Khan's threats about Drosh are still perplexing. It looks as if he were, frightening the Mehtar to keep him quiet about Nursat while Umra Khan settles his other enemies. If he really intended to attack Drosh, we should expect him to portend a march against Swat or Asmar. All the same, if we could get from Peshawar an assurance that Chitral territories should not be violated by Jandole forces, it would strengthen Nizam's position, although of course he would at once begin clamouring about Nursat again.

The Mehtar is just as shifty as ever. He would agree now to any arrangement about Yasin with pleasure, for his fears are very great concerning Sher Afzal. If he were once really confident of his power to remain in Chitral he would certainly seek to raise difficulties or make a hard bargain. Annexation would be a mistake. It would look like a breach of faith on our part. It would be as inexpedient under present circumstances as it is unnecessary. My idea is to have little Shuja-ul-Mulk made Governor, with a British Political officer as his guardian and director. We would be responsible for the security and good government of the district guarantee the small revenue, &c. In return for all this there would be no interference from Chitral of any kind. If Nizam or his villainous advisers had the run of the place, all the old atrocities would be started again. If we are in a position to protect the people from oppression, there will be no running away of the inhabitants. On the other hand, all will be delighted. Nizam is universally disliked, and, with the exception; of a small party, Rahmatulla's relations and Mohamad Wali's foster relations, Khushwakt domination is dreaded only less than the rule of the Katur. The wretched villagers want peace and some sense-of security that their wives 8 children shall not be sold at the pleasure of the king, nor their houses fields taken away unjustly, merely to reward the favourite of the hour, may confidently expect that under just government the Yasinis will be loyal and grateful, until, at any rate, the terrors of the old regime have faded from their memory. Then of course men will be as indignant at the restraints of in­justice properly administered as all other natives in a similar stage of civilization are and always must be. They hate oppression themselves naturally, but equally naturally they love to oppress those weaker than they are. "Project me from the strong, let me plunder the weak, is the hearty desire of every one of them.

No further news of the Russians. Two men have just arrived who say no troops have left Murghabi at all as yet. This statement I doubt very much.

I start to morrow with Bruce for Shali, Shagot, &c., leaving Young husband and Gordon…………….Twelve men of the guard accompany me to provide one sentry at night………The marches will all be short. Nizam goes too. "Tamasha" is ………..only object.

The weather ………………..hot in the middle of the day, but the sun is generally temperature …………..breeze. I am most anxious to get away. Five years of this………upon one – a few months of civilization is necessary to prevent one …….. becoming sterile, one's disposition …….or morose.

P.S. There is a suspicion that Umra Khan's game is to get Government or Nizam to ask him not to attack Drosh. In this he will seem to oblige Government and Nizam without being required to give up Nursat



[demi-official.]

No. 2256 D.O., dated Srinagar, the 30th May 1893.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To—Sir H. M. Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 2148, dated the 23rd May 1893, I enclose the marginally noted demi-official letter received on the 29th May, enclosing copy of a demi-official letter. No, 50 dated the 30th April 1893, from Robertson, relative to the state of affairs in Chitral.

_____________

[demi-official.]

No. 1960, dated Gilgit, the 14th May 1893.

From—Lieutenant J. Manners-Smith, Assistant British Agent at Gilgit,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. barb, Offg. Resident in Kashmir.

Herewith copy of a demi-official letter from Robertson to Durand,
dated the 30th April, which is the letter referred to in my telegram No. 1919
of yesterday's date.

Robertson had not received the Government of India orders about withdrawing when he wrote, but he has since done so via Peshawar, as an urgent letter, dated the 6th instant, which arrived yesterday afternoon, explained.

The letter referred to I have sent on to Durand, who is still in camp. It was really chiefly private, but was sent urgent, and therefore opened by me, as. Robertson had received information, which led him to believe that a number of Swati Mullas had proceeded up the Indus with students, for the purpose of joining in a gathering of forces against Chilas. The rumour must have been false, as everything was quiet down the river when Twigg left Chilas on the 8th. The Chitralis may have got news of the unsuccessful "mission from the Hindustani fanatics into Swat, and distorted its return into this story. I refer to the telegram from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, dated the 8th.

Twigg and Sandbach came here from Chilas via the Kanjut Pass two days ago which shows that our friends in Tangir and Darel are at our mercy, if any serious trouble should occur again in the Indus valley.

________________

[demi-official.]

No. 50, dated Shogot, the 80th April 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B.

Your demi-official to Younghusband was unluckily not dated, so it is not clear whether you wrote it before of after your letters of the 15th and 16th to me. Mian Gul's death ought to put a stop to any general rising in the Indus valley, even if it were otherwise possible. Ii hope all chance of such an event has now passed a way. It would undoubtedly be unpleasant for Gilgit if a determined fanatical attempt was made to drive us out of the country but it would not be more than unpleasant. It must fail utterly. Our holding Chilas makes us very strong. The enemy might hammer their heads

against the stone walls there as long as they liked, but could not venture to attack Bunji or Gilgit while we have Chilas. Its possession secures Gilgit. If they really mean a determined assault on Chilas preparatory to other adventures, they must have a severed lesson read them. I will march through Tangir and Darel, with a strong force of Chitralis, and show the Kohistanis how vulnerable they are. They Mehtar is madly anxious for such an expedition. He believes it would make manifest his devotion to Government and earn being to have peaceful neighbours, but all the me if there were anything like a big business threatening, I should start at once. The road are not difficult comparatively speaking, while we should go very fast. Bruce would probably accompany me. The Punyali levies could; go over the Singal Nullab Pass into Darel; we would meet them marching through Tangir. One word of caution is necessary. None of the Punyalis from Akbar Khan downwards would like to see the Darelis completely smashed up, as none of them really liked the Hunza Nagar success. It would consequently be necessary for me to get hold of them, as soon as possible, to keep them under my own eye. While we are in Chilas, the Kohistanis, however infatuated; their fanaticism may make them, are powerless for evil, unless they rose in such numbers that, instead of being a kind of mere frontier police business it would be a general frontier war, when the proper remedy would be applied from Peshawar way. Chilas is the real 'darband' for Bunji, as all the natives know very well. It paralizes any raiding attempt on Gilgit. It puts Darel, Tangir, Thur aun Sazin entirely at our mercy. When it is seen that we not only hold it strongly now, but really intend to stick to it for the future, and yet have no desire to conquer the whole of the valley, the people will settle down to acquiesce and peace provided they are let alone. The Kaghan valley Sayads is the mainspring of all hostile movements. They fear, their valley will be harried by troops and transport, in. precisely the same manner that Astor has suffered. As I wrote in a postscript to my last letter, Umra Khan is very likely 'bluffing' about Drosh, so I have written to him a second letter about frontier matters, a copy of which you will find enclosed. His brother, Muhammad Shah Khan (Miskini Khan), has written to me again. He appears to be desirous of ingratiating himself with the Mission with an eye to the possibility of future benefits for himself, which is satisfactory enough. Umra Khan's forces are besieging Pamjan. Guns have been sent with them. Umra Khan is either with the troops or intends to go to them shortly.

Abdul Hakim tells me that, after conversation with some of Sher Afzal's well-wishers, lie is sure that many Chitralis believe that we are at heart well disposed towards Sher Afzal. They do not believe that he is a prisoner at all, but that he will shortly return openly, not secretly as he came before. They expected Nizam would be installed and proclaimed Mehtar by the Government of India. As this has not been done, they conclude we intend eventually to put Sher Afzal on the throne.

It is also said that all the Bashghalis are favorable to that prince. He wisely conciliated them in every way, distributing much money amongst them. The people, say that now the passes are opening, "we shall see."

The men, who brought news from Badakhshan that Sher Afzal's son and his followers had been taken under escort to Kabul on their road down the Latku, told a precisely contrary story, declaring that the men were still at Zebak. Chitralis of course like to tell every one that which he wishes to heat. I imagine myself that the party has really been taken to Kabul. Whether or no there is any foundation for the almost universal belief that Sher Afzal will shortly put in an appearance once more, depends altogether upon the state of our relations with the Amir, of which I of course know nothing.

I arrived here to day with Bruce. The Mehtar is with us. We have done the one days march in three journeys. This arrangement was nominally in the interests of sport, but we have not had any. It may be the Mehtar is afraid of over fatiguing my excellent majesty. He is painfully anxious lest by some accident he should offend me. If he were but stronger minded or of firmer will, it would be better for himself, but no doubt he would be much less easy to manage. He really likes being kind, and with a British officer always near him should turn out a model Mehtar. He told, me last night with glee how the Eshani Hazrat had asked for 30 slaves on payment, but Nizam without being disobliging had shown how impossible it was to send slaves while I was here.

Muhammad Wall's broth Gauhar Aman, is with us here. He is all right. There is not the slightest suspicion he will be poisoned. I believe the Bernas man's daughter promised to Rahmat-ullah's little son has been given to Muhammad Raft's brother. It is not a matter with which I can interfere.

______________

Copy of a letter from Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., to Umra khan of Jandol, dated the 27th April 1893.

On the 2nd of February, two and a half months ago, I did myself the pleasure of writing to you about frontier affairs, being under the impression that you were prepared to enter into discussion on the subject with the British officer in charge of the Government of India Mission to Chitral. On the 5th of March, you sent me a courteous communication, showing that you fully understood the contents of my letter and repeating many of its phrases. You also remarked that the pressure of urgent business at the moment prevented your writing more definitely, but promised to let me hear from you again shortly as soon as you had leisure at your disposal. May I ask you now to be kind enough to fulfill this promise? The year is getting on, and I am most anxious to know that cordial and friendly relations are fully established between you and Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk If, on the other hand you are no longer inclined to discuss the Narsat and other frontier questions: with me, I shall write and acquaint the Government of India with the fact. In either case I beg you will accept the assurance of my friendship and my good wishes for your health and prosperity.


K. F.

D.No. 612F.



[Demi-official.]

No. 2427 D.-O., dated Srinagar, the 6th June 1893.

From - utenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To - H.M. Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 2256, dated the 30th May 1893, I enclose the marginally noted demi-official letter received on the 6th June, enclosing extract from a demi-official letter No. 55, dated the 8th May 1893, from Robertson, relative to the state of affairs in Chitral.
From Lieutenant J. Manners-Smith, V.C. Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, No. 2003 D.C., dated the 18th May 1893.


____________

[demi-official.]

No. 2003 D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 18th May 1893.

From - Lieutenant J. Manners-Smith, V.C., Assistant British Agent, Gilgit,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. Barr.

I send herewith extracts from Robertson's last demi-official to Durand. The portions I have omitted were merely expressions of private views and evidently not intended to go further.

I have sent you a cipher telegram to-day regarding Robertson's intentions as to returning to Gilgit and leaving Younghusband in Chitral with Gordon and the full Sikh, escort.

I feel sure Durand shares Robertson's views as to the inexpediency of throwing away, by now leaving Nizam to his fate, the hold we have gained over Chitral; and that he agrees that, if Younghusband is to remain at all, he must have a strong guard behind him, until the Mehtar is strong enough to be responsible for the safety of his British visitors to say nothing of his own neck.

______________

Extract from a demi-official letter from Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., to Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B., No. 55, dated Shogot, the 8th May 1893.

We halt here today and march to Chitral tomorrow. The explanation given by the bearer of your special daks of your urgency was that the Gilgit troops, had been heavily defeated in Chilas losing their two guns, all the Gilgitis and Punyalis had been sent away to fight, while you were importuning the Mehtar for help. Under these circumstances my-wishes agreed with the Mehtar's that we should waste a day at Shogot. It will relieve any possible bad impressions induced by the dak runner's information.

Muhammad Wali presence at Gilgit is undoubtedly causing us some trouble. That raseal Muhammad Rafi lately sent a secret messenger to him. The man was stopped on the road and turned back wounded. It is said that Muhammad Wali's adherents amongst the Ghizr men have sent him a message to the effect that, if he is given Yasin, well and good but if this is not done, they advise his running away by the Kargah to Yaghistran where they propose to join him. The Dirells and Tangiris are also said to be alarmed at the strong guards Ghulam has pleased on the roads leading into their valleys and to be preparing against the supposed attack. This leads me to hope that the Kohistani's riding may be to defend their country against our expedition from Gilgit by way of Chilas and through Darel and Tangir, and that when they ..... that no such expedition is contemplated they may quietly return home again.

There is a suspicion that Umra Khan is inciting people to steal; rifles from Chitral and from the mission escort.

Bapi Lal, a Beza, who has been detained some time in Bajaur, awaiting an answer to a letter from Nizam to Umra Khan:-

1. Fifteen days ago Sahibzada Muhammad Syad of Mian Kilai, accompanied by the Kazi of the Khan of Nawagai had a long private interview with Umra Khan at Munda. The conference was kept profoundly secret; It lasted from noon to far in to the night. Conjectures concerning it are chiefly to the effect that Umra Khan and Safdar Khan are trying to patch up a peace.

2. The Swat people, acting in concert with Muhammad Sharif Khan, have sent Rs. 6,000 to Nawagai Khan, asking him to attack Umra Khan at once, otherwise the latter, after subduing Pamjan Khan and the Sin forts, will certainly invade Swat.

3 Muhammad Sharif Khan is at Thana. His family, is at Ningrahar near the Peshawar frontier. The Khan of Thana and Muhammad Sharif Khan have lately seized 15 horses which Umra Khan bad bought' in Peshawar, and which were on their way to him.

4. Umra Khan is encamped near Bargholi with a force variously entrenched and numbering two or three thousand men. He is besieging Bargholi which is 'defended by Pamjan with only sixty men. Nevertheless, the latter makes frequent sallies; he has killed about twenty of Umra Khan's men. The Jandol troops are said to fight with the most reckless bravery. Pamjan's son, Saifulla, holds Barun with 80 men. His younger brother is at: Ranai on the opposite side of the river with only 40 men. The Khan of Rubat, an ally of Pamjan, occupies Rubat with a hundred men. The four garrisons between them have only sixteen rifles. Bapi's opinion is that, in spite of all the bravery of the defenders, Umra Khan will achieve an easy victory. He has promised to settle the business in from 16 to 20 days at the outside. If Pamjan is captured, it is thought that this 'time Umra' Khan will not let him, escape with his life.

5. The Baba Sahib had not returned to Dir. Bapi, when leaving Shahzadi, saw the Murids preparing for the reception of the holy man at that place.

6. The Sipah Salar is still at Asmar, but the Afghan garrison there has been greatly reduced, numbering at the present time not more than 2,000 men. The remainder has been sent away in consequence of- troubles between the Amir and the English or the Russians, so folks say.

7. Amir-ul-Mulk has definitely refused to return to Chitral unless Kila Drosh be promised him. Umra Khan in his letter, which the Mehtar sent over for me to see, declares that the boy will not go back, and he (the Khan) cannot force him to do so. He has sent word also that he would be personally obliged it Nizam would give Drosh to Amir-ul-Mulk. He has sent word also that he would be actively helped him, but, as Amir-ul-Mulk has none, he did not care to do so. Further, that he, Umra Khan, was a sincere friend of the Mehtar and of the Government of India, although as yet he had received no benefits, such as money, &c., from the latter. Many people reported lies to the Mehtar about him (Umra Khan), but he hoped to explain everything in an interview with Nizam as soon as his hands were clear of Pamjan.

8. Umra Khan told Bapi that he intended sending a man to see me in a day or two.

9. On one occasion Umra Khan sagaciously observed that the Mehtar should not believe that the English would ever actively help him. They would give money and presents, and by honied word attempt to get hold of the country. I is impossible for the English to bring large force from Gilgit into Chitral, because or the distance and because of the difficulties of transport and supply while a small force would be useless. Their real - their only road was through Swat and Bajaur, but this they will not be able to take for a long time. "We will see" added the Khan ending the conversation.

Bapi (or Bappi) is of opinion that, if the Mehtar does not give up Drosh to Amir-ul-Mulk, Umra Khan will probably attack. He and many expect there must be something hidden under the Jandol Khan friendly protestations to the Mehtar, and that after he has smashed Panijan, he will either turn his attention to Drosh or the Bashghal valley, and so occupy the summer.

I shall not be able to leave Chitral for some days, in accordance with Government instructions. I shall wait a reasonable time for a reply from Umra Khan.

* * * * * * * * * *

A sudden withdrawal of the whole party would reduce Chitral to the condition in which we found it, while to leave Younghushand behind with a diminished escort would he highly imprudent. My present idea is to hold a farewell Darbar as soon as convenient, and then start with Brace for Gilgit, leaving younghusband and Gordon behind with every man of the escort to give Nizam a further chance of establishing his position.

* * * * * * * * * *

Ghulam Khan has arrived at Drosh from Bajaur.

K. F.

D. No. 616F.



[Demi-official]

No. 2507 D.-O., dated Srinagar, the 10th June 1893,

From - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To - Sir H. M. Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.l. Foreign Secretary.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 2427, dated the 6th June 1893, I enclose the marginally noted demi-official letters received on the 10th June, enclosing extracts from demi-official letters from Robertson, relative the state of affairs in Chitral, and giving certain information in regard to the movements of the Russians and the Afghans in the Pamir region.
From Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., British Agent, Gilgit.

(1) No. 2201, dated the 22nd May 1893.

(2) No. 2145 dated the 25th May 1893

_________________


[Demi-official.]

No. 2101 D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 22nd May 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C. B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir.

I send you herewith an extremely interesting letter from Robertson, giving the latest news he had of Russian and Afghan moves. The former of course will move, however much they protest, and the latter seem inclined to hang on to their rightful possessions.

If the reinforcing of Sarhad is true, the Amir is certainly not stick­ing to the line shown on his map. His speech to the Kafirs is thoroughly characteristic: he is the regular Afghan bully.

I presume that the next letter we get from Robertson will be on his
way out.

_____________

[Demi-Official.]

No. 52, dated Izt, opposite hot springs, one mile from Drosh, the 2nd May 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B.

We have moved here from Drosh as everybody, Mehtar included, wishes to bathe in the springs.

Messengers are coming in from beyond the passes continually bringing news, much of which is unfortunately more or less contradictory, while not a little is pure fable, or an exaggeration of the vague rumours floating about the frontier.

All agree that the Russians will take Wakhan this year and also Shighnan. Most believe also that Badakhshan be seized as well. The reasons for this opinion are the movements the Russians have already made according to common report and the counter movements made or being made by the Afghans.

The Khwaja Minjan's Khalifa arrived this morning. His news is definite, given with confidence in its truth, and agrees in the main with that of other travelers. It may at any rate be taken as expressing the general belief of, and the information possessed by, the Zebakis. It is to the following effect:-

(1) The General at Faizabad starts shortly for Bagh whither the infantry from Faizabad have already gone. The cavalry have moved to Rustak. These are precautionary measures against a possible attack from Darwaz or Kulab.

(2) The garrison at Panja is to be reinforced by 150 men drawn from the detachment at Minjan. From Panja 100 men have been sent to strengthen Sarhad and a similar number to Bapatung. One pony load of rifles and one pony load of cartridges have reached Panja for the use of the garrison.

(3) Advanced guards of Russians have arrived at Kishu, half a day's journey from Panja in the Khargoshi direction. The Russians have also advanced from Soma, and have a post one and a half day's journey nearer the Shakhdhara than Soma, while their main force is half a day's journey behind the advance post.

The Afghans have sent a company of 60 men to Shakhdara to watch these movements.

(4) From Sarez also the Russians have advanced, and 100 Afghans are in consequence guarding the Yal Darband. This Darband is said to be at the foot of a pass called the Sargaighund, and to block the nullah leading to Bartang and the Ghund valley also.

5. Sher Afzal's son's horses confiscated by the Amir are in the transport lines at Faizabad, but are paid for by Sher Afzal, which may or may not be a suspicious circumstance.

There is no doubt whatever that there are many refugee in Chitral would welcome the advance of the Russians, and would help them to the extent of their power. Like the majority of the Badakhshis, they would do anything to get rid of the Afghans.

The disaffected to Nizam, are as you know very numerous, and are continually sending secret messengers to Zebak. The Zebak is told the Khalifa that these men industriously spread reports of the small number of British there are in Chitral, and how easy it would be to capture the place, is to encourage the adherents of Sher Afzal to attempt another invasion. Many Lutdeh Kafirs have come here. They say that a deputation of their tribe went to Kabul to see the Amir, who used very threatening language towards them, declaring that, unless they sent at once a headman from each of their sixteen villages to make complete submission to him, he would invade their country. He told them to place no reliance on the Mehtar and the English. The latter were his blacksmiths, who supplied him mite rupees and such arms as he required. He had the Lutdehis at a disadvantage on all sides. If they disobeyed him, he would eat them up at the head and at the feet. The point about the Amir's speech is this. He know as well as every one else that the Lutdeh Kafirs have been tribute, and acknowledge allegiance to the Mehtar of Chitral for a very long time. If he has been correctly reported and means, what he says, the Amir is bent on undertaking a frontier policy of extreme for forwardness.

The Kafirs also say it is not true that Sher Afzal is a prisoner. The Amir at first was exceedingly angry with him, but that now Sher Afzal is at large, and is treated with great kindness by the Amir. This is the general opinion in Chitral, and probably the Kafirs got the news from some Sher Afzal's followers, and not from Kabul as they pretend.

People who fly from Chitral to join the enemy get their lands and possessions confiscated. There is a suspicion that certain headmen ................... the credulous people that Sher Afzal is close at hand is certain of success, ..... that it would be only common prudence to join him. These headmen have 'rallied' from Sher Afzal to Nizam but pretend they are humbugging the latter, and are still in close correspondence with the former. Their ................ to get poor devils to run away and then become possessors of the ................... lands. As far as I know, it is only in Latku that this game is being played there it has been attended with considerable successes.

Shahzada Lais has to day given me a definite promise that the hold himself responsible that none of his 'Murids' leave the century. He says he cannot be responsible for the 'Murids' of other 'Pirs,' but he will do his best to influence them also.

The opinion is gaining ground that the mission is secretly inclined to favour Sher Afzal. The rumour is industriously spread by the supporters of Sher Afzal. They know well that I formally congratulated the Mehtar on his occasion to the throne on behalf of the Government of India, but lies in Chitral are readily believed. The inveterate liars are always the most credulous of mortals. The only remedy is to have a great Darbar, summon people from all sides to attend it, and then actually instal Nizam in the name of His Highness the Maharaja and he Government of India with much gun firing, band playing, present giving and an elaborate ceremonial. It is now a month and a half since I sent in my report. During that period my knowledge of the people and of the affairs of Chitral has naturally increased, yet I am just as certain as when I wrote that all my main suggestions are sound, practicable and will, if adopted, be most really economical in the end.

Younghusband sends me word from Chitral that Pamjan is said to have made a successful sally, from Barun or Bargholi, returning to his stronghold after killing some of Umra Khan's men, that the truce between Umra Khan and the Khan of Nawagai continues in force; that Muhammad Sharif Khan is trying to induce the Sipah Salar to attack Umra Khan through Nawagai. There is also a report of a Narsati that a deputation of Kam Kafirs has actually started for Asmar to pay their respects to the Sipah Salar. All day long I have been receiving visitors. The weather is beautiful, the country delightful. Younghusband reports all well at Chitral. We are all as fit as possible. Start for Parchah tomorrow. There are men waiting to give me more news, but if I delay sending off this letter until I have heard everything everybody has to say it cannot go to day at all.

______________


[Demi-Official]

No. 2145 D-O., dated Gilgit, the 25th May 1893.

From – Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B. British Agent at Gilgit,

To – Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Offig. Resident in Kashmir.

I send herewith extracts from a batch of Robertson's letters just received. His No. 56, dated 12th May. The reference of Muhammad Wali is, I believe, because the boy asked to have his wife sent him. She is a daughter of the late Mehtar Afzal-ul-Mulk. I am inclined, as I have telegraphed to you, to send the boy to Astor; here he is a thorn in the side of the Mehtar's Governor of Yassin, and is constantly intriguing against him.

I am afraid the said Governor is not so tactful as Robertson imagines; there are the usual complaints of his oppression, but he has a difficult game to play.

No. 57 of 12th May. There may be something in this; Kaye has reported a Kohistani force as coming up, but I hope this is not the case. The stories he has heard of small losses do not tally with the 120 men buried in Chilas itself. Of course these people boast in order to cover their defeat.

No. 58 dated 14th May. I was afraid, in the unsettled state of Bajaur, that Umra Khan would not meet Robertson.

The Jemadar's action, in writing to stop Umra Khan from attacking. Sher Afzal, is curious. He said nothing to me when here about having done so, nor can I find any trace amongst the letters of his having reported his having written. I dare say it was to save his neck from Sher Afzal.

I have written, to Robertson saying, I hope, he will bring Ghulam in to Gilgit; it will enable us to put an end to Muhammad Wali's intrigues, and his formal reception berg should have an excellent effect in Yassin.

No. 59, dated 15th May. I cannot find the place mentioned near the Khargoshi Pass reported to be held by the Afghans, but it is evident that the Amir is beyond the line laid down by him both in this case and

____________



[Demi-Official.]

No. 58, dated Chitral, the 12th May I893,

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C.B.

The situation in Chitral seems to have very greatly improved and to be still improving. A few months more ought to see affairs settling down into a state very satisfactory for us; but of course at present it would be most highly inexpedient to withdraw altogether from the country. I have replied in this sense to the Foreign Office, and mentioned my determination to leave Younghusband and Gordon behind with all the escort, as fifty men is quite small enough in my opinion for the strength of the guard.

My Latku journey was, I believe, a great success. The people were re­assured, the Sayads were nobbled, and are said to have been pleased. We shall see, however, in a week or two the actual measure of success obtained.

After we left Chitral, there was a regular stampede of the people here. This also seems to have now stopped. It put a stop to our projected journey up the Arkari, but Shahzada Lais is there, now, and as I wrote before He has definitely undertaken that none of his Murids shall, run away. All the in­habitants of the valley are Shahzada Lais's Murids. The one doubtful remain­ing district is Turikho. They are said to be a little unsettled there. If this is the case, it may be necessary to pay this a visit also, perhaps on my way to Gilgit. We shall see.

Nizam is dying to get Muhammad Wali out of Gilgit to Kashmir or somewhere; while that young gentleman himself seems to be very contented and happy where he is. He is quite a potentate and propounds question for you to answer as if he were at least on an equality with the Mehtar. I think the best, plan would be to tell him that we never interfere with the internal affairs of Chitral, more especially with the domestic arrangements and royal prerogative of the Mehtar in, family affairs. That this is the policy of the Government of India and of the authorities of Gilgit every one knows, If Muhammad Wali wants any favours, or concessions from Nizam, it is absolutely necessary that the first step is for him to make proper submission to his lawful king, trusting to the kindness and sense of justice of the latter. In such a case some help might perhaps be given him if it could be done without interfering with Chitral manners and customers, but our consistent end must be to let Nizam know that we consider him as real a Mehtar as his father was, and that we should no more think of interfering with his private domestic affairs than we should have thought of interfering with Aman-ul-Mulk's.

Nizam will soon be trying on a scheme to get hold of Muhammad Wali's mother, his own half-sister. In this he will fail. He has already hinted at it to me. Mehtar's have practically the same powers of controlling the marriages of their relatives that the Queen or the Czar have in their respective families; consequently we cannot interface between Nizam and Muhammad Wali, on the other hand, the mother of the latter will certainly never be brought back from Gilgit against her will. I fear Muhammad Wali plays polo too well and is consequently being made too much of in Gilgit. Ghulam has been very carefully instructed as to his behaviour in Yassin. I do not think you need be under any fear about him. He is showing himself exceedingly intelligent and tactful as far as I can hear. There will be no oppression or bullying there of any sort. I think Muhammad Wali's followers should now return to Yassin.

_______________



P.S. - Russians reported to be all going back everywhere. Umra Khan said to have got the worst of one or two skirmishes with Pamjan.

Extract from a demi-official letter from Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I., to Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Durand, C.B., No. 57, dated Chitral the 12th May 1893.

Anent the Talibilms. It seems that the Kohistanis were more than satisfied with their last efforts at Chilas, but all the same do not intend to fight again. The food question is so difficult they say. They declare their losses were not very great, were less indeed than those suffered by the bodyguard, but it was necessary to go back at once as every one was starving. Now there is a fund being collected in all masjids for the Talibilms who are expected to start shortly for Chilas. They cannot carry grain, so they are to be supplied with rupees to buy food locally. The Talibilms may amount to 1,000 or 2,000, but not more. They will be indifferently armed, chiefly with swords. If they do attack, they ought to be swept away easily. They are only boys. Indeed if they cannot be driven back, it is to be hoped that the attacked force will be killed to a man for drawing the pay and aping the ways of soldiers, while they are only impostors getting their money under false pretences.

_________________



[demi-official.]

No. 58, dated Chitral, the 14th May 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel, A.G.A. Durand, C.B.

One curious point brought to light by the Peshawar Diaries is that Jema­dar Rab Nawaz Khan in Sher Afzal's time, while, according to his own account, he was hourly in danger of his life and in great distress and f eau by reasons of the behaviour of Sher Afzal, yet nevertheless when Umra Khan's forces advanced over the Lawarai to attack Sher Afzal, wrote a letter of protest to Umra Khan against the latter invading Chitral. I asked the Jemadar in a casual way if it were true that he had written such a letter. He answered that it was true. He volunteered no explanation, and I turned the conversation. Will you find our if in his correspondence with the Gilgit Agency he made any mention of this letter? Of course Umra Khan and his brother, on getting this communication, assumed that Sher Afzal having the Jemadar's support had the support also of the Government of India. It is said that in their embarrassment at being stopped in their adventures by the Jemadar, they invaded Bashkar for the sake of appearances, as it would not do to admit they so readily obeyed the orders of the Government of India.

I have had a moderately civil letter from Umra Khan, who mentions that he has had a letter from the Viceroy, saying how pleased the latter would be if Umra Khan met me but as Umra Khan truly says it would be most inadvisable for him to meet me under present circumstances. This point I suggested in my reply to the Foreign Office telegram sent through the Commissioner of Peshawar.

Umra Khan also complains of the difficulties of his position, and of the total lack of help he has received from Government. Concerning Narsat &c., he remarks he has written fully on the subjects to the Foreign Office. He is evidently a little "hutted" or wishes to appear so.

There is nothing further to detain me here. I shall start for Gilgit on the 26th instant. Bahadur Khan will probably accompany me from Barnas to Ghizr, and Ghulam from Ghizr to Gilgit. I am trying quietly to alter the Mehtar's arrangements in the matter of my going down, but if he is firm in his resolve, I shall give way as it will only involve a few days additional delay. The Kam Kafirs are now busy with a serious quarrel amongst themselves. They are beyond our sphere of influence altogether I think.

______________

[Demi-official.]

No. 59, dated Chitral, the 15th-.May.1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand. C.B.

Your demi-official of the 6th instant. Younghusband has drawn up for me the enclosed statement of our information about the present disposition of Afghan troops.

It appears to be correct, that is to say, different informants agree on the main facts. There seems no doubt that the Amir has a detachment at Sarhad. The numbers given us are 26, 20, 30, one man says forty but all are unanimous in saying there is a detachment there.

The unanimity of every one about the actual presence of Russians in Wakhan, and the little graphic touches of description about them and their doings were extraordinary. Nevertheless it appears now that the Russians never were there at all. This makes one diffident in certifying to any information as absolutely accurate, but I believe the Amir has a small force at Sarhad.

____________

Disposition, of Afghan troops on the Pamirs and Badakhshan frontier according to information received in Chitral up to May 10th 1893.

In Wakhan 300 men, of which 20 to 40 are at Sarhad, about 60 at a post (Kikm or Akbar Zer-i-Zanrin near the Khargoshi Pass and the remainder at Killa Panja.

In Shighnan and Roshan, 500 men and four guns; of these 100 are said to be guarding the Yal Darband at the foot of the Sargan-i-Ghund Pass in Bartang. There were originally six guns but two have been sent back to Faizabad.

In Badakhshan, one battalion infantry, one battery of artillery, and two troops of cavalry at Faizabad; 300 infantry in Munja; 300 infantry in Rustak; 200 infantry Ragh; four troops of cavalry at Sayad and Samti, guarding the passages across the Oxus.

The total strength of the Afghan forces on the Pamirs and Badakshan frontier may be taken as 2,400 infantry (three battalions), two batteries of artillery, and one regiment of cavalry.
K.F.

D.No. 689F.


[Demi Official.]

No. 2790-D.O., dated Gulmarg, the 28th June 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To - Sir H.M. Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 2539, dated 13th June 1893, I forward copies of Robertson's final demi-official letters of Colonel Durand in regard to Chitral affairs.
Demi-official letter No. 63, dated 21st May 1893.

Demi-official letter No. C-1, dated 28th May 1893.

Demi-official letter, dated 25th May 1893 (extract)

___________


[demi-official.]

No. 63, dated Chitral, the 21st May 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I.,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit.

A profound calm is on the surface of things. I leave next Friday with a clear conscience. We have news from Asmar that S her Afzal is to he detained a prisoner for three years. If this is true, our frontier is quite safe at any rate. The Amir is intriguing, bullying and frightening the Katu Kafirs (the Lutdeh men), requiring deputation to he sent to him to make proper submission, under pain of an invasion of the Kafir country. The Kafirs object, and so does the Mehtar naturally. The Kara people my friends, are characteristically raging and intriguing all round. They are toe most stiff necked and fierce of all the, Kafir tribes I know anything about, and have of late been committing several entirely unnecessary impolitic murders.

Umra Khan is said to have taken the Rani fort by a coup de main,


putting all the defenders, 140, to the sword, while his own loss was compara­tively trifling. He, then, is said to have offered a road for retreat to Pamjan Khan at Bargholi, which is not more than a rifle shot from Rani, but the old fellow replied; that he intended to keep on fighting, and was quite ready to die. This is the Mehtar's story as related by him to the on the authority of various informers lately arrived in Chitral from Bajaur and that neighborhood. The Jemadar thinks the news undoubtedly true. As soon as the Sin business is quite settled, if any satisfactory arrangement can be completed with Nawagai, Umra Khan will probably attack the Kam (or else Swat in Though valiant, at times furiously brave, they are in a high state of exasperation, and should make a stubborn defence. They will try and get the Amir's help no doubt. The Mehtar is by no means pleased with their recent behaviour, and sent word to me last night that he had refused to see a deputation just arrived from Kamdesh. I told the deputation this morning that, until they had satisfied the Mehtar about the recent murders I was unable also to listen to any of their representations. They have promised to return tomorrow with Inayat Khan or some other Mutabar of the Mehtar as a guarantee that the latter has sent them to me.

There is little doubt in the minds of the people here that an Adamzadas, named Amanat Shah a great fighting man who was murdered here two nights ago, was shot by the Mehtar's secret desire. The decrease was an old acquaintance of mine a ................... Shah-i-Mulk, and a sworn friend of Sher Afzal's. I hear today that several men have fled the country from .................. it may be in consequence of this murder, which has set many men trembling for their own lives. But murders in Chitral are unfortunately common incidents, so common indeed that ordinary people take but little interest in such occurrences. It will take a long time before this state of things is changed.

News came yesterday that the Russians were certainly on the Pamir-i-Wakhan. Today we got word that they are going back from Murghabi even.

The unanimity of all our messengers that the Russians were at one time actually on the borders of Wakhan is very curious. We must send a trust­worthy man from Gilgit, through Ali Mardan Shah, to Mulls Ashoor before we shall truly know what actually occurred. I hope the Indus valley is quiet, and that we have settled, and are settling down to an uneventful summer. It is already extremely hot in Chitral, but every one keeps well.

The attempt at restarting the Kaka Khel timber trade seems so far to have failed ignominiously. The first party sent to do the work fled at once. They are now somewhere about Asmar. The next lot are said to have refused the Mehtar point-blank. We have, carefully kept outside the whole question, and I have abstained from even mentioning the subject to the Mehtar. I hope, therefore, that this unjust trade has come to an end of itself. The Mehtar will never be able to complain that he gives it up at my request, a very important point. He has so far been forced to give it up, simply because his people would not agree to continue it.

______________

[demi-official.]

No. C-1., dated Camp Gurki, tie 28th May 1893,

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.A. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit.

I send you a letter received by Khushwakt as we were leaving Chitral. It shows that Sher Afzal has restarted his intrigues, and is by no means hopeless of regaining Chitral. Do you know if there are any definite assurances from the Amir on the subject of the detention of Sher Afzal? If please let me know of them. We shall probably go by the Chamarkand reaching Gilgit in about a fortnight. I am busy 'conciliating' as we go along. We ourselves are highly popular, but the Mehtar makes little or no way in the affections of the people. I need not write at any length as we shall meet very shortly.

_______________


Translation of a letter from Sher Afzal to Raja Khushwakt Khan, dated Monday, the 19th of Shawal = 6th May 1893.

Of exalted rank, distinguished with honour, my brother Khushwakt Khan may you always remain under the shelter of God, and may you remain honoured and respected in both the worlds! By the kindness of the Lord of the world I am well and safe. Please God, you also will be in the same condition.

Further, may it be known to you that you and I are brothers. Your father and mine intended to become friends. My father (Shah Afzal) has asked your father that he (Padshah Khushwakt's father) should arrange for a from his father in Law's (Chazanfar of Hunza) family to be betrothed ................... ............... ......... ...................................... ..................................................... .......................... ..........

he brought a man of the Russians to his own place. When the English, came to Chitral, he sent the man down to Drosh. When the English want to Drosh, he had him thence sent to GramoI where the man remained in the house of Abdul Said Kalash. This agent of the Russians was ten months in the country. After that period Aman-ul-Mulk sent him to Ali Mardan Shah, and the latter helped him in his return across the Pamir. Last year when the English were sending forces against Kanjut, this Nizam-ul-Mulk sent a letter to his father, saying he had made arrangements with the Yaghistanis, and asking for permission to attack and take Gilgit from the English.

Aman-ul-Mulk in his lifetime used to tell his sons that his evil doings against the English were well known; that, if evil days came on him, he had no road to the English, but that he will proceed to Ishkuman and Pamir, and thence to the Russians. Aman-ul-MuIk used to say these words; now also if misfortune happens to Nizam-ul-Mulk, he will not go to the English, hot to the Russians.

In Kaghaz-i there is a man named Tawar and Azad and Ramat-ullah. These were sent by Aman-ul-Mulk, the year before last, with Haji Kokandi to the Russians, also last year after their having returned once. He used to tell the man of the English that he sent them for trading purposes. Those men have not returned yet. You should let the men of Government know this. I have done no evil against Government, nor ever ^intend - to do so. If God grants me my country, I will make friendship and relationship with you. You explain these matters fully to the men of Government. Please God, I am not a liar or given to breaking my promises.

The rest—may the days of jour life be prosperous.

[Seal of] Sher Afzal.


________________

Extract from a demi-official letter from Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I., to Lieute­nant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B., dated Chitral, the 25th May 1893.

* * * * * * * *

There is no further news of Russian and Afghan movements. I shall send Khushwakt over the Baroghil to find out and take to Gilgit an account of what has actually happened in Wakhan this year. We must do something for this old and trusted spy and faithful worker on our behalf. Could you get, him a jagir in Gilgit? It would be politic as well as just to handsomely reward his good services and unswerving fidelity. Despite his long tongue and his occasional want to tact, he is the best of all the Kings he is best of all the kings.

The Kam Kafirs are intriguing all round and misbehaving generally in their usual idiotic way, alternately lying, bullying and whining.

New has come from Bajaur that Umra Khan has captured Rani as well as Barun. It is said that he overwhelmed the former fort with artillery fire, smashing down the defences and killing 82 men. Never the less his own loss amounted to between 60 and 70 killed and wounded a prodigious number, if true for this class of fighting. The news is more than corroborated by a letter from Gulam Haldar Khan to the Jemadar, which relates that Umra Khan has captured all the four forts completely subduing the Sin country. It furthers asserts that an immediate a .......................................

..................

...............

The Queen's birthday was observed here yesterday with much ceremony. Nizam-ul-Mulk came over in the morning to offer his congratulations, and the headmen followed one another all day with the same object. It was an admirable opportunity for distributing toshakhana presents. In tie afternoon there were sports, while, in the evening, we entertained at dinner some 250 guests, including the Mehtar, and everybody who is anybody besides num­bers of people who are nobodies. The festivities still, continue. To-day there is to be a great polo match, and more sport which darkness compelled us to leave over from yesterday. The whole business was a very great success the. Queen and her birthday will long be remembered in Chitral. I want a good picture, of the Queen properly famed for the Mehtar. My own idea is that a photograph of Her Majesty statue at Bombay, would be the best picture to give. This would show the Queen on a throne, crowned, and with a sceptre in her hand just the sort of picture to properly impress the Chitralis. The only objection would be the eyes. I must think it over. Hope to see you in a fortnight or so.

* * * *


K.F.

D. No. 690F.

No. 2791, dated Gulmarg, the 28th June 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To - The Secretary to the Government of India foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 2767, dated 26th instant, I have the honour to for ward, for the information of the Government of India, a letter No. 2540, dated. 17th June 1893, with its enclosures, from Surgeon-Major. G.S. Robertson, C.S.I., being his final report on Chitral affairs, together with a copy of the instructions issued by him for the guidance of Captain Young-husband.

The mission accounts are separately forwarded with my letter No.- 2792, dated 28th June 1893. I would submit my opinion that Surgeon-Major Robertson bas conducted the duties entrusted to him by the Government of India with much tact and discretion; that the object of the mission to Chitral has been fulfilled; and that it is "evident that Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk is largely indebted to the support and assistance he received from Surgeon-Major Robertson's mission for the measure of success attained by him in establishing himself as the Ruler of Chitral.

I consider that the instructions framed by Surgeon-Major Robertson for the guidance of Captain Younghusband, who remains as Political Officer in Chitral, are full and sufficient, and that they have been drawn up with the care, skill, and foresight which have marked all Burgeon-Major Robertson's actions; and with the knowledge and experience of men and measures in Chitral which he possesses to so rare a degree.

I trust that the services of Surgeon-Major Robertson and of the officers, whom he so strongly commends for their cordial assistance, will be brought to the favorable notice of the Government of India; and I venture to draw particular attention to the terms n which Surgeon-Major Robertson refers to the excellent work done for the mission by Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim.
Captain F.E. Younghusband, Lieutenant the Hon'ble C.G. Bruce. Lieutenant T.L. R. Gordon.

___________________

No. 2540, dated Gilgit, the June 1893.

From - Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I.,

To - The Resident in Kashmir.

I have, already officially informed you of the return of the Chitral mission to Gilgit, and of its work being now ended. I now forward, for subsequent transmission, to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, final report on Chitral affairs, together with a copy of instructions, left behind for the general guidance of Captain Younghusband; also the mission accounts.

2. A translation of a letter addressed to me by Mehtar, Nizam-ul-Mulk is likewise enclosed. It was handed to me just before my departure from Chitral by the Mehtar himself, who took the opportunity of presenting it to renew his professions of entire devotion to the Government of India, his earnest desire to place himself and the resources of his country, at the disposal of the power which had not only seated him on his father's throne but was still maintaining him there with equal .........................

3. Nizam-ul-Mulk does not pretend that all his actions during his father? .. ......................................

proceedings on his part; justifiable only on the ground that he was acting under the orders of his father and King, he has nevertheless been treated with the utmost kindness by the Government of India.

4. He fluently proclaims Iris gratitude for what has been already done for him, while he earnestly confesses his inability at the present time to con­tinue the struggle against his numerous enemies, unless he is still sustained by the same strong hand which has so powerfully aided him in the past. He founds an argument why he should be accorded further help in the future, on the broad ground that it is necessary for a great Government to be consistent in its policy. It is this conviction, which is found underlying all his utterances, although it is usually somewhat obscured by that habitual indirectness, of speech, which is common to all orientals.

5. You are aware that the Government of India left it to me to decide whether Captain Younghusband should remain in Chitral with a small escort, or whether he should return with the mission to Gilgit. I decided that he should stay behind in Chitral and that the whole of the detachment of the, 15th Sikhs, with Lieutenant Gordon of the same regiment, should, be left with him also as a personal guard. I formed this determination on the grounds that there is now ho unreasonable risk in officers living in Chitral if properly protected; that any sudden withdrawal of the whole of my party would create, such a general feeling of insecurity throughout the country that it would be probably impossible for the Mehtar to maintain his authority even if it did not impel him to leave Chitral altogether. Finally, I considered that although 60 Sikhs under a trustworthy commander were sufficient to guard the resi­dence, and stores of the Political Officer, yet it would be an act of imprudence to diminish that number. In short, I read my telegraphic instructions about leaving Captain Younghusband at Chitral with a "small Escort" as meaning a sufficient escort, and acted on this assumption.

6. In now adverting to the work actually accomplished by the Chitral


Mission. I think it may be considered good on the whole. My previous report, dated the 18th of March, will have shown the nature of many, of the difficulties the mission had to content against. Most of these difficulties were, however, successfully overcome, and consequently they need not be referred to against at any length.

7. As a means of closely connecting Mehrat Nizam-ul-Mulk himself


with the Kashmir Darbar and with the Government of India, there never was any doubt about the assured success of the mission. But it was quickly discovered that a much wider field of operations lay before the Political Officers than was contemplated when the mission originally started. The country was in a distracted condition, torn by factions; the Mehtar was highly unpopular; the English were looked upon with suspicion and dislike by the influential classes.

8. For its own safety, therefore, no less than with the view of maintaining English influence and English prestige, the mission was compelled to actively and energetically support Nizam-ul-Mulk in his Government, yet without ever appearing to interfere in the internal affairs of the State.

9. Instead of finding ourselves in the position of envoys sent to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with recent triumphs over rebellious subjects and powerful outside foes, we, found ourselves called upon to firmly establish on his throne, and infuse with hope and virile energy, an unnerved terror-stricken Chief who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear lest the Government of India might have the will and also the power to energy any injury to its nominee.

10. That under such ..................................... .................... ............ ......... ....... ....... ........... ................................ ...................................................... .

11. Military force Other than that which the Mehtar himself can organize and direct, it would be impolitic to use in Chitral, even if it were possible to employ it at such an enormous distance from its base of reinforcements and supplies in Kashmir or India.

12. The upper classes have to be won over and conciliated by friendly, overtures, apparently emanating from men absolutely secure and. confident in their strength and position, while at the same time the imagination of the Adamzadas must be acted upon by the spectacle of their ruler; being securely protected from all outside enemies, and gradually making himself feared and respected by the firmness, combined with justice, of his rule, and by the display of the wealth and resources he possesses as the subsidize ally of his acknowledged suzerain, His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir.

13. That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy it would be idle to deny, but there are also two factors, the, value of which cannot be overestimated, as favouring influences in any attempts we may make to mould the Chitralis to our interest, especially if these; favouring influences be employed discreetly and with dexterity. They are, first, the absence of any real fanatical feeling in Chitral, and, secondly, the extreme impressionability of the people.

14. The absence of all sentiments of religious intolerance in Chitral amounts to a national peculiarity. It is especially indicated by the strenuous but futile efforts of one or two of the chief men notably by one of the Mehtar's uncles, to gain a reputation for fanaticism. But the pretended bigotries displayed are so obviously a threadbare cloak for biding simple designs for increasing individual self-importance that no one is deceived by so palpable a sham. One man, a Cousin of the Mehtar's, at first very friendly in his relations with the mission, went on a visit to the "Baba Sahib" at Dir. On his return it was discovered he had become fanatical. He kept aloof from all communication with the British officers, bat yet maintained this uncompromising attitude with so much difficulty, so much, doubt and self consciousness, that it was impossible to feel any resentment at such embarrassed shamefaced proceedings. Another individuals, who had been promised a small present, remembered on the day the "khilats" were distributed that, as a "Sofi," he could, not possibly attend to receive his gift. He nevertheless came to the garden door of my house and openly before all his followers begged that his reward might be sent him there by the band of his friend.

15. The impressionability of Chitralis again is something extraordinary. It undoubtedly makes them terribly fickle. But fickleness tells both ways



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