From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir

16. It follows, therefore, that a Political Officers in Chitral has a wonderful power always at hand of influencing for a time all those brought into direct contact with him. All manner of apparently determined enemies of the Mehtar, Adamzadas, Moghli Pirs, Sayads as well as ......................................................... ................................................................................. .............................................

17. Having now indicated what strong support can be afforded. Mehtar by British officers in Chitral in the way of winning over to his cause the influential classes— the villagers and poorer people will always look at the English with favorable eyes— and having in. my former report, already referred to, shown how the position of the. Political Agent at Chitral san be easily rendered practically safe against those who from fanaticism or other motives are hostile to the continued residence of British soldiers so close to their frontiers, it is still necessary to revert to the present weakness of the Mehtar and his absolute dependence on the Government of India.

18. Nizam-ul-Mulk's lack of popularity can be overcome by time. His miserable poverty will he relieved, by the Kashmir and Government of India subsidies he will receive. But the strongest influence against him at present is the doubt in his subjects' minds whether the Government, of India really intends to continue its full support to Nizam-ul-Mulk, or whether it will after a time withdraw its officers and leave the country to be scrambled for again by Sher Afzal, Umra Khan, and the Khushwakt Princes.

19. Intriguers declare, and their words spread like wild fire throughout the land, that Sher Afzal is only biding his time until he has come to terms with the Government of India and with the Amir; also that the fact of Muham­mad Wali being treated as a princely guest at Gilgit is significant that Government has not made up its mind what to do. They point their arguments by ' showing that Sher Afzal is in active correspondence with his supporters in Chitral, and by truly stating that numbers of Yasinis, in response to Muham­mad Wali's intrigues, are continually running away to Gilgit.

20. The people in fact are waiting for a sign in which they may place some confidence. They fear to do or leave undone anything which may bring down upon them the vengeance of Sher Afzal or Muhammad Wali, it either of those princes are in the end triumphant in Chitral or in Yasin. They know the capacity of both Katurs and Khushwakhas for wreaking vengeance on those they bear enmity to.

21. For this state of things, there is a simple and effective remedy. It is for the Government of India to at once assume, and let the fact be widely known that it does assume the protection of both Chitral and Yasin foreign enemies will be warned off. The people⁴ will be given peace.

22. The majority of the inhabitants of Chitral would, gladly welcome the change. The Adamzadas would soon be brought to acquiesce in it. All but a small minority in Yasin are clamouring to become subjects of the Government of India. At the present moment there are deputations of Tuj men in Gilgit, braving Muhammad Wali's resentment, who have come to implore that they may not again be handed over to the cruel oppression of either Khushkwakt or Katur. On the road to Gilgit the same petition was continually made to me secretly by those who fear to openly, declare their sentiments.

23. The English, were never so popular in Chitral is they are at present. It was discernible everywhere on the return march in the ready smile, the willing service of the men we met. Some Adamzadas at Mustuj, friends of Nizam-ul-Mulk, came to me to pray that Government, would not now withhold water from the tree it had planted with its own hand, and so leave it to wither and die - the poorer classes everywhere re-echo the same with in simpler but equally sincere phrases.

24. An Englishman now may travel anywhere through out the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort unless. Mr. Bruce's our .................. may be also denominated. There were no sentries at night. No ................... of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five man ................. the country.

25. With all their foibles, and vices, of which they have their proportionate share, it is impossible not to like Chitralis. I personally should view with sad regret any retrograde, step on the part of Government which would inevitably be followed: by a return to confusion and bloodshed in the pleasant country, and in a relapse into sorrow and misery of the happy faced picturesque people.

26. I think I have now in this and in my former report gone over all the ground of which it seemed necessary or desirable that you should have my opinion. There only remains for me now the grateful task of acknowledging the valuable services and the happy selection of the officers appointed to accompany and assist me.

27. Captain Younghusband admirable qualities, as a traveller as welt as his general ability, are well known. I need only refer to his thoroughness, his perfect temper and geniality in dealing with orientals, and his extreme conscientiousness, which make him an ideal companion in any mission liable to prove difficult or dangerous.

28. Lieutenant Bruce of the 5th Gurkhas possesses in a marked degree the power of at once getting on good terms with all sorts and conditions of people from the proud Adamzadas to the lowly serf. He has immense energy, but it is always well directed. He is clever and quick, while, his natural liking for eastern peoples seems to be thoroughly appreciated and reciprocated by them.

29. Lieutenant Gordon, who commanded my escort of the 15^th Sikhs, gave me valuable help. The discipline and general behaviour, of the men under his command was altogether praiseworthy, leaving absolutely nothing to be desired. Mr. Gordon is a thorough painstaking officer, upon whom, after a very short acquaintance, you instinctively place very great reliance, both on account of his clear headed grasp of any given question, and also by reason of his trustworthy conscientious character.

30. The Superintendent of the Agency Office at Gilgit Khan Sahib Abdul Hakim, also accompanied me, and in a multifarious capacity. He was not only in charge of the mission office, but had to perform the duties of an active Political, Officer, as well as act as interpreter in Chitrali, Persian, &c. Most important of all he had to keep me informed of the secret feelings or changes in feelings of the headmen and villagers whose districts we travelled through.

31. It is hard to say in which of these various capacities he laboured most strenuously. But his most valuable service to me was undoubtedly the astonishingly exact and extensive information he obtained about the people, their desires, their hopes, and their fears. It is no exaggeration to say that on the march to Chitral, I was equally well informed of the private opinions of old women chatting round a village fire, and of the vague restless longings of ambitions headmen. At Chitral itself the local intrigues—the private and family jealousies of individuals about the Mehtar—nothing seemed to escape the skillfully organized intelligence arrangements.

32. Abdul Hakim's unswerving loyalty, his unassailable integrity were always most conspicuous, while his strong character, combined with his tactful disposition made him equally respected by the Chitralis and by the officers of the mission. The services he rendered were in short most meritorious, and I should be wanting in my duty if I omitted to properly emphasize and attract particular notice to their excellence.

________________

Translation of a letter from Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk of Chitral, to Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I. in charge Chitral Mission, dated the 26^th May 1893.

1^st.—The amount of yearly subsidy, which was fixed by the Kashmir Darbar and Gilgit for my father, should as before be continued to me, even I should be entitled to an increase of it since I have been placed (on the throne) by Government in this country, and my father's wealth has all been plundered, and consequently T am in very great straits for want of funds to reward people, and to meet the necessary expenditure.

2^nd.—As my country belongs to Government, anyhow the parganah (district) of Narsat, which from the time of my ancestors having belonged to us, is my hereditary property, should be taken out of the usurping possession of the Khan of Jandol and handed over to me, so that the bad name and blemish on our reputation may get wiped off.

3^rd.—As through favour of Government all the country possessed by my father has been granted to me, a sanad also should be granted to me, saying that all the countries possessed by the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk are granted to his son, Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk, by the Government of India, so that my head may be raised, and my position exalted before all high and low people.

4^th.— As the stay of Sher Afzal in Badakhshan, and also that of the son of Mir Wali in Gilgit, causes refractoriness and wandering amongst the people of Chitral and Warshagam, and as it is quite likely that Mir Wali's son by talking intriguingly with the people of Yaghistan may delude them, it is advisable, even necessary, that Sher Afzal should always be kept at Kabul or Kandahar, and that Mir Wali's son should be sent down to Kashmir.

I trust, my friend, you would pay your attention to the points contained in this letter.

_______________

(Confidential)

Memorandum for Captain Younghusband and Mr. Gordon.

The Chitral Mission will leave Chitral for Gilgit on the 26^th of May.

Captain Younghusband, in his capacity of Assistant to the British Agent at Gilgit will remain behind in Chitral with Mr. Gordon and the .................. 15^th Sikhs, ............. further orders.

Captain Younghusband will report on all maters and receive orders from the British Agent, Gilgit. He will keep a "Political" Diary, sending all news to Gilgit at least once a week. Important information he will report as frequently as he thinks necessary. Captain Young husband's attitude towards the Mehtar of Chitral should be as follows: He should seek to maintain the cordial, personal, and friendly relations the mission has established with that prince. Whenever competent to offer it, he should give advice whenever asked to do so, but except in questions connected with the foreign relations of the State, he should always make it clear that the advice proffered was merely friendly counsel, and not intended to have the force of formal official instructions, the non-observance of which would be looked upon with dissatisfaction by the Government of India. He must continue to impress on the Mehtar that the Mehtar alone is responsible for the good Government of the country, and that he cannot shift this proper responsibilities on to the shoulders of the Assistant British Agent, the latter being merely an official visitor and a guest, staying in Chitral at the express desire of the Mehtar. He must he also care­ful to say nothing which may be construed as pledging the Government of India to any increase of its responsibilities in Chitral, or to any deviation from the line of policy it has definitely laid down, which may he briefly defined as follows : The maintenance of friendly relations between Chitral and its suzerain, His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir; strict non-interference in the internal affairs of the Chitral State ; the right to direct the foreign relations of the country; the continued payment of a specified subsidy so long as Chitral keeps to her engagements with the Kashmir Darbar. While acting within these limitations, Captain Younghusband should always enter a strong and vigorous protest against the adoption of any barbarous procedures or punish­ments which are opposed to all principles of humanity or justice, the general idea being that in Chitral British officers will never countenance any such actions on the part of a Government which owes so much of its authority to the moral and pecuniary support of the Government of India.

In the event of difficult questions arising m relation to border affairs, they should always be submitted to Gilgit for orders; but Captain Younghusband may possibly be called upon to decide such manners himself when there is no time for him to await instructions from the British Agent. A brief discussion of some of the more probable points on which se may be called upon to give definite instructions on his own responsibility may therefore not be out of place here.

Concerning the Dir-Bajaur-Kafiristan frontier: speaking generally, Captain Younghusband should leave no stone unturned in attempting to esta­blish friendly relations between the Mehtar of Chitral and Umra Khan. It is highly probable that no overt act of general .............. on the part of Dir or Swat will be directed against the British officers &t Chitral while Umra Khan; is in the ascendant, and while he continues to cultivate friendly relations with the Government of India. The Baba Sahib and other fanatics would appear to be powerless to organise a large expedition of a religious character against Chitral, while Umra Khan, with his prestige for piety aid: strength combined, and with his known antipathy to priestly arrogance, professes friendship for Chitral and the Government of India.

The Kam Kefirs are at present divided amongst themselves. They are believed to have sent deputations to the Amir of Kabul. They may send other deputations to Chitral. They may be told that the Amir of Kabul is a friend and ally to the Mehtar of Chitral. If as is ............................... owing elegance to any one other than the ................ this proposition must be politely but firmly rejected. They should be told that they are only accorded a hearing, because they are assumed to be subjects of the Mehtar of Chitral, and that, if they have anything to say on this clear and definite understanding, their petition, after consultation with the Mehtar of Chitral, will be submitted to the British Agent at Gilgit. Kafir deputations should only be received after they have been seen by the Mehtar, and sent by the latter to the Assistant Political Officer. Nor should they be accorded a formal farewell interview until they have received the usual permission from the Mehtar to return to their own country. If Umra Khan attempts an invasion of the Bashgal valley, a by no means improbable contingency, the Mehtar of Chitral should be advised to abstain from interference between the belligerents. The Kam Kafirs and the Jandolis have now been at war for eighteen months, and what­ever the original rights of the quarrel may have been, they have long been lost sight of in the fury and ruthlessness with which the fighting has been carried on by both parties. The Chitralis have hither to abstained from inter­fering in the quarrel, and have consequently now lost their right to protect the Kafirs. The allegiance paid by the Kam to Chitral is obviously of a shadowy description. That the Mehtar can produce arguments that the Kafirs are and have been for a long time more or less subject to Chitral is most true. He can also produce very good reasons why he should be allowed to protect the Bashgal valley, and valid excuses why he has not been able to do so before now. But this is not a matter for logical argument. The fact remains that be cannot, under present circumstances, hope to succeed in a war, which would be very popular with the Yaghistanis from their desire to turn the English out of Chitral; and that the Mehtar would not dream of embarking, on such an enterprise, unless he hoped that sooner or later the Government of India would come to his assistance.

Umra Khan is and professes to be in a highly discontented state of mind with the Government of India. Although the Amir has been restrained from crushing him, although the Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk was prevented from joining a formidable combination against Jandol and invading Dir at a moment, when such an invasion would have been most embarrassing to Umra Khan, the latter complains that he gets no help from the Government of India. Nevertheless, it is most important, as mentioned before, that Umra Khan should be conciliated, if conciliation be possible, yet all attempts at opening up friendly, relations with him must be made tactfully and cautiously lest he think, that overtures are being made to him from Chitral from motives of fear, in which case he will at once rapidly increase his demands.

In the event of Umra Khan attacking Drosh fort or invading any portion of territory which undoubtedly, indisputably, belongs to Chitral, and which may for the present purposes, be defined as including the whole of the Kalashgam with the valley, and the village of Urzun and the adjacent country as far as the ridge which separates the Urzun district from the valley leading to Istargat (Gourdesh); also the Kunar valley on the left bank of the Kunar river at least as low as the valley and village of Damir; in the event of Umra Khan entering any portion of this country with his forces, Captain Younghusband should write him a letter couched in courteous and friendly terms, pointing out the disfavor with which such an act of aggression cannot fail to be viewed by the Government of India, and asking Umra Khan to withdraw from Chitral territory. If such a letter is ineffectual, or if Umra Khan acts on the pretence that he never received it, it is obviously impossible that the Chitralis should be prevented from defending their own country. It is, however, highly improbable, under existing circumstances, that, even if fighting actually occurred, and Umra Khan were victorious, he would extend his operations beyond the capturing of Drosh fort. That would almost certainly be the limit of his efforts. After making every possible effort to prevent the outbreak of a war, but yet failing in the endeavor. Captain Younghusband should content himself with preventing the possibility of any ……………………………………………………………………scene of conflict and should quietly wait in Chitral pending instructions from Gilgit. But it is to be hoped that, unless something unforeseen occurs to interfere with the present friendly relations between Umra Khan and the Government of India, such aggressive acts on the part of Umra Khan are practically impossible.

If the Mehtar of Chitral were to be assassinated, an unlikely contingency now there is no open rival in the field, Captain Younghusband must bear in mind that a king cannot be imposed on a country by an outside power, unless it is in a position to support him by force of arms. He should conse­quently do nothing, but strengthen his own defensive position in every way, observe the course of events, and send several urgent messages to announce the catastrophe at Gilgit.

He should treat the de facto Mehtar, whoever he may be, with every respect, but, with the utmost caution, should announce that he himself is a visitor and guest in the country, and has to await definite instructions from his superior authority before taking any steps in the way of formal official recognition of the new ruler.

He should ho very cautious about complying with any demand that he should leave the country; since that would involve his abandoning all his stores and food, besides placing himself at the mercy of a possible enemy in the difficult defiles and dangerous mountain paths, he must necessarily traverse on his way to Gilgit; he might possibly get no supplies on the road and be prevented from hiring transport. Should his position become absolutely untenable, he must take care to be provided with a sufficient number of hostages of a rank which will ensure the safety of himself and his party. These must be guarded strictly. But, as there will always be at least two or three months' provisions in the "Residency " besides plenty of ammunition, and, as our present position at Chitral is a fair defensive one, especially against local forces, Captain Young husband's best plan would be to remain where he is, strengthen his defences in every way, and wait for help from Gilgit.

Lastly, and most important of all, Captain Younghusband must never allow himself to be lulled into a false state of security, because the surface aspect of affairs is calm and unruffled. He must not suppose that Chitralis are of such simple character that they cannot keep a secret. The history of Sher Afzal's recent invasion must not be forgotten. The close proximity of a hot bed of fanaticism at Dir must always be borne in mind, as well as the ease with which small bodies of devoted fanatics can reach Chitral without observation, now all the passes and mountain tracts are opening. These considerations should compel both Captain Younghusband and Mr. Gordon to be always on their guard against possible surprises, and to be reasonably cautious in all work which takes them away from their house as well as in all
plans for sport and other recreation. They must never let it appear that they have cause for anxiety, but strict discipline should be maintained, and all proper military precautions carefully observed. They are responsible for an isolated body of Indian troops placed in the midst of a not unfriendly but fickle population, and surrounded by more or less untrustworthy tribes who, either from a desire to bring discredit and ruin on the Mehtar, or from motives of religious intolerance may, at any time be incited to attempt an outrage on the British officers or their Sikh guard.

It may be taken for granted that all their doings will be carefully watched, all their habits widely known. Any slackness in discipline or any carelessness in outside rambles may act as an incitement to a murderous attack which would not otherwise be attempted. The Chitral bazar will, during the ensuring months, be attempted. The Chitral bazar will, during the ensuing months, be thronged by traders and others from Asmar, Dir, and other districts, of many of these men nothing will be accurately known. Ordinary prudence which time is not allowed to deaden is alone necessary for an attempt at outrage, even if it were to be quite unsuccessful, would still in itself be a matter of very great regret. Mr. Gordon should carefully read and consider this memorandum as well as Captain Younghusband so that in the absence or during any illness of the latter officer, he would be prepared to on its suggestions.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA