From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir

Nizam as I have said before, evidently owed the success to his coming from Gilgit, and is incapable by himself of ruling the country or of remaining in it with Sher Afzal loose. The abolition of the old custom, of lining the road for miles with men who fired a feu de joie as a mission arrived, for fear of accidents, Nizam's anxiety for the safety of his life, and Wafadar Khan's depression, are very unpleasant incidents. But look to the news of Sher Afzal departure to 'Kabul to make a very marked difference.

There is, I trust, no danger of an outbreak, for there is no one to lead it, and with ample food, a good defensible house, and the people as opposed to the Adamzadas or headmen with us, I think there should be no cause for anxiety.

The question as to what Government is to do is a very serious one. I entire­ly share Robertson's views about Chitral; if we do not establish our hold the Russians will l am sick of the rubbish which one hears as to their not moving and meaning no harm. Every year they advance, and will advance until they find the point where a further advance really means war with us. I should consider any Russian Commander on the Pamirs a fool who, if we do not establish a hold on Chitral, missed or did not make an opportunity for occupying the Mustuj Valley and Chitral itself he would be backed, and we must either sit down and be prepared to treble out garrisons here, to say nothing of the effect on the Peshawar frontier, or go to war on what might seem in adequate grounds. We know thoroughly well that for years the. Russians have had an eye on Chitral. They meant to establish themselves Hunza, and were forestalled just in time they are casting their eyes on Chitral, and should equally find the door barred there.

As to the possibilities of holding these countries with small garrisons if properly entrenched, my views are identical with Robertson's. Very few men go a long way here the tribes of the Hindu Kush are no gluttons at fighting, and will not face us in the open, or attack us if in fortified positions. We have a hold on Yasin now, which should in my opinion never be allowed to pass out of our hands. We might with equal ease establish a hold on Chitral.

As to the numbers necessary, I think a brigade is perhaps too much to ask for but that we must increase the garrison here by a couple of our own regiments, I have no doubt if we are to rivet our hold on Chitral. The Indus Valley to Chilas we are, I think, bound to maintain possession of, and we cannot do all that is now required with three weak Kashmir regiments.

In Chitral we have as we know in our hands the old Kushwakht kingdom and a moiety of the Chitralis, given a year of so of practical occupation we shall have an increasing number of headmen and people with us.

I am quite as prepared, as Robertson is, when the time comes official suggestions, to be called an extravagant alarmist propounding of territorial aggrandizement baaed largely on personal ambition frontier officer here must be prepared for that, but no fear of this kind will make either of us alter our opinions to suit anybody else's.

I forward this letter and Robertson's therefore for your information and that of the Foreign Secretary for the question must be faced sooner or later.

No. 10, dated Chitral, the 25^th January, 1893 (demi-official)

From - G.S. Robertson, Esq., C.S.I.

To - Lieutenant-Colonel, A.G. Durand, G.R.

I have not ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ...................... ......................

His anxiety to get a mission sent him was simply because, unless it were sent speedily, he could not possibly remain in Chitral during the winter.

On our arrival here to-day we found Nizam, Wafadar & Co. terribly depressed looking. Our reception though ambitious was tame and flat compared with those in Aman-ul-Mulk's time.

It was not considered advisable to have musketry firing from fear of "accidents," and while the shooting at the mark was going on, Nizam reined his horse back into the crowd behind me his in have been because his horse would not stand fire, but Bruce, who was watching him thought it was done from prudential motives an opinion tire Jamadar also shared.

Everyone was respectful and polite to me, but I am far from satisfied with the look of things.

There is little or no food in the country; everyone is said to be on short commons; there is no money in the fort, and the place has been looted of all available property, partly by Sher Afzal, but chiefly by the Chitrali headmen themselves.

The worst feature in the case is, however, the quiet and self-satisfied way in which the known adherents of Sher Afzal stroll about. They have most of the Snider rifles and ammunition in their possession.

The country may be said to be divided into two parties. The Sher Afzal faction includes the great majority of the Adamzadas, the Mullas, and the Mughli Pirs. Tim other, which may be called the English faction, comprises most of the poorer classes as well as those people who may be bought, a considerable number in all ranks, as you are well aware. With this last party, Nizam seems to Le largely regarded as a mere puppet in our hands.

The Jamadar believes that were Sher Afzal to make another attempt upon Chitral, Nizam would be at once killed by the people here, and British officers, if they were with him, would have more than enough to do to save their, own lives, unless they were protected by an escort very much larger than the one we have lie takes, as you may perceive, the most gloomy views of the situation.

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