Gdi 2011 Gemini Lab China qpq cp



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Say no – Space


China would never agree - space weapons are its asymmetrical response to U.S military superiority.
Uhalley 7 (Stephen, Analyst specializing in Chinese foreign affairs for the Hoover Institution at Stanford, " A China-U.S. Space Arms Race?" www.ccny.cuny.edu/aacs/.../Uhalley_Steve_Space-Arms-Race-Paper.doc, AD 7/1/11) AV

As is well known, the Chinese have been building their military capability for years. They are deeply concerned about American military superiority, something that for all the cash and determination China is unlikely to match head to head for decades. Thus Beijing focuses on an asymmetrical response, going for the dominant power’s Achilles’ heel, even as it concurrently expands its naval (particularly submarine) and aerospace capabilities. Knowing that American military effectiveness depends on certain space assets, they seek to neutralize these. In the event of a military conflict with the United States, possibly over Taiwan, Beijing thus might consider putting out of commission key American satellites, or at least suggest a credible threat that they might do so. Obviously, this possibility does now complicate the Taiwan Strait equation, affecting the calculus that determines what Washington is to do if Taiwan is attacked. China’s overall idea, it would appear, is to have a two-pronged approach in dealing with American dominance in space. One approach is to develop space weaponry of its own that can be used against American satellites. At the same time, it seeks diplomatically to maneuver the United States into a legal framework that would prevent Americans from developing the space assets or weapons necessary for adequate defense. At least, this latter prong is rhetorically present, and pushed, even if the Chinese themselves might actually have reservations about having restraints placed on what they might do in space. In this regard, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley Tellis argues: “The importance of space denial for China’s operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power.” Hence, he believes, “Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities.” In the event, finding itself in a very awkward situation, the Chinese government has decided not to provide any explanation of the ASAT test, probably because to do so would lead to further uncomfortable questions. It also recognizes that silence has its own eloquence. It has, after all, made an unmistakable statement regarding its capability to shoot down a satellite, and with greater precision than simply detonating a nuclear device in space. It can be seen, at base, a challenge to American dominance in space, in keeping with a tradition of possessing at least a modest deterrence capability. As Eric Hagt has plausibly pointed out, “It was a deliberate and strategic, but also defensive, act.”


Say no – Space


China doesn’t care about diplomacy – all they want is to challenge the U.S.
Clark 9 (Dereck, Military Studies @ Hawaii Univ., 9-18, http://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/Graduate%20Degree/MADMS%20Theses/files/2/Dereck_A_ClarkThe_Great_Leap_Upward_HPU_Masters_Thesis.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG)

For years, China has publicly spoken out against the militarization of space and has been a proponent of a treaty' that would prevent the weaponization of space by the U.S. and all other space-faring nations. Whether or not the Chinese are sincere in their public statements and diplomatic efforts regarding this issue is yet to be determined. However, China's pursuit of a multi-dimensional counter-space arsenal, their 2007 test of a kinetic kill ASAT weapon, and their overall lack of transparency surrounding military applications of their space program makes four points abundantly clear that their public diplomatic initiatives do not: 1.) China views the space domain as the high-ground where aspects of all future conflicts will take place and is actively' preparing for this reality': 2.) China views the U.S. as dependent on its space systems as a facilitator of its military advantages and has highlighted this as an Achilles heel that must be exploited in any future war with the U.S. involving space assets; 3.) China has singled out the U.S. as its most likely and its most formidable opponent in any future space war and consequently, U.S. dominance in space is threatened as never before: 4.) As China's interests and capabilities in space continue to grow, it will look to develop ways to protect its interests and reduce its own growing vulnerabilities. As a result of this reality and after a decade of U.S. attempts to frustrate China's military space capabilities, it appears these attempts have reached a critical point of failure.
China will say no – change in arms control policy and unreliable decision-making
Cheng 7 (Dean, Senior Asia Analyst @ CAN , Feb., http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/frv07v02.pdf, accessed 7-1, JG)

Questions about Chinese Decision-Making. Beyond purely military concerns, the Chinese handling of the ASAT test underscores how little we understand China’s decision-making processes, despite nearly thirty years of interaction. It is probably excessive to suggest, as some have, that the hesitant Chinese diplomatic response indicates a “rogue PLA,” acting on its own accord. The PLA’s 2006 Defence White Paper, unlike the 2002 and 2004 editions, made no mention of the PRC’s efforts at the United Nations to forestall space weaponization and militarization. Such an omission would not be made lightly, and suggests that the decision to undertake ASAT tests was reached sometime in advance, and was known to the top PRC leadership.


China is opposing the United States – no reason they would give up their weapons
EASR 8 (East Asian Strategic Review, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2008/east-asian_e2008_01.pdf , accessed 7-1, JG)

Today China appears determined to become a center of resistance against the United States, the post-Cold War world’s leader in many arenas. This opposition is seen in not only China’s economic activities, but also its national security efforts. Having minutely analyzed the United States’ current strengths and weaknesses, China is endeavoring to narrow its gap with US capabilities in established weapons systems by exploring such possibilities as construction of an aircraft carrier and reinforcement of its nuclear capabilities. At the same time, China is building up its cyber war capabilities. China is also countering US dominance in security-related space activities by developing technologies to exploit the vulnerabilities of US space assets. This capability was amply demonstrated by the success of the anti-satellite test described earlier. China’s resistance is further manifested in its proactive involvement in the Galileo Project, the European program aimed at developing a navigation satellite system that will not rely on the United States’ GPS. As such, the project serves as an opportunity for China to deepen its ties with Europe while challenging US supremacy. Moreover, China is carrying out its own initiatives, such as the Beidou system mentioned earlier. It also appears to be enhancing its optical reconnaissance satellites and developing SAR reconnaissance satellites; these projects, if successfully realized, will allow China to dramatically improve its capabilities in space asset use and space-based information gathering.




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